I understand, but it's an important part of my view of ethics, there are many who view ethics as subjective and/or relative. [...] So it's my view when talking about justice that we have a view of justice that's has some objective standard. — Sam26

I completely agree.

Your response to the self-sealing fallacy is not sufficient. [...] Thus, because of the way your argument is framed, it's self-sealing as far as I can tell. — Sam26

Well, in theory, we could always ask the individuals whether they have an inclination to seek justice for themselves or not; but I see your point that this is not practicable to do in a large scale. Much like for intentions, we cannot be certain about inclinations from mere observations. However, we have a few solutions left: (1) reasonable claim, and (2) empirical data by observing ourselves.

(1) Reasonable claim: For a given behaviour, it is not more reasonable to assume that the person was seeking justice rather than injustice to themselves?
(2) Empirical data within ourselves: I already asked, but do you not personally have an inclination to seek justice rather than injustice for yourself?

I don't think it's true that necessarily all unjust people know their unjust (you seem to be basing this on the idea of innate knowledge). — Sam26

It must be so, because if they sincerely did not know that their act was causing some harm, then it would be an honest mistake; which is a mistake, but is not unjust.

What is the evidence that we have innate knowledge, as opposed to knowledge gained in some other way. — Sam26

Specifically regarding morality, I summarize here the argument from my original post, which has yet to be refuted: if knowledge is necessary for intentions, and intention is necessary for moral language, then knowledge is necessary for moral language. And we know it cannot be learned from observation, because as Mr. Wayfarer stated earlier, we cannot entail 'what ought to be' from 'what is'. Therefore, either moral language does not exist, or if it does, then its knowledge must be innate.

Generally speaking, there is a test to determine if a knowledge is innate or not, but let's save it for another time, for the sake of keeping this post somewhat short.

Yes, you are on to something! I was not all that familiar with the term meta-ethics, but the way you have described it makes sense. Described as such, you are correct that my original post is merely about the source of our knowledge of the moral good; which is meta-ethics. The focus was not on the essence of morally good intentions and acts; which is normative ethics. This discussion was brought up later on, almost as a tangent; and to this, I claim that the Golden Rule is a sure way to test the moral goodness of an intention and act. While the two topics are related insofar that they deal with ethics, the claims are not dependant on one another.

I also agree about the views that morality is objective, and that predicting the consequences of an act is a good way to determine moral goodness, as this method follows from the Golden Rule.

It is possible, therefore, that determining whether an action is moral, can only be only be done in the context of the perpetrator's acquired knowledge of morality (in the normative sense) because although innately born with the concept of what is 'good' and what is 'evil', they may have no moral knowledge at all i.e. have no clue as to whether their actions will achieve or frustrate the achievement of that state. — Inter Alia

If I understand you correctly, you are saying that although we may all have theoretical knowledge of the moral good, we may lack the knowledge of the right course of action in a given situation. That may be, and this is where the Golden Rule becomes a useful tool. How should I act? The same way I would want others to act towards me in the same situation if the roles were reversed.

Sure, there are the books that contain the definition and the people that know it. The definition, while abstract, is not something ontologically separate from those physical books or people. (It is also implicit in the natural world which means it is discoverable by anyone with the requisite intelligence and skills.) — Andrew M

If by definition, you mean quite literally the description of the concept, and not the concept in itself, then I agree with you. (man this topic is hard).

Wittgenstein would agree they're objective. Yet, he (rightly, in my opinion) denied that math are discovered and unchangeable. Rather, they're invented. The world is a certain way. But it could be otherwise. This means that the way the world is, is contingent. Although, it is also a fact that people most of the time perform certain tasks the same way. It is not just the world that exhibits regularities, it is us as well. Math are grounded in certain human actions; sorting, arranging etc. These actions are performed with a certain amount of regularity by most humans. These performances are then re-enforced by schooling and "hardened" into rules. These rules then, are the basis of math. Had the world been otherwise, had we been otherwise, then our practices would be different and math would be different as well (if they would have been invented at all). — Πετροκότσυφας

Not gonna lie, I did not read your quoted paragraphs (tl;dr O:) ), but I read the above. Let's make the distinction between three kinds of reality: (1) potential, that is, not actual and contingent, (2) actual and contingent, and (3) actual and necessary. I claim that math concepts fit into reality (3). We can use Chesterton's Test of Imagination to demonstrate this.

• (1) Unicorns don't exist, but I can image them. They are therefore potential.
• (2) Horses exist but I can imagine a world without them. They are therefore actual and contingent. Same for laws of physics. These may be unchangeable in our universe, but sci-fi writers imagine universes with different laws all the time, like a flat Earth carried by elephants on a giant turtle.
• (3) The concept I+I=II is actual (we can test this with objects), and I cannot imagine any other results, such as I+I=I or I+I=III. E.g., try to imagine 1 apple, and then 1 other apple, and yet imagine 3 apples in total, without adding a third apple in the mental image. It cannot be done. Math concepts are therefore actual and necessary.

That image imparts no information. — Wayfarer

Nevertheless, we agree that the container of info is physical, even if the info it contains is not. But I think that a mental image is also nothing but a container of information. After all, 'mental image' is synonymous to what I called earlier 'physical visualization', even according to Edward Feser's article.

If information is the arrangement of physical parts, then there must be a reason for that particular arrangement being the particular arrangement which it is in order that we can say that it is "information". It must have the capacity to inform us of something. — Metaphysician Undercover

To clarify, I was referring to information pointing to no concepts, that is, meaningless raw data, like statics from the tv set, perceived by the senses but unintelligible to the mind. Otherwise, I agree that meaningful information must be non-physical, for the reason you pointed out.

What different symbols represent is not unchangeable, and this is evident in evolving language. So if for some reason the ordering of the symbols which represent numbers gets changed, and this all agreed upon, such that the order is 1,3,2,4, and the symbol 3 starts to mean the same thing as 2 does now, then 1+1 would equal 3. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are once again confusing the symbol or word, with the concept it points to. Yes, we can change the symbols 1, 2, 3, ..., but we cannot change the concepts I, II, III, ... As such, we can make 1+1=3 if we change the symbols, but cannot make I+I=III <-- As you can see, there is one too many bar on the right side of the equation, which makes it unbalanced.

And as it is with concepts of numbers, so it is with other concepts. E.g., we can change the word "red", but the concept of red-ness will remain unchanged.

The point is that there is no necessity between the symbol and what it represents. It doesn't necessarily represent what it does, and this is because what it represents was somehow decided upon. Therefore the relationship between the symbol and what it represents is dependent on the existence of subjects. Since the existence of concepts seems to be dependent on this relationship between symbols and representation, we cannot simply assert that concepts are "objective" if you define objective in this way (independent of subjects). — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree with your first three sentences. This is why there are different languages and writing symbols. However, I still disagree with your last sentence, that concepts or universal forms are dependent on that relationship. A rock participates in the form of rock-ness, even before a subject observes it or find a word or symbol for it for the first time.

First, an action is just or not just, not because of what someone believes, but because of objective criteria that we recognize as just. — Sam26

Agreed. But just to clarify, the current argument is not whether or not justice is objective (it is), but whether all humans seek justice to themselves (even if they could be wrong about what true justice is).

Your argument is self-sealing. — Sam26

I don't think so. All we need to do to falsify it is to find a case where a man is faced with two options with similar outcomes, but the first one is just to him, and the second one is less just; and the man picks the less just option (assume no false perceptions). But I claim no such case exists: Who in their right mind would pick the less just option when all else is equal?

But external facts aside, the question is what do you, Sam26, observe within you? Do you not find an inclination to seek justice at all times, at least for yourself?

Really, all you're saying is that people don't willingly harm themselves. After all when an injustice is done, whether it's an injustice to oneself or to another, then one is harming oneself or the person to whom the injustice is done. Thus, the real question is "Do people do harm to themselves intentionally?" The answer is quite obviously yes. People smoke knowing full well that they are harming themselves, not only do they smoke knowing this, but they do a myriad of things knowing that they're harming themselves. If they do these kinds of things, why wouldn't they do things to themselves that they perceive to be unjust? — Sam26

Harming oneself is not synonymous to injustice. Take martyrs, or even people who practice self-flagellation. They willingly harm themselves, but do so precisely in the name of justice. As for smokers, it is explained by one of the following three reasons: (1) addiction, (2) they don't truly believe it causes harm, (3) they may believe it causes harm, but do so because they perceive that not doing so would result in a greater harm (e.g. peer pressure). None of these reasons implies injustice done to oneself.

All your doing is making the claim that they believe they're seeking justice for themselves, but the error of this thinking can be seen if we understand that being unjust is the same as any wrongdoing. We know that people make all kinds of immoral decisions, knowing that that their actions are immoral, and knowing that it will cause harm to themselves, or harm to others. — Sam26

Maybe my position is not yet clear, because I agree that unjust people know they are unjust. This follows from the title of this discussion, that moral knowledge is innate. I am just arguing at the moment that they have no inclination to do injustice to themselves.

My main point is that all immoral acts cause harm to someone, and I'm going to stick with that. [...] So for a lie to be immoral it would have to cause harm to someone, if it doesn't cause any harm, then I would contend that it's not immoral. — Sam26

Would you then say that the morality of an act is determined by the consequence? I.e., If it results in harm, then immoral; if not, then not. It would seem to follow that attempted but failed murder is not immoral because no harm was done. Do you agree?

The problem here is that space and time are not properties, so neither can place be a property. That's why motion is so difficult to understand, it's not the property of an object, it is a relationship between objects. — Metaphysician Undercover

This seems inconsequential, because a relative property is still meaningful, so long as the standard is the same for all things. If I describe the dog I see as being at the intersection of streets A and B at time T, everybody understands the description of the location, so long as streets A and B don't move.

How would you propose to determine the spatial-temporal location of a concept? — Metaphysician Undercover

Easy: They have none. My position is that non-physical things don't occupy physical spaces. I thought this was a generally accepted claim. Where would the claim that "all things have a spacial-temporal location" come from?

How are you defining "objective" here? — Metaphysician Undercover

Part of reality, independent of a subject. As such, math concepts are discovered and unchangeable. We cannot simply decide that "1+1=3", even if everybody agreed to do so.

Yes, your definition of "ideal" is completely different from mine. Ideal to me means perfect in conception. Therefore a thing cannot be an ideal. You define ideal as the perfect thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright, but I admit I am not sure what the difference is between "perfect in conception" and simply "perfect". It seems that if a thing is perfect, then its conception cannot be more perfect.

If conception was as you describe here, experience dependent, then we could never understand things which had just been described to us, but we had not seen. The various fields of science demonstrate that the true nature of conception is within definition, as there is much which is described and conceived of, without having been experienced. — Metaphysician Undercover

A fair point. I reply that it is true, that if we have never experienced basic concepts of shapes, colours, sounds, tastes, and feelings, such as, triangle-ness, redness, a music note, sweetness, and coldness, then we could never understand more complex concepts made from basic concepts, such as house, horse, sun, or law. But if we do apprehend the basic concepts from experience, then I think we can apprehend complex concepts composed of basic concepts, without experiencing them. E.g., I have never observed a chiliagon, but if it is defined as "a polygon with 1000 sides", then I can apprehend it, because I already apprehended the concepts 'polygon', '1000', and 'sides'.

Well, if unintelligible or meaningless information is nothing but the arrangement of physical parts in a certain way, then I can definitely mail such info from a mental image: Say I have a mental image of this. I transpose this info on paper, and voilà. And the same can be done with the mental image of a particular triangle, so long that it does not serve to symbolize the concept of triangle-ness. I.e., an animal can have the same mental image when observing a picture of a particular triangle, without understanding the concept of triangle-ness.

As far as I can tell, the hypothesis of info being nothing but arrangements of physical parts seems adequate, when concepts are not involved.

How can one imagine triangle-ness without any physical properties? Isn't that exactly what triangle-ness is, a physical property? — Metaphysician Undercover

Particular objects participate in triangle-ness due to their specific physical properties, but the concept triangle-ness itself is not made of physical properties, as demonstrated in my previous argument. Also, see the response below in case of confusion about the term 'imagination'.

How would you imagine a universal triangle that is not a particular kind of triangle, namely scalene, isosceles or equilateral? I think that fails Chesterton's test. So maybe you're thinking of the definition of a triangle (e.g., a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles). And, yes, we can think coherently about that. But the definition is not separable from particulars either, whether the human being that thinks about it or the books that contain it. — Andrew M

As I read up on this stuff, I see now that I was using the term 'imagination' incorrectly. I indeed meant to say "thinking coherently" about the concept, and not "having a physical visualization in the mind". This may have created some confusions; my bad. So the fact that we can think coherently (without contradiction) about a thing that contains no particular shows that such thing is not essentially made of particulars.

I am not sure what you mean, Andrew, regarding "the definition is not separable from particulars either". Could you clarify?

You can represent it physically, but it's an ideal object in the sense of being a geometric primitive. And surely the triangle I am just now imagining, is not physical, on account of it's a mental image. — Wayfarer

I don't think that an image being mental demonstrates that the image is non-physical. For one thing, mental images are particulars. Do you have a reason to believe it to be so?

Think, McFly, Think (and I recommend having a read of the whole post.) — Wayfarer

I finally read this. It was good, and on par with my position; not too surprising as Feser and I are both catholic. And... I once again used the wrong term in my posts when it comes to 'imagination'. I used the term generally to say "thinking about the concept", where as Feser uses it strictly to say 'mental image' or 'physical visualization in the mind'. This may have been one of the sources of confusion throughout the discussion, such as this one.

Hello.
What criteria that is learned from experience can be used to judge if an act is moral or not? It cannot be the harm caused by the act, because, as discussed with @Sam26, an act causing harm can still be moral if it is done for good reasons. We yet have to discover the criteria to judge if the reasons are good or not.

Besides how does one separate innate knowledge from any other kind of knowledge? In other words, what is the criteria by which we understand that a piece of knowledge is innate? — Sam26

In the case of morality, the raw sense data is called Conscience. Otherwise, in general, you can search within yourself to discover undoubtable principles, such as "All humans ought to be treated with the same level of respect", or "1+1=2", or "If A is B, and B is C, then A is C".

I am intrigued.

Excuse me, but have you been living on planet Earth? People believe all kinds of crazy things, even when it comes to how they treat themselves. Just look at those who believe that blowing themselves up will win them a place in heaven. As for the example I gave, why would you doubt that people would do this willingly, people do all kinds of things willingly in the name of religion. I agree that there were some, maybe even a majority who probably didn't sacrifice willingly, but even a cursory examination of how people have behaved in the past, toward themselves and towards others leads me to conclude you are as wrong about this as you can get. — Sam26

I admit I misspoke when I said that nobody sacrifices themselves willingly. You may be right that some may willingly blow themselves up, and others with them, in the name of some religion. Having said that, I want to clarify my claim about human behaviour, and show that the above fact does not harm it:

Everyone seeks justice for themselves (not necessarily for others), and avoid injustice against themselves (not necessarily injustice that works in their favour). In other words, everyone is inclined to do good to themselves.

Now, in the case of people blowing themselves up, either they see the act as (1) just or (2) unjust. (1) If they see it as just, then it fits my claim, and their error is only an error in facts about the given situation. E.g., they may sincerely believe that the people they blow up are evil people, like Nazis, where as in fact, they are not. (2) If they see the act as unjust, then it is nevertheless seen as unjust in their favour, because as you said yourself, it is likely done to "win them a place in heaven". But, it cannot be that some people willingly accept a condition that they perceive to be unjust to themselves, if a more just option exists. If you disagree, then I challenge you to find one. ;)

That's MY point, that's exactly what you're doing? Thus, it's your argument that's circular. You didn't read my point carefully enough. — Sam26

My argument was not circular, because the Golden Rule was my starting point; a premise to judge if events are moral or not. I think you are now asking where the premise comes from. It is based on the metaphysical principle that all humans have equal ontological value. I made a post to defend this claim here, but I think most people will agree, simply by agreeing that slavery is immoral. So if all humans have equal ontological value, it follows that they ought to be treated with the same level of respect, and the Golden Rule is merely a practical way of ensuring it is done correctly in a given situation.

So you object to the Golden Rule being the absolute criteria to determine morality, on the grounds that individuals may have different ways of how they want to be treated. I dispute the underlined point. It is inherent to human nature that all humans seek justice and avoid injustice, at least to themselves. I doubt that the victims of the sacrifices to the sun god ever did this willingly, or that the priests picking the victims ever picked themselves; because how can one willingly choose a condition for themselves if they think the condition is unjust? Same for suicidal people; they do not see suicide as a good thing in itself, but as a last resort to minimize the injustice that would otherwise happen to them if they kept on living.

Thus, if everyone inherently seeks justice and avoids injustice to them, then the golden rule is fitting because it results in seeking justice and avoiding injustice for all; and justice is another term for the moral good.

The Golden Rule itself is dependent on a particular view of morality, so it can't be the test of what's moral or immoral. — Sam26

This statement begs the question: If the Golden Rule is truly the test for what is moral, then it is not itself dependant on any moral views; and if it is dependant on a moral view, then it cannot be the test for what is moral. To escape the circle, you would need to back up the claim that the Golden Rule is dependant on a particular moral view. What view would that be?

You need to respect the fact that the properties which a thing actually has, and the properties which a thing is said to have are not necessarily the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your logic is correct; however, we can take a shortcut when it comes to physical things, because of the law of physics that no two physical things can occupy the same space at the same time. As such, the properties of place and time are sufficient to determine if two physical objects observed are the same. And... it is also possible for universal concepts, because they have a limited quantity of essential primary properties (they may have an infinite quantity of essential secondary properties, but these are not critical in defining the concept, as previously explained).

It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.
— Samuel Lacrampe

There are two sides to this procedure, and you are completely neglecting one side. The perception of the object is one factor which allows us to describe it, but knowing the words, and their meanings is another factor. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are missing my point, as I was using my statement above merely as an analogy. My point was that we are certain of the truth of particular examples that contain the concept, such as "this is not a triangle". My hypothesis that "we already have implicit knowledge of the concept from observation" explains this phenomenon, and has not yet been refuted.

Did you not ever go to school in your life? It is quite clear, that in school we learn the concepts, they are taught to us by our teachers. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that we can learn some concepts in school, but it does not follow that concepts are subjective. We are taught some math concepts, and yet it is clear that these concepts are objective. Besides, what about the fact that people born blind cannot apprehend the concept of redness, despite having gone to school? Remember that the essential property of redness is not "this light frequency range", which is merely its cause (and good luck explaining light), but purely this.

I simply explained that you were working off an incorrect definition of "ideal", which made the ideal into a particular instance of occurrence. If "ideal" is made into a particular instance of occurrence, then any occurrence is the ideal of that particular occurrence, and "ideal" looses all meaningfulness. So I could define the "ideal" as obtaining 40% on my math exam, then if I get 40% on my math exam I have obtained the ideal. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

What is your definition of ideal? Mine is "perfection; as good as a thing can possibly be". Note that I don't mean Perfection in everything (this could only be God); only in the thing discussed. Under that definition, it is definitely possible to reach ideals. The ideal answer to 2+2 is 4, because it is as good as it can possibly be. And a 100% score on an exam is the ideal score, because there is nothing to add to reach a better score. I don't understand your example of "40% score on an exam"; what is this ideal of? Not score, because it is possible to obtain a better score.

For Aristotle nature is an inseparable unity of matter and form. Whereas for Plato, matter and form (or ideas) constitute separate and distinct natures. — Andrew M

It is simple enough to demonstrate that information is not physical (at least certain types). We can use the Test of Imagination, as Chesterton calls it: If a thing x is imaginable without the property y, then y is not essential to x. Thus if a certain type of info is imaginable without any physical properties, then physical properties are not essential to this type of info. And this is precisely what we do when we imagine universal forms such as triangle-ness, whiteness, justice, etc. As universals have no particulars by definition, and all physical properties are particulars, then universal forms are imagined without physical properties. Therefore information regarding universal forms is not physical.

That is not to say that universal forms actually do exist without matter, but only that they can exist without matter, without contradiction.

I don't mind the standpoint of nominalism or subjectivism, insofar that the arguments are rational and respectful. If a standpoint is false, then a flaw should exist, and it is a matter of finding it.

And I agree, although, again, it’s important to distinguish a ‘form’ from a ‘mental image’. That is a hard distinction to draw but it’s important. — Wayfarer

I am still unclear about this one. Is 'mental image' the same as 'concept', that is, the form once abstracted in the mind? Or else, if by 'mental image' you mean the physical visualization in the mind, then I agree that concepts are not that; because concepts, being universals, cannot have accidentals properties, which are necessary for any physical visualizations.

There is probably no definition that will fit every single case of what constitutes an immoral act. — Sam26

Conventionally, the "Golden Rule: Will (or intend) unto others as you want them to will unto you" is the absolute criteria to determine if an act is moral or not (between humans). As you will try to defend that harm is an essential property of an immoral act, I will defend the test of the Golden Rule.

What distinguishes the two is having good reasons for one as opposed to not having good reasons for the other. — Sam26

I agree about the necessity of a good reason, but what determines a reason as 'good'? We still need to find the criteria for that.

and if it can be demonstrated that there was no harm, then it would seem to follow that there was no immoral act on the part of the agent. — Sam26

Excluding the harm done to oneself (because it is a bit ambiguous), what about the case of attempted murder? There was no harm done to the victim because the attempt failed, and yet it is evident that the act is immoral.

It's my belief that anyone who commits an immoral act does harm to himself or herself. — Sam26

I agree. Not from a psychological standpoint but from a metaphysical standpoint. If the purpose of our existence is to be morally good and we go against it, then we harm our very existence. But this topic is beyond the scope of this discussion so we should save it for another time.

Now you have lost me. I cannot follow what you are arguing here. You speak about "examples used to falsify the definitions". I assume that these examples are drawings on a paper or some other medium, or in some cases a verbal description. These examples are constructs, created by the person drawing, doing the demonstration. So when an understanding is produced in this way, why do you conclude that it comes from a concept already within? — Metaphysician Undercover

The examples I was referring to are these: "This is not a triangle", and "this is a triangle". I assume you agree that these statements are true, as well as virtually everyone else. Now, this knowledge, that these statements are true, must be explained. I explain it by our knowledge of the concept of triangle-ness. In other words, our knowledge of the concept enables us to make true statements of particulars, as above, which in turn enables to come up with its definition, through a socratic dialogue. It is like describing an object observed: the perception of the object enables us to describe it; and not the opposite way around.

[...] Concepts do not exist in any "objective sense". They are property of subjects and so are subjective. The "more correct" doesn't exist in an objective sense, it is something agreed upon by the various subjects. Some call this inter-subjectivity, but inter-subjectivity doesn't create a true objectivity. But "correctness" is created by inter-subjective agreement, so "three angles" is more correct than "four angles" because it is what is agreed upon by convention. This is what constitutes "correctness", what is agreed upon by convention, not some "objective" concept. — Metaphysician Undercover

If I understand, you claim that the concept of triangle-ness is subjective, and that we all have similar ones by coincidence. Can you back-up this hypothesis of "inter-subjectivity"? It seems to me that if we all observe an object with extremely similar properties, then it is reasonable to assume that we all observe the one and same object, until proven otherwise. As such, the onus of proof is on you to defend a more complicated hypothesis.

Your example is of one particular math exam. Just because you got 100% on one exam, this does not mean that you have the ideal understanding of mathematics. You have a lot more to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are committing the fallacy of moving the goal post. My point is that reaching the ideal is a logical possibility. As such, you have once again the onus to prove that reaching an ideal definition of triangle-ness is impossible.

The law of identity does not suggest that if two separate things change to have all properties coincide, then they become one and the same thing. This is impossible, because 1+1=1 is mathematically impossible. Rather, it says that if two subjects could describe all the properties of an object that they observed, and that all the properties were to coincide, then it follows that they observed the same object. E.g. If I saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z; and you saw a brown dog at time t and position x, y, z, then it follows that we saw the same dog (assuming no false perceptions).

This exercise also applies to concepts. Thus if the properties of a concept described by several subjects coincide, then the concept described is one and the same for all. Some people in this discussion claim that not all properties coincide. Some, including myself, claim they do; and the minor differences in description is explained by a minor difference in expression, not by a difference in the properties observed. E.g. I may describe the dog as brown, and you may describe it as beige.

Note: the statement "Since all concepts are located in different minds, it follows that the concepts must be separate things in all minds" is invalid, because this "location in the mind" is not a property of the object observed, but of the subject. It would be similarly invalid to say "Since the perception of the dog is from different subjects, then it follows that we did not observe the same dog".

How do I access the concept within me, such that I can determine which changes need to be made? — Metaphysician Undercover

Through a socratic dialogue, either with yourself or with others, which serves as a falsification method. Much like the correctness of a scientific theory is tested through particular experiments, we can test the correctness of a definition through particular examples. Say your first attempt to define triangle-ness is "a plane with three angles". I falsify this by pointing out that this shape is a plane with three angles but is not a triangle. So we must add to the definition that the sides must be straight. Then, I might add the property "red" to the definition, and you falsify this by pointing out that some triangles which are not red remain triangles. So we remove "red" from the definition, and the result is "a plane with three angles and straight sides." If it cannot be falsified any more, then we have obtained the perfect definition.

But... notice that we both seem certain about the correctness of the examples used to falsify the definitions. Where does this knowledge come from? It must come from the concept which we already had. As such, the exercise was never to find the concept, but to express it correctly with words. In other words, we all have the implicit knowledge of concepts, and we just try to obtain explicit knowledge from this. This explicit knowledge is useful to deduce universal truths such as "no triangle can fill up a circle", because we now know that all triangles have straight sides where as no circles do.

We can get the meaning of words from physical demonstration. — Metaphysician Undercover

This sounds more like a method to learn a new language than to obtain a concept; but for the sake of argument, let's suppose you are correct. Well, you and I did not go through this process of physical demonstration before having a discussion; and so according to you, it is possible that, despite using the same language, my words have significantly different meanings than yours. So why would to decide to have a discussion with strangers if there is a possibility that none of the words used have the same meaning?

We determine that a particular definition is "incorrect", based on the assumption that there is an ideal definition. The ideal is the best, the most perfect, and need not be something existent, it is simply the assumption of a goal, strive for the best.[...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Actually, inasmuch as a 'better' implies a 'best'; and a 80% mark implies a 100% mark, then a 'more correct' implies a 'fully correct' or 'ideal'. This is necessary. If the ideal does not exist, then neither does the 'more correct' in any objective sense. As such, if you believe that no ideal definition for triangle-ness exist, then it follows that the definition "three angles" is no more correct than "four angles", which is absurd.

I think that the ideal is never achieved, and this is what inspires us to always better ourselves in our understanding. — Metaphysician Undercover

This claim sounds ad hoc. Can you back it up? If I obtained a 100% mark on a math exam, then my answers have reached the ideal, and I cannot better myself on that exam.

If you want to put a cup on a table,[...] — darthbarracuda

That makes sense to me. I wonder if an objector might say that it is logically possible to have an infinite loop, where the one derivative power is passed down in circle, like a game of hot potato; but this seems so absurd that it would be a last-resort hypothesis.

[...] if material things are contingent, then this means they do not have to exist, which means that they have the potential to not exist. [...] — darthbarracuda

Yes, good point. It is true that contingent existing things have the potential to not exist; and the potential of 'x' implies the potential of 'not x' at some point; and therefore contingent existing things must have the potential to exist at some point.

[...] if we're going to Aristotelian route, it's that goodness has a lot of similarities to that of functioning "as it should". A lamb might not be bad if it's functioning as it should, i.e. to develop into a sheep. But it may be a bad lamb if it fails to develop. [...] — darthbarracuda

How about this:

In man-made things, it is evident that a thing is good if it actualizes its nature, its design. E.g., a paper-cutter is called good if it actually cuts paper correctly, which is its nature. And the nature of a thing is synonymous to its essential potential. E.g., the paper-cutter does not have the potential to cut paper if there is no paper to cut at this time, but once there is, then the potential appears, and a good paper-cutter will actualize it. Therefore a thing is good if it actualizes its essential potential; which means that an un-actualized essential potential corresponds to evil. As is the case of man-made things, so it would be for non-man-made things if these also have essential potential, that is, a nature, a design, a purpose, a final cause.

We just need to demonstrate this last part. Unfortunately, I don't know how yet. I am not even sure if demonstrating that things have essences is sufficient to prove that they must have a purpose, for even Aristotle seems to make a distinction between formal cause (essence) and final cause (purpose). I suspect Aristotle was wrong in making this distinction.

I like it. Here are my questions/comments.

4) "It cannot be infinitely long." Is there a way to demonstrate this, other than by Occam's Razor?

6.) "Things can only exist, however, if it has the potential to exist which is actualized." I don't think this is possible. It seems to me that before a thing exists, then neither does its properties, including the property of potential existence. But we can reach the same conclusion that there must be an actualizer (7) from the premise "everything that begins to exist requires a cause that exists".

8.) "There cannot be more than one purely actual actualizer, as differences between them would entail some difference in potential, which cannot be since it is actualized." This assumes both things have the same potential, which is not necessary (or not demonstrated to be). One thing could be fully actual with respect to its own potential, and similarly for the other thing. Thomas Aquinas comes to the same conclusion from the premise of full perfection, but I can't recall how he demonstrates full perfection in God.

14.) "A privation is an unactualized potential, which corresponds to evil" This is interesting. Could you expand on this? I have trouble imagining that a lamb, having the un-actualized potential of being a sheep, must have evil.

We already discovered that my concept of triangle is not the same as yours. Mine included "three angles", yours did not. We discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

But what criteria is used to determine that one definition is more correct than the other? I answer that the criteria is the concept, which is the same in all of us. Of course I agree that triangle-ness has the property of "three angles", but as I stated earlier, this is a secondary property which can be deduced from the first property of "three straight lines", and so it is redundant. Similarly, we could add the secondary property that "the sum of all angles equates to 180°", which is also deduced from first properties.

[...] you claim that we could not communicate unless our concepts are the same. See, you have things backward. It is through communication that we establish consistency, and sameness between our concepts, the sameness doesn't exist prior to communication as a prerequisite for communication, it is produced from communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

You are wrong twice. You did not refute my argument that if all words can have different meanings for each individual, then we get infinite regress because all definitions are made of words. It is like speaking completely different languages. My meaning of "yes" could be your meaning of "no", my "flat" could be your "round", etc. Then an agreement could not be attained if there is no common ground or criteria that is shared among all individuals. Therefore, not only could we not communicate, but even if we could, it could not serve to attain an agreement on meanings.

Consider Plato's Symposium. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

This does not prove that individuals necessarily have different concepts. It could be that some definitions are less correct than others, that is, some definitions less accurately point to the one concept. Do you not agree that if I said my definition of the concept of triangle was "four angles", then it would be incorrect? It is pretty much in the name, that "triangles" have "three angles". And an incorrect definition implies that there exists a correct definition.

The problem is, that definitions do not coincide. We already determined this with our definitions of "triangle", yours is different from mine. [...] — Metaphysician Undercover

Your entire argument depends on the premise that meanings are always different for every individual.
For the sake of argument, let's suppose that our definitions are different to start with. As you said yourself here, "we discover these differences, and attempt to correct them through discussion, communication", thereby making it possible to agree on one definition or meaning for words. Once this is achieved, then concepts become one and the same, by the same law of identity.

Thanks for sharing. Yep, still perplexed. Now I gotta add 'phantasms' as part of the terms to understand, on top of 'forms', 'concepts', 'matter', 'mind', 'intellect', and 'nous'. It's times like these I want to go back to simpler theories in which reality is made of 'stuff' out of a mould, and call it a day.

If the tautology contradicts your claim, then you are wrong. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yet another tautology. Remember that coherent debates require clear description of positions, and also reasons to back them up. In this case, if you say that your tautology contradicts my claim, you should explain why that is.

What is at question is whether or not there is a "form of redness" prior to us calling something red. I say no, you say yes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Finally you explain your position, that words create forms, that "red" creates our concept of redness. You seemed to be against this position earlier, but let's move on. Does your claim apply to particular things, as well as concepts? I.e., is the existence of redness in particular things prior to us calling the thing "red"?

My dictionary has a quarter of a page of entry under the word "plane". What is at issue here is whether or not there is ambiguity in word usage, and clearly there is. The ambiguity is reduced by producing definitions. So when you define "plane" as a flat surface, then through this definition you are reducing the possibility of ambiguity. Once it is defined as "flat surface" we can proceed toward understanding the ambiguities within "flat surface". What exactly do you mean by a surface, and what exactly constitutes 'flat". Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Clearly there is"? I understand that complex terms like "angel" or "quasar" are ambiguous terms and demand thorough thinking to remove the ambiguity; but why is it the case for simple terms like "plane", "flat" or "surface"? If you think that all words are ambiguous until they are defined, then this results in infinite regress, because definitions are made of words. Also, the statement "Ambiguity is never removed in an absolute way" is a self-contradiction because the very statement would forever remain ambiguous.

It is not required that individuals have the same concepts in order to communicate. If that were the case, then communication could not be a learned ability. [...] Instead of accepting and promoting this absurdity, we ought to consider the proposition that communication is less than perfect. When you say something, I do not understand it exactly in the way which you intend. That is because the conceptual structure within my mind is not exactly the same as that in your mind. But this imperfection does not necessitate the conclusion that we cannot communicate. [...] If my concepts were exactly the same as yours, then whatever you said would automatically be received by me exactly in the way that you intended. [...]. — Metaphysician Undercover

This cannot be. See my previous response above about infinite regress. If my concept of a triangle is not the same as yours, then how could we ever (1) discover this, and (2) correct it to be the same? I could say that "triangle" = "plane" + "three straight sides", but this assumes that the concepts "plane", "three", "straight", and "sides" are the same in both of us, otherwise, we are groundless.

There are other ways to explain the phenomenon of misunderstandings, such as logical fallacies; i.e., we all know the laws of logic innately, but we sometimes make mistakes by cutting corners. Another one is that some concepts have not yet been apprehended (E.g., I don't know what a "quasar" is), and although we can realize this by ourselves, we can make an error by not thinking rationally.

Plato's intent is to go beyond this false premise of Pythagorean Idealism, to determine the real nature of concepts. That is why he worked to expose all the difficulties of it. He continually took words with very ambiguous concepts, and worked to expose that ambiguity. This is known as Platonic dialectics. This flies in the face of Pythagorean Idealism, in which ambiguity is not possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't disagree with what you wrote, but it does not refute my claim. If Plato's intent is to determine the real nature of concepts, then the concept must be the same in all minds. Otherwise, even if successful, each person would come up with a different result according to their own concepts, and the dialogue would be pointless.

This is only according to your definition of "universal form". Your definition doesn't seem to allow a distinction between what the concept says (means) and what the concept is ( its ontological existence). This seems to be because you have no principle which allows for a concept to have any ontological existence. You take the lazy route, just assuming that concepts exist, with no principles to demonstrate how this is possible. — Metaphysician Undercover

That is right, I make no distinction between "meaning" and "concept", such that a word pointing to concept x is the same as a word meaning x. That is my position. As such, you cannot disagree that meanings are identical in all minds if the definitions coincide. As for the explanation of their existence, we simply have not got to that topic yet, and I don't remember you arguing that the existence of concepts as I describe is impossible. We can do that next.

To each other object. Space is, in such a metaphysic, composed entirely of relations between objects. Therefore, it could be argued that the objectual properties refering to space are not "of the object", but "of the world". Time could be seen in a similar way, replacing objects with events. — Akanthinos

Got it, thanks. In other words, it could be there is no such thing as an absolute cartesian coordinate system for space. I am okay with this theory for space, but it cannot work for time. Time is a function of causality, whereby an effect cannot logically exist before its cause, and so at the very least, the "direction" of time is an absolute.

But that's not the same thing. "A triangle doesn't have the property of compatibility with circularity" states nothing about the potential compatibility of triangularity and circularity, which is exactly what we are trying to get at here. "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with circularity" is already closer to the mark. The first one doesn't have the causal relevance necessary the full phenomena. — Akanthinos

I see your point, that the second statement gives more info than the first one. But as you said before, this results in having an infinite amount of negative properties like "A triangle has the property of not being compatible with figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides"; which is absurd. [Absurd for a philosopher; not for common people who would not give two craps about such a discussion :D ].

How about this solution: Let's differentiate between first and second properties, whereby second properties are deduced from the first. E.g., a triangle has the first properties of "flat surface" and "three straight sides", and then second properties of "not being compatible with circularity, or figures with 4, 5, 6, ... sides", and "the sum of angles equates to 180°" etc, all of which can be deduced from the first properties. As such, first properties are always positive, and second properties can be positive or negative.

One could argue that there are at least two spaces for each act of understanding : the space occupied by the information itself, and the space occupied by the information necessary to interpret the object of understanding. As such, understanding, as a stand-in for information processing, would be distributed. — Akanthinos

I think I understand; but these spaces seem merely accidental, and not essential to the process of understanding, like a particular triangle will always have a particular size and location, even though size and location are not essential properties. Even if it is not actual, telepathy as a process of transferring info seems logically possible, and would not require these spaces, although time is still inevitably present.

I could be completely off the mark, but are you saying that sometimes, an action to fulfill justice could move the goal post elsewhere, effectively requiring more actions etc; like a horse attempting to reach the carrot on a stick? I am not sure if such a scenario is necessary in reality, because even if the rules of a system were set up to produce such an effect, then we could always change the rules.

Take the Prisoner's Dilemma scenario. The rules are indeed set up such that the prisoners, despite making rational decisions, can only fail. But this is not a logically necessary situation. We just need to change the rules of the game so that justice is compatible with rational behaviour.

I made no mention of causation, that's your interpretation. What I said is that without the word "red" there is no such thing as what the word red refers to. Do you not recognize that the word "red" is an essential part of "what the word red refers to"? And so there is no such thing as what the word red refers to without the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Your claim is a tautology and thus unproductive. Now, either a thing is red, that is, it participates in the form of redness, prior to us calling it "red", or it is not.

• If it is, then the word "red" is not the cause of the existence of redness. And our mind, abstracting concepts by mere observation, does not necessitate words.
• If it is not, then the word "red" is the cause of the existence of redness in things, which is absurd.

The defining term is not the same as the term defined. In Aristotelian logic the defining concept is within the concept defined, as an essential feature. So "man" is defined by "animal", as the concept of animal is within the concept of man as an essential property but animal is not the same as man. Likewise, you define "plane" with "flat surface". One is not the same as the other. The defining term is the more general. If defining terms had the same meaning as the words being defined, then we would never get anywhere in our attempts to understand meaning. It would all be circular. "Flat surface" would mean the exact same thing as "plane", and it would be pointless to define one with the other because it would not help you to understand anything. It is the very fact that "flat surface" means something other to you than "plane" does, that it can be used to help you to understand what "plane" means. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Man" is not defined merely as an animal, but "plane" is defined merely as "a flat surface". Then you have it backwards: If I defined "plane" as a "plane", then it would be circular. But to define "plane" as "flat surface" is not; precisely because I may know what "flat surface" means and not know what "plane" means. Then the definition of "plane" as a "flat surface" proves that they have the same meaning. If 2+2=4, then it proves that they are logically the same. I.e., having 2 apples and another 2 apples is logically identical to having 4 apples. Thus if "plane" = "flat surface", then they are logically identical.

That is exactly what is at issue here, and why there is so much misunderstanding and disagreement about what universal forms are. Apokrisis, following Peirce argues that there is vagueness, and violation of the law of non-contradiction which is an inherent aspect of all universals, it is essential to universals. — Metaphysician Undercover

Alright. Although I don't agree, I appreciate the consistency in the whole system.

How do you propose that we ought to determine, and compare, the properties of the concepts within each others minds, other than by discussion? — Metaphysician Undercover

Discussion or dialogue is adequate, as is the case for finding the essence of the concept for triangle-ness. I gave another argument before: the fact that if concepts could possibly be different in individuals, then all attempts for communication would be hopeless. Consequently, we must have faith that concepts are, if not identical, then at least exact duplicates in everyone's mind. Finally, if concepts are different in individuals, then most of Plato's dialogue are pointless, because Socrates and his peers, attempting to find forms through arguments, all assume that the form they are looking for is the same for everyone.

But these accidental differences are still there, and this disallows us, according to the law of identity, from saying that it is the same concept in your mind, as in my mind. — Metaphysician Undercover

You contradict yourself with the earlier claim that you believed in concepts being universal forms. If universals, then these forms or concepts cannot have accidentals.

I think, in Aquinas' terminology, the senses perceive the shape, the intellect perceives the Form, and the mind derives the concept. So concepts are internal to minds, but the Forms are not. — Wayfarer

Interesting. Could you explain the differences between "the intellect perceives the Form" and "the mind derives the concept"? I would have imagined that the intellect is part of the mind, and that the concept is the concept of the form. Maybe it is that the intellect is active in abstracting the form, where as the mind is passive and merely stores it (now called concept once in the mind)?

What you claim here is false. Without the word "red" there is nothing that "red" refers to. That's the point. You are claiming that thing which "red" refers to would exist without the word red. But without the word "red" there would be nothing which "red" refers to, because there would be no such thing as "red". So this nothing cannot be an existent thing. To get to the point of asserting that there is something which "red" refers to, it is necessary that there is the word "red". — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying then that the word "red" caused the existence of the redness in things, instead of the opposite way around? Following the same train of thought, there was no badness in things until we used the word "bad", and no wetness until we used the word 'wet'; and so to generalize, our words create reality, as opposed to reality causing us to create words to refer to it. Am I correct on your position?

No, I am saying "plane", and you are saying "flat". By what principle of identity do you conclude that two very distinct words are "the same thing". And since it is very clear that these two distinct words are not the same thing, then it is also very clear that we are not saying the same thing when we say these distinctly different words. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the dictionary here, a "plane" is defined as "a flat surface". By law of maths, if x = y, then x and y are the same thing; and so if "plane" = "flat surface", then "plane" and "flat surface" are the same thing.

This is how we distinguish between when we are referring to two distinct things which are similar to each other, and when we are referring to the exact same thing, by taking account of the accidentals. So it is by analyzing the accidentals that we determine whether we are talking about two distinct, but similar things, or that we are talking about one and the same thing. — Metaphysician Undercover

Does it follow that we cannot test if two things are the exact same if those things don't have accidentals, such as is the case for universal forms, which yourself claimed to exist? How can you speak coherently about universal forms if the first law of logic does not apply to them?

Here is a better way: We test if two things are the exact same by comparing all of their properties, regardless if those properties are essential or accidental, and checking if they are similar or different. As such, the law of identity is applicable to all, even to universal things.

You argument is non sequitur. Just because a person may know a language without knowing a particular concept, does not imply that a person can know a concept without knowing a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

In other words, although knowing the concept is not a necessary effect of knowing the language, knowing the language can still be a necessary cause. I accept the correction.

There is no such thing as redness unless there is such a thing as what the word "red" refers to. And, there is no such thing as what the word "red" refers to unless there is language. Therefore there is no such thing as redness without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

My turn to call non-sequitur. Just because the word "red" refers to the thing which causes the concept redness in the mind, it does not follow that the word "red" is necessary for the existence of the thing, and by extension, the existence of the concept. (Note that I have used the term "concept" to refer to both the thing outside the mind and the idea inside the mind, and as Wayfarer points out, this could be inconsistent with Aquinas who differentiates between form and concept).

You said "exact same properties", so if I am not picky I have not carried out my obligation of due diligence to determine whether the conditions of "exact same" have been fulfilled. — Metaphysician Undercover

But according to google, a plane is a flat surface, and so we are really saying the same thing, and in which case our concepts of triangle-ness does coincide.

That's the problem. "Exact same" implies that accidentals have been included. "Universal" implies that accidentals have been excluded. The two are incompatible by way of contradiction. Yet you insist upon using the two together, to say that I have the exact same concept as you. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that 'universal' implies that accidentals have been excluded, by definition of 'universal'. But why would 'exact same' implies that accidentals have been included? As a side note, I thought your position from an earlier post was that universal forms (2) existed, in addition to particular forms (3).

Space is one of the concepts which we use to understand relations between things. — Metaphysician Undercover

Although I find this topic interesting, I will drop out of it because it drifts away from the main topic of forms.

So you may be correct that "all forms are eternal" could be what Plato, Aristotle, and Augustine thought. It is hard to tell because Plato's dialogues I have read (far from all of them) were all about logic and morality which are necessary truths, not about contingent things like apple-ness and redness. Same goes for your passage from Augustine, which uses math as the example so that doesn't help us either :( . But more important than opinion is truth (philosophy > philosophers); and I think I can justify why we should make a distinction between eternal Forms (1) and non-eternal forms (2).

Imagine an evil tyrant who takes over the world and decides to erase the past by burning all books and teachers talking about logic, math, and morality. Well, despite this, the new generation would still be able to rediscover or recollect the laws of logic, math, and morality, and furthermore, the tyrant would not be able to successfully teach different laws than the true ones, such as "2+2=3" and "justice is bad and injustice is good". This is also on par with Plato's Theory of Recollection in the Meno, in which a slave can recollect geometric principles despite never being taught geometry. As these Forms are indestructible and unchangeable, even in the mind, they are eternal and stand above all else.

On the other hand, if the evil tyrant decided to destroy any particular object that is red (jerk), then the new generation could not conceive the form of redness. Redness is not an eternal Form that can be rediscovered or recollected; and must be observed at least once to be conceived; and so Meno's slave could not have recollected redness if he never observed a red thing before. As these forms cannot be acquired by the mind without existing in particular things observed, they are not eternal in the mind.

One question I have about it is - what exactly is meant by the term ‘intelligible object?’ — Wayfarer

Good question. My guess is that 'intelligible' it is not synonymous to 'observable', but is rather related to having coherent communication. We can observe particular things with all their accidentals, but we cannot intelligibly describe each particular thing without the use of universal forms followed by their accidental properties. In order to have an intelligible conversation with you about a particular rock in my backyard, I would have to describe it literally as "the rock (universal form of rock-ness) in my backyard (its accidental properties)". If I called it "Rock #22" or "Bob", you would not know what I am talking to you about if you have never observed said rock.

You stated the terms 'blueprint' and 'eternal' in the same sentence. I think it is important to keep the distinction between Forms and forms. Forms or necessary truths are eternal; forms or concepts or blueprints are not. It is not possible to imagine a thing that is illogical, thereby making logic an eternal Form. On the other hand, it is possible to imagine a world where no red things exist, that is, where no particular participates in the blueprint of redness, and effectively, no subject in that world (excluding God) can acquire the concept of redness; thereby making redness a non-eternal form.

So your claim is that the child understands what "red" is without understanding language. Why is that not contradictory to you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Do you really believe that we can have concepts without language? — Metaphysician Undercover

Why is it contradictory to you? It would be contradictory to understand the word "red" without the language, but not the concept "redness". Concepts are not made of words; rather, words point to concepts. A blind man may know the language, but cannot grasp the concept of redness if he has never seen a red thing. Therefore language is not the cause of acquiring concepts.

Sorry, but my concept of triangle is not the same as that. Mine is of a plane figure, with three sides and three angles. See how different mine is from yours? Yours is "flat", mine is "plane". Mine has three angles. yours does not. Mine is the concept of a triangle while yours is the concept of triangle-ness. To have "the exact same properties", all properties, even the accidentals, must be the same. — Metaphysician Undercover

"Flat", "plane"... don't be so picky about the words MU. And yes, you can have three angles too, but these are redundant because a plane with three sides necessarily has three angles. You might as well add that the sum of the angles equates to 180°, but this is once again redundant. To sum up, your concept coincides with mine; thereby demonstrating that subjects acquire identical concepts, which is necessary to have coherent communication.

What accidentals can you add to concepts? Remember that concepts are universals.

Space and time, as we understand them, are not physical things. Nor are the relationships between physical things physical things. This is why physicalists produce such a confused form of metaphysics, they take the descriptions which physicists produce, concerning the physical world (descriptions of relationships between objects), and treat these descriptions as if they are actually physical things. — Metaphysician Undercover

I think I agree with you regarding time not being a physical thing, because it is a function of causality, which is not necessarily about physical things. But what about space? Common sense or default position is that space or location is a physical thing. How can you back up your claim that it is not?

OK, now you add another qualification, the child must be able to understand the language. That just proves my point. Which do you believe, does the child abstract the concept of redness solely by seeing red things, or is the use of language necessary as well? — Metaphysician Undercover

The child abstracts the concept of redness solely by seeing red things. The understanding of language is not necessary for abstracting the concept, but it is to test if the child got the concept or not, simply because us observers need to ask the child questions. If we could pierce into his mind without asking questions, then he would not need to understand the language. The language is necessary only to know the words which point to concepts, not to obtain the concepts themselves.

First, you beg the question with your definition of universal form, by saying that they are separate from the minds which they are in. That is what you are trying to prove, that they are separate from the minds. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you suggesting that universal forms are identical to minds? This seems so absurd to me that I did not find the need to backup that statement. Does this means that if you think of a triangle, then your mind becomes triangle-ness? Anyways, I was not trying to prove that concepts are separate from minds, I was trying to prove that all minds connect to the same concepts; as such the argument is not begging the question.

Then, you still do not have any premise which allows you to assume that concepts in different peoples' minds have "the exact same properties"? — Metaphysician Undercover

We went over this before but I will demonstrate once again for one concept. My concept of triangle-ness has the essential properties "flat surface" + "three straight sides". Does your concept have the exact same properties? If not, then what are they?

I would assume that being in different minds is a case of having different properties. — Metaphysician Undercover

But I thought you agreed that forms were not physical, did you not? If not physical, then they cannot have any physical properties, such as a physical location.

Thanks for the info on relational properties. indeed, I think it is the case for colours. I don't see why temporal and spatial properties would be relational though. Relational to what? They are accidental only. I also don't agree with the negative property concept. Instead of saying "an object has the property of non-x", it seems more correct to say "an object does not have the property x".

Why not? Understanding happens in a time and a space. — Akanthinos

I think understanding happens in a time, but not in a space. Here is why: Consider time t1 before I understand an info, and time t2 after I understand it. If we could go back to t1 (somehow), then I would not understand the info. But I understand the info at places p1 and p2, provided it is at time t2. In other words, the existence of understanding seems to be a function of time but not of place.

But I wonder it this is besides the point anyways. The existence of the information "Montréal is in Québec" is not dependent on the receiver understanding the message, is it?

Could you provide an example? I don't see how one could fulfil justice without being just. Note, I don't mean here mere legal justice, which could be unjust; but real justice.

Dang. Once again, I have trouble understanding your big words. Could you provide an example of what you call 'non-relational aspects of an object'?

I'd argue in the same sense as you, but rather viewing temporal and spatial properties of information as yet another indication that information is physical. Datum informs also the processor from their occurences in space and time, and therefore in no actual way does Epp applies in a meaningful way to both individualised occurences of "Montréal is in Québec" and "Montréal is in Québec". — Akanthinos

If I understand correctly, you say that because the information "Montréal is in Québec" was spoken at a specific time and place, then that indicates that info is physical. But as I was trying to show, the info is a separate thing from its container. The container has a time and place, but not the information. People acquire the same information from the message "Montréal is in Québec", regardless if they hear it today or tomorrow, in Canada or in France.

Well ... yes. Unjust justice is a contradiction, and so the fulfilment of justice, that is, being just, cannot be unjust.