Well, I have issue with saying that laws can be only based on consequences because no one knows the full consequences of their actions. — I like sushi

You might not know the full consequences of your actions, but one might know that following a certain law when it applies will generally maximize the consequences the law is shooting for.

it seems like I have to assume there is some hypothetical law that can be seen as unquestionably ‘the best’ law. If so then why would anyone question it. Point being rules are questioned and the kind of ‘laws’ I believe you have in mind are not ever brought into examination they are just accepted. — I like sushi

I'm saying that if a law selects for consequences, and you grant (2), you end up with the conclusion that you must follow certain laws exclusively. You can question those laws, but the intent behind those laws remains, and, thus, they are prone to this extrapolation. They could be changed like any other law, however, and not all laws are obviously based on consequences, so my argument is somewhat specific in this regard.

For comparisons sake, we do not question whether or not a ball will drop if released, we bring this inot question only when experience shows otherwise (ie. in outer space). Obviously we are talking about ethics here so there is far more to question here when it comes to human biases and subjective opinions soak with human emotions. — I like sushi

Why not question a law - even if it is one of the laws I mention? Certainly, the outcome of following any law would be less certain than dropping a ball near the surface of the Earth.

It seems to me that the act-utilitarian, for instance, always acts rationally when bringing about the best outcome - something I argued must always be attempted if one is to have good intentions - as the best outcome, which has the best consequences, is the only good outcome if all other outcomes have deficits of good consequences. So, the act-utilitarian must also relinquish their free will if they are to be a “good” consequentialist.
— ToothyMaw

This seems to be implying that free will must somehow involve you doing things at random, or for emotional, short sighted reasons which doesn't seem like an obvious premise. — Echarmion

Not what I'm saying. I'm saying that in terms of making choices about how to act in moral situations, one can only choose the decision with the best outcome if they want to be a good utilitarian. Choosing a second best outcome is not always emotional or short-sighted, although I do argue it is wrong.

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives, does one truly have free will in a meaningful sense, given people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws?
— ToothyMaw

The obvious counter-question to this is what "free will in a meaningful sense" is supposed to be. There are people that argue that the essence of free will is the capacity to act rationally. — Echarmion

If freewill is acting rationally, and the act utilitarian has only one rational choice, would you still think that that is meaningful free will? I certainly don't.

Alternatively, you might list deontology or rule-consequentialism as examples in which one can be rational by following rational, impartially defensible laws. But did you make those laws?
— ToothyMaw

I don't think anyone else but me can make the laws that are in my mind. — Echarmion

You have no means of imposing those laws on anybody probably, so those laws don't matter much.

Given this argument holds, it appears that rule-consequentialism does indeed become more and more like act-utilitarianism as the laws get more specific, as premises (1) and (2) are granted by probably every rule consequentialist and some deontologists, too. So, if you want to make consequences matter, you have to grant that it is rational to only act in one very specific way - maximizing utility - in certain circumstances, and if you don’t like this, you have to deny premise (1), (2), or (1) and (2).
— ToothyMaw

The problem is that utility isn't defined here, so while this kind of reasoning is useful if you have a given value you want to maximise for, it doesn't give you that value by itself. — Echarmion

I intentionally didn't define exactly what utility is, as the thing being maximized might vary according to each relevant law. But for the rule consequentialist utility would probably equate to welfare most of the time, and that is most relevant for that portion of the OP.

Would you like me to try and explain it? What specifically didn't make sense? And yes, premise (2) is basically saying that if we form laws based on consequences, we ought to act according to those laws such that we gain maximum utility (in other words follow the appropriate law whenever it applies, something established in (6)), as the consequences mattering is crystalized in those laws. Even a deontologist might create a law that prioritizes consequences solely in order to bring about the desired consequences in the form of utility. If the law doesn't do that, then it is irrelevant to my argument.

And I never said all rules and laws are rational, or that people think all rules or laws are rational. The ones they might claim are, are the ones I'm concerned with, however.

I still disagree. I specifically say:

If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives — ToothyMaw

This is the act-utilitarian, essentially. If they want to be good act-utilitarians they must grant what I write later - even though most people don't agree with them. The same goes for rule-consequentialists.

The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? — Philosophim

You didn't fully understand it. Not only does rule-consequentialism become more like act-utilitarianism, it has serious implications for supposedly impartially defensible laws that are actually based on consequences for anybody. But yes, I emphasized that angle because I consider rule-consequentialism to be a serious challenge to act-utilitarianism.

Furthermore, the quality of human pain doesn't affect, say, whether or not it is wrong to slap someone because one lacks empathy, except insofar as that pain is undesirable. There is nothing about pain or a lack of empathy that dictates that slapping someone is inherently wrong from a consequentialist perspective.

Utility is inextricably related to consequences, so I would say this: honor might evoke a certain universal meaning when used, but it cannot be quantified and measured like consequences, and thus the process of deciding what decision has maximum utility is often apparent when one considers consequences. Alternatively, you might say it is obvious when an action is honorable, but it is only honorable according to an existing code that varies from one person to another, and from one culture to another. There are undoubtedly some common threads, but predicating decisions to what is "honorable" is like saying you will make a decision based on some sort of maximizing calculus. Such calculi exist, but what are you maximizing?

Also: if the two of you would just read the formal argument you would realize I stipulate in (1) that only the subset of those laws that are formed by reasoning about consequences are relevant.

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim

With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP. — Philosophim

Ethics as a school of philosophical thought exists. That's my proof. I suppose I could preface my OP with the caveat that this intense thinking about morality is directed at other people who desire to think about morality rigorously; I'm not saying that everyone always tries to act rationally, but I think that creating a system that allows us to act rationally according to some reasonable ethical principles is the ultimate goal of ethical philosophy, even if many or most people don't care about anything like that. If you disagree with that, then you aren't really interested in ethics.

It's important to me that I treat people honorably. Sometimes I don't live up to that aspiration. The source of that isn't some formal, codified, "rational" ethical code, it's empathy and fellow-feeling. How does that make me directionless or irresponsible? — T Clark

I could talk in vagaries about honor and "fellow-feeling", two things which I think should exist as concepts because they are useful, but I'm more interested in drilling down to find some more certain things. Also, I don't think you are directionless or irresponsible as my comment wasn't intended to be an aspersion on you.

I wouldn't put it up here if I didn't want it to be picked at.

edit: I see you genuinely wanted to know. The premise everyone is up in arms about is solved when you recall that people philosophize about ethics, and that there are even scientists that are appointed as ethical advisors by the government and corporations and such.

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim

I think most coherent people provide reasoning for their beliefs and the laws and rules they want to follow and impose on others - even if that reasoning is garbage. If I were to believe you and T Clark, everyone is just directionless hippies and/or irresponsible pleasure-seekers with absolutely no designs on being ethical in any substantial way.

Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either. — Philosophim

Yes, you are correct - but this is a quibble. I was wrong; I should have said that the rules people try to follow often come with some sort of reasoning, even if that reasoning has logical flaws or faulty premises. And reason doesn't give us indisputable truths.

I didn't expect people to attack the assumption that people often try to justify the laws they want with some forms of reasoning.

When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths.

edit: not to mention, human values are treated as truths by many people, so the two things are entangled

edit 2: Otherwise, I mean rational in the traditional sense of being in accordance with reason or logic. Sorry for not making that clear in the OP.

Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. — DubiousDachshund

That rule consequentialism is appealing or desirable because of these things is undeniable.

Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point. — DubiousDachshund

I think that when you say that rule consequentialism says that the justification for following rules that are selected because they maximize value must either be grounded in estimated consequences, or it really is just deontology with a pre-justification of maximizing expected value in the form of your assertion that “an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value”.

You also say that the rules built on this rule are justified because they are impartially defensible. Well, they are only impartially defensible according to whether or not they would fit into this internalization-filter if premise (4) is denied, and their only criterion for selection is tied to that which makes them good; it becomes circular: a rule is good if it contributes to the maximum value because a rule says that maximum value is worth pursuing leads to maximum value by justifying that rule according to itself.

I don't think that this is a problem, however, if one concedes either that rule-consequentialism like Hooker's is actually deontology, as the inception of the internalization rule - or any of the rules it leads to - could just be treated like any other rule that can be defended in any of the often circular or specious ways people typically defend rules, i.e. lying is wrong because it is by nature dishonest and dishonesty is wrong, you have the duty not to lie because of divine proclamations, etc.

If you wanted to factor in all of the desirable aspects of rule-consequentialism as a defense of the assertion that the rules one might formulate should be judged based on whether or not they are impartially defensible, you would need to change the mechanism by which the rules are internalized.

Regardless, this means Hooker's rule-consequentialism would circumvent my argument, I think.

Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding. — DubiousDachshund

Yes, if you can prevent it from dissolving into act-utilitarianism then I agree that it seems it would be more reasonable.

This isn't necessarily true if one subscribes to rule-consequentialism. For instance, Brad Hooker's defense of rule-consequentialism—that an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value—denies this psychology. Rather, he argues a rule-consequentialist could hold the following psychology: (1) their fundamental moral motivation is to do what is impartially defensible; (2) they believe that acting on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible; (3) they believe that rule-consequentialism is on balance the best account of impartially justified rules. Thus, I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value — DubiousDachshund

I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund

What about laws that would dictate which choice is to be made upon being presented with a dilemma?

If we are presented with a law, or an intersection of laws, that tell us how to differentiate between two acts with good consequences - but one is clearly superior due to the situation or context - isn't the intention just being displaced and projected onto a law or number of laws created by people that, if followed correctly, selects the best outcome based on a deficit of good consequences (its internalization dictates it must contribute to the maximum expected value, which implies that one outcome is preferable to another)? And if so, does the impartial defense of such rules not support the logic of my argument?

As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'? — Leontiskos

An outcome is, broadly, what happens as a function of our directed intention, whereas consequences in this context are what actually happens to people when one acts.

If one subscribes to a categorical imperative against lying, then lying to bring about good consequences has no place at all in terms of bringing about ethical outcomes, whereas for a consequentialist lying could very well be an outcome favored because it brings about what are deemed to be good consequences. If you have an absolute rule that says one must never lie, the best outcome - not lying - is good regardless of the potentially crappy consequences it might have for people.

It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes. — Pantagruel

Clearly there are instances in which the consequentialist can effect a better outcome over another - even if non-trivial activities can have unforeseen outcomes. Just because we aren't always aware of all of the consequences of our actions doesn't mean we cannot make some accurate predictions and come up with what is a best decision according to its estimated outcome.

If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. — Pantagruel

My argument specifically stipulated that the best outcome could be achieved, a stipulation that could be changed to that "the best outcome that can be most reliably produced" could be achieved. It would be relatively easy to amend my argument to accommodate your objections, as "the best outcome that can be reliably produced" could just be the best outcome once the circumstances surrounding the viability of certain decisions are evaluated.

What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists. — Leontiskos

If we were talking about some sort of absolute rules, we don't need to prioritize consequences, and, thus, one could just throw out premise (6). But yes, my argument could be applied to many different forms of ethics with some modifications.

Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien

I agree.

Not to mention, it seems to me that among the group of people who are aware of this thread and your OP, it appears most of the people who have responded disagree with you, so you are being coerced into believing that your own beliefs about meta-ethics are wrong, right?

Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation. — Judaka

I think that one can successfully expand the group in such a way as to redefine what can be considered moral, even given that what you say about groups is true. For instance, most people only care about their loved ones, when really if they applied their principles universally - which I would argue is the ultimate goal of any successful morality - they would care more about children dying halfway across the world from starvation than about their dog. A moral position merely requires some sort of reasoning and an ought, not universal agreement among all moral agents in a given group.

Not to mention, is it not true that espousing a certain morality puts you in a group with others with a similar morality? Do I not have more in common with a free-thinker halfway across the world than my proselytizing, fundamentalist neighbor? Group membership can be viewed in so many different ways, and one is in so many different groups, that reducing morality to it being coercion by a group becomes a meaningless exercise except when adjudication is involved.

Would you say that those who fought for equal voting rights in the US were by default wrong merely because they were initially the minority and their views didn't benefit the wellbeing of everyone in the US? What if the reformers in this instance had viewed it that way? They wanted to guarantee everyone equal rights under a system that denied them rights, and their best arguments did not benefit the white upper or middle class. But then white people began to take up the cause because they saw the absurdity of segregation, and it was because of an expansion of group membership with little gain for those who defined how morality was judged - the group being citizens deserving rights - that people of color were given equal rights and the pre-eminent group morality was subverted. And this outcome cannot be attributed to good arguments alone; we needed people like Rosa Parks to point out the ongoing stupidities of racists with their actions.

So yes, a less common position might not agree with the morality of the group one is born into (such as white people in the 1960's) or finds themselves ensnared in, but according to your logic there can never be valid moral progress or evolution from within a group that does not favor the group being persuaded in some way; the independent reformer is potentially automatically wrong, and I think that that is a very problematic way of looking at morality, as morality must evolve as, say, technology advances. For instance, what do we do about potential AGI sling shotting us forward technologically? Or how to even engage with AGI at all? Our current modalities are not sufficient, and we need to be able to develop them to accommodate something that might be truly alien to us.

Essentially, I'm saying your view doesn't deal with instances in which a group has no motivation other than their own wellbeing to adopt a more equitable position, as it doesn't necessarily benefit the entire group in question and could even be contrary to the interests of the group at large. There needs to be some sort of external factors in there that decide it, be it actions of the minority or other, perhaps unintended things.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. — Judaka

Perhaps this is partially true, but those positions can be justified with reasoning given some first principles one might naturally espouse, so the moral position could be viewed as somewhat natural given the cognitive faculties humans have. Not to mention we are programmed to possess morals, even if the specific content of those morals is not synonymous with whatever behavior you think a given human would default to.

The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. — Judaka

Are you saying those things don't factor into one's moral perspective?

smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka

I for one have seen this happen on the forums and also the opposite, as even a minority opinion expressed well seems to earn respect here. So, I would say among people who largely try to be reasonable the smaller perspective is usually weighed, even if not charitably.

Yes, that appears to be correct. But how does that relate to truthfulness? That algorithm is just useful for determining whether red apples are sweet. It doesn't actually tell us that red apples are sweet; we would need to test the two types of apples. That's the point I'm making.

are such statements as the first one of any value to the philosopher when its truth value changes with the conditions (context) from which the statement is made? — invicta

On the other hand statements such as the ones in the second examples are tautologies but in a sense are more valuable in modern setting as they’re the basis of calculators and more complex computational machines which we rely on in the modern world. — invicta

Yes, truths that are modulated according to conditions are useful, if that is what you are getting at.

For instance, I might say about a person's decision to act in a certain way:

If one has the ability to have chosen otherwise, then one has free will insofar as the truth of different possible future outcomes is concerned. That is a pretty basic way of summarizing compatibilism.

But in the second quote you seem to be talking about algorithms. Algorithms - as exemplified by the Turing machine, which can implement any conceivable computer algorithm given enough time and a long enough strip of paper - are processes that we follow to make calculations or solve problems. They do not have to be tautological, or even true, but rather (ideally) efficient, possessing a finite number of steps, and directed at solving some specific problem.

Take the following statement below as not only being out of context but also being untruthful

All red apples are sweet

In the above statement would you say it’s useless be the mere fact that it’s out of context or that it is untrue ? — invicta

It could be useful even out of context if it were an integral part of a list of steps in an algorithm, which doesn't require truthfulness but rather something more contextual directed at solving a problem.

If it were just untrue then it just wouldn't be a good basis for a philosophical argument.

Apples grow on trees

The above has informative value in any given context as it informs the uninformed that apples grow on trees — invicta

This is better for a basis for an argument because it is universally true and also informs.

Many environmental problems are longitudinal collective action problems. They arise from the cumulative unintended effects of a vast amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are unknown to each other and distant from each other. Such problems are likely to be effectively addressed only by an enormous number of individuals each making a nearly insignificant contribution to resolving them.

Human sensibilities when it comes to managing and looking after their environment are simply overruled by the irrationality of such consumption driven by market forces beyond their simple understanding so much so that they become endebted to the technological consumerist age they live in…taking on uneccessary debt to have the latest car, the latest phone etc. — invicta

So, is capitalism a problem? Or do we all need to do nearly insignificant things in massive numbers to solve these problems? The first quote is not sufficient to explain how we would curtail market forces and the consumerism it is all entangled in. I do not know much about economics or how to organize political movements, and solutions to those two problems seem to ask more of one than what is claimed to be "nearly insignificant". Overthrowing capitalism - if you would advise that - seems unlikely in the extreme and (potentially) irresponsible.

Not that I wouldn't replace capitalism if I had the power to if there were a better thing out there for humanity and the Earth, but, as I recall Slavoj Zizek once warning the Occupy movement: you need to know exactly what you are doing if you want to make radical changes - even if those changes seem, or really are, necessary. Sorry if that comes across as patronizing or something. I just genuinely feel this way about it.

But I guess for now, I can make sure I recycle and stop buying unnecessary crap.

:up:

Wasn't playing devil's advocate, but I'll just let it ride. Good interacting with you. I don't think I have a whole lot to offer on this one. See you around, I guess.

How can an exactly identical situation have multiple possible outcomes? — Cidat

Seriously, though, compatibilism is the obvious answer, and that seems to be what you are looking for.

You could always say that it was plausible that you could have chosen otherwise in a given situation, that there could be a universe in which you chose otherwise - you just didn't. This doesn't require a situation to have multiple possible outcomes and is compatible with determinism or the idea that your actions have traceable causes. This is not libertarian free-will, but it is the closest we will probably get in this universe.

There are varying degrees of capitulation to esotericism that characterize philosophers' attempts to defend the idea of free-will, but your question is pretty simply answered: yes, there is a universe in which libertarian free will could exist.

There could be a universe in which every antecedent cause is dependent upon a future state of the universe, even, and that makes even less sense to me than the existence of libertarian free will.

It can exist in a universe in which magical, intangible devices exist in people's brains that allow them to defy the laws of physics and make choices unconstrained. Or in a universe in which we all exist with aseity, as it turns out, which is unlikely in the extreme.

I promise I'm not contradicting myself, as I think climate laws would still need to be logical, and thus airtight, so there is that.

In a perfect world, I think rational thought and desired outcome would be congruous.

Of course, they are not, largely, but when it comes to something as important as the climate crisis, the argument could be made to totally reshape society. The desired outcome - the avoidance of intense suffering for a large portion of humanity - is so all encompassing that reason and logic should be employed, perhaps even exclusively, to pursue this goal as doggedly as is necessary. It doesn't matter if environmentally friendly laws contradict other laws, as mitigation of the climate catastrophe is the force by which we should measure and shape other laws - not the other way around.

This would also apply for avoiding nuclear war or any other existential crisis that humanity might face.

I don't care whether it's logically consistent with the other laws that exist... Do you? — Judaka

Should we not try to avoid contradictions in law? Aren't parity and justice and general equality before the law to be desired over the short-term efficiency of judging a law only by its theoretical, although perhaps beneficial, outcome - at least some of the time?

Applying law, which is the main reason law exists - to be applied - becomes difficult when the laws you are referencing could be contradictory. For instance: the idea of mutual combat, a thing that goes on at most martial arts gyms pretty regularly, although not all, explains why we don't throw people in prison for leg-kicking each other vigorously.

However, a gunman might latch onto this and say that they and another engaged in a mutual shootout and, as a symptom, the other died, but they shouldn't be charged with murder because it was mutual.

Both circumstances could be construed as mutual combat, and if we do not have some sort of logic to parse the differences between mutual combat in a safe environment and mutual combat outside of a safe environment, we may end up allowing a murderer to get away with murder, or potentially imprisoning someone for wheel-kicking someone else in the head while sparring, depending on which way you lean.

I suppose my amendment to the OP is that no belief exists in a vacuum; rational thought requires a prioritization of logic to have better compatibility among beliefs or elements, especially when dealing with an applied logic, such as in law. The selection of the efficient, ostensibly desired outcome by mere selection of which factors give said outcome could have implications elsewhere that are antithetical to retaining overall structural coherence of such a system of beliefs or laws or whatever.

Another thing: if we are talking about a construct like law, for example, we very much are talking about something with a form of permeating logic, and one cannot throw out just any conclusion one desires via elimination of premises, as one would also need to throw out other conclusions that result from those premises elsewhere, or risk contradictions with whatever replaces the undesirable conclusion.

We cannot say that, for instance, "people are always responsible for breaking the law when they break the law, except when they break a law that circumstances can mitigate", even though we might not consider one responsible for breaking a law due to mitigating circumstances, and think it is wrong to convict someone when circumstances are mitigating, because this leads to a contradiction with the general case that people are always responsible for breaking the law when they break the law.

This retention of logic seems all-important to me, at least when discussing certain things.

I'm already sick of typing and hearing "permeating logic" in my head, and I don't even think it is all that original of an idea. I just kind of made it up to defend the idea that the most logical, rational view is always the best, an idea you have dislodged at least a little in my mind.

I don't think there's a way for all the different uses of the words logic and logical to be unambiguous. Especially "logical", which just has way too many meanings that overlap and apply in the same contexts. So, if there is a way that sidesteps the problem, I don't know about it. For me though, logic has no qualitative value, whereas "logical" might or might not have one. You can say one's "logical chain" purely descriptively, but generally "logical" means correct, valid, rational thinking. If someone's logic was invalid, then their conclusion wouldn't be logical. Maybe that helps? However, I'm no expert on the topic. — Judaka

Anyway, I think I'll have to ask you to re-explain what you mean by "permeating logic", as I'm just completely lost as to what this refers to. — Judaka

By "permeating logic", I mean a system or set of principles underlying the arrangement of factors that contribute to belief and, thus, beliefs themselves, that roughly adheres to the standards of logic.

For example, you might believe that we all have intangible but very real souls that pop into existence at conception. You also think people with souls should not be killed or murdered, although this does not only apply to fertilized eggs. Your reasoning that it is wrong to throw out an egg follows the standards of formal logic:

1. A fertilized egg has a soul.
2. It is wrong to kill beings with souls.
3. It is wrong to throw out fertilized eggs.

Not only is this logical, there is an underlying logic that gives more value to beings with souls than, say, octopi. The same person who believes that it is wrong to throw out fertilized eggs could be the same person who eats a live octopus, all according to what I would call a "permeating logic". The rigorous logic is a vehicle for the underlying logic, which I suppose could be construed as "true belief". The two may interact, but I would say mostly only when integrating new elements into one's worldview.

That it's difficult to incorporate incompatible beliefs means it's easier for one to integrate beliefs with a similar logic or reasoning, that fits into their current worldview. Do you think it's possible that we're saying the same thing in slightly different ways? — Judaka

I think we do indeed agree, yes. I'm just emphasizing the fact that reason and logic are to be desired, partially because I think people should always at least try to make their worldviews coherent according to general reasonableness regardless of any difficulty in doing so. This might be less efficient and healthy than just taking the path of least resistance, and I admit that. Both things have a time and place, for sure.

Way to make neuroscience make sense to someone scientifically illiterate like me. I half expected to be grouped in with NOS because of my lack of understanding, although perhaps I didn't make as many, or perhaps any, overly specious claims - or so it would seem from the way you broke it down.

I have no other arguments for free will and will now step aside so people with your knowledgeability can keep fighting the good fight.

:up:

That's basically the argument I made. Not my best, by far. I seem to remember hearing about an essay by Dennet that says something similar.

where do those externally generated signals get stopped? — Isaac

Do you think externally generated signals must be stopped at some point in order for free-will to exist?

What if there is some function by which beliefs, for example, are stored and represented at least partially by some sort of stochastic factor and then this sort of moderately understandable randomness results in enough deviation to allow one to say, with moderate certainty, that their beliefs are not formed only from external signals and personal valuation, but rather also a number of hidden factors that may or may not be physiological? What if we couldn't even observe the means by which beliefs are formed and acted upon, at least not on the right level?

Maybe we can do all that, and after reading about this I think the credition model of belief is probably accurate, but it seems to me that there is enough elbow room for us to posit that maybe not knowing everything about the brain could allow free will to creep in, even if it could be viewed as grasping at straws.

edit: this is my best argument for free will, and I'm not even committed to it; I know it is weak.

Cocky Libertarian gets humbled by Neuroscientist on the Reality of (the nonexistence of) Free-Will.

edit: I'm going to actually try to say something substantive, sorry for the cringeworthy jokes

On a regular basis, it's not so much that I change my beliefs as that I refine them and become more aware of them. But then there are a few issues where I have come to question my basic understanding in a more fundamental way. That feels unsettling, but that's how it's supposed to work. That's what philosophy is for. — T Clark

:ok:

Well said, sounds about right for me too.

I've noticed that I seem to be using two different meanings of the word "logic". I am designating goals as being logical, and also using the more scientific definition of logic that just means a system or set of principles underlying the arrangements of elements (or beliefs or factors that contribute to belief). I think that it is valid to say that there could be an underlying logic that governs one's beliefs in scientific terms, and also that these beliefs could be logical, as in they were produced by a logic that roughly adheres to the standards of formal logic. That's my understanding, but if I'm wrong please correct me anyone who knows more about this.

If someone has a perspective that is producing undesirable results, the reason for disbelief can't be just "it's not useful to be this way". Instead, one needs to attack that perspective using their true beliefs, making purposeful but minor adjustments, that's the path of least resistance. — Judaka

What determines if beliefs are true or not true? Are true beliefs just the beliefs that don't change when one has a perspective they want to change due to a lack of usefulness? Or are they more robust opinions that strictly reflect reality?

Adopting a perspective that is likely to produce the desired result, but is entirely foreign to someone's overarching views is not feasible, because it is likely to be simply too difficult for them to adopt that perspective. One cannot choose to believe whatever would be practical for them to believe. There are prerequisites for belief that must be followed or this entire endeavour will be pointless. — Judaka

The difficulty of integrating something that is largely incompatible with one's beliefs into their worldview doesn't really address the point that for any given belief there must be some similar logic and reasoning with one's held beliefs to integrate said beliefs into their worldview in a coherent way, even if to do so is a matter of making small, deliberate changes that do not presuppose general reasonableness. However, I don't see how the vectorized logic and reasoning can be separated from the making of these adjustments, and I can only think that one's "true beliefs" are exactly a representation of a source of a permeating logic (which is probably very flexible) that provides some of the necessary pre-requisites for forming beliefs.

My point is that even the successful, less logical outcome must contain some logic to be of use given there are some basic logical prerequisites stipulated by a permeating logic.
— ToothyMaw

What do you mean by "some logic"? Are you saying it can be illogical, but it must fit into an individual's wider narrative of their world? Or something else? — Judaka

Upon re-reading that I'm not sure what I meant. I think I meant that there must be some overlap between any number of similar goals and an ideal goal that would be considered totally in line with a permeating logic for those goals to be useful, and that the goal that is most in line with the latter might make less sense on a global scale and more sense in terms of individual outcome compared to the other goals.

Of course, one needs to set good goals and determine whether their perspective will deliver on those goals and this requires reason to figure out. However, once you're satisfied that you've done your best to create a goal, then the perspective needs to accomplish producing that desired outcome, and succeeds and fails by whether it does, yes? — Judaka

I suppose.

Therefore, a perspective that is accurate and logical but does not produce the desired outcome is a failure, and a perspective that mightn't be that accurate or logical which does is a success, do you agree? — Judaka

My point is that even the successful, less logical outcome must contain some logic to be of use given there are some basic logical prerequisites stipulated by a permeating logic.

However, are you talking about a shared logic, like one built by a society? — Judaka

I'm going to call it "permeating logic".

By permeating logic, I mean the logic that operates more broadly than that which is applied to something as local as some packet of premises and desired conclusions. This could be a logic shared by people, or it could be a logic that one desires to abide by for the sake of having a sensible worldview. I am inclined to think that people interact with both.

I think that any given perspective or goal derived at least partially from a permeating logic must agree with some aspects of the permeating logic and also must not contradict it. This means that the ends are indeed a logical perspective or goal, even if that isn't what makes it good, per se. But do we not want to preserve the rules designated by logic, among other things, that guide our forming of perspectives by providing a logic or logical framework?

What you write about is detachment, a means of circumventing the misapplication, or overapplication, of logic and reason. I am starting to agree with you that yes, this is a useful way of looking at things some of the time.

It is only worthwhile to bring up my OP in circumstances where you aren't evaluating a perspective by the outcome. If it's useless, it's because it'd be redundant to tell you to do what you've already been doing. — Judaka

Good point.

It's about the measuring stick for success which guides their reason. You keep bringing up cases where the measuring stick is pre-defined to be the outcome. Do you perhaps, secretly agree with me? It's okay to join me on the dark side, you know? We can form a supervillain team together. — Judaka

So long as I get to be the evil, big brain mastermind that ultimately spells his own doom with his unchecked hubris.

I wasn't questioning your qualifications on this subject. I consider introspection a valid source of psychological knowledge. — T Clark

Well, in that case, I at least, try to think that way. I have some overarching principles and really only view that which is logical and reasonable as worth integrating into my worldview. Maybe some of my assumptions are wrong, but I believe that it is one's duty to try to iron that out through dialogue and introspection.

When I'm on here I almost always argue for fun, but sometimes I have to change some beliefs, which is always interesting depending upon how dear to me it is.

goals must possess some logic to be of value in a world that largely acts sensibly on a human scale.
— ToothyMaw

I think this is really wrong in that it doesn't reflect how real people determine value in the real world. It seems like you are trying to stuff how people really behave into your mold of logic and reason where it doesn't fit. — T Clark

I'm only talking about some instances in which there is a deliberate, rational consideration of what to believe. I don't think humans really think this way all of the time. Obviously, people determine value based on a multitude of things. What I am describing is just one facet of that.

I admit I'm not qualified to make serious claims about how people actually think, but I think I can make claims about how the relationship between the evaluation of the worth of goals and their relationship to logic works, which is hypothetical and not grounded in any real understanding of the human mind.

Do you really think this is how people who play chess think and behave? I haven't played chess since I was a kid and I was never very good at it, but the process you guys are describing seems artificial. There are billions of possible moves and chains of moves. It makes sense to me that reason would come into play to help evaluate a move once one has been identified, but I don't see how it could possibly be useful in identifying moves in the first place. — T Clark

There is a difference between strategic thinking (long-term), and short-term tactical thinking, both of which are engaged in in chess, and pretty much every other game of any complexity that there is.