Again, my point is the idea of forcing pain on someone else for one's own benefit of alleviating pain is not a good one. — schopenhauer1
Nah I don't think this follows. Just because someone is doing something bad does not mean I have any moral duty to get involved to stop them. I didn't ask to be here, and I hate cleaning up messes other people make. I have enough to worry about in my own life, so I mind my own business and let others do their thing. — darthbarracuda
But surely I am justified in trying to convince people that doing something is wrong, if I believe it is wrong? — darthbarracuda
Not having a child involves the certainty that the person will not suffer, and the uncertainty that...? — darthbarracuda
And again, unnecessary suffering (for someone else). — schopenhauer1
Was it necessary for her to not get harmed further or are you causing the very harm in the first place because you enjoy it? — schopenhauer1
No it isn't. Straw man. This actually has only surface similarities at best. The trolley problem is picking between two bad alternatives to other people. This is about creating all instances of future suffering for someone else to alleviate one instance of suffering of oneself. — schopenhauer1
Again, it's to alter their behavior to prevent other people's suffering. Just like the person who likes to blow up stuff in residential neighbhorhods who gets joy from it, should alter their behavior... — schopenhauer1
If someone else is born already and was blatently going to get harmed, and you were trying to prevent this, thus causing slight harm... vaccines, pushing someone out of a moving train, educating one's offspring, not neglecting them, that sort of thing. — schopenhauer1
Don't understand this argument — schopenhauer1
That implied, the small harm to oneself to prevent others harm.. affecting others.. — schopenhauer1
Again, other people's suffering is not a means to your end.. If someone likes blowing up stuff in residential neighborhoods but is prevented from doing so, and cries about it, tough shit. — schopenhauer1
If we continue to procreate, unethical behavior will continue. The inverse is not true and establishes its persuasive ability. — darthbarracuda
Presumably because the potential sufferings of an unborn person can and often does exceed (in great proportion) the potential sufferings of those who do not procreate (because they do not procreate). — darthbarracuda
If someone got pleasure from something that caused someone else known collateral damage (i.e. not intended but known to cause damage), that ain't good. — schopenhauer1
Forcing collateral harm on others, to alleviate one's own desires is not moral. — schopenhauer1
This is ridiculous reasoning. — schopenhauer1
Forcing suffering on others to alleviate one's own is not justified, because you don't know the quantity of suffering that will take place. — schopenhauer1
People are not means to your ends. — schopenhauer1
I said unnecessary suffering. Don't straw man. — schopenhauer1
One can argue, since already born, taking the vaccine is preventing oneself from harming others, besides preventing future harm for oneself. — schopenhauer1
But certainly, preventing birth, prevents all unnecessary harm from occurring for a future person with no negative consequence to that future person. — schopenhauer1
Can you give me an example of an altruistic action or deferred gratification action, or any action at all for that matter that isn't predicated on the belief that it will give you pleasure? (Perhaps substitute "pleasure" with "happiness" or "wellbeing" as they mean the same thing here). — Bert Newton
If one can prevent pain for another person when one is able to, that is the correct action. — schopenhauer1
To be an antinatalism you don't have to say that life is mostly suffering, you just have to accept that suffering is all that can be considered, so if ANY is experienced, it would be better never to have been. — JacobPhilosophy
This is because the absence of that pain is good, and the absence of all the pleasure you may have experienced is not bad, as it is not a deprivation to a potential being, only an existing one. — JacobPhilosophy
Well as I explained, just because a community truly believes they are doing what they believe to be in the best interests of human flourishing, doesn't mean they are right... — Thomas Quine
Just as in the natural world, diversity means some paths lead to the flourishing of the species, and some lead to extinction. — Thomas Quine
My next point is that we can actually determine what best serves human flourishing through science and reason. This means if we can agree on the common goal, we have an objective starting point for ethical considerations. — Thomas Quine
This would be the argument presented by saying giving birth (avoiding extinction) is the only way to guarantee ethical treatment. — JacobPhilosophy
We can, however, say that eliminating potential harm is good. — JacobPhilosophy
Well I'd say in regards to life evolving again, that would be beyond ones control. — JacobPhilosophy
Also, it doesn't make sense to say that procreation is the only way to guarantee ethical action, because that is only valuable when there is a being to receive said ethical action. — JacobPhilosophy
Could it be argued that extinction isn't only not unethical, but the only way to guarantee the removal of unethical practices? — JacobPhilosophy
I am something other than my experiences? Fancy that. — Pantagruel
I think population metrics are a better yardstick by which to measure human flourishing, in the same way if we ask whether bison are flourishing in Yellowstone, we don't track the life history of an individual bison. — Thomas Quine
Morals are grounded in intuition, and then whatever moral framework we’ve been inculcated with. — praxis
The Shakers of course saw their truest flourishing to happen after death and their beliefs were meant to lead them to it... — Thomas Quine
Am I wrong? Can anyone provide an example of a moral precept held by any community past or present who did not come to that position on the belief that it served human flourishing? — Thomas Quine
I don't follow your conclusion. If it's hopeless to try to universally justify our values, doesn't the nihilist escape tension by rejecting universal values? — Adam's Off Ox
So the nihilist experiences preferences, which you may call values, without falling back on some rational or logical meaning for those values. — Adam's Off Ox
You seem to be supporting the nihilist's position. — Adam's Off Ox
The intellectually honest nihilist is constantly in tension because he still values things and often has strong attachments while at the same time he rejects the idea of objective value. — BitconnectCarlos
If you do not communicate with us, what grounds could there be for supposing that you even have thoughts? — Banno
The issue here was if someone could have a concept of "me" without a concept of "not me". You've moved to someone with no concepts whatsoever. — Banno
What I don't like about philosophy is that you have to accept certain assumptions that cannot possibly be proven in any manner. — JacobPhilosophy
...and you can do this only because you also have thoughts that are about other stuff. That's how you worked out the difference between "me" and "anything external"; without which, not. — Banno
Then you missed the point. Thought needs much more than just a thinker. Think on it a bit. — Banno
One can only think because one is already embedded in a world and a language that interprets it. — Banno