Well, I have issue with saying that laws can be only based on consequences because no one knows the full consequences of their actions. — I like sushi
it seems like I have to assume there is some hypothetical law that can be seen as unquestionably ‘the best’ law. If so then why would anyone question it. Point being rules are questioned and the kind of ‘laws’ I believe you have in mind are not ever brought into examination they are just accepted. — I like sushi
For comparisons sake, we do not question whether or not a ball will drop if released, we bring this inot question only when experience shows otherwise (ie. in outer space). Obviously we are talking about ethics here so there is far more to question here when it comes to human biases and subjective opinions soak with human emotions. — I like sushi
It seems to me that the act-utilitarian, for instance, always acts rationally when bringing about the best outcome - something I argued must always be attempted if one is to have good intentions - as the best outcome, which has the best consequences, is the only good outcome if all other outcomes have deficits of good consequences. So, the act-utilitarian must also relinquish their free will if they are to be a “good” consequentialist.
— ToothyMaw
This seems to be implying that free will must somehow involve you doing things at random, or for emotional, short sighted reasons which doesn't seem like an obvious premise. — Echarmion
If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives, does one truly have free will in a meaningful sense, given people are inclined to act according to supposedly rational rules and laws?
— ToothyMaw
The obvious counter-question to this is what "free will in a meaningful sense" is supposed to be. There are people that argue that the essence of free will is the capacity to act rationally. — Echarmion
Alternatively, you might list deontology or rule-consequentialism as examples in which one can be rational by following rational, impartially defensible laws. But did you make those laws?
— ToothyMaw
I don't think anyone else but me can make the laws that are in my mind. — Echarmion
Given this argument holds, it appears that rule-consequentialism does indeed become more and more like act-utilitarianism as the laws get more specific, as premises (1) and (2) are granted by probably every rule consequentialist and some deontologists, too. So, if you want to make consequences matter, you have to grant that it is rational to only act in one very specific way - maximizing utility - in certain circumstances, and if you don’t like this, you have to deny premise (1), (2), or (1) and (2).
— ToothyMaw
The problem is that utility isn't defined here, so while this kind of reasoning is useful if you have a given value you want to maximise for, it doesn't give you that value by itself. — Echarmion
If one acts according to what is rational, even if what is rational to a given agent is not rational from other perspectives — ToothyMaw
The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? — Philosophim
I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim
With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP. — Philosophim
It's important to me that I treat people honorably. Sometimes I don't live up to that aspiration. The source of that isn't some formal, codified, "rational" ethical code, it's empathy and fellow-feeling. How does that make me directionless or irresponsible? — T Clark
I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far. — Philosophim
Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either. — Philosophim
Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. — DubiousDachshund
Firstly, I still think a rule-consequentialist following Hooker's theory would reject (4). Sure, the selection of the rules would be about maximizing consequences, but the intention behind following these rules would be something like "it is the most impartially defensible theory". Perhaps this is also due to how well it matches our convictions, it is consistent, gives explanatory power behind why certain convictions are right or wrong, and gives novel answers to moral dilemmas. The reason for being a rule-consequentialist would be that it is the moral theory that answers these kinds of questions the best. Thus, when selecting rules, the rule-consequentialist should select R1 rather than R2 because R1 leads to more well-being, but the intention would be "follow the most defensible moral theory" rather than "desire good outcomes." I think this is different enough to maintain my original point. — DubiousDachshund
Secondly, even if the argument holds for the rule-consequentialist and (4) remains in the way that it is projected onto the choice of rules, I don't think it would lead to an absurd conclusion compared with act-utilitarianism for instance. Each decision wouldn't be determined by maximizing the good, rather, a limited number of rules would be followed. Everyone can only internalize so much, and the more complicated the rules, the more costly to internalize. The cost of internalization would also be affected by the cost of going against human psychology. If the rules require one to live a life of self-sacrifice, then the cost of internalization would likely be impossibly high. The resulting rules would by that token be far less demanding. — DubiousDachshund
This isn't necessarily true if one subscribes to rule-consequentialism. For instance, Brad Hooker's defense of rule-consequentialism—that an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value—denies this psychology. Rather, he argues a rule-consequentialist could hold the following psychology: (1) their fundamental moral motivation is to do what is impartially defensible; (2) they believe that acting on impartially justified rules is impartially defensible; (3) they believe that rule-consequentialism is on balance the best account of impartially justified rules. Thus, I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund
an act is wrong if it is forbidden by the code of rules whose internalization by the majority of everyone has maximum expected value — DubiousDachshund
I don't think all types of consequentialists must always have a desire to bring about the best possible consequences. — DubiousDachshund
As far as I can tell, premise (6) is a tautology. Is there some significant difference between an 'outcome' and a 'consequence'? — Leontiskos
It is unrealistic to apply something like an objective standard - the best outcome - when any kind of non-trivial activity invariably results in unforseen outcomes. — Pantagruel
If you are a consequentialist, the best outcome is the one which can be most reliably produced, the one over which you have the most control. — Pantagruel
What about the argument is uniquely consequentialist? It seems like the argument will apply generally, and not only to consequentialists. This is a problem if you are specifically aiming at consequentialists. — Leontiskos
Dit que le mieux est l'ennemi du bien
Morality mandates a perspective be taken as one member of a group, with an interest in the group's wellbeing, and any views that fall outside of this context are invalid. In a philosophical context, that "group" is unlikely to be of your choosing, and instead might be the citizens of a nation or just the whole of humanity. Any motivation that would clearly be contrary to the group's cannot be reasonably used as part of an argument for a moral position, without explaining why that is fair or justified within the context of the entire group, or as the best solution to the situation. — Judaka
The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. — Judaka
The moral perspective forces someone to take an unnatural position to how one would usually. One's thinking factors in one's priorities, values, goals, philosophy, and how one interprets and characterises things and other factors that don't fit into the moral context. — Judaka
smaller perspectives might be excluded, as you're to take the position of the group in question. — Judaka
are such statements as the first one of any value to the philosopher when its truth value changes with the conditions (context) from which the statement is made? — invicta
On the other hand statements such as the ones in the second examples are tautologies but in a sense are more valuable in modern setting as they’re the basis of calculators and more complex computational machines which we rely on in the modern world. — invicta
Take the following statement below as not only being out of context but also being untruthful
All red apples are sweet
In the above statement would you say it’s useless be the mere fact that it’s out of context or that it is untrue ? — invicta
Apples grow on trees
The above has informative value in any given context as it informs the uninformed that apples grow on trees — invicta
Many environmental problems are longitudinal collective action problems. They arise from the cumulative unintended effects of a vast amount of seemingly insignificant decisions and actions by individuals who are unknown to each other and distant from each other. Such problems are likely to be effectively addressed only by an enormous number of individuals each making a nearly insignificant contribution to resolving them.
Human sensibilities when it comes to managing and looking after their environment are simply overruled by the irrationality of such consumption driven by market forces beyond their simple understanding so much so that they become endebted to the technological consumerist age they live in…taking on uneccessary debt to have the latest car, the latest phone etc. — invicta
How can an exactly identical situation have multiple possible outcomes? — Cidat
I don't care whether it's logically consistent with the other laws that exist... Do you? — Judaka
I don't think there's a way for all the different uses of the words logic and logical to be unambiguous. Especially "logical", which just has way too many meanings that overlap and apply in the same contexts. So, if there is a way that sidesteps the problem, I don't know about it. For me though, logic has no qualitative value, whereas "logical" might or might not have one. You can say one's "logical chain" purely descriptively, but generally "logical" means correct, valid, rational thinking. If someone's logic was invalid, then their conclusion wouldn't be logical. Maybe that helps? However, I'm no expert on the topic. — Judaka
Anyway, I think I'll have to ask you to re-explain what you mean by "permeating logic", as I'm just completely lost as to what this refers to. — Judaka
That it's difficult to incorporate incompatible beliefs means it's easier for one to integrate beliefs with a similar logic or reasoning, that fits into their current worldview. Do you think it's possible that we're saying the same thing in slightly different ways? — Judaka
where do those externally generated signals get stopped? — Isaac
On a regular basis, it's not so much that I change my beliefs as that I refine them and become more aware of them. But then there are a few issues where I have come to question my basic understanding in a more fundamental way. That feels unsettling, but that's how it's supposed to work. That's what philosophy is for. — T Clark
If someone has a perspective that is producing undesirable results, the reason for disbelief can't be just "it's not useful to be this way". Instead, one needs to attack that perspective using their true beliefs, making purposeful but minor adjustments, that's the path of least resistance. — Judaka
Adopting a perspective that is likely to produce the desired result, but is entirely foreign to someone's overarching views is not feasible, because it is likely to be simply too difficult for them to adopt that perspective. One cannot choose to believe whatever would be practical for them to believe. There are prerequisites for belief that must be followed or this entire endeavour will be pointless. — Judaka
My point is that even the successful, less logical outcome must contain some logic to be of use given there are some basic logical prerequisites stipulated by a permeating logic.
— ToothyMaw
What do you mean by "some logic"? Are you saying it can be illogical, but it must fit into an individual's wider narrative of their world? Or something else? — Judaka
Of course, one needs to set good goals and determine whether their perspective will deliver on those goals and this requires reason to figure out. However, once you're satisfied that you've done your best to create a goal, then the perspective needs to accomplish producing that desired outcome, and succeeds and fails by whether it does, yes? — Judaka
Therefore, a perspective that is accurate and logical but does not produce the desired outcome is a failure, and a perspective that mightn't be that accurate or logical which does is a success, do you agree? — Judaka
However, are you talking about a shared logic, like one built by a society? — Judaka
It is only worthwhile to bring up my OP in circumstances where you aren't evaluating a perspective by the outcome. If it's useless, it's because it'd be redundant to tell you to do what you've already been doing. — Judaka
It's about the measuring stick for success which guides their reason. You keep bringing up cases where the measuring stick is pre-defined to be the outcome. Do you perhaps, secretly agree with me? It's okay to join me on the dark side, you know? We can form a supervillain team together. — Judaka
I wasn't questioning your qualifications on this subject. I consider introspection a valid source of psychological knowledge. — T Clark
goals must possess some logic to be of value in a world that largely acts sensibly on a human scale.
— ToothyMaw
I think this is really wrong in that it doesn't reflect how real people determine value in the real world. It seems like you are trying to stuff how people really behave into your mold of logic and reason where it doesn't fit. — T Clark
Do you really think this is how people who play chess think and behave? I haven't played chess since I was a kid and I was never very good at it, but the process you guys are describing seems artificial. There are billions of possible moves and chains of moves. It makes sense to me that reason would come into play to help evaluate a move once one has been identified, but I don't see how it could possibly be useful in identifying moves in the first place. — T Clark