It's just possible that we didn't evolve the capabilities to perfectly model the cosmos. Or that our modeling leaves something out since it's abstracting the patterns from empirical experience. — Marchesk

What would a perfect model of the cosmos look like compared to imperfect models? It seems to me that it is the nature of models to leave things out - things that are not useful to what your goal is in modeling some aspect of the cosmos. Why do we model?

Dreams could be simulated subjective experiences.

Iirc you were asking about how an unconscious mental process could feed into a conscious experience. — Kenosha Kid

Here you seem to be asserting that the neurologist is conscious of the patient's unconscious processes before the patient is conscious of them:

There was a famous experiment a while ago that showed that neurological behaviour associated with motor responses fired before correlated decision-making processes in the prefrontal cortex. The subjects remember, from their limited but direct phenomenal experience, deciding to act, then acting, when in fact the action appeared to be unconsciously chosen and only consciously ratified -- or rationalised -- after the act. — Kenosha Kid

This reminds me very much of Daniel Kahneman's System 1 / System 2 model of the brain and his tests of it. Problems that appear amenable to pattern-matching (the thing that makes it easier to add 5 or 9 to things than 7 or 8) but that pattern-matching would lead to the wrong answer for follow a similar pattern. Human subjects swear blind they worked out the answer, when in fact they seem to be *receiving* an answer and ratifying it. Badly. That is, System 2 (the so-called rational, algorithmic part of the brain associated with conscious decision-making) receives a putative answer from System 1 (the dumb but hard-working pattern-matching part of the brain that acts without conscious input). — Kenosha Kid

Iirc you were asking about how an unconscious mental process could feed into a conscious experience. We just ended up at how humans learn anything at all by a regression of lazy 'Why?'s. Since there's no end to that, and I have good reason to believe that humans learning things is not something you doubt, I'm drawing a line there. It is sufficient to accept that humans can learn within the scope of this question. (A different matter if the thread were about, say, child development.) — Kenosha Kid

No. For the umpteenth time, I'm asking what observable difference is between conscious and unconscious processes are.

This says nothing about how memory is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery. — Harry Hindu

It's not all perceptual. A dream of a red apple isn't information about an apple in the external environment. — Marchesk

This just causes more confusion about what a subjective experience is. Why do people keep using terms that they have no idea what it means? Is this not clear evidence that use and meaning are not one and the same? Can people use words that they don't know how to use?

Haha, what?
I didn't claim to know what pain is, why would I have a burden of proof on me? — Mijin

Haha, then why are you using a word that you don't know what it means. You literally don't know what you are talking about.

That's all I know about it. If you'd like me to break down what a subjective experience actually is, well I can't, and nor would any neuroscientist claim to be able to at this time. That's the hard problem that we'd like to solve. — Mijin

Then why do you use terms that you don't what they mean? That is ludicrous.

What I know about pain is that it is an unpleasant subjective experience, following activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system. — Mijin

What does it even mean for "an unpleasant subjective experience that follows activation of specific regions of the parietal lobe, usually (not always) preceded by stimulation of nociceptors of the nervous system"? How do subjective states follow from physical states?

I said that I assume (don't know) that other humans experience pain, because they freely claim that they do. P-zombies could of course claim to be in pain, but this would require the universe to be trying to fool me for some reason -- the simpler explanation for sentient beings claiming to have subjective experiences is that they actually do.

That's evidence and an argument for the existence of pain in other humans, not a claim that that is what pain *is*. — Mijin

This makes no sense. You assume that other humans have it because they claim it, and don't assume it if a pzombie or computer claims it. You assume IT exist in humans without even knowing what IT is. You're losing me.

Depends on whether the computer lacked a subjective experience of pain. — Marchesk

What is a subjective experience, if not information in working memory about the environment relative to your body.

A subjective experience is when the world appears to be located relative to your sensory organs.

Oh, I can explain it. I just can't learn it for you. We have reached an impasse: I shan't embark on a lengthy post describing how human beings learn things without a sign of good faith from you that this is a serious conversation, and you can't provide a sign of good faith, presumably because you have none. That, as far as I see it, is that. — Kenosha Kid

LOL. That is what I've been asking this whole time -- how human beings learn things. How is a scribble about unconscious processes, and what is the observable difference between conscious processes and unconscious processes?

As I said, you can't logically doubt that we can learn things and at the same time ask questions expecting to learn my viewpoint, or expect me to discern your meaning. — Kenosha Kid

I only doubt that we can learn things based on what you have said, not what I have said. You are the one that can't explain the difference between conscious and unconscious processes. If what you said works for you, then good for you.

Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works?
— Harry Hindu

It is often used that way. — Marchesk

What is often used that way? It was a question. Read it again.

What is the relationship between brain and mind?
— Harry Hindu

One's three pounds of flesh, and the other has something to do with the resulting subjectivity, intelligence, intentionality and behavior. — Marchesk

This doesn't tell us anything about the relationship between mind and brain. All you are doing is just re-explaining the differences. How do these different things relate to the point where they can be metaphors for each other? IS the brain a metaphor for the mind?

But then you're stuck with explaining everything from that monism. And some things don't fit quite so well. Take information before the evolution of life. What does it mean for a bunch of rocks to be information? Information to whom? — Marchesk

As I have said numerous times: Information is the relationship between cause and effect. A bunch of rocks is the effect of what caused the bunch of rocks - a landside, earthquake, etc., therefore a whom is not a necessary part for information to exist - only causal relationships are necessary.

Your second question is asking what information is useful, and for what purpose, so you are asking questions about usefulness and purpose, not information. Do you agree that some information is useful and some is not? It's not that the information doesn't exist. It's a judgement of which information is useful or not for some goal in the mind.

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. — Wayfarer

Is the brain a metaphor for how the mind works? Is the computer a metaphor for how the brain works, or how the mind works? What is the relationship between brain and mind?

Computers are metaphors for how the mind works, but the mind is not a computer. It doesn’t process bits of data. Conversely, computers don’t make judgments. — Wayfarer

This is circular. Why is the computer a metaphor for the mind, and not a chair? It seems to me that it is because computers do make judgements (IF-THEN-ELSE), just like we do. Brains process bits of data. The bits are the distinct "boxes" that we put everything in. We think in bits of sensory data - shapes, colors, sounds, feelings, etc - the smallest, most fundamental forms that we can think in.

Actually, the hard problem of consciousness is recognised by neuroscience. In a paper called The Neural Binding Problem(s), Jerome S. Feldman addresses the 'problem of the subjective unity of perception': — Wayfarer

Sure, because the problem is dividing the world into physical and mental parts, and then explaining how the two interact. The solution is to not divide the world into two separate parts - monism.

That's a shift of the burden of proof.

I feel pain.
I assume other humans also feel pain for various practical reasons, but also because if other humans were p-zombies they would have no reason to say that they experience pain.

Any claim beyond that, needs supporting arguments and data. In the case of animals, there are lots of good arguments for why at least some animals feel pain, but of course that's a big topic in itself.

But if someone wished to claim that computers, or non-living systems experience pain, the burden is on that person to provide an argument and data for this claim. — Mijin

No. The burden is upon you to explain what pain is.

You can only claim that others feel pain because of their behavior. If a computer behaved like they were in pain, would you say that they feel pain? You seem to be asserting that pain is a behavior. If not, then some behavior is informative of some state of pain. What is pain? Information about the state of your body. If a computer possessed information about the state of it's body, and was programmed to engage in behaviors when that information appears in working memory, then how is that any different than what humans do?

The problem is that this approach explains nothing. What are footprints in the sand? Information. What is consciousness? Information. What is memory? Information. — Daemon

Sure it does. It explains that everything is information. The problem is that you just don't like the idea because you haven't been able to supply a logical argument against it.

Memory is something that goes on in conscious minds. It's associated with conscious experience. There's a lot of very specific biological machinery involved, which has evolved over billions of years. It's an aspect of living beings. It's not an aspect of pianos, beach sand, or digital computers. — Daemon

This says nothing about what memory is, or how it is associated with biological machinery and not other types of machinery.

Do the footprints inform you of anything? What type of information can you acquire from footprints? What would a private detective use footprints for? Where are the footprints, in the sand or in the detective's brain? Where is the information that the footprints provide - in the detective's brain or in the causal relationship between the footprint (the effect) and the person who put them there (the cause). In other words, meaning and information exist prior to any observer interacting with it. The footprints inform you that someone walked this way recently, which direction they were walking, how big the person was, if they were running or walking, etc., all from an impression in the sand. Where does all of this information come from if not what caused the footprint?

I do not need to back up a claim that we can learn things from study. The claim is not seriously in doubt. — Kenosha Kid

Everything you said is to be doubted because you can't explain the observable difference between conscious processes and unconscious processes. In other words, you have no idea what you're talking about.

Worlds of difference. A camera image is either chemical emulsion if it's old-fashioned film, or patterns of pixels if it's digital photography. It's arguably not even 'an image' until it's recognised by an observer; cameras don't recognise images. An image is not an image to a camera, because no camera is capable of intentional action or interpretation. — Wayfarer

The same can be said about eyeballs. Connect eyeballs to a brain, or a camera to a computer, and then you have interpretations of images.

Let me ask you a counter question: do you know what an 'ontological distinction' is? Do you know why it might be argued that there is an ontological distinction to be made between devices (which are constructed by humans) and sentient beings? — Wayfarer

What is the distinction? Both cameras and sentient beings are physical objects. Seems to me that you'd have just as difficult of a problem explaining how images are in brains.

Please clarify, if possible. If not possible, no worries. — bongo fury

Read the rest of the post. The tree ring example doesn't clarify things for you?

I am saying much more than that. If you did not read those parts, or refuse to comprehend what I wrote, that's not my fault in presenting my opinion. — god must be atheist

If you want to point to where you said more than that, I'd be happy to address it, but it seems to me that you are the one not reading posts, and just providing knee-jerk comments to things you think I said, but didnt.

Here you demonstrated perfectly what you need ot deny: that words (scribbled or uttered) have meaning. — god must be atheist

I never denied scribbles have meaning. I said scribbles are images and images have meaning.

You, yourself, explained what the red of the apple is, without presenting an apple. You presented to me on sensory idea of "red", only verbal idea of "red". Therefore words have meanings, and we think in words. — god must be atheist

Would you have understood anything I said if you never experienced the visual of the redness of an apple?

All you are saying is that we use images and sounds to refer to other sensory impressions which can include other visuals and sounds, or even other scribbles.

All sensory impressions have meaning to them. Red of an apple means the apple ripe. Hearing you speak English means you know how to speak English. The smell of coffee means coffee is being brewed, etc.

The color isn't the ripeness. The sound isn't your knowledge. The smell isn't the coffee. They are all about these things.

Again, this is nothing but an infinite regress of childish 'Why? — Kenosha Kid

No. Its an effort to get you to back up your own statements. You can't even answer my question about the observable distinction between conscious an unconscious processes. So again, you continue to make statements using terms that you can't even explain or define in any coherent way.

You're right, I should have been more clear- what I meant was, in asking the question, I'm presupposing the distinction. In other words, what I mean is: supposing the distinction sound, what do they refer to? — McMootch

If the distinction were sound then there would be no reason to ask your question. Your question stems from the fact that the distinction between gender and sex isn't clear.

But these days folks are arguing that they're different, and then insisting upon certain uses in a way that, I think, doesn't really make clear how they're conceiving of the relationship between sex and gender and the pronouns. — McMootch

People can insist that people use certain terms all they want, but in a society with free speech, they can't dictate what words others should or shouldn't use.

If what they claim isn't clear, then what could they be insisting?

Is this a moral/political issue, or a metaphysical/epistemological issue? What does a person mean when they claim to feel like, or be, a man or woman? Is it a mental problem? Is it possible that we have souls that are male and female that get put in the wrong bodies, or what? The fact that there seem to be so many people willing to just accept what others insist that they do without asking these questions is a great example of how political propaganda has an effect on weak minds.

A Man Without Words: https://vimeo.com/72072873

We all think in images, or sensory impressions.

Words are scribbles and sounds. To say that you think in words is to say that you think in scribbles and sounds.

Difficult (or impossible) as it may be, I'm interested in determining whether there is any evidence that English pronouns are supposed to refer specifically to a person's sex or gender (or both). — McMootch

1. The question presupposes that there is a distinction between sex (biological) and gender (social/performative). If you don't affirm the distinction fair enough, but debating it is not the intent of this post. — McMootch

No, the question only presupposes that we use scribbles to refer to things, not what those scribbles should or should not refer to.

It seems to me that you have to first determine what the relationship between sex and gender are to be able to determine whether or not it is meaningful to use some scribble to refer to one or the other, or both.

Haha yes, potentially. When implemented as automation. Then the reference of each symbol token becomes a matter of mechanical fact. As when a machine translates a phonetic symbol into a sound. When considered apart from such automation, the syntactic connections may well be made semantically, so that we acknowledge a pretended connection between, say, a written letter and a phoneme, or between one written token of the letter and another. — bongo fury

The reference to each "symbol" becomes a matter of causal fact. Effects "symbolize" their causes. The tree rings in a tree stump don't pretend to be about the age of the tree. The tree rings are about the age of the tree because of how the tree grows through out the year - cause and effect.

Words and letters are slightly different in that their use is arbitrary. We could use any scribble or sound that we make to refer to any other sensory impression, which may include other scribbles or sounds. In this sense, it is the syntax/semantics that is pretend, or arbitrary.

The same causes lead to the same effects, and that is the syntax (the rule). The semantics is the relationship between cause and effect.

If you've ever read a nonfiction book, you have gained knowledge of things you never had conscious experience of. You do not experience Agincourt when you read about it, but you still acquire knowledge about it. Same goes for science. You can learn about things the brain does that we are not conscious of by study, research, education, reading out of interest, etc. I don't really get why this is where the conversation is going. It seems a tad basic. — Kenosha Kid

Your example is to basic and leaves too many questions left unanswered. How does consciously observing scribbles on a page provide knowledge of unconscious processes?

Is the web page that appears on your computer monitor a unconscious process? If it is, then are you consciously aware of an unconscious process? Is your breathing an unconscious process? Are you consciously aware that you are breathing? You may not be consciously controlling it, but can be aware of it and you can force yourself to breath faster, slower or deeper or hold your breath. You can even make noises when your breath. How do you explain how we can be both not conscious and conscious of our breathing?

What is the observable difference between conscious and unconscious processes?

If i knew, I'd be famous. Assuming I could explain it to the rest of you bullet-biting p-zombies. — Marchesk

I'm not one of those asserting that the mind is an illusion, or doesn't exist. What I'm saying is that our view of the world as "physical" boxes containing "non-physical" images and minds is wrong. The boxes are quantified information. There are no "physical" boxes with "non-physical" items in them. It is all information.

One of the strangest things the Deniers say is that although it seems that there is conscious experience, there isn’t really any conscious experience: the seeming is, in fact, an illusion. — Olivier5

Given that our knowledge and understanding of brains is in the form of conscious visual models, if our minds are illusions, then so is our understanding of brains. All the deniers do is undermine their own theories of how brains work.

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?
— Harry Hindu

I don't know. — Marchesk

Then how do you know that minds or images don't literally exist in computers?

It's a hard problem. But maybe we'll know in another century. — Marchesk

Its only a hard problem if you're a dualist. You have to explain how certain hardware contains minds and other hardware doesn't. The problem is thinking in "physical" and "mental" terms - that there are physical boxes that contain these non-physical things we call images and minds.

Produced by minds, part of the makeup of minds, however you wish to phrase it. Mind being a word for consciousness, thinking, intentionality, desire and anything that's difficult to reduce to neurons firing and chemicals flowing. — Marchesk

Thats just rephrasing your statement that images are in minds. What does it mean for a mind to produce images? Doest your computer produce images on the screen? Where is the image of this web page- in your brain, in your mind, or on the computer monitor?
I don't know what consciousness is, but thinking, intentionality and desire can all be reduced to behavior.

I don't know. The exist in our minds, though, and arguably nowhere else. — Marchesk

Well, that was my question: how do minds exist "inside" brains?

But then I think you need to also explain how images are "in" minds, too.

Like I said, I sounds like a meaningless contradiction. I asked the question to get clarification. Asking a question isnt making bizarre statements. Asking questions stems from trying to understand others' bizarre statements. Why don't you just answer the questions?

Which part of the brain asks questions - the conscious part, or the non-conscious part? Your still haven't made a meaningful distinction between conscious processes and unconscious processes.

Yep, images and sounds don't literally exist inside computers. They're encoded as information for output devices that create sound and light waves for our eyes and ears. — Marchesk

How do images "literally" exist inside brains?

So, everywhere. I disagree. — bongo fury

Your disagreement isn't an valid argument against anything I've said.

But it's a special fiction indulged by animals capable of playing along. — bongo fury

Then semantics/meaning is a fiction?
Wouldn't that mean that syntax is non-fiction?

The definition of consciousness, I'm going to use here is awareness of the external world and also of oneself. It's quite obvious that this is what is meant by consciousness by most folks as when these don't occur e.g. when one is asleep or in a coma, we're said to be unconscious. — TheMadFool

The problem is that you are still aware when asleep. You wake up suddenly to loud noises. How could you do that unless you were at least partially aware? Are you conscious while dreaming?

Is consciousness just an experience, or does the experience have to have some causal connection with the world outside of the mind, i.e, the experience is in some sense about the world?

I'm not sure what specifically you're asking. We have brains that react to external stimuli and convert that reaction into what we consciously experience via various transformations and augmentations. What bit of that are you questioning: How things can react to external stimuli (physics)?; Why we have brains that can do this (evolution)?; How brains do this (neurology)?; Or are you just asking about the first-/third-person distinction, e.g. why a stimulated nucleus accumbens feels like pleasure? — Kenosha Kid

You used the term, "experiences", so I'm asking you how you were using the term.

My bad, I used the term 'phenomena' in an inconsistent way. What I meant was that there are _processes_ in the brain that we are not conscious of (e.g. outline detection, pattern-matching, etc.) and processes that we are conscious of (e.g. rational decision-making). — Kenosha Kid

What does it mean to be "conscious" of something?

A child can just ask 'why?' to every answer; that's not interesting conversation. Do you believe that you are conscious of every thing your brain does, including the cited examples of inverting the retinal image, white-shifting colours, outline detection? Do you claim you make a conscious effort to do these things? Do you consciously regulate your breathing at every moment? Consciously produce dopamine when you spot something surprising that you consciously decide is good?

If not, then you already know that you are unconscious of many (indeed) of the processes occurring in the brain, and your incredulity is less than credible. — Kenosha Kid

It depends on what you mean by, "conscious" and "conscious efforts". How does one come to consciously know that they are unconscious of many processes occurring in the brain? :brow: It sounds like a meaningless contradiction to me.

That would be the fundamental unit of cognition - basic cause and effect. The sand acknowledges the pressure of the footprint and gives way accordingly. Its a long way from the complicated cognition we enjoy, but it is the start of it. — Pop

Exactly! The relationship between cause and effect is information, and information is a fundamental unit of cognition.

Was he saying that the sand on the beach (for example) was capable of cognition? — Daemon

Isn't your footprint information that Daemon passed this way? Doesn't the sand have a memory of your passing - the persistent existence of your footprint in the sand? Once the footprint is washed away, the sand forgets you ever passed this way.