I don't understand "belongs to the order of the intelligible." — Xtrix

I mean exactly what Kant says:

"Appearances, insofar as they are thought as objects according to the unity of the categories, are called phenomena. But if I assume things that are objects merely of the understanding and that, as such, can nonetheless be given to an intuition--even if not to sensible intuition - then such things would be called noumena (intelligibilia)" (A249)

"If, on the other hand, by merely intelligible objects we mean merely objects of a nonsensible intuition-objects for which, to be sure, our categories do not hold and of which therefore we can never have any cognition at all (neither intuition nor concept) - then noumena in this merely negative signification must indeed be admitted". (A286/B343)

Noumena are intelligible objects: they belong to intelligibility (as distinct from sensibility), and thus to the understanding. More specifically, noumena are intelligible objects that are not sensible, hence why the mark the limit of the sensible, and hence why so-called 'positive noumena' would be the same as objects of intellectual intuition.

--

One way I like to think of it is as the difference between not-X (noumena) and not X (thing-in-itself). Not-X is determinate: if you draw a Venn diagram of X and not-X, not-X is everything X is not. They are mutually exhaustive. This is the case with phenomena and noumena. All that is phenomena is not noumena and vice versa. On the other hand, not X (thing-in-itself) is simply something else: Not X is not defined by it's relation to X: the only thing you know of it is that it isn't X. The TII is like this: it is not defined in relation to the phenomenal.

In simple language, if I ask you what you are looking for and you tell me 'not that' (and point to something), it could be anything ("whatever it is, it isn't that"). But if you tell me 'not-that', you mean something quite specific: you mean every other thing that isn't that thing you just pointed to. tTII and noumena relate negatively to the transcendental in just these ways, respectively.

Remove intuition and there is nothing to say, yet to refer to some item, any item - be it of thought or knowledge - must necessarily mean there is an attachment to sensibility and intuition (space and time) — I like sushi

If this is true, we have no account for justice, beauty, mathematics, or anything that does not have an object strictly of its own. We think justice only by means of things being relatively just, those things being in space and time. But the thing said to be just isn’t justice itself, justice being merely a judgement.
——————

The number one is only given as a concept via sensibility — I like sushi

True enough, but we could never conceive the number one if not first having the concept of quantity. We only use numbers because, e.g, we look at our hands and see there are many little thingys sticking out of them. In the same way, we see a snowflake melt, and iff we ask....how did that happen, we’ve already presupposed there was a reason. Which gives us the principle of cause and effect a priori in understanding. Even if we don’t know why, we know there must be a why....because we watched something happen.
—————-

There is no ‘chair in and of itself’ and there is no ‘thing in and of itself’, there is phenomenon that is given through sensible experience due to limitation. — I like sushi

Do you see that you’ve named something in the former, but not in the latter? If you name a thing a chair, you’ve cognized what was once a mere thing of sense, into an object known as a specific thing. So there is a chair in and of itself, because you said so. Before you named it, before you did all the mind stuff, when it was nothing but some thing you perceived, it was merely a thing-in-itself with no name.
—————-

The relevance to the thread here is likely the miscasting of what can reasonably be called ‘outer’ that isn’t a merely anything but ‘inner’. — I like sushi

Well said.

Good post.

we don't represent black holes with an image of black holes.
— frank

Sure we do; in no other way can we cognize them, in order to talk about them. The images are indirect representations, therefore possibly false, but images nonetheless. — Mww

I'm pretty sure you're interpreting Kant as an indirect realist.

More specifically, noumena are intelligible objects that are not sensible — StreetlightX

OK. Examples of such intelligible objects would be what exactly? And whatever is given as an example, is this not therefore phenomenal (as objects)? I see the difference being made between understanding and sensibility, but my point is that it's completely irrelevant. Why? Because both the noumenon and the thing in itself are unknowns -- in any way other than that they're unknown. If you're arguing one is known in some other way, then it's no longer unknown.

and the thing-in-itself is given no reality when it is actual quite real.
— Mww

"Real" in what sense exactly? — Xtrix

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it.

That aliens could see it differently from our perceptions? — Xtrix

Dunno. Maybe. Maybe not. depends on how alien they are.
————-

That's such a misreading of Kant. But have it your way. — Xtrix

Thanks. I think I will, doncha know.

“...as to other thinking beings, we cannot judge whether they are or are not bound by the same conditions which limit our own intuition...”

As is the thing-in-itself. — Xtrix

The thing in itself isn't generated by our faculties limits, or anything to do with us, rather it's that which generates whatever appears to us; in order for us to grasp something with a sensible intuition, there has to be a certain movement in the thing in itself that facilitates the generation of appearances in us. The thing in itself being necessary but not sufficient for our appearances.

...though we cannot know (sensibility + cognition) these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think (thought) them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears. — CoPR

Moreover, it's helpful to mark the boundary between the capacities of our representation and the objects represented. We can have this as a concept without there being any sensible intuition associated with it.

Further, the concept of a noumenon is necessary, to prevent sensible intuition from being extended to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible knowledge — CoPR

So the noumenon functions as the name of the limit of applicability of sensible intuition; it's about the limit of our subject's faculties; the thing-in-itself is about things conceptualised apart from how they embed in sensible intuition. The distinction between boundary (noumenon) and what lays outside the boundary (thing in itself), what lays within the boundary are phenomena and appearances.

Kant is an indirect realist, if such be synonymous with being a representationalist. His entire academic catalog is dedicated to a representational human epistemological and moral system.

He calls himself a transcendental realist, in order to grant Hume his empiricism, but also to add the faculty of pure reason to it, as a supplementary, but no less necessary, human condition.

The importance of the distinction as I understand it lies in Kant's desire to remain a certain kind of realist (an 'empirical realist', as he famously calls himself). As is well known, Kant is keen to distinguish himself from idealism of Berkeley, and does so precisely by positing the thing-in-itself which gives rise to appearance. The importance of the fact that the TII is not relative to us (or to our transcendental constitution) means that in some way, the universe exists 'out there' regardless of whether we are there to cognize it or not.

If, on the other hand, the TII were merely 'for us' in the way that noumena are (noumena are 'faculty-relative' - not-X, rather than not X), then Kant cannot in good conscience call himself a realist. It would simply be the limit of a faculty (which already belongs to the transcendental subject), that would itself make the subject finite, and not the universe 'out there' which outruns any conditions of possibility of knowledge. The distinction has bearing on the status of the transcendental subject: it tells us something about its (our) place in the cosmos, as it were. @fdrake's explanation is, I believe, pretty much along the same lines.

Examples of such intelligible objects would be what exactly? — Xtrix

God, soul, Universe as Totality... It can be thought, but not known. It is thought as a mere boundary of what I cannot know. My intelect push me to it, but knowledge fails because only phenomena can be known.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through a pure understanding), is not at all contradictory; for one cannot assert of sensibility that it is the only possible kind of intuition. Further, this concept [noumenon] is necessary in order not to extend sensible intuition to things in themselves, and thus to limit the objective validity of sensible cognition(...) . In the end, however, we have no insight into the possibility of such noumena, and the domain outside of the sphere of appearances is empty (for us)(...)The concept of a noumenonf is therefore merely a boundary concept, in order to limit the pretension of sensibility, and therefore only of negative use". (Kant, Op. cit. p. 362)

I think Kant is clear here.

Kant is an indirect realist, if such be synonymous with being a representationalist. His entire academic catalog is dedicated to a representational human epistemological and moral system.

He calls himself a transcendental realist, in order to grant Hume his empiricism, but also to add the faculty of pure reason to it, as a supplementary, but no less necessary, human condition. — Mww

I feel things gearing up toward a conflict about "what Kant really meant."

I'll just leave it at this; what Xtrix has been saying is a common interpretation which has the benefit of solving the problem of induction, which is something indirect realism can't do.

Whatever you may think of this interpretation, it deserves a nod for its prevalence and effectiveness.

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it. — Mww

Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either.

The thing in itself isn't generated by our faculties limits, or anything to do with us, rather it's that which generates whatever appears to us — fdrake

So the thing in itself is what's represented, though we don't know what it is "in itself." Fine. Either the same is true of noumena, or else noumena are representations of some kind, which would make them phenomena. If noumena are something in between, it's not been demonstrated here.

The distinction between boundary (noumenon) and what lays outside the boundary (thing in itself), what lays within the boundary are phenomena and appearances. — fdrake

"Distinction between the boundary" is meaningless to me. There's phenomena and noumena, in my reading. In yours, there's phenomena, noumena, and the thing in itself. Fine. But I'm not seeing it in anything that's been quoted from Kant so far.

The importance of the distinction as I understand it lies in Kant's desire to remain a certain kind of realist (an 'empirical realist', as he famously calls himself). As is well known, Kant is keen to distinguish himself from idealism of Berkeley, and does so precisely by positing the thing-in-itself which gives rise to appearance. The importance of the fact that the TII is not relative to us (or to our transcendental constitution) means that in some way, the universe exists 'out there' regardless of whether we are there to cognize it or not. — StreetlightX

Sure. What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. If noumenon is used as word for the "boundary" between phenomena and the thing-in-itself, I'm just not yet convinced by that. Kant, in many passages, also clearly links both the noumenon and the thing in itself -- one passage was already cited earlier. It would be hard to square the two interpretations.

Maybe I'm just hopeless, but I'm still not understanding exactly where noumena are supposed to fit in your (and others') readings.

God, soul, Universe as Totality... It can be thought, but not known. It is thought as a mere boundary of what I cannot know. My intelect push me to it, but knowledge fails because only phenomena can be known. — David Mo

Things we think aren't phenomena? "God" and "soul" and the "Universe" are not phenomena or knowledge? Than how can you speak about them at all?

If you're not including thoughts as phenomena, I don't agree with that at all. If Kant says that somewhere I missed, I think it's just a mistake.

I read the exact quotation and yet I don't see your point. Kant is discussing the limits of what we can know and is equating the thing-in-itself with the noumenon in that passage, in my reading. It's actually a little baffling that you you interpret it as supporting you, but so it goes.

What's another word for thinking about an object not as one of the senses but of a thing-in-itself? Answer: noumenon.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself[...]"

Seems pretty clear here.

Just saw this:

Many accounts of Kant's philosophy treat "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" as synonymous, and there is textual evidence for this relationship.[14] However, Stephen Palmquist holds that "noumenon" and "thing-in-itself" are only loosely synonymous, inasmuch as they represent the same concept viewed from two different perspectives,[15][16] and other scholars also argue that they are not identical.[17] Schopenhauer criticised Kant for changing the meaning of "noumenon". However, this opinion is far from unanimous.[18] Kant's writings show points of difference between noumena and things-in-themselves. For instance, he regards things-in-themselves as existing:

...though we cannot know these objects as things in themselves, we must yet be in a position at least to think them as things in themselves; otherwise we should be landed in the absurd conclusion that there can be appearance without anything that appears.[19]

He is much more doubtful about noumena:

But in that case a noumenon is not for our understanding a special [kind of] object, namely, an intelligible object; the [sort of] understanding to which it might belong is itself a problem. For we cannot in the least represent to ourselves the possibility of an understanding which should know its object, not discursively through categories, but intuitively in a non-sensible intuition.[20]

A crucial difference between the noumenon and the thing-in-itself is that to call something a noumenon is to claim a kind of knowledge, whereas Kant insisted that the thing-in-itself is unknowable. Interpreters have debated whether the latter claim makes sense: it seems to imply that we know at least one thing about the thing-in-itself (i.e., that it is unknowable). But Stephen Palmquist explains that this is part of Kant's definition of the term, to the extent that anyone who claims to have found a way of making the thing-in-itself knowable must be adopting a non-Kantian position.[21]

So, again, it's more controversial than I thought. But I'm still not seeing much textual evidence to support many of the claims being made here.

It exists. It must, or we would have no perception of it.
— Mww

Then in this sense both thing-in-itself and noumenon exists, otherwise we wouldn't say anything about either. Although to use "perception" is misleading -- we don't strictly perceive either. — Xtrix

“...objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility...”

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. Things-in-themselves are unknown to us.

That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence.

We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it.

(1)

Representations of our sensibility is an affect on our senses. An affect on our senses is a perception. A perception requires what we call an outward object. Outward objects are outward things. — Mww

Ok, sure.

(2)

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. — Mww

Of course.

Here's where you make the jump I just am not seeing:

Outward objects in themselves are perceived. things-in-themselves are perceived. — Mww

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this.

If something is perceived, it's phenomena. To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. Kant's postulating something that may be "outside" our representations, apart from spatial and temporal forms. This is what "in itself" means -- in itself as opposed to the forms of our knowing anything (in space and time). Sensations, and hence perceptions, are spatial and temporal, and hence representation, and hence phenomena. So we can't "sense" the thing-in-itself, we can't "perceive" it, we can't "know" it. This is why the concept of thing-in-itself has been so controversial for so long.

Human beings have scope and limits, and the thing in itself has always appeared to me to mean simply whatever there is outside this scope.

That which is merely perceived is unknown to us. — Mww

You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid.

That which is conceived can be talked about. To be conceived does not require existence. — Mww

Sure.

We perceive the thing-in itself. We don’t perceive noumena because there is nothing in the human faculty of representation that allows for it. — Mww

In my reading we don't strictly perceive either. Our perceptions, our representations on the occasion of sense, are phenomena. What's represented apart from our spatial-temporal "cognoscitive powers" is noumenon, the thing-in-itself. We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it -- what we perceive is whatever shows up for us in time and space: representations. You see what I'm saying?

If you're just using "perception" in the same way I'm using "representation," then sure, representations of something makes sense -- but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself."

Again, I think your own passage says it nicely:

objects are quite unknown to us in themselves, and what we call outward objects, are nothing else but mere representations of our sensibility... — Mww

(1) Outward objects = representations of our sensibilities.
(2) Objects in themselves = quite unknown. (Notice he doesn't say they're "unknown, yet we perceive them." That would make them representations of our sensibilities [1].)

Now what about "inner objects" like thoughts and the like? Maybe this is what you're getting at. I would argue they're phenomena as well, but perhaps that's off topic.

What I'm failing to see is where noumena play a role if they're not representations and not the thing-in-itself. — Xtrix

“...But there is one advantage in such transcendental inquiries which can be made comprehensible to the dullest and most reluctant learner—this, namely, that the understanding which is occupied merely with empirical exercise, and does not reflect on the sources of its own cognition, may exercise its functions very well and very successfully, but is quite unable to do one thing, and that of very great importance, to determine, namely, the bounds that limit its employment, and to know what lies within or without its own sphere....”

Yadda yadda yadda...transcedentally generated, empirically employed, this and that....

“...But we are met at the very commencement with an ambiguity, which may easily occasion great misapprehension. The understanding, when it terms an object in a certain relation phenomenon, at the same time forms out of this relation a representation or notion of an object in itself, and hence believes that it can form also conceptions of such objects. Now as the understanding possesses no other fundamental conceptions besides the categories, it takes for granted that an object considered as a thing in itself must be capable of being thought by means of these pure conceptions, and is thereby led to hold the perfectly undetermined conception of an intelligible existence (noumenon), a something out of the sphere of our sensibility, for a determinate conception of an existence which we can cognize in some way or other by means of the understanding....”

Phenomena are the only “input” to understanding, to which are synthesized concepts and from which cognitions are the “output”. Understanding thinks....

(“...understanding cannot intuit and intuition cannot think, neither of these can be exchanged....”)

......of phenomena as an object in the same way imagination treats an appearance. Imagination synthesizes appearance with intuition to give phenomena....

(“....undetermined object of empirical intuition...”)

.......understanding says....hey I can do that. I’m just gonna synthesize phenomena, the object in a certain relation I think of as an object in itself, with conceptions and get me, not the undetermined object of empirical intuition, but rather, the undetermined conception of an intelligible existence, thereby cognizable in some way.

Whoa, hoss. Two things, yo.
1.) The only concepts understanding can use in its synthesizing are the categories, which are already claimed in the synthesis with empirical real objects, in order to get cognitions. Therefore, the categories won’t fit and the intelligible existence is illegitimate, and,
2.) You can’t go changing a phenomenon into an object in itself. You have no ground to do that, And just because you can doesn’t mean you should.

No...you whoa hoss. If I can think it, it must be conceivable.
(Yeah, conceivable, but nothing can be done with. No cognition, no experience, no knowledge....zip, nada.)
——————-

So you see, boys and girls, what happens when a big-shot faculty gets too big for his britches.

( I made all that up. Made perfect sense at the time.)

You quoted me in this post, but don't address noumena at all -- which is what I was questioning. I appreciate the attempt, and don't want to be accused of "cantankerousness," but I still fail to see what role the noumenon plays if it's not representations and not the thing-in-itself.

The cantankerous one is very much correct. That doesn’t stop them being a needless impolite and obnoxious person. — I like sushi

I don't think this characterization of me is altogether just, but I guess that's neither here nor there.

"it also follows naturally from the concept of an appearance in general that something must correspond to it which is not in itself appearance, for appearance can be nothing for itself and outside of our kind of representation; thus, if there is not to be a constant circle, the word "appearance" must already indicate a relation to something the immediate representation of which is, to be sure, sensible, but which in itself, without this constitution of our sensibility (on which the form of our intuition is grounded), must be something, i.e., an object independent of sensibility. Now from this arises the concept of a noumenon, which, however, is not at all positive and does not signify a determinate cognition of something in general, in which I abstract from all form of sensible intuition". (A251–2) — David Mo

(My italics)

Exactly right.

Outward objects in themselves are things-in-themselves. What we perceive -- our representations, our sensations in time and space -- are phenomena. You grant this. — Xtrix

No, I do not grant that what we perceive are representations. Or, if I said something to that effect, then I shall go beat myself up.

One needs to keep in mind perception actually is nothing but reception of incoming empirical data. If incoming data, not in but incoming, are representations, how were they created? We can say how representations are created on the backside of sense organs, but we cannot use the equipment from the inside of us to create representation on the outside of us. Inside, everything relates to something, on the outside, what would data relate to except other data, which tells us nothing.
——————-

That which is merely perceived is unknown to us.
— Mww

You just said perception is an affect of our sensations, of our senses. Some sensations and perceptions are "unknown"? I still don't see your point I'm afraid. — Xtrix

An affect on our senses, not of. It isn’t that perceptions are unknown, as in we don’t know we have been affected. We don’t know what we’ve been affected by.

Try this: incoming data is information in certain forms of energy. The output of the sense organs is still energy, but a different form. The translation from one to the other is unknown to us, but it must have happened, because we did perceive something. What we perceived needs more equipment doing different things, just as e.g., the optic nerves are different than the rods and cones.
—————-

We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it — Xtrix

Thing is...to say we have no knowledge is to say we have no experience. But we often perceive things of which we have no experience, every time we learn something new. Or just a loud bang from around the corner caused by something not known. So the lack of knowledge, or, experience, cannot be the reason we don’t perceive noumena. Either noumena just aren’t there to be perceived, or there is no such thing as noumena to be perceived.
——————

If something is perceived, it's phenomena. — Xtrix

Not yet. If something is perceived, it will be a phenomenon. It isn’t phenomenon merely by being an affect on the senses. That is sensation and tells us something has appeared to the faculty of representation.
—————-

To say the thing in itself is perceived is therefore saying it's a phenomenon or representation of some kind. It's not. — Xtrix

Correct. It’s not. See above. The thing-in-itself perceived is just another something perceived. Same-o, same-o. See waaaayyyy above: object in itself equals thing-in-itself, and we certainly perceive objects, so.......

Don’t forget. We cognize representations, not things. There’s no contradiction in allowing things-in-themselves to be the objects of perception, because they have nothing to do with the system, other than to kick-start it.
——————-

but we have no idea what that something is, and as soon as we try to attribute to it any property whatsoever we're assigning to it something spatial-temporal -- that's the whole point of bringing in the "in itself." — Xtrix

We can’t have an empty object affect us. How would we know we’d been affected? We have no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. That doesn’t mean we don’t know anything about the thing that affected us. We are given an object, that object must have characteristics of some kind which show up in its appearance.

Then the fun begins!!!

Imagination pulls intuitions out of consciousness, throws them at the appearance, finds out what sticks. Experience helps by telling imagination it can pull a narrower range of intuitions. Whenever imagination is all happy, it gives understanding...the faculty that thinks....a phenomenon. Understanding thinks whether its conceptions match the intuitions experience says belongs to the phenomenon......

( yep....wood, paint, wheels....all cool.)

....then thinks the pure conceptions, the ones understanding possesses regardless of phenomenon, and thinks a phenomenon must have regardless of any of its empirical properties......

(Does the phenomenon have shape? Can the phenomenon be a cause or an effect? Is the phenomenon even possible? Oh oh. No, the phenomenon has been imagined as having wings. In light of the manifold of intuitions imagined, that contradicts experience, this object is not possible. Scratch the wings)

......and if the phenomenon meets the criteria, it is judged as a proper cognizable object with a name, and “soapbox racer” becomes knowledge.

So you see, we don’t bring in the “in-itself”; we only bring in the thing. The in-itself is determined by its own nature, not ours. What we don’t know, and is impossible to ever know, is whether the nature of the thing-in-itself attributes to the thing, the same properties we think the thing has.

And this says nothing about a priori cognitions. Well....lemme tell ya all about....wha? No? Too much?

The most spectacular reference is quantum mechanics, where the act of measuring creates the measured. — David Mo

That's an interesting statement in the context of this thread. The relevant question is whether it points to a subject/object duality or to an underlying symmetry. That is the measurement problem.

But even in relativity, there is still an objective truth. Space and time may distort relative to an observer, but a spacetime interval is the same for all observers. Simultaneity may be relative to an observer, but cause and effect are still the same for all observers. And the impetus behind all of that, the speed of light is the same for all observers: all the things that are relative are reasoned to be so because they must be in order to account for the speed of light being an objective, non-relative value. — Pfhorrest

Yes. So I'd just like to note the symmetry here with respect to observers. The train has a velocity relative to the platform or, symmetrically, the platform has a velocity relative to the train. No subject/object duality is implied.

No, I do not grant that what we perceive are representations. — Mww

This is baffling to me, but OK...

One needs to keep in mind perception actually is nothing but reception of incoming empirical data. If incoming data, not in but incoming, are representations, how were they created? We can say how representations are created on the backside of sense organs, but we cannot use the equipment from the inside of us to create representation on the outside of us. Inside, everything relates to something, on the outside, what would data relate to except other data, which tells us nothing. — Mww

The incoming stimuli, our sensations, are data, yes. The second they hit the sense organs, they become representations to us, unless you argue that what effects us from "outside" corresponds exactly to what we sense, perceive, etc. That's fine, but it's not Kant. So how are representations created? By the brain and nervous system on the "occasion of sense," through our cognitive faculty. Whatever our representations are representations of, outside of our cognitions, is the thing in itself. Things in themselves are what is represented to us, but because we are bounded by space and time, there's nothing whatever to say about them (or it).

Saying we can't create representations "outside of us" is not true -- there's all kinds of things outside me: trees, books, rivers, anything at all. Who said representations are limited to "internal" things like feelings or thoughts? If that's not what you're saying, OK, but then surely you admit trees aren't "internal" -- and if you do, then everything we can know or talk about is technically "internal", bounded by our skin so to speak, and so the "internal/external" or "inside/outside" distinction is useless.

An affect on our senses, not of. It isn’t that perceptions are unknown, as in we don’t know we have been affected. We don’t know what we’ve been affected by. — Mww

We don't know what we've been affected by in themselves, you mean? We certainly know what we've been affected by otherwise -- as objects in space and time; our representations. I already granted we don't know what our sensations or representations are of in themselves, apart from our spatial-temporal boundedness.

Try this: incoming data is information in certain forms of energy. The output of the sense organs is still energy, but a different form. — Mww

This is saying the same basic thing, yes. And I agree. But the "different form" is our representations -- how we experience the world, bounded by our brain and nervous system.

We don't perceive it, because we have no knowledge of it
— Xtrix

Thing is...to say we have no knowledge is to say we have no experience. — Mww

You're right. We don't experience the thing-in-itself either. Experience is bounded by space and time.

But we often perceive things of which we have no experience, every time we learn something new. — Mww

That's not using experience the way I'm using it here, of course. I mean human experience in general, not, say, an "experienced doctor." The forms of any experience whatsoever is space and time. Anything we experience at all will be experienced in this way. Thus, to say we have experience of the thing in itself isn't correct.

Not yet. If something is perceived, it will be a phenomenon. It isn’t phenomenon merely by being an affect on the senses. That is sensation and tells us something has appeared to the faculty of representation. — Mww

Ok, you're using the term in a different way from me. I consider sensations to be phenomena. What would it be prior to "becoming" phenomena, exactly? How do we know we even have sensations at all "before" they become phenomena. Either something is experienced (as phenomena of experience) or it isn't. I don't understand these extra steps you seem to put in. Doesn't make much sense to me.

Correct. It’s not. See above. The thing-in-itself perceived is just another something perceived. Same-o, same-o. See waaaayyyy above: object in itself equals thing-in-itself, and we certainly perceive objects, so....... — Mww

Yes, we perceive objects. We don't perceive objects in themselves. I don't know what that would mean. How can we perceive an object that isn't spatial or temporal? What would it look like? What properties does it have? We don't know, because we can't say a thing about it. We can certainly say plenty about objects -- as objects of our sensations and perceptions, and thus representations.

I think this stems from the above and not using sensation and perception in the same way I am. Again, I consider them phenomena, and by phenomena I mean literally anything experienceable. Out experiences are bounded, again, by space and time. Thus, whatever else sensations, perceptions, phenomena, etc. are outside of these forms we really cannot experience or perceive in any way. That would be the thing-in-itself. it's almost a matter of logic.

Don’t forget. We cognize representations, not things. There’s no contradiction in allowing things-in-themselves to be the objects of perception, because they have nothing to do with the system, other than to kick-start it. — Mww

That's exactly what I think, yes -- it's a contradiction. I don't see how "things" and "representations" are different. Things-in-themselves (thus outside our spatial-temporal modes of experience) is a different story.

We can’t have an empty object affect us. How would we know we’d been affected? We have no knowledge of a thing as it is in itself. That doesn’t mean we don’t know anything about the thing that affected us. We are given an object, that object must have characteristics of some kind which show up in its appearance. — Mww

Of course it has characteristics -- in space and in time. A weight, a mass, color, shape, a quality of feeling, etc. We know we're affected because we experience things, as representations -- not in themselves. So whatever affects us certainly isn't empty to us -- it's any object at all, and not just trees and books but feelings, emotions, pains, thoughts, etc. Anything else whatever is the thing in itself, which you admit is not knowable. There isn't a third realm between knowable and unknowable, in my view -- or between experience and nothing, or between life and death. There's one or the other.

You almost seem to be saying there's an object out there affecting us that isn't yet a phenomenon but isn't empty, and that we can still know something about. I still have no idea what this means.

No, the phenomenon has been imagined as having wings. In light of the manifold of intuitions imagined, that contradicts experience, this object is not possible. Scratch the wings) — Mww

Imagining a pink unicorn is still an idea, yes? Imagination is an experience as well, bounded by our human limits. That's still part of phenomenology.

:up: Finally someone sees that, and clearly explains how, Mww gets it right!

Please explain why he gets it right, by all means.

"The concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself[...]

Putting it very simply and in a way that Kant may not have specifically explained it: a noumenon is the idea of an idea; the concept of something beyond our (sensible) knowledge; an idea of the in itself. A thing in itself is the idea of an actuality beyond not merely our knowledge, but our very ideas.

This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings.

Putting it very simply and in a way that Kant may not have specifically explained it: a noumenon is the idea of an idea; the concept of something beyond our (sensible) knowledge; an idea of the in itself. A thing in itself is the idea of an actuality beyond not merely our knowledge, but our very ideas. — Janus

So they're both "ideas"? This seems so riddled with confusion I really don't know how to respond. But if it makes sense to you, you're a smarter guy than me.

This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings. — Janus

I certainly agree.

This shit is all very hard to speak coherently about: hence the disagreements and misunderstandings. — Janus

Key point! It is not really worth claiming this or that is ‘correct’ when it comes to interpreting Kant. The great value is in understanding why and how different interpretations exist.

The reason I always recommend this work to anyone with any serious regard for philosophy is precisely for this reason - it forces you to question your own position and come to understand other positions.

Complete agreement about what Kant meant is not necessary. Taking onboard different views surrounding Kant is an extremely fruitful and intriguing exploration.

Picture, Canvas and Paint would be a decent analogy.

The Picture painted only exists due to Paint and Canvas. We cannot see the Picture if only one or the other is present. We need both to acquire ‘knowledge’ - the question is more or less about the limit of inference.

Maybe I'm just hopeless, but I'm still not understanding exactly where noumena are supposed to fit in your (and others') readings. — Xtrix

I'm not sure how else to explain it that hasn't already: noumena mark a limit of sensibility.

Perhaps one source of confusion is the asymmetry between noumena and the things-in-themselves: it's true that noumena are thing-in-themselves, but the converse does not hold. One might say: noumena are things-in-themselves under the aspect of the transcendental subject. However, get rid of the transcendental subject, and one similarly 'gets rid' of noumena - but not things-in-themselves, which are subject-independant.

One might say: noumena are things-in-themselves under the aspect of the transcendental subject. However, get rid of the transcendental subject, and one similarly 'gets rid' of noumena - but not things-in-themselves, which are subject-independant. — StreetlightX

So noumena are subject-dependent, unlike things in themselves -- and they mark the limit of sensibility.

So the limit of sensibility is what exactly? Not phenomena or representations, and not really the thing-in-itself. It's just another word for the boundary between what can be known and what can't?

It's clear that we have limits. We're limited by space and time. Something in itself isn't part of that. Are noumena part of space and time or not? If not, and yet they differ from things in themselves, then what are they (is it)? Saying noumena "mark the limit" just isn't clear to me.

Or put it this way: what exactly is "gotten rid of" when the subject goes away? In that case, why not just say the thing in itself goes away too? Who's to say?