When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths.

edit: not to mention, human values are treated as truths by many people, so the two things are entangled

edit 2: Otherwise, I mean rational in the traditional sense of being in accordance with reason or logic. Sorry for not making that clear in the OP.

Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. — DubiousDachshund

That rule consequentialism is appealing or desirable because of these things is undeniable.

Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point. — DubiousDachshund

I think that when you say that rule consequentialism says that the justification for following rules that are selected because they maximize value must either be grounded in estimated consequences, or it really is just deontology with a pre-justification of maximizing expected value in the form of your assertion that “an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value”.

You also say that the rules built on this rule are justified because they are impartially defensible. Well, they are only impartially defensible according to whether or not they would fit into this internalization-filter if premise (4) is denied, and their only criterion for selection is tied to that which makes them good; it becomes circular: a rule is good if it contributes to the maximum value because a rule says that maximum value is worth pursuing leads to maximum value by justifying that rule according to itself.

I don't think that this is a problem, however, if one concedes either that rule-consequentialism like Hooker's is actually deontology, as the inception of the internalization rule - or any of the rules it leads to - could just be treated like any other rule that can be defended in any of the often circular or specious ways people typically defend rules, i.e. lying is wrong because it is by nature dishonest and dishonesty is wrong, you have the duty not to lie because of divine proclamations, etc.

If you wanted to factor in all of the desirable aspects of rule-consequentialism as a defense of the assertion that the rules one might formulate should be judged based on whether or not they are impartially defensible, you would need to change the mechanism by which the rules are internalized.

Regardless, this means Hooker's rule-consequentialism would circumvent my argument, I think.

Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding. — DubiousDachshund

Yes, if you can prevent it from dissolving into act-utilitarianism then I agree that it seems it would be more reasonable.

This isn't necessarily true if one subscribes to rule-consequentialism. For instance, Brad Hooker's defense of rule-consequentialism—that an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value—denies this psychology. Rather, he argues a rule-consequentialist could hold the following psychology: (1) their fundamental moral motivation is to do what is impartially defensible; (2) they believe that acting on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible; (3) they believe that rule-consequentialism is on balance the best account of impartially justified rules. Thus, I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value — DubiousDachshund

I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

What about laws that would dictate which choice is to be made upon being presented with a dilemma?

If we are presented with a law, or an intersection of laws, that tell us how to differentiate between two acts with good consequences - but one is clearly superior due to the situation or context - isn't the intention just being displaced and projected onto a law or number of laws created by people that, if followed correctly, selects the best outcome based on a deficit of good consequences (its internalization dictates it must contribute to the maximum expected value, which implies that one outcome is preferable to another)? And if so, does the impartial defense of such rules not support the logic of my argument?

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'? — Leontiskos

An outcome is, broadly, what happens as a function of our directed intention, whereas consequences in this context are what actually happens to people when one acts.

If one subscribes to a categorical imperative against lying, then lying to bring about good consequences has no place at all in terms of bringing about ethical outcomes, whereas for a consequentialist lying could very well be an outcome favored because it brings about what are deemed to be good consequences. If you have an absolute rule that says one must never lie, the best outcome - not lying - is good regardless of the potentially crappy consequences it might have for people.

It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes. — Pantagruel

Clearly there are instances in which the consequentialist can effect a better outcome over another - even if non-trivial activities can have unforeseen outcomes. Just because we aren't always aware of all of the consequences of our actions doesn't mean we cannot make some accurate predictions and come up with what is a best decision according to its estimated outcome.

If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. — Pantagruel

My argument specifically stipulated that the best outcome could be achieved, a stipulation that could be changed to that "the best outcome that can be most reliably produced" could be achieved. It would be relatively easy to amend my argument to accommodate your objections, as "the best outcome that can be reliably produced" could just be the best outcome once the circumstances surrounding the viability of certain decisions are evaluated.

What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists. — Leontiskos

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). But yes, my argument could be applied to many different forms of ethics with some modifications.

Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien

I agree.

Not to mention, it seems to me that among the group of people who are aware of this thread and your OP, it appears most of the people who have responded disagree with you, so you are being coerced into believing that your own beliefs about meta-ethics are wrong, right?

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation. — Judaka

I think that one can successfully expand the group in such a way as to redefine what can be considered moral, even given that what you say about groups is true. For instance, most people only care about their loved ones, when really if they applied their principles universally - which I would argue is the ultimate goal of any successful morality - they would care more about children dying halfway across the world from starvation than about their dog. A moral position merely requires some sort of reasoning and an ought, not universal agreement among all moral agents in a given group.

Not to mention, is it not true that espousing a certain morality puts you in a group with others with a similar morality? Do I not have more in common with a free-thinker halfway across the world than my proselytizing, fundamentalist neighbor? Group membership can be viewed in so many different ways, and one is in so many different groups, that reducing morality to it being coercion by a group becomes a meaningless exercise except when adjudication is involved.

Would you say that those who fought for equal voting rights in the US were by default wrong merely because they were initially the minority and their views didn't benefit the wellbeing of everyone in the US? What if the reformers in this instance had viewed it that way? They wanted to guarantee everyone equal rights under a system that denied them rights, and their best arguments did not benefit the white upper or middle class. But then white people began to take up the cause because they saw the absurdity of segregation, and it was because of an expansion of group membership with little gain for those who defined how morality was judged - the group being citizens deserving rights - that people of color were given equal rights and the pre-eminent group morality was subverted. And this outcome cannot be attributed to good arguments alone; we needed people like Rosa Parks to point out the ongoing stupidities of racists with their actions.

So yes, a less common position might not agree with the morality of the group one is born into (such as white people in the 1960's) or finds themselves ensnared in, but according to your logic there can never be valid moral progress or evolution from within a group that does not favor the group being persuaded in some way; the independent reformer is potentially automatically wrong, and I think that that is a very problematic way of looking at morality, as morality must evolve as, say, technology advances. For instance, what do we do about potential AGI sling shotting us forward technologically? Or how to even engage with AGI at all? Our current modalities are not sufficient, and we need to be able to develop them to accommodate something that might be truly alien to us.

Essentially, I'm saying your view doesn't deal with instances in which a group has no motivation other than their own wellbeing to adopt a more equitable position, as it doesn't necessarily benefit the entire group in question and could even be contrary to the interests of the group at large. There needs to be some sort of external factors in there that decide it, be it actions of the minority or other, perhaps unintended things.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. — Judaka

Perhaps this is partially true, but those positions can be justified with reasoning given some first principles one might naturally espouse, so the moral position could be viewed as somewhat natural given the cognitive faculties humans have. Not to mention we are programmed to possess morals, even if the specific content of those morals is not synonymous with whatever behavior you think a given human would default to.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. — Judaka

Are you saying those things don't factor into one's moral perspective?

smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka

I for one have seen this happen on the forums and also the opposite, as even a minority opinion expressed well seems to earn respect here. So, I would say among people who largely try to be reasonable the smaller perspective is usually weighed, even if not charitably.

Yes, that appears to be correct. But how does that relate to truthfulness? That algorithm is just useful for determining whether red apples are sweet. It doesn't actually tell us that red apples are sweet; we would need to test the two types of apples. That's the point I'm making.

are such statements as the first one of any value to the philosopher when its truth value changes with the conditions (context) from which the statement is made? — invicta

On the other hand statements such as the ones in the second examples are tautologies but in a sense are more valuable in modern setting as they’re the basis of calculators and more complex computational machines which we rely on in the modern world. — invicta

Yes, truths that are modulated according to conditions are useful, if that is what you are getting at.

For instance, I might say about a person's decision to act in a certain way:

If one has the ability to have chosen otherwise, then one has free will insofar as the truth of different possible future outcomes is concerned. That is a pretty basic way of summarizing compatibilism.

But in the second quote you seem to be talking about algorithms. Algorithms - as exemplified by the Turing machine, which can implement any conceivable computer algorithm given enough time and a long enough strip of paper - are processes that we follow to make calculations or solve problems. They do not have to be tautological, or even true, but rather (ideally) efficient, possessing a finite number of steps, and directed at solving some specific problem.

Take the following statement below as not only being out of context but also being untruthful

All red apples are sweet

In the above statement would you say it’s useless be the mere fact that it’s out of context or that it is untrue ? — invicta

It could be useful even out of context if it were an integral part of a list of steps in an algorithm, which doesn't require truthfulness but rather something more contextual directed at solving a problem.

If it were just untrue then it just wouldn't be a good basis for a philosophical argument.

Apples grow on trees

The above has informative value in any given context as it informs the uninformed that apples grow on trees — invicta

This is better for a basis for an argument because it is universally true and also informs.

Many environmental problems are longitudinal collective action problems. They arise from the cumulative unintended effects of a vast amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are unknown to each other and distant from each other. Such problems are likely to be effectively addressed only by an enormous number of individuals each making a nearly insignificant contribution to resolving them.

Human sensibilities when it comes to managing and looking after their environment are simply overruled by the irrationality of such consumption driven by market forces beyond their simple understanding so much so that they become endebted to the technological consumerist age they live in…taking on uneccessary debt to have the latest car, the latest phone etc. — invicta

So, is capitalism a problem? Or do we all need to do nearly insignificant things in massive numbers to solve these problems? The first quote is not sufficient to explain how we would curtail market forces and the consumerism it is all entangled in. I do not know much about economics or how to organize political movements, and solutions to those two problems seem to ask more of one than what is claimed to be "nearly insignificant". Overthrowing capitalism - if you would advise that - seems unlikely in the extreme and (potentially) irresponsible.

Not that I wouldn't replace capitalism if I had the power to if there were a better thing out there for humanity and the Earth, but, as I recall Slavoj Zizek once warning the Occupy movement: you need to know exactly what you are doing if you want to make radical changes - even if those changes seem, or really are, necessary. Sorry if that comes across as patronizing or something. I just genuinely feel this way about it.

But I guess for now, I can make sure I recycle and stop buying unnecessary crap.

:up:

Wasn't playing devil's advocate, but I'll just let it ride. Good interacting with you. I don't think I have a whole lot to offer on this one. See you around, I guess.

How can an exactly identical situation have multiple possible outcomes? — Cidat

Seriously, though, compatibilism is the obvious answer, and that seems to be what you are looking for.

You could always say that it was plausible that you could have chosen otherwise in a given situation, that there could be a universe in which you chose otherwise - you just didn't. This doesn't require a situation to have multiple possible outcomes and is compatible with determinism or the idea that your actions have traceable causes. This is not libertarian free-will, but it is the closest we will probably get in this universe.

There are varying degrees of capitulation to esotericism that characterize philosophers' attempts to defend the idea of free-will, but your question is pretty simply answered: yes, there is a universe in which libertarian free will could exist.

There could be a universe in which every antecedent cause is dependent upon a future state of the universe, even, and that makes even less sense to me than the existence of libertarian free will.

It can exist in a universe in which magical, intangible devices exist in people's brains that allow them to defy the laws of physics and make choices unconstrained. Or in a universe in which we all exist with aseity, as it turns out, which is unlikely in the extreme.

I promise I'm not contradicting myself, as I think climate laws would still need to be logical, and thus airtight, so there is that.

In a perfect world, I think rational thought and desired outcome would be congruous.

Of course, they are not, largely, but when it comes to something as important as the climate crisis, the argument could be made to totally reshape society. The desired outcome - the avoidance of intense suffering for a large portion of humanity - is so all encompassing that reason and logic should be employed, perhaps even exclusively, to pursue this goal as doggedly as is necessary. It doesn't matter if environmentally friendly laws contradict other laws, as mitigation of the climate catastrophe is the force by which we should measure and shape other laws - not the other way around.

This would also apply for avoiding nuclear war or any other existential crisis that humanity might face.

I don't care whether it's logically consistent with the other laws that exist... Do you? — Judaka

Should we not try to avoid contradictions in law? Aren't parity and justice and general equality before the law to be desired over the short-term efficiency of judging a law only by its theoretical, although perhaps beneficial, outcome - at least some of the time?

Applying law, which is the main reason law exists - to be applied - becomes difficult when the laws you are referencing could be contradictory. For instance: the idea of mutual combat, a thing that goes on at most martial arts gyms pretty regularly, although not all, explains why we don't throw people in prison for leg-kicking each other vigorously.

However, a gunman might latch onto this and say that they and another engaged in a mutual shootout and, as a symptom, the other died, but they shouldn't be charged with murder because it was mutual.

Both circumstances could be construed as mutual combat, and if we do not have some sort of logic to parse the differences between mutual combat in a safe environment and mutual combat outside of a safe environment, we may end up allowing a murderer to get away with murder, or potentially imprisoning someone for wheel-kicking someone else in the head while sparring, depending on which way you lean.

I suppose my amendment to the OP is that no belief exists in a vacuum; rational thought requires a prioritization of logic to have better compatibility among beliefs or elements, especially when dealing with an applied logic, such as in law. The selection of the efficient, ostensibly desired outcome by mere selection of which factors give said outcome could have implications elsewhere that are antithetical to retaining overall structural coherence of such a system of beliefs or laws or whatever.

Another thing: if we are talking about a construct like law, for example, we very much are talking about something with a form of permeating logic, and one cannot throw out just any conclusion one desires via elimination of premises, as one would also need to throw out other conclusions that result from those premises elsewhere, or risk contradictions with whatever replaces the undesirable conclusion.

We cannot say that, for instance, "people are always responsible for breaking the law when they break the law, except when they break a law that circumstances can mitigate", even though we might not consider one responsible for breaking a law due to mitigating circumstances, and think it is wrong to convict someone when circumstances are mitigating, because this leads to a contradiction with the general case that people are always responsible for breaking the law when they break the law.

This retention of logic seems all-important to me, at least when discussing certain things.

I'm already sick of typing and hearing "permeating logic" in my head, and I don't even think it is all that original of an idea. I just kind of made it up to defend the idea that the most logical, rational view is always the best, an idea you have dislodged at least a little in my mind.

I don't think there's a way for all the different uses of the words logic and logical to be unambiguous. Especially "logical", which just has way too many meanings that overlap and apply in the same contexts. So, if there is a way that sidesteps the problem, I don't know about it. For me though, logic has no qualitative value, whereas "logical" might or might not have one. You can say one's "logical chain" purely descriptively, but generally "logical" means correct, valid, rational thinking. If someone's logic was invalid, then their conclusion wouldn't be logical. Maybe that helps? However, I'm no expert on the topic. — Judaka

Anyway, I think I'll have to ask you to re-explain what you mean by "permeating logic", as I'm just completely lost as to what this refers to. — Judaka

By "permeating logic", I mean a system or set of principles underlying the arrangement of factors that contribute to belief and, thus, beliefs themselves, that roughly adheres to the standards of logic.

For example, you might believe that we all have intangible but very real souls that pop into existence at conception. You also think people with souls should not be killed or murdered, although this does not only apply to fertilized eggs. Your reasoning that it is wrong to throw out an egg follows the standards of formal logic:

1. A fertilized egg has a soul.
2. It is wrong to kill beings with souls.
3. It is wrong to throw out fertilized eggs.

Not only is this logical, there is an underlying logic that gives more value to beings with souls than, say, octopi. The same person who believes that it is wrong to throw out fertilized eggs could be the same person who eats a live octopus, all according to what I would call a "permeating logic". The rigorous logic is a vehicle for the underlying logic, which I suppose could be construed as "true belief". The two may interact, but I would say mostly only when integrating new elements into one's worldview.

That it's difficult to incorporate incompatible beliefs means it's easier for one to integrate beliefs with a similar logic or reasoning, that fits into their current worldview. Do you think it's possible that we're saying the same thing in slightly different ways? — Judaka

I think we do indeed agree, yes. I'm just emphasizing the fact that reason and logic are to be desired, partially because I think people should always at least try to make their worldviews coherent according to general reasonableness regardless of any difficulty in doing so. This might be less efficient and healthy than just taking the path of least resistance, and I admit that. Both things have a time and place, for sure.

Way to make neuroscience make sense to someone scientifically illiterate like me. I half expected to be grouped in with NOS because of my lack of understanding, although perhaps I didn't make as many, or perhaps any, overly specious claims - or so it would seem from the way you broke it down.

I have no other arguments for free will and will now step aside so people with your knowledgeability can keep fighting the good fight.

:up:

That's basically the argument I made. Not my best, by far. I seem to remember hearing about an essay by Dennet that says something similar.

where do those externally generated signals get stopped? — Isaac

Do you think externally generated signals must be stopped at some point in order for free-will to exist?

What if there is some function by which beliefs, for example, are stored and represented at least partially by some sort of stochastic factor and then this sort of moderately understandable randomness results in enough deviation to allow one to say, with moderate certainty, that their beliefs are not formed only from external signals and personal valuation, but rather also a number of hidden factors that may or may not be physiological? What if we couldn't even observe the means by which beliefs are formed and acted upon, at least not on the right level?

Maybe we can do all that, and after reading about this I think the credition model of belief is probably accurate, but it seems to me that there is enough elbow room for us to posit that maybe not knowing everything about the brain could allow free will to creep in, even if it could be viewed as grasping at straws.

edit: this is my best argument for free will, and I'm not even committed to it; I know it is weak.

Cocky Libertarian gets humbled by Neuroscientist on the Reality of (the nonexistence of) Free-Will.

edit: I'm going to actually try to say something substantive, sorry for the cringeworthy jokes

On a regular basis, it's not so much that I change my beliefs as that I refine them and become more aware of them. But then there are a few issues where I have come to question my basic understanding in a more fundamental way. That feels unsettling, but that's how it's supposed to work. That's what philosophy is for. — T Clark

:ok:

Well said, sounds about right for me too.

I've noticed that I seem to be using two different meanings of the word "logic". I am designating goals as being logical, and also using the more scientific definition of logic that just means a system or set of principles underlying the arrangements of elements (or beliefs or factors that contribute to belief). I think that it is valid to say that there could be an underlying logic that governs one's beliefs in scientific terms, and also that these beliefs could be logical, as in they were produced by a logic that roughly adheres to the standards of formal logic. That's my understanding, but if I'm wrong please correct me anyone who knows more about this.

If someone has a perspective that is producing undesirable results, the reason for disbelief can't be just "it's not useful to be this way". Instead, one needs to attack that perspective using their true beliefs, making purposeful but minor adjustments, that's the path of least resistance. — Judaka

What determines if beliefs are true or not true? Are true beliefs just the beliefs that don't change when one has a perspective they want to change due to a lack of usefulness? Or are they more robust opinions that strictly reflect reality?

Adopting a perspective that is likely to produce the desired result, but is entirely foreign to someone's overarching views is not feasible, because it is likely to be simply too difficult for them to adopt that perspective. One cannot choose to believe whatever would be practical for them to believe. There are prerequisites for belief that must be followed or this entire endeavour will be pointless. — Judaka

The difficulty of integrating something that is largely incompatible with one's beliefs into their worldview doesn't really address the point that for any given belief there must be some similar logic and reasoning with one's held beliefs to integrate said beliefs into their worldview in a coherent way, even if to do so is a matter of making small, deliberate changes that do not presuppose general reasonableness. However, I don't see how the vectorized logic and reasoning can be separated from the making of these adjustments, and I can only think that one's "true beliefs" are exactly a representation of a source of a permeating logic (which is probably very flexible) that provides some of the necessary pre-requisites for forming beliefs.

My point is that even the successful, less logical outcome must contain some logic to be of use given there are some basic logical prerequisites stipulated by a permeating logic.
— ToothyMaw

What do you mean by "some logic"? Are you saying it can be illogical, but it must fit into an individual's wider narrative of their world? Or something else? — Judaka

Upon re-reading that I'm not sure what I meant. I think I meant that there must be some overlap between any number of similar goals and an ideal goal that would be considered totally in line with a permeating logic for those goals to be useful, and that the goal that is most in line with the latter might make less sense on a global scale and more sense in terms of individual outcome compared to the other goals.

Of course, one needs to set good goals and determine whether their perspective will deliver on those goals and this requires reason to figure out. However, once you're satisfied that you've done your best to create a goal, then the perspective needs to accomplish producing that desired outcome, and succeeds and fails by whether it does, yes? — Judaka

I suppose.

Therefore, a perspective that is accurate and logical but does not produce the desired outcome is a failure, and a perspective that mightn't be that accurate or logical which does is a success, do you agree? — Judaka

My point is that even the successful, less logical outcome must contain some logic to be of use given there are some basic logical prerequisites stipulated by a permeating logic.

However, are you talking about a shared logic, like one built by a society? — Judaka

I'm going to call it "permeating logic".

By permeating logic, I mean the logic that operates more broadly than that which is applied to something as local as some packet of premises and desired conclusions. This could be a logic shared by people, or it could be a logic that one desires to abide by for the sake of having a sensible worldview. I am inclined to think that people interact with both.

I think that any given perspective or goal derived at least partially from a permeating logic must agree with some aspects of the permeating logic and also must not contradict it. This means that the ends are indeed a logical perspective or goal, even if that isn't what makes it good, per se. But do we not want to preserve the rules designated by logic, among other things, that guide our forming of perspectives by providing a logic or logical framework?

What you write about is detachment, a means of circumventing the misapplication, or overapplication, of logic and reason. I am starting to agree with you that yes, this is a useful way of looking at things some of the time.

It is only worthwhile to bring up my OP in circumstances where you aren't evaluating a perspective by the outcome. If it's useless, it's because it'd be redundant to tell you to do what you've already been doing. — Judaka

Good point.

It's about the measuring stick for success which guides their reason. You keep bringing up cases where the measuring stick is pre-defined to be the outcome. Do you perhaps, secretly agree with me? It's okay to join me on the dark side, you know? We can form a supervillain team together. — Judaka

So long as I get to be the evil, big brain mastermind that ultimately spells his own doom with his unchecked hubris.

I wasn't questioning your qualifications on this subject. I consider introspection a valid source of psychological knowledge. — T Clark

Well, in that case, I at least, try to think that way. I have some overarching principles and really only view that which is logical and reasonable as worth integrating into my worldview. Maybe some of my assumptions are wrong, but I believe that it is one's duty to try to iron that out through dialogue and introspection.

When I'm on here I almost always argue for fun, but sometimes I have to change some beliefs, which is always interesting depending upon how dear to me it is.

goals must possess some logic to be of value in a world that largely acts sensibly on a human scale.
— ToothyMaw

I think this is really wrong in that it doesn't reflect how real people determine value in the real world. It seems like you are trying to stuff how people really behave into your mold of logic and reason where it doesn't fit. — T Clark

I'm only talking about some instances in which there is a deliberate, rational consideration of what to believe. I don't think humans really think this way all of the time. Obviously, people determine value based on a multitude of things. What I am describing is just one facet of that.

I admit I'm not qualified to make serious claims about how people actually think, but I think I can make claims about how the relationship between the evaluation of the worth of goals and their relationship to logic works, which is hypothetical and not grounded in any real understanding of the human mind.

Do you really think this is how people who play chess think and behave? I haven't played chess since I was a kid and I was never very good at it, but the process you guys are describing seems artificial. There are billions of possible moves and chains of moves. It makes sense to me that reason would come into play to help evaluate a move once one has been identified, but I don't see how it could possibly be useful in identifying moves in the first place. — T Clark

There is a difference between strategic thinking (long-term), and short-term tactical thinking, both of which are engaged in in chess, and pretty much every other game of any complexity that there is.

Is a method that accomplishes the goal successful or not? Of course, there's room for nuance in evaluating the outcome. The best method isn't one that succeeds at great costs or with great risk. But shouldn't a perspective be evaluated by what it produces, not by whether it's logical or accurate? What does it even mean to be logical and accurate without a goal? What do you think? — Judaka

I think that to say that perspectives only have value insofar as they produce the desired outcomes doesn’t deal with the selection of which outcomes should be pursued (not saying you are saying logic and reason don’t matter). In chess, as you point out, the goal is pre-defined as winning. So yes, I agree that we agree on the fact that in circumstances in which the goal is clear and immutable, the only thing that matters is producing “moves that win”, as opposed to trying to only develop moves that are rational or logical for the sake of being rational and logical. Consequences > reason for its own sake.

But in cases where the goal must be established, either by subjective evaluation of one’s own motivations and desires or by knowledge of objective facets of reality, reason seems to be at least partially responsible for the establishment of those goals, as we can always ask ourselves: is this goal, whether it be informed by facts or a way of thinking or something else, actually worth pursuing? If it is, why? Is usefulness not itself relative to the goal, whose relevance is in turn relative to the reasoning used to formulate that goal?

Thus, I think logic and reasoning are inherently valuable because robustness of opinion is the greatest measure of whether or not some perspective is valuable for accomplishing a goal insofar as it represents the realization of a plausible world that we would want to live in - which I think is the greatest goal for any perspective.

Do you think the rules of chess, by which moves are a function of, are based on a logic that makes it a desirable, deeply satisfying game to play? I do. I see the realization of personal goals as being no different; goals must possess some logic to be of value in a world that largely acts sensibly on a human scale. People want there to be rules, they just differ on which rules are correct, and rightly act in accordance with said rules when possible - much of the time.

Something kind of interesting but somewhat off-topic: I think reason plays the long game; if you have a game in which the rules change, the goal becomes to both further the game (so long as it is useful to do so) and to develop new heuristics via experience and reasoning. What you outline, while conceptually efficient, doesn't favor this augmentation of perspectives, but rather provides a schematic for understanding the processes by which people should form perspectives. So, it seems of limited usefulness outside of evaluating the worth of an individual's opinions.

I would like to discuss Aristotle with you but, honestly, I'm reading about this and none of it is making sense. Wikipedia is not ideal for learning things...at all, really.

The proximity to the powers that be seems to be important to me: the corporation, while faceless, takes the position of the provider to a certain degree, yet has no issue with dictating the terms of one's toils without any pretense of having one's best interests, or the best interests of anybody, in mind, as profits are all that matter.

Furthermore, there is a sense of purpose and identity that goes with living under an authoritarian strong-man who speaks to all of the xenophobic or otherwise dark tendencies some people desire to see realized. At least Trump had the interests of the reactionary right and alt-right in mind. I doubt a single cart-gatherer for a super-market truly believes that the supermarket they work for cares that they harbor racist thoughts - or would validate them. Probably because they don't and wouldn't, as a corporation is not a political tribe.

edit: not supporting Trump here, he was perhaps the most criminal president we have ever had

Unreasonable arguments that bring a person happiness, therefore, produce happiness. Well-reasoned, intelligent arguments that bring a person despair, therefore, produce despair. Happiness is preferable to despair, and so the illogical and fallacious perspective is correct. — Judaka

I am not arguing against the use of reason. I am proposing that one should use reason to find the most useful perspective for themselves, and carefully consider the pros and cons of their perspective before deciding upon it. — Judaka

Truth or logic, they're both irrelevant, just choices, we reach our conclusions by the process of deciding what factors to include and emphasise, and how we interpret these factors. — Judaka

It seems arbitrary to designate the illogical and fallacious perspective to be correct merely because it produces happiness. But I understand you are playing fast and loose with some of these conclusions merely for the sake of conciseness; some people have already done that legwork.

The connection between the assertion that selecting factors to reach conclusions and the idea that all that matters are the outcomes of such conclusions doesn't really follow, I think.

Truth and logic are relevant because they are integral to any process by which factors are considered and disregarded; you seem to be operating under the assumption that we do not apply different types of reasoning when forming conclusions, and the choice of reasoning is certainly paramount to reaching a conclusion that can be deemed useful, just as the selection of factors is.

And reason, even if applied to reach a certain end, inherently arcs towards truth given some correct first premises or postulations. Conclusions that do not have any basic logical prerequisites are by their nature not useful much of the time because they do not have to reflect reality. So, if we want usefulness that extends beyond "this is good because it makes me happy" or "this is good because it will help me become more competent", the application of logic and reasoning isn't really a choice.

I would say that reasoning is imperative as a means of extending one's useful conclusions
— ToothyMaw

What does "extending" mean? — Judaka

I mean using logic and reasoning to form beliefs based on other beliefs. People do that all the time, and it doesn't necessitate the consideration of an arbitrary number of relevant/irrelevant factors.

I am not arguing against using reason. Chess is not an example where reason determines what perspectives or ways of thinking are good, only what produces good moves in chess does that. — Judaka

Okay, but - and you seem to agree with this - the formulation of good moves is still informed by reason in chess, even if it isn't the same kind of reasoning that determines if a perspective is good or bad. It does determine usefulness, however, which you claim to be the most important measure of the validity of a belief, so there is a parallel.

Thus, my point in bringing up chess was to demonstrate that, even given a context in which outcome is all that matters, imposing parameters often does not diminish the value of reasoning (whatever kind of reasoning that might be); I'm not saying that the goal is to form logical, reasonable opinions about chess, but rather that parameters, even if they must exist to do something as basic as thinking, do not inhibit the importance of using reason to "win". Reason is not a choice, but rather a necessity, for forming opinions with useful outcomes.

Only so far as they help to produce the desired outcome. However, I'm not endorsing any methodology for what outcomes are desired. — Judaka

The stakes here are whether logic, reason and accuracy are mandatory qualities for a belief to be considered good. Not whether they're ever important. Do you think that an unreasonable opinion that produces happiness is better than a reasonable opinion that produces misery? Or is the quality of your opinion dependent upon being accurate, truthful, logical and valid? — Judaka

I would say that reasoning is imperative as a means of extending one's useful conclusions, and also of measuring the usefulness of extending or broadening a conclusion: if the forming of opinions existed in a vacuum with no logical extensions or prerequisites for forming them, then any belief could potentially be justified via weighing of subjectively valued pros and cons. If this were the case, then no belief would have any more value than another unless its value was consensually agreed upon by all, and there would be no way of resolving many significant disagreements.

I know you aren't arguing that logic doesn't exist, but you do argue that it is a choice to use it when forming valid opinions. If the methodology by which an opinion is formed is the only measure of its validity, disregarding the logic that might help you form beliefs based on other beliefs, then there would be a collapse into what I just described; we would be stuck with a bunch of contradictory opinions whose conflicts could not possibly be resolved except to introduce some sort of reasoning and/or logic.

I don't know how this translates into logic being necessary for an opinion to be good, but logic is an absolute necessity for us to have any means of sorting reality in cases less trivial than leaving for work late because one is a dunce.

Someone is finally understanding that I'm this forum's villain. — Judaka

You took that dig well.

Upon reading a few more times: did you actually write this, Judaka? It's like you told ChatGPT to write like a cross between the Joker and someone trying to recruit young men for a domestic terrorist group.

Maybe there's a little Jocko in there too.

edit: hints of lobster?

I hope my post wasn't too critical, by the way. I think it is a thought-provoking OP.

I rely on a whole army of people because my little brain could not even slaughter the cow or start a fire, or a hack random piece of flesh off a carcass to hold over the fire on a green stick till it had charred a bit. And that is how I deal with unworkable complexity - I get someone else to do it, who can do it better. — unenlightened

I get the feeling Judaka is concerned with an individual's interactions with complex constructs or issues. Even between the different people in the beef-to-mouth chain you talk about Judaka would probably say those people engage in the pruning of relevant factors when fulfilling their tasks or communicating with each other. That's how I understand the OP, at least.

But I could be wrong, for sure.

To express one's self, in thinking or communication, there needs to be a concise message. Of all the points of possible relevance that could be brought up and used to reach some type of conclusion, it is not feasible to use more than a handful. — Judaka

The limitation of logic lies in our limited capacity to deal with more than this handful of factors, and that each factor must be limited further still by meaning. — Judaka

You make it sound like the process of reaching conclusions goes backwards; when someone addresses an issue of some complexity, I would expect them to both discover and intentionally select points of relevance to integrate into their expression, and this might facilitate something not so concise.

While it may be true that people set out to prove things via some established premises or postulates, perhaps even in the hopes of reaching a certain conclusion, most people are not mathematicians and logicians; most people don't use the logic necessary to forming sound conclusions, so they aren't really bound by it. Nor are most people textbook writers, so I don't see why people must necessarily form conclusions based on points of relevance only.

You seem to be arguing in favor of some sort of ideal thinker, even though you appear to simultaneously assert that logic and reason are irrelevant and that the only thing that matters is that one disregards certain factors when expressing oneself.

What is the process used to sequester these factors if not some form of reasoning?

To give each point the meaning necessary to justify its relevance? The very process of thinking precludes the possibility that one hasn't created a circumstance with parameters resulting from the prerequisites of simplifying for limitations of expression. — Judaka

True, but parameters might genuinely not matter, or be immensely useful, insofar as useful conclusions can be drawn despite what seems to be a selection process centered merely on producing something concise enough to be understood that also works. For instance, when determining how to move your bishop in a game of chess, its possible moves not only exist so long as the rules of chess are agreed upon, but also remain so when you are considering how to move other pieces. You could think about how your adversary's knight might intersect with how you might move your rook. But you wouldn't say that one's strategizing does not matter when considering things other than the movement of your bishop, would you?

I know this example is imperfect, as anyone any good at chess just holds all of the ways the most currently important pieces can be moved in their heads at all times, with no need to partition their thinking. But they do engage in strategies that do not require near omniscience that win them games, so those strategies must pay off, and I find it difficult to believe that reasoning ceases to matter, or becomes less important, the moment you exclude some factor from consideration.

Unreasonable arguments that bring a person happiness, therefore, produce happiness. Well-reasoned, intelligent arguments that bring a person despair, therefore, produce despair. Happiness is preferable to despair, and so the illogical and fallacious perspective is correct. — Judaka

So basically, everyone should believe anything they want so long as it makes them happy because we use arbitrary processes of sequestration to express ourselves. That seems to be what I'm reading here.

The methodology for measuring the various pros and cons is what matters, rather than evaluating the logic or truthfulness of the ideas. — Judaka

 
Are the logic and truthfulness of a belief not important pros or cons, or perhaps even the most important depending upon what we are talking about? And what about morality?

How could humanity possibly function if that was what all of us did? Just weigh the pros and cons without any care for right or wrong, true or false? Maybe that kind of logic applies to aesthetics, or warfare, but in a civilized society we need to have laws that are a result of, or are enabled in some way by, some sort of logic. Science also requires the imposition of parameters yet exists beyond pros and cons.

I see no way around that.

Okay, I think we almost entirely agree. That doesn't happen a whole lot on this site.

Would you say we ought to reduce suffering regardless of the status of the individuals in consideration? The suffering of one individual does not take precedence over the suffering of another?

If so, that is a sensible, but not flawless, morality that fits my conditions and then can inform our laws.

The morality of an action is deemed by the effect of harm be that physical, financial or even emotional on an individual. — invicta

You are talking about the specific case, which would be some sort of negative utilitarianism, whereas I am talking about the general case - the conditions necessary for a morality to inform our laws in a meaningful way.

Right. Thanks for the wisdom, Josh. I'll look into some more contemporary accounts of philosophy of science.

I find that every time I talk about something I don't really understand on this forum I get corrected. Maybe I should stop talking about things I don't understand.