"I am bald" and "I am not bald" can both be true since there is no agreed upon theory of bald. — noAxioms

I disagree. The only criteria is consistency in A and consistency in B in the law of non-contradiction. You don't need to find the real essence of "bald" but merely need a consistent definition, such as "no hair anywhere on the head". In this case, "I am bald" and "I am not bald" are mutually exclusive. Therefore only consistency and not the essence in the terms is needed to apply the law of non-contradiction.

the logic made no statement that all countries occupy disjoint geographical regions (and there are indeed counter examples), so no conclusion about their separation can be drawn at all. — noAxioms

I used the word 'separation' loosely. The separation can be disjoint and yet still a separation.

If no absolute criteria is known (fuzzy fact), then you can't invoke the law of contradiction to prove that there is in fact an absolute criteria. — noAxioms

Your statement is circular.

Why is it important? — noAxioms

Are you asking why finding the essence of life is important? I personally find the topic interesting; that is why I am here. Why are you here if you don't find the topic important?

Correct me if I am wrong, but it seems to me that you are now arguing for "right judges might" instead of "might makes right", as seen in the following quotes. Am I correct?

the unfairness of its laws

We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal.

a state sweltering with the heat of injustice

Slavery is just if the slave society defines it as just. Apartheid is just if the apartheid regime says it is just. And they did. — Bitter Crank

In which case, was it a just act for the nazis to kill the jews in Germany under the nazi regime?

What changed the "justice" of slavery and apartheid in slave and apartheid regimes was either overwhelming opposition to slavery and apartheid in other regimes, expressed through legislation, trade embargoes, or armed resistance. — Bitter Crank

And why were the other regimes and armed resistance in opposition to slavery and apartheid, if not because they thought that these laws were unjust? If so, then right judges might, or a priori justice determines if the laws are just or not.

Law of non-contradiction does not hold without a hard definition of the essence, so invoking the law presupposes the conclusion that there is such an essence. Dr Cleland brings the subject up using 'bald' as the example. — noAxioms

I honestly find it hard to believe that the law of non-contradiction, typically seen as the first principal in metaphysics, is itself dependant on the existence of essence of things. In fact, the strength (or weakness depending on the case) of pure logic is that it contains no substance, only variables (A, B, X, Y, ...). Furthermore, it seems like an easy cop out for someone to dismiss a logical argument simply on the grounds that he does not believe in the essence of the terms used. Could you unpack this 'bald' example if possible?

Yes, one could arbitrarily make up such a rule, and then be able to classify anything as life or not-life, but what has that proven? That is not the essence of life, it is just an arbitrary rule that sorts things into two buckets. It does not prove the existence of an essence. — noAxioms

I think it still does due to premise 2. Here is an analogy: We know country X exists because we know someone from country X. We also know country Y exists because we know someone from country Y. This is enough to deduce that a separation or border exists between countries X and Y.

This is true, but the laws themselves are based on justice and not the opposite way around, aren't they? When the laws allowed for slavery and apartheid, they were unjust laws. Therefore right makes might. Otherwise, the phrase "unjust law" is logically meaningless.

Your concern about dealing with a-holes is noted. I will give you my full position on this: The golden rule is an absolute in morality, and is an effective tool in conflicts, even with a-holes. There is always a way to deal with any situations without breaking the golden rule, even if the solution is not always easy to find. I will try to explain how it is so.

Let's unpack the rule: It is not synonymous to being an extreme pacifist or a push-over. It simply answers "yes" to the question "Would I like a similar treatment under a similar situation?". Thus a-holes can be penalized, but justly, not by being a-holes back at them. Example: You murder my wife. I could murder your wife in return, but this would be responding to an unjust act with an unjust act. Instead, I will catch you and put you in jail for a long time. This does not break the golden rule because out of justice, I would like to be treated the same way if I murdered someone.

Golder rule of ethics: Do onto others as you want them to do onto you. I don't want to be killed, so killing others is unethical.

I am not an atheist so I can only speculate, but I would assume that not all atheists are pro-choice.

Does might make right? It depends if you are asking with respect to description or prescription. A descriptive statement is simply saying what is, making a mere observation. A prescriptive statement is saying what ought to be.

Machiavellianism is correct as a description of human history, as you pointed out; but it is wrong as a prescription for moral behaviour, because it violates the golden rule of ethics: do onto others as you want them to do onto you.

Premise 1 is not based on the conclusion, but on the law of non-contradiction: the two propositions "A is B" and "A is not B" are mutually exclusive. This is known with certainty even if we don't know what A and B mean.

I picked two easy ones on purpose, to show that there exists data on both sides. Your comment again misses the point of my argument that claims that the essence exists, not that it is easily found. I agree that it is hard to label things like viruses, but that is because the essence has not been found yet, not because it does not exist. And the essence must be clear because of premise 1.

Cannot agree with it. The line is fuzzy, so something can be questionably on either side. — noAxioms

A thing can be on either side but not both at once. If p is true, then not-p is false, and vice-versa. This applies to all p, including the term "living" even if we have not found the essence yet. This means that the line separating the living and non-living things must a clear one.

Don't understand this one. A rock is not a dead dog, and would a dog not qualify as life if I could not produce a dead one?
If you mean a dog is living compared to the rock, the label seems to have already been applied for the rule to have meaning, so it does not help narrow the essence you seek. — noAxioms

I mean that a dog is clearly labelled as a living thing, and a rock is clearly labelled as a non-living thing. You misunderstand the point. It is that there are things that fit in each label.

For any rule, it seems to take little effort to conceive of an exception. The conclusion seems to be a theory that avoids strict rules. — noAxioms

What do you mean by rule? Essential properties? Can you prove that for any rule there is an exception? That statement seems to be a self-contradiction. Anyways, my argument proves that the essence exist, it does not attempt to find it.

I think that definition of "cell" is outdated, and maybe based in misunderstanding. Isn't there many smaller active units within the cell? — Metaphysician Undercover

It is possibly an old definition. At any rate, it is the simplest thing that I know to be living with certainty, and so it is a starting point in the discussion. As we get closer to the essence, maybe the title of the simplest living thing will shift.

Fire seems not to meet the last one. — noAxioms

Yeah I admit I don't understand what the term "semiosis" means (process that involves signs?).

I have bailed on attempting to define an essence, and leave it a call to be made on a case-by-case basis. — noAxioms

This may be the end result. But at least I think I can prove that the essence of life exists:
- Either a being is a living being or a non-living being. It cannot be both.
- There exists an instance where a being is clearly labelled as living and another instance where a being is clearly labelled non-living: e.g. a dog and a rock.
- Therefore a separation/border exists between the two labels, which is the essence. Its location may not be clear, but it must exist.

Why do you think that a cell is the simplest possible living thing? — Metaphysician Undercover

By the definition of the term itself: the smallest structural and functional unit of an organism. With this definition, if we were to ever find simpler organisms than our currently known cells, then these would also be called cells I think.

Why would you think that a fire metabolizes? Metabolism is clearly defined as what living things do. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yeah I agree. As such, metabolism should be excluded from the essence of living things because it presupposes it. We can replace it instead with "interaction with environment, either input or output".

Well, of course Platonism implies Platonism.
It looks like the term "eternal" is hitching a ride with propositional consistency here, though. — jorndoe

You are free to remove the first term "eternal". But without it, the statement is either implied to be eternally true, or not. If eternally true, then no change to the original statement. If not eternally true, then there are some instances when the statement is not true, but that is illogical: the statement "nothing is eternally true" is sometimes not true.

Note, it is possible that I misunderstood your point. If so, just ignore this comment.

I apologize if this was already brought up before. I want to bring up one more essential property of all living things: The ability to attempt to be self-sustainable, that is, to keep their parts functioning properly. Not all living things achieve this, but they can all attempt to. This now differentiates living things from mere physical reactions: a tree will attempt to extend its roots and lean in a certain direction to find more energy, where as a fire will not attempt any of this and is merely acting upon the laws of physics. Similarly, a car engine has functioning parts, but none are aimed at being self-sustainable. Even a newborn baby will cry for the aim at improving its health state.

All the properties mentioned previously (needs energy, can grow, can reproduce, adaptability, ...) are all means to the end of self-sustainability. None of these means appear to be essential because one mean may work for one thing but not another (at least in theory).

On an unrelated note, this marks my 100th comment. I am treating myself to a cookie.

Does (abstract propositional) consistency itself exist apart from all else, is it a constraint on our thinking, or something else...? — jorndoe

Here is my take on this. Abstract concepts such as laws of logic and formulas exist in themselves and are eternal: 1+1 does not cease to equal 2 just because there are no concrete things to apply it to. But this is not the case for Platonic Forms of concrete things such as "triangle-ness" and "tree-ness": a tree does not retain its tree-ness once you remove all the matter from it. I think this is also Aristotle's position.

generally, it is the condition extending from cell division to death — Galuchat

Welcome. I agree that things made of cells are living things. But why is that the case? What makes a cell a living thing, and anything simpler than a cell a non-living thing (I assume you agree with the latter phrase too)?

characterised by the ability to metabolise nutrients, respond to stimuli, mature, reproduce, and adapt to the environment through semiosis. — Galuchat

This may answer my previous question. But would that not make a fire a living thing much like a cell? Note, this seems to be the position of some people in this discussion. I am on the edge on that one; and yet I cannot seem to find a clear difference between a cell and a fire.

doesn't that make the kalam/cosmological argument into an argument for Platonism instead, sort of...? — jorndoe

Yes, it does in the sense that some concepts must be eternal. To think otherwise yields to a self-contradiction: One thing is eternally true, that nothing is eternally true.

Suppose x is (defined as) atemporal, "outside of time". Then there can be no time at which x exists. And x cannot change, or be subject to change, but would be inert. Interaction with x could not occur. — jorndoe

I agree that x could not change, but why could x not change other things, that is, act as their cause? E.g. the eternal law of logic is one of the causes to me thinking logically. The Formal Cause is one of Aristotle's four causes of things.

I see what you are saying now. Laws of physics are statements and math formulas that predict the behaviour of objects. These objects are compelled to forces, such as gravity, but not laws, such as the laws of gravity. Therefore mindless objects indeed don't "follow laws" in the sense that they are caused or motivated by them to behave in their predictive ways.

With this clarification, it seems there is not much in common between human laws and laws of physics. The two types of "laws" have completely difference essences.

The only problem with that change of premise (if it's true) is that you can't argue from me being aware of things having a cause of its coming to be, to there being a God. — Purple Pond

I think you can. Sure, your awareness is not the cause of the existence of God, but it means that we can deduce the existence of God from our awareness that all temporary things have a cause. In other words, we can reason backwards, from observation to effect to cause, even though in reality things occur from cause to effect to our observations. When Descartes says "I think therefore I am", he does not mean that his thinking is the cause of his existence, but that his existence is necessary for him to think.

I am not sure I understand your argument against the phrase "begins to exist". Even though the exact moment for the beginning of your existence is not clear, we can definitely deduce a beginning:
You exist today, and you did not exist 100 years ago; therefore your existence has a beginning.

I think I can clarify this. Instead of saying "whatever begins to exist has a cause", we can say "all that is not eternal has a cause". As you point out, "causation has a cause" is nonsensical. It follows that causation does not have a cause, and therefore causation is eternal. Does that sound surprising? Not so; it is part of what is called "eternal truths". Such eternal truths include:
- laws of logic: if p is true, then not p is false,
- laws of mathematics: 2+2=4
- laws of morality: charity is good, killing is bad. (Though this one is controversial).

Doesn't it require a mind to follow rules — Metaphysician Undercover

Only if the rule is only influencing and not compelling. If a rule is only influencing, then following it is a voluntary act of the mind. But if compelling, then the object does not need to have a mind. We are influenced by man-made laws, and it is our voluntary choice to follow them or break them. On the other hand, our bodies (and all mindless objects with a mass) "follow" the laws of gravity because they are compelling laws, and we cannot help but fall from the sky to the ground. All laws of physics are compelling laws.

What people experience in near death experiences seems to be even a higher state of consciousness or awareness. — Sam26

What reasons do they give for claiming to experience a 'higher state of consciousness'? Is it a self evident experience?

On a similar note, what reasons do we have to claim that our waking state is a higher state of consciousness than our dreaming state? I can think of two reasons:
1. Our waking state is continuous from one day to the next, where as our dreaming state appears to change every night.
2. We can analyze our dreaming state during our waking state, but we cannot (at least I cannot) analyze our waking state during our sleeping state.

In order to have a mental image of stick there must exist a stick somewhere in the past present, or future. — Purple Pond

I agree with that statement, with one picky modification: There need not be a stick, but something external to us. If I have a mental image of a unicorn, it does not follow that unicorns exist (past, present or future), but that I have experienced the basic objects that the image is made of: e.g. a horse + a horn.

To put your argument in a different way:
- Nothing can come from nothing: even our imagination cannot create images from scratch;
- we perceive an external reality;
- therefore an external reality must exist.

This is exactly why we need to find the essence of a living being! With this precedent, what is to stop anyone else from granting human rights to any other objects? Note, I am all for protecting nature, just not to the level of granting human rights.

It sounds like you are asking what is the use of finding the essence of words? It is very useful when it comes to validating or refuting an argument. For an argument can be refuted in three ways:
1. Finding ambiguity in the terms used
2. Finding a false premise
3. Finding a logical fallacy from the premises to the conclusion
Knowing the essence of words is needed for 1 and helps for 2.

Second one is disqualified, because if a particular instance is designed, it is not original cause. — noAxioms

Not if the designer is God, the uncaused causer. But I agree that we should apply occam's razor and postpone this hypothesis until all the simpler hypotheses have been refuted first.

As for having more probability outside of the cosmos hypothesis: Is that realistic? My understanding is that the laws of chemistry are called laws because they apply in all environments, not just in an earthly environment.

Would could you possibly mean by "the virus has life, but it is not alive"? That seems completely contradictory. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps, as Cavacava points out, it is the difference between potentiality and actuality? This would differentiate a virus from a cell, and still differentiate a virus from a rock, as the former has potentiality and the latter has no potentiality.

The answer in this case is unclear, but the challenge lies in the data, not in the essence of the word 'tall'. Here is the proof: Remove the fuzziness from the data, say A is 10 m tall to within 5 mm, and B is 2 m tall to within 5 mm. Who is taller? Clearly A.

Your case gives an unclear answer, and my case gives a clear answer. The only difference between the two cases is in the data, not in the essence of 'tall' because the same essence is referred to in both cases. Therefore that cause of the unclearness is in the data, not in the essence of 'tall'.

I see. So scientists may agree on the direct cause of the creation of life, that is, the right ingredients at the right settings, but may differ on the explanation or cause of that cause. And the reason is the high improbability for all the conditions to be just right, is that correct?

From this information, I see only two logically possibilities for the original cause:
1. random event from nature, despite the improbability
2. not-random event, that is, intelligent design

Sorry for the late response on this comment. It sounds like you have the same position as some of us in this post: that simple life of a thing is nothing but the proper functioning of the thing's parts. It follows that a factory, car engine, or even a fire have simple life. That is also my position for a simple life, like simple cells.

I think they may be able to do it, but I don't think they will be able to explain their results objectively, using only a material/objective level of description. — Cavacava

Why is that? If we are able to produce life from material (matter and energy) only, then life is made of material only. Nothing can be created out of nothing. Note I am not including here a human being, which may not only have a life, but also a soul.

'Tall' can still be used as a relation, because saying "Y is tall relative to X" is the same as saying "Y is taller than X". Thus 'tall' and 'taller' have very much the same essence in this case. Also, 'tall' should always be relative to X if we want to say something that is objective and accurate.

Now I agree that in an everyday conversation, people may say "He is tall" (with no relation). In which case, this is more an expression of the subject than a description of the object, and there are indeed fuzzy boundaries to the word. It follows that not all words have essences; but some do, as is the case for "taller", or "tall" when saying "tall relative to X".

That doesn't help, unless you are prepared to say that Albert, who was most recently measured as 1770.1mm tall is 'tall relative to' Gunther, who was most recently measured as 1770.0mm tall, which would be inconsistent with how the word is used. — andrewk

Actually I am prepared to say that. Let's put it this way. Logically, there are only three answers when comparing the height of X and Y:
A. X is taller than Y
B. X is shorter than Y
C. X is exactly equal to Y in height.

If X = 1770.1 mm tall and Y = 1770.0 mm tall, then the right answer is A, not B or C. Logic beats popular opinion.

The article was very interesting.

I don't know anybody that would describe a 1.51m human as 'tall'. — andrewk

You seem to forget that part of the essence of tallness is to be 'relative to X'. Be specific in the object and in X, and you will obtain a clear conclusion. If you ask "Is a 1.51 m human tall?", a reasonable person will ask "Tall relative to what? To a cat, yes; to a giraffe, no." Then you reply "Tall relative to the average human height, which is 1.5 m". Then the person says "Yes, because if the average human height is exactly 1.5 m, the a 1.51 m human is taller (more tall) than the average human height. 0.01 m taller, to be precise." Once again, the fuzziness lies not in the essence, but elsewhere.

but we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions for C, which is what an essence is understood to be. — andrewk

Cool. I did not know that this was a way to determine the essence of things.

we cannot identify necessary and sufficient conditions for C — andrewk

Why not? If the premise "object > 1.5 m" is certain, then we can conclude with certainty that the object is taller than 1.5 m. Thus the condition is both sufficient and necessary for the conclusion. How much taller? By the same amount claimed in the premise. What if we are not certain about the premise? Then the conclusion is not certain, but this has nothing to do with the essence.

2 apples + 2 apples = 4 apples. We are certain of this principle. What if we are not certain that we have 2 apples + 2 apples? Then we are not certain that we have 4 apples. But this does not make the principle uncertain.

My original point was to refute the claim that "The notion of essence is philosophically defunct." If the goal of your comment is to argue against my point, then I think you are committing the straw man fallacy, because I agree with everything you say, and it does not refute my point.

I agree that if the measurement is fuzzy, then the conclusion about the object's tallness is consequently fuzzy, but this does not change the claim that "tallness" has a clear essence. This is also proven by what you claimed:

I think everybody would agree that somebody whose estimated height is greater than two metres is tall, and that somebody whose estimated height is less than 1.5 metres is not tall. — andrewk

In this case, the data is clear (away from the fuzzy boundaries) and the conclusion is clear. This proves that the essence of 'tallness' is also clear, because if it wasn't, then the conclusion would not be clear, despite having clear data.

This indeed seems to be the logical conclusion if one is a real atheist. Leap of faith for the win!

It sure is. At least this life. Some have hope that the next life, still called "life" will be without suffering.