You haven't shown any fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

Fallacy of ambiguity, hasty generalisation. It has been shown. Read my previous post.

You're rendition just changes the conclusion so that it is the same as P2, which is to make it appear to be be begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

A reminder of your original argument:

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.

P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.

C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.

Your inclusion of the word "often" in P2 creates the ambiguity. P2 could be rewritten without loss of meaning as: People act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules in some, but not all, cases. From there, you hastily and illicitly reach the general conclusion that "Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed". The wording of this conclusion is ambiguous and raises the questions: are conventions and unspoken rules not rules? Or are they rules which are not followed?

Judging by the history of this discussion, you started out arguing for the former, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. but you've recently switched to the latter, claiming that conventions and unspoken rules are rules but they're not followed. This was just after I pointed out that your argument produces exactly the same result for explicitly stated rules as it does for conventions and unspoken rules. Apparently, that spoiled your assertion that conventions and unspoken rules are not "true" rules, so you decided to start claiming that rules are not followed instead. But this is ambiguous, too. Are rules not followed in all cases or only in some? This ambiguity can easily be resolved just by noting the word "often" in P2 - indicating that rules are not followed only in some cases - but you refuse to acknowledge it.

So what'll it be? Are you going to stick with your new game plan where you strongly imply that rules are not followed in all cases, or are you going to return to your old strategy where you argue that conventions are not "true" rules? Make up your mind, dude.

Right, your proposed substitution results in ambiguity because there is no longer the distinction between "rules" in the sense of what people follow (def#1), and "rules" in the sense of unspoken rules (def#2). That's the point of my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm happy to adopt your terminology of "def#1" (or "#1") for explicit rules and "def#2" (or "#2") for non-explicit rules, but I'll remind you that your OED definitions #1 and #2 do not make the same distinction.

You'll need to specify how my substitution "results in ambiguity".

My substitution simply demonstrates that your deductive argument applies equally to explicitly stated rules as it does to conventions and unspoken rules. There's no mistaking #1 for #2 here. You originally applied your argument to conventions and unspoken rules ("def#2") and I demonstrated that the same argument equally applies to rules ("def#1"). This supports my argument that conventions are rules and that rules don't have to be explicitly stated. Arguing that conventions are rules and that rules need not be explicitly stated is not equivocation.

You refused, and substituted "unspoken rules" (#2) with simply "rules", creating ambiguity by dissolving my requested distinction between "rules" (def#1) and "unspoken rules" (def#2), so your equivocation of my requested distinction created that ambiguity. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't dissolve the distinction. I showed you what difference results from drawing the distinction, which is none. Your deductive argument has the same effect on both rules and conventions, which only supports my claim (and the dictionary definition) that rules can be either explicit or not-explicit; #1 or #2. And/or it demonstrates that your argument is problematic.

If a rule is broken once, then we cannot say that it is being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a rule is followed once, then we can say that it is being followed.

And, since people often break rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people follow rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, since people often follow rules, we cannot make the inductive conclusion that people don't follow rules (in all cases).

Observation tells us that people break rules and this means that rules are not being followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Observation tells us that people follow rules and this means that rules are being followed.

Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that it's far more likely that rules are followed than not. — Metaphysician Undercover

Therefore you are clearly wrong to say that rules are not followed. (In all cases? In some cases? You wouldn't clarify.)

And since you want to extend the definition of "rule" to include all sorts of unspoken rules, traditions, customs, and norms, which differ throughout the world, and are actively evolving as we speak, being broken time after time, you are simply bringing more evidence against yourself. So the evidence is clear, it is more likely that rules are not followed than followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your conjectures constitute neither argument nor evidence. I'll repeat my earlier argument that if conventions were not followed in most cases, then there wouldn't be any conventions. A convention - defined as "a way in which something is usually done" - exists only because it is followed in most cases; it would cease to exist otherwise.

I proposed a distinction between a type of rule which people consciously try to follow (rules expressed in language), and a type of rule which has no expression in language (unspoken rules), such that it cannot be identified or formulated in any way which would allow a conscious mind to attempt to follow it. And this is consistent with def #1, and def #2 of my OED. — Metaphysician Undercover

It is not consistent with the OED. The OED def #1 you quoted earlier - "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform" - does not exclude unspoken rules. The distinction between explicit and non-explicit is not stated as part of that definition. On the other hand, the Google definition that I quoted earlier states that a rule can be either explicit or understood.

My proposal is that for the purpose of this philosophical inquiry, and logical proceeding, we only use "rule" to refer to the first, so that we can avoid ambiguity and equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I reject your proposal, and so does the dictionary.

This stubbornness on your part forces the conclusion on you, that "rules" are not followed, producing that dilemma which is specific to your ambiguous interpretation of "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, it was your ambiguous, invalid argument that forced the conclusion and dilemma on us. Besides, I've been arguing that we do follow rules, remember? You're the one arguing that we don't.

My conclusion was "conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. " — Metaphysician Undercover

As I said, your argument is invalid. This is what your argument should have been (with a valid conclusion):

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.
C. Conventions and unspoken rules are (rules which are) not always followed.

The proposed substitution yields "rules are not rules which are followed". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is ambiguous. It could mean either:

(i) Rules are not followed in all cases; or

(ii) Rules are not followed in some cases.

If (i) were true, then I would agree with you that "we are not rule-following beings".

However, if (ii) is true, then it follows that:

(iii) Rules are followed in some cases.

It may not be immediately obvious that (ii) and (iii) are not mutually exclusive, although they might appear to be so with the ambiguous wording when "in some cases" is omitted.

If both (ii) and (iii) are true, i.e. if rules are followed in some cases and not followed in others, then we could equally say that we are "rule-following beings". That we follow rules in some cases but not in others is just what Premise 2 of your argument tells us, particularly with its use of the word "often" (not "always").

You want to draw the conclusion that people don't follow rules, laws or conventions because it sometimes happens that people don't. However, people also do follow rules, laws and conventions in many cases. I think you'll find it far more likely that they are followed than not followed. The conventions of language use are no exception.

Okay, I’ll leave it to Antony to try and explain it to you then.

.....except those two, not three for one was repetitive, are precisely examples of a single unit.....one thing to pull, one joke not heard.

There may be demonstrations that successfully counter my assertion; those are not them. — Mww

I would consider "(one) leg" (to pull), "(one) joke" and the pronoun "one" to be different in meaning to "a single unit". Surely "a single unit" is different in meaning to the words "leg" or "joke", even though there may be only a single unit of each of these. And the pronoun can refer to any person or to people in general, so not necessarily even a single person. At the very least, would you agree that "one" can mean, but doesn't always mean, "leg" or "joke"?

And if the general conclusion is, no rules are followed — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you even read my post? Your argument is invalid. The valid conclusion of your argument is that rules are not always followed, not that no rules are followed.

Therefore the general conclusion is not absurd at all, it's a simple brute fact of human existence, that all rules are broken by free willing human beings.
"Rules are not rules which are followed", and that statement simply reflects the nature of freedom of choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

If your general conclusion is that "no rules are followed", this must mean that humans are not free to follow rules. So it's probably a good thing that your argument is invalid. "Rules are not rules" just seems off somehow.

But I can agree to your substitution if you insist, just to humour you. I don't see the point though, because it doesn't show that rules are not rules, as you claimed. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not my claim, it's yours, as your summary of the conclusion of your own deductive argument:

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover

Simply substitute the word "rules" for "conventions" in the above. To make things easier, I already did this for you:

The substituted conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that rules are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules". Therefore we ought not describe rules as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "rules are never followed". — Luke

The absurd conclusion of your summary of the argument is: "we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules"."

The conclusion of your argument, if you substitute "rules" for "conventions" becomes:

C. Rules are not rules which are followed. — Luke

Perhaps you might think I'm begging the question. — Metaphysician Undercover

Your deductive argument is invalid and begs the question. Here is your original argument again:

Argument 1 (your original argument):
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules.
C. Conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed.

The conclusion should be that conventions and unspoken rules are rules which are not always (or only often) followed.
In order to arrive at your original conclusion, you require another premise stating that conventions and unspoken rules are not rules. Since that (hidden) premise is also your conclusion, you are begging the question.

Let's try some other versions of your argument to clarify the matter:

Argument 2:
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People NEVER act in ways outside of rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules.
C. Rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules are rules which are ALWAYS followed.

Argument 3:
P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People ALWAYS act in ways outside of rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules.
C. Rules/conventions/laws/unspoken rules are rules which are NEVER followed.

This removes the ambiguity and does not lead to absurdity.

It only shows that rules are not followed. And I already addressed this issue. Human beings are not rule-following creatures, as I described, we choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

And, as I have repeatedly stated, this is no different for conventions. We choose freely, with free will, whether or not to follow any given convention. Conventions are just like rules because they are rules.

Therefore we cannot make the general statement that rules are followed, and we are left with the converse, rules are not followed, if we desire the general statement. See, it is false to describe human activities as rule-following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover

I cannot make sense of this. Is it "false to describe human activities as rule-following activities" even when at least some of those activities include rule-following (e.g. sports)?

You are going to extreme lengths to try and dispute a dictionary definition.

You can deny this all you want, because it doesn't make sense to you that people could communicate with each other without following rules, but I think the evidence is very clear. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's not an argument, though, is it.

The whole point of that deductive argument was to show that "rule" in the sense of rule-following, has a very distinct meaning from "rule" in the sense of unwritten rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

You'll have to do a lot more work than that. If your deductive argument was intended to demonstrate that your "true" rules are very distinct from conventions and unspoken rules, then why does the substitution produce exactly the same results for both? And why does it produce the absurd conclusion for both that rules (including conventions and unspoken rules) are not rules? There seems to be a problem with your reasoning.

It was a shih tzu.

In case you missed it, the point of my three examples was to suggest meanings of "one" you may not have thought of, in order to try and demonstrate that "one" needn't have only the meaning of "a single unit", as you asserted.

Did you hear the one about the zoo that only had a dog in it?

One could Google it:

Pull the other one

Some applications cannot be different. Hearing the number one, for example, can never be applied in any other way than to an image of a single unit, hence must have the same meaning to everyone hearing the word. — Mww

Pull the other one.

Oh boy Luke, this is becoming extremely dreadful. I think you need to read that post over. Not only have you demonstrated an inability to interpret a deductive argument, but also you didn't even remember what I wrote following that conclusion. When a person says "not all conventions serve as rules which we follow", and you represent this as saying "conventions are never followed", that's an inexcusably horrible straw man. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh boy Meta, you are painfully dense. Try substituting "rules" for "conventions and unspoken rules" in your argument:

P1. To follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions.
P2. People often act in ways outside of rules.
C. Rules are not rules which are followed.

The conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that conventions are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "conventions are rules". Therefore we ought not describe conventions as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "conventions are never followed" — Metaphysician Undercover

The substituted conclusion indicates that we cannot make the generalized claim that rules are rules which are followed. In other words, we cannot truthfully assert "rules are rules". Therefore we ought not describe rules as rules which we follow because this would be a faulty description. In no way does this imply "rules are never followed".

Sound reasonable?

This is the crux of the problem. And I went over this with Josh earlier in the thread. Let's assume that these things which you call "rules" (and I'm trying to get away from this word so that we can distinguish these from true rules), act as some sort of guidelines for behaviour which we freely choose to either follow or not follow in our common activities. Then we cannot describe this behaviour as "rule-following behaviour", because the real nature of the behaviour consists of deciding whether or not to follow the "rules", and the actions resulting from both decisions. If you only allow into your description the part of that activity which is observed to be rule-following, then your description of the activity is deficient because it doesn't account for the other part which is not rule-following. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't understand what you're blabbering about here. Just give up, please.

Of course, conventions aren't always followed, but then rules and laws aren't always followed, either. — Luke

Following a rule does not mean to act in accordance with the rule more often than not. Try telling the judge, I only murdered twice in my entire life, that should qualify as following the rule, so I think you should let me go free. — Metaphysician Undercover

Not all rules are laws.

Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? — Luke

Yes, of course I believe that, — Metaphysician Undercover

If you believe that conventions are never followed - as the conclusion of your deductive argument implied - then you're a fool living in a fantasy world. Of course, conventions aren't always followed, but then rules and laws aren't always followed, either. So, what's your point? Should we now class rules and laws, together with conventions, as being inappropriate to rule-following and impossible to follow?

What I think, is that this whole way of describing human behaviour as fundamentally consisting of rule-following activity, is completely wrong at the most basic level. I believe we are fundamentally free willing human beings, making free choices, and this is completely inconsistent with your representation of human beings as creatures who are following rules in their behaviour. And I believe it quite obvious that the evidence supports my perspective, because we really are not very good at following rules, even when we try really hard. — Metaphysician Undercover

The underlying false assumption here is that rules compel us to follow them, as if they were laws of nature. Neither rules nor laws nor conventions force you to follow them; they will not rob you of your free will.

The point, which I've been repeating, is that "following a rule" is that judgement itself. The judgement that "a rule is being followed" is what constitutes "following a rule". It seems very clear to me that "X is following the rule" is nothing other than a judgement that X is following the rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not interested in moving on to this new argument of yours. Our disagreement was over what counts as a rule and whether a rule must be explicitly stated or not. You can refer to the dictionary again for that answer. The goalposts aren't moving.

First premise: to follow a rule means to act within the confines of that rule, and not stray outside of those restrictions. Second premise: people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules. Conclusion: conventions and unspoken rules are not rules which are followed. — Metaphysician Undercover

Even if your bare assertion that people often act in ways outside of conventions and unspoken rules were true, people more often act in ways inside of conventions and unspoken rules. Therefore, your conclusion does not follow from the second premise. Do you honestly believe that conventions are not followed? Conventions could not exist if that were true.

Don't you see that in order that a rule is being followed, such a judgement is necessary? — Metaphysician Undercover

I've already said that it may be necessary to make a rule explicit in order to judge whether a rule is being followed. That wasn't our discussion/disagreement. You made the absolute claim that all rules must be explicit and that children couldn't learn rules prior to learning language because of this. I'm not going to keep repeating myself.

I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed).
— Luke

I believe I explained the deficiencies of your examples. — Metaphysician Undercover

No, you haven't.

So if there are some different types of "rules" which are non-explicit, and therefore impossible to be followed, these types of rules are irrelevant to our discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

Conventions, unspoken rules, and the unwritten rules of baseball are not impossible to be followed. These are all relevant rules.

Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule.
— Luke

What Wittgenstein describes in some of those quoted passages, is that we can make judgements which do not require a rule. But this does not imply that we can judge whether a rule has been followed without a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

Our disagreement started with your claim that rules are not necessary for language because a child does not have grammar/rules to begin with. This was all based on your starting assumption that rules must be explicitly stated. I have now shown this assumption to be false: rules do not need to be explicitly stated in order to be rules.

Our disagreement/discussion was never about the ability to judge whether or not a rule is being followed. You are trying to move the goalposts. I'm not interested.

We were talking about "rules" in the sense of "rule-following". Obviously when you define "rule" in some other way, which is not consistent with this use, then i would not adhere to that claim about what "rule" means. That's why equivocation is a fallacy. — Metaphysician Undercover

I'm not defining "rule" in some other way. The Google definition is of a rule in the sense of "rule-following"; a rule which can be either explicit or understood (i.e. non-explicit).

To "follow a rule" is a judgement. I'm still waiting for you to show how such a judgement can be made when the rule is not expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

I have shown this, several times. I linked to Wikipedia pages on Convention, Unspoken Rule, and the Unwritten Rules of Baseball, for example. You have provided no reasons for why these are not examples of non-explicit rules (that are followed).

To copy another person's actions, to mimic, is not to follow a rule, because a "rule" is a generalization concerning numerous actions. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to what definition? I'm not going to accept your own made-up definitions of words.

Now, if someone is said to "follow a rule", this implies that a judgement of accordance has been made between the person's actions and the rule. Can you explain to me how that rule could exist in some form other than in language, which could allow it to be referred to, in order for that judgement to be made? — Metaphysician Undercover

Regarding judgment:

338. One judges the length of a rod, and may look for and find some method of judging it more exactly or more reliably. So — you say — what is judged here is independent of the method of judging it. What length is cannot be explained by the method of determining length. — Anyone who thinks like this is making a mistake. What mistake? — To say “The height of Mont Blanc depends on how one climbs it” would be odd. And one wants to compare ‘ever more accurate measurement of length’ with getting closer and closer to an object. But in certain cases it is, and in certain cases it is not, clear what “getting closer and closer to the length of an object” means. What “determining the length” means is not learned by learning what length and determining are; rather, the meaning of the word “length” is learnt by learning, among other things, what it is to determine length. — Philosophical Investigations

128. From a child up I learnt to judge like this. This is judging.

129. This is how I learned to judge; this I got to know as judgment.

130. But isn't it experience that teaches us to judge like this, that is to say, that it is correct to judge like this? But how does experience teach us, then? We may derive it from experience, but experience does not direct us to derive anything from experience. If it is the ground of our judging like this, and not just the cause, still we do not have a ground for seeing this in turn as a ground.

131. No, experience is not the ground for our game of judging. Nor is its outstanding success.


139. Not only rules, but also examples are needed for establishing a practice. Our rules leave loop-holes open, and the practice has to speak for itself.

140. We do not learn the practice of making empirical judgments by learning rules: we are taught judgments and their connexion with other judgments. A totality of judgments is made plausible to us.

141. When we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions. (Light dawns gradually over the whole.)


144. The child learns to believe a host of things. I.e. it learns to act according to these beliefs. Bit by bit there forms a system of what is believed, and in that system some things stand unshakeably fast and some are more or less liable to shift. What stands fast does so, not because it is intrinsically obvious or convincing; it is rather held fast by what lies around it.


204. Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes to an end;—but the end is not certain propositions' striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the bottom of the language-game. — On Certainty

Maybe that helped, maybe not. Anyway, even if a rule needs to be made explicit in order to judge whether or not someone has followed a rule, this does not imply that a rule needs to be made explicit in order to be a rule.

I repeatedly said that you can use "rule", or define it however you want. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know about "repeatedly". You didn't say this until the previous page (page 11). Before that, you had made the absolute claims that "a rule must be expressed in language" on page 10, and that "rules cannot exist without language" on page 8.

I should have looked more closely at your #1 and #2 definitions, which I had assumed drew the same distinctions between explicit and non-explicit rules that I was trying to point out to you with the Google definition that I posted earlier. However, this is not the distinction between them. Your #1 definition of rule is: "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform". This is very similar to the Google definition, and likewise allows for the principle or rule to be either explicit or non-explicit. I was probably quick to overlook this because your definition #2: "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things" is close to what I had in mind when it comes to non-explicit rules.

There is no rule which dictates how "rule" must be used or defined, that was my argument. — Metaphysician Undercover

This may be the case if you're not concerned with making sense, or if you're Humpty Dumpty.

If you now want to argue that you can give "rule" whichever definition you want, #1, #2, or any other random definition — Metaphysician Undercover

Wait, isn't this your position, which you claim you've "repeatedly said" and which you repeated again at the start of your post? Except, I wouldn't include "any other random definition".

in reference to that particular context in which it has been used, then the actual context of that particular usage gives me grounds to judge your proposal as right or wrong. Notice that I am not referring to a rule to make this judgement, I am referring to the particular context. — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by a "context"? If a context isn't a rule, then you can't mean any of the OED definitions of "rule". Do you think language ever gets used in the context of "a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things"? It seems fairly obvious to me that this OED definition #2 of "rule" has at least some part to play in the teaching of language, the meanings of our words, and the contexts in which those words are used.

You were the one arguing that such rules of usage exist. — Metaphysician Undercover

I was trying to say, in accordance with Wittgenstein's view, that grammar is not restricted to explicitly stated language. For Wittgenstein, "grammar consists of the conditions of intelligibility of a language. It is the conventionally-established basis on which we can make sense: 'Grammar consists of conventions' (PG 138), keeping in mind that conventions here are not due to a concerted consensus, but to an unconcerted agreement in practice" (Moyall-Sharrock). This is why I've been arguing that rules can be non-explicit. Rules can be explicitly stated, although they don't have to be. I probably didn't help at all, but I was trying to assist @Antony Nickles in his explanation of the ideas and methods of OLP, which is supposed to be the purpose of this discussion.

139. When someone says the word “cube” to me, for example, I know what it means. But can the whole use of the word come before my mind when I understand it in this way?
Yes; but on the other hand, isn’t the meaning of the word also determined by this use? And can these ways of determining meaning conflict? Can what we grasp at a stroke agree with a use, fit or fail to fit it? And how can what is present to us in an instant, what comes before our mind in an instant, fit a use?
What really comes before our mind when we understand a word? — Isn’t it something like a picture? Can’t it be a picture?
Well, suppose that a picture does come before your mind when you hear the word “cube”, say the drawing of a cube. In what way can this picture fit or fail to fit a use of the word “cube”? — Perhaps you say: “It’s quite simple; if that picture occurs to me and I point to a triangular prism for instance, and say it is a cube, then this use of the word doesn’t fit the picture.” — But doesn’t it fit? I have purposely so chosen the example that it is quite easy to imagine a method of projection according to which the picture does fit after all.
The picture of the cube did indeed suggest a certain use to us, but it was also possible for me to use it differently. — Wittgenstein, PI

Do you agree that we can move forward with our inquiry by using definition #1, and rejecting definition #2 as irrelevant? — Metaphysician Undercover

There's a delicious irony here: you demonstrate that you have understood my point that a rule can be defined as either #1 or #2 - as explicit or understood - but you refuse to explicitly state that you were wrong. I have no interest in "moving forward" with "our inquiry", thanks.

That I disagree with a proposed definition does not mean that I think it is incorrect, it simply means that it's not a definition I would use for this purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

What purpose? There was no purpose. Instead, you made these absolute claims:

All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language allows for the existence of rules, which are expressed via language, and therefore cannot exist without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You make no mention of context or purpose here. Instead, these are absolute claims regarding all rules.

We will not ever sort this out, because it always depends on how the word is used, in context. Otherwise, I will refer to definition #1 "a principle to which an action conforms or is required to conform", and you will refer to definition #2 a prevailing custom or standard; the normal state of things", and we will always disagree as to "what a rule is". — Metaphysician Undercover

This is a total mischaracterisation. You want to pretend as though my position all along has been that rules can only be non-explicit and that all rules are unwritten? You must be a post-truth philosopher dealing in alternative facts.

It has been your position throughout that a rule can only be explicit. My position, in line with the dictionary definitions, has been that a rule can either be explicit or understood (i.e. explicit or non-explicit).

Now that you have finally acknowledged that a rule can either be explicit or non-explicit, as per your own OED definitions #1 and #2 of the word "rule", then you must also acknowledge what I have been telling you for five pages: a rule does not have to be explicit.

Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect?
— Luke

I'm saying that the the dictionary definition does not qualify as a "rule". — Metaphysician Undercover

That doesn't answer the question. You clearly disagree with the dictionary definition which states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You already agreed earlier that our disagreement was over whether or not rules must be made explicit:

This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic.
— Luke

Yes, that describes the disagreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

If a rule must be made explicit, as you claim, then it cannot also be "explicit or understood" as the dictionary definition states. That is, unless you can explain how "explicit or understood" means only "explicit".

Whether or not the dictionary definition of the word "rule" itself qualifies as a rule is a separate issue to whether or not you believe the dictionary definition is incorrect.

You can insist that "convention" implies "rules being followed", but that's just fallacious logic, unless you define "convention" in a way which only begs the question. The reality of the situation is that "conventional" is used in numerous different ways, and you are arguing by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I simply posted a link to the Wikipedia article on 'Convention'. I didn't make any argument.

Your use is most consistent with my OED definition #6 "following tradition rather than nature". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "Your use"? I posted a link to a Wikipedia article.

This does not even imply "agreement", as in definition #1. — Metaphysician Undercover

Oh? What does the OED definition #1 say?

So even to claim that "conventional" as you use it, implies "agreement" is fallacy by equivocation. — Metaphysician Undercover

I haven't made any such claim. You seem to be arguing with the voices in your head.

Furthermore, if we proceed to assume that "conventional" implies agreement, as your fallacious, deceptive, equivocal argument would lead us to believe, we still must address the fact that "agreement" to a rule does not imply that the rule will be followed. So even if there were agreements concerning how one ought to use a hammer, as the equivocal, argument would imply if it wasn't fallacious, this does not mean that the activity of using a hammer can be described as people adhering to that agreement. This is because people have free will, and they often simply decide not to adhere to their agreements, for various reason. This is a very important part of moral philosophy, there is no necessary relation between agreeing to something, and actually adhering to the agreement, the act of adhering to is completely separate from the act of making an agreement. So when it appears like someone is adhering to an agreement, we cannot conclude that an agreement has been made, because we do not have that logical relation. All we can conclude is that there is an act of "adhering to", but this is completely distinct from making an agreement. — Metaphysician Undercover

Don't blow a gasket, sweetheart. I never mentioned the word "agreement".

You asked how can a rule be public if it is not explicitly stated. I indicated my answer by linking to the Wikipedia article on conventions. It appears you do not disagree that conventions are public, nor that conventions are not explicitly stated. Perhaps you disagree that conventions are rules? Your argument appears to be that conventions cannot be rules because it isn't necessary to follow conventions. But how are explicitly stated rules any different in that respect? Rules are made to be broken, as they say.

If there is any sort of agreement in conventions, then "This is not agreement in opinions, but rather in form of life" (PI 241). Google defines "convention" (in the relevant sense) as: "a way in which something is usually done." Is this a rule? Well, I'd say it is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity", so yes.

It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted.
— Luke

This is nonsense. How could a dictionary definition qualify as an "unwritten rule"? — Metaphysician Undercover

What's nonsense is your relentless twisting of words and meaning. The dictionary definition of the word "rule" states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". According to your own personal defintion of the word "rule", you want to exclude the "understood" and leave only the "explicit". What this - the agreed-upon subject of our disagreement - has to do with your question is beyond me. I never suggested that an explicitly stated definition qualifies as an "unwritten rule".

What might qualify as unwritten rules here, however, are how we use dictionaries and how we use the words contained within them in terms of writing style, tone of voice, body language, and a host of other things that surround, support and provide sense to explicitly stated language.

I've already explained to you your misinterpretation, but I'll briefly describe it again.. An individual cannot judge oneself to be following a rule, because this just means "I think I am following the rule" which is not necessarily a case of following a rule. Therefore the judgement of whether or not a person follows a rule must be made in reference to the rule as existing in a public setting, not a rule as existing within one's mind. Such a public rule could only exist as expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

There you go again trying to change the subject. Our disagreement, as you agreed, is over the definition of the word "rule" and whether a rule must be explicitly stated or not (in order for it to be a rule). Let's sort out what a rule is first, and then we can discuss rule following. I've offered you a class of examples of an understood, implicit rule in the form of conventions. How are these not rules? And what authority do you have to disagree with the dictionary definition?

e.g., believing (as discussed with Luke above) — Antony Nickles

I don't recall having this discussion.

My point is that there is no such thing as a regulation or principle which governs, that is not explicitly stated. — Metaphysician Undercover

Are you saying the dictionary definition is incorrect?

The issue appears to be, that if rules of language use don't exist as an expression of language, then the rules do not exist within the public domain. If they are public, then where else could they exist if not as language? — Metaphysician Undercover

Try these:
Convention_(norm)
Unspoken_rule
Unwritten_rules_of_baseball

So we must turn to the private, internal domain of the individual to find these implicit rules, if they are real. — Metaphysician Undercover

:roll:

Within the internal, private, we find what I called (for lack of a better word) "principles", in my discussion with Josh. The argument is that there is a very significant need to distinguish these private "principles", which serve as some sort of guidance to free willing, intentional choices, and public "rules", which are explicit regulations that govern conduct. The difference is immediately evident in the role of correction. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is meaningless babble.

The hammer is a good example. There are no rules for how to use a hammer, so long as you do not damage private property, or injure someone. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are conventional ways to use a hammer. These conventions are not explicit, but implicit rules. In case you missed it, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity".

Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit.
— Luke

How is intention irrelevant, when to follow a rule is to intentionally act according to the rule? — Metaphysician Undercover

This was already answered by the quote. Our disagreement is over whether or not rules must be made explicit. You are trying to change the topic.

This is evidence of your delusion. You think that the dictionary definition provides a stated rule for how the word "rule" must be used, and if I step outside the precise boundary of your interpretation of that stated rule, I am necessarily mistaken. — Metaphysician Undercover

There might be no explicit rules for how to use a dictionary or the words it contains. But, then, there are unstated, conventional rules for their uses, including the conventional uses of the word "rule".

It's ironic that you accuse me of drawing precise boundaries. Your attempt to exclude unwritten rules is an attempt to restrict and censor the dictionary definition. Otherwise, by all means, tell me how I've misinterpreted.

199. Is what we call “following a rule” something that it would be possible
for only one person, only once in a lifetime, to do? — And this
is, of course, a gloss on the grammar of the expression “to follow a
rule”.
It is not possible that there should have been only one occasion on
which only one person followed a rule. It is not possible that there should
have been only one occasion on which a report was made, an order given
or understood, and so on. — To follow a rule, to make a report, to give
an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (usages, institutions).
To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand
a language means to have mastered a technique.

206. Following a rule is analogous to obeying an order. One is trained
to do so, and one reacts to an order in a particular way. But what if
one person reacts to the order and training thus, and another otherwise?
Who is right, then?
Suppose you came as an explorer to an unknown country with a language
quite unknown to you. In what circumstances would you say that
the people there gave orders, understood them, obeyed them, rebelled
against them, and so on?
Shared human behaviour is the system of reference by means of which
we interpret an unknown language. — Witt, PI

So why am I me? — Ori

Because nobody else wanted to be you.

In my experience, I see that people learn to talk, and do so adequately without reference to rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

Children are often corrected when they learn to talk, by parents, teachers and others. They may not be taught explicit rules - that's my point - but they are still taught how to speak properly, and this training constitutes "the regulations or principles governing the conduct" of language use. As the Google definition of the word "rule" states, such regulations or principles can be either "explicit or understood".

And if I have doubts about how to express what I want from someone else, there are no rules for me to refer to. — Metaphysician Undercover

You will do so in language, presumably, and one that is understood by the other person.

That is how language use is different from a rule-governed activity. For the majority of its activities there are no rules to consult if one has doubts about what ought or ought not be done, but a rule-governed activity has rules which can be consulted. — Metaphysician Undercover

There are rules you can consult if you have doubts about what ought or ought not be done with language, e.g. dictionaries, thesauri, rules of syntax, other fluent speakers, written examples, etc. Language is a tool. Learning how to use a hammer won't tell you when or where you should hammer, either.

This is exactly why language cannot be a rule-governed activity. Each instance of language use occurs in a particular and unique set of circumstances, and the meaning must be designed, created, for that specific context. — Metaphysician Undercover

If every use of language were this unique, then we could never use or understand language from one situation to the next, nobody would ever be able to learn a language, and dictionaries would not be possible. There's a good reason why I don't need you to define every word in each of your posts.

This is meaningless babble to me. I have no idea what you mean by "corporate culture", or "understood set of behaviours". — Metaphysician Undercover

Look it up.

So there is no such thing as "implicit" rules without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

According to the dictionary definition I gave earlier, a rule is: "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

Unless you have a more authoritative reference other than your personal say-so?

Sometimes we train pets to respond to particular verbal commands. We might say that our pet understands to do (or not do) something, or behave a certain way, even though the pet doesn't speak English, and we might never make the rule explicit - to the pet - in English.
— Luke

To "understand" does not require following a rule. You are simply begging the question, assuming that one cannot understand without following a rule. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's part of the dictionary definition of "rule": "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

If a dog can be trained to respond appropriately to the command "sit" as well as a child can, then they understand the meaning/use of the word, even though a dog would not be able to understand an articulation of this "regulation or principle governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of" language use (i.e. an articulation of this rule).

I described my experience of understanding another as presuming to allow the other's intention to become my own, such that I do what I think the other wants me to. The fact that it is presuming allows for the reality of misunderstanding. You might think that it's odd to believe that a dog or cat has intention, and that it allows my intention to become its own, and that's why it does what I want it to do, but it's no odder than believing that such animals "understand", and clearly these animals act with purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Intention is irrelevant to our disagreement, which is whether or not rules must be made explicit.

When children are trained how to use language, they learn "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure" for the activity of language use, which is a definition of "rule(s)". Obviously, children don't already know the principles that govern (i.e. the rules of) speaking English before they learn how to speak English.
— Luke

That a person behaves in an habitual way does not demonstrate that they have learned "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure". If this were true, then we'd have to conclude that birds, insects, and probably even single celled beings have learned the regulations governing conduct and procedure. — Metaphysician Undercover

I didn't mention habit. You've overlooked the training.

It's an inductive conclusion. All the rules I've ever known have been expressed in language, therefore I think that a rule must be expressed in language. I've already invited you to disprove this principle, and I'm still waiting, as your attempts seem to have failed. Until you provide that proof, I'll adhere to my reasoning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Put simply, you're mistaken. The dictionary defintion I have repeatedly given states that a rule can be either "explicit or understood". You appear to be using a special meaning of the word "rule" that excludes the (unarticulated) "understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity".

Yes, we learn rules from their linguistic expression. If one simply observed an activity and made up so-called "rules" to follow, from the observations, in order to engage in that activity, this would not be a case of learning rules, it would be a case of making up so-called "rules". — Metaphysician Undercover

How is language use any different to these sorts of rule-governed activities? Language use is itself an activity that we are taught how to do, with rules to follow about how to do it properly (or adequately, at least).

Consider the difference Wittgenstein describes between thinking oneself to be following a rule, and to be actually following a rule. Think of this as a part of Wittgenstein's definition of "rule", as a restriction placed on the word's usage. — Metaphysician Undercover

How can this be a definition (or part of a definition) of the word "rule"? "Rule" means actually following a "rule"?

The meaning of the word is an explanation of its use. Explaining a particular use of a word is describing a rule for its use; describing how the word is used by (e.g.) English speakers. To repeat, a rule is "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

If actually following a rule is "part of Wittgenstein's definition" of the word "rule", then you acknowledge that a word's definition is initimately linked with the activity of language use; that there are right and wrong ways to use words (or to make sense using words). According to Wittgenstein, "For a large class of cases...the meaning of a word is its use in the language." (PI 43)

I have seen no acceptable logic which leads to this conclusion, and I see no evidence of learning rules in early childhood learning of language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Of course you have, except that you are blinded by a particular definition of "rule" which you think requires that it must be expressed in language.

I see that people only learn rules after they learn language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Using language is following rules. Perhaps you are thinking of language only as some abstract entity, forgetting that we physically use it and are taught the principles governing its use.

If you truly believe this, then you ought to be able to provide some examples. Show me some rules, or even a rule, which is not expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

You want me to express in language that which I am saying needn't be expressed in language, thereby proving your point that rules are only expressed in language? Okay I'll try. Off the top of my head:

Corporate culture is an understood set of behaviours which are often not explicitly expressed in language. That's one example. Also, rules and laws are often made explicit only after there has been some transgression of the implicit, understood principles of conduct. There's also pets. Sometimes we train pets to respond to particular verbal commands. We might say that our pet understands to do (or not do) something, or behave a certain way, even though the pet doesn't speak English, and we might never make the rule explicit - to the pet - in English. We might instead train the pet to follow rules only with food rewards or verbal reprimands. Finally, there is language itself. When children are trained how to use language, they learn "the regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure" for the activity of language use, which is a definition of "rule(s)". Obviously, children don't already know the principles that govern (i.e. the rules of) speaking English before they learn how to speak English.

It's only a website link, so not sure why it wouldn't work for you, but here it is again: https://www.academia.edu/42996392/Wittgensteins_grammar_through_thick_and_thin. Note that you don't need to download the PDF, you can just scroll down the page to see the article.

No, "language" is the more specific term, while "communicate" is more general. Using language is a form of communicating, but there are forms of communicating which do not use language. If language is a specialized human form of communication, then the child might still use more animalistic types before learning the human type. — Metaphysician Undercover

Do these "more animalistic" forms of communication have rules?

Right, it's a sort of dilemma which the philosophical misconception of language creates. The resolution to that dilemma is to recognize that the philosophical representation of language, which assumes rules as a necessary aspect of language, is wrong. Language allows for the existence of rules, which are expressed via language, and therefore cannot exist without language. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's a simple solution for you to claim that language is necessary for rules but rules are not necessary for language. I would agree that language is necessary for the linguistic expression of rules (as you imply), simply because language is necessary for any linguistic expression. But why are rules not necessary for language? Is your position that language has no rules?

There are right and wrong ways to use words and to make sense with words. This is what grammar is about. Besides, you appear to acknowledge that language consists of rules, when you say:

These rules would be private rules, constituting a private language — Metaphysician Undercover

Private or not, you are effectively saying that rules constitute a language.

Why are "rules required to learn rules"? Because you say so?
— Luke

You don't seem to grasp the issue. Rules are expressed in language. — Metaphysician Undercover

Rules can be expressed in language. They don't have to be.

A rule is: "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity."

The article I linked to in this earlier post may help: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/493421

It's not so black-and-white. You have to allow for learning and intermediate stages of development and capability. Children can learn the rules of grammar just as they can learn the rules of a game. It takes practice.
— Luke

Learning is a social interaction, That's the point, a child needs to be able to communicate in order to be able to learn. — Metaphysician Undercover

If communication is a pre-requisite to learning, as you claim, then a child without language should not be able to learn, right? But children - who start off with no language - do learn. How do you account for this?

That's what Witt pointed out at the beginning of PI, it's as if a child needs to already know a language in order to learn a language. — Metaphysician Undercover

He offers this as an example of a common philosophical misconception of language, not as an endorsement of the idea. He starts with this example only to undermine it throughout the rest of the work.

Otherwise, tell us: what language does a child "already know...in order to learn a language"? A private language which is comprehensible only to one person? Wittgenstein argues against this possibility. Do you have a counterargument?

That's why we cannot characterize language as consisting of rules because then we'd have an infinite regress of rules required to learn rules, and rules required to learn those rules etc.. — Metaphysician Undercover

Why are "rules required to learn rules"? Because you say so?

Again, people learn how to use language every day. I do not mean by that that a child learns rules or a language by a particular age and then their learning is finished. Learning is a continual process, not some end-point. However, one can be judged to have attained (via learning) a "level" or an adequacy of competence/knowledge/fluency of a language or of the rules. You can become fluent in a language or in the rules of a game without knowing any of the rules to begin with. This is happening every day.

But this implies that a person goes into the social interactions, in the original condition (as a child), without grammar. And, the person must still be capable of communicating, in that original condition, in order to learn the grammar, without having any grammar. Therefore grammar is not a fundamental aspect of communication. — Metaphysician Undercover

It's not so black-and-white. You have to allow for learning and intermediate stages of development and capability. Children can learn the rules of grammar just as they can learn the rules of a game. It takes practice.

I read him as indicating instead that a "surveyable overview" of all grammar is difficult, if not practically impossible, since our grammar is "deficient in surveyability":
— Luke

How could there be grammar which is not surveyable? The rules of grammar must be observable if they are to be followed. It makes no sense to say that someone is obeying grammatical rules which they have not found, located, or identified. — Metaphysician Undercover

It might be better to say that grammar is not easily surveyable, as in, not able to be taken in at a glance. Wittgenstein doesn't say much about it, but I can think of a few reasons why. For example:

Are you consciously aware of the grammatical rules as you speak or write every sentence? Could you name the grammatical rules for all uses of a given word (without looking it up, of course)? Are you aware of the grammatical rules and meanings/uses of all words in every English-speaking location?

If you are actually interested in Wittgenstein's notion of grammar, I recommend reading this article.

It's a funny thing that LW's other really salient metaphor for what he's up to is seeking a "bird's eye view" -- that puts you not only not on the rough ground but not on the ground at all! Perhaps this is his "stereoscopic vision", I don't know. It's odd though. — Srap Tasmaner

Wittgenstein's metaphorical contrast of "rough ground" with "slippery ice" are both found on the ground (obviously).

Wittgenstein advocates a return to the rough ground of actual everyday language use and a departure from the preconceived/misconceived role of the philosopher as being (e.g.) to create an idealised "slippery ice" formal system using the "crystalline purity of logic" in order to make discoveries of things hidden beneath the surface of language.

The "surveyable overview" Wittgenstein speaks of relates to grammar (in W's wider use of the term), and so to the rough ground of actual everyday language.

Wittgenstein talks about things like "following a rule", which you can't formalize in rules on pain of regress, and then he asks how it is possible that we clearly can follow a rule or fail to despite the lack of definitive criteria. To answer that question, you need the bird's eye view, but therein lies temptation: it is from such heights that we perceive structure, human civilization laid out before us like a circuit board in all its logical perfection, the territory reduced to a map. — Srap Tasmaner

The overview, or bird's eye view, that Wittgenstein might wish for is of the rough ground of actual everyday language use. Whether Wittgenstein was, in fact, seeking such a "surveyable overview" of our grammar is questionable. I read him as indicating instead that a "surveyable overview" of all grammar is difficult, if not practically impossible, since our grammar is "deficient in surveyability":

122. A main source of our failure to understand is that we don’t have an overview of the use of our words. — Our grammar is deficient in surveyability. A surveyable representation produces precisely that kind of understanding which consists in ‘seeing connections’. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate links. The concept of a surveyable representation is of fundamental significance for us. It characterizes the way we represent things, how we look at matters. (Is this a ‘Weltanschauung’?) — PI §122

He goes on to imply that it is, however, possible to get a "surveyable overview" of the small region of our language/grammar which is problematic for us in a particular case (which he calls in the above quote a "surveyable representation"). See §123-127, particularly §125.

Thank you, I understand your being wary of talking about something "higher". A reticence that I have is that philosophy does want something higher, a more complete understanding, to better ourselves, to rise above what can be lazy, nasty, partisan, ineffective, unintelligible, etc. I think OLP provides the possibiity of that in taking us from: grasping for a goal of certainty to have it slip away, to waiting to see the grammar that provide the humble dirt from which to begin that work. — Antony Nickles

I agree. I was probably insufficiently clear that I had traditional (pre-OLP) philosophy in mind in reference to this desire for something "higher"; that is, something more objective, certain, rational, etc.

Perhaps we are looking for a specific version of "higher", even before we start our investigation to look at the use of our concepts. — Antony Nickles

In reacting to skepticism, philosophy sees the problem as the human, its fallibility, its inconsistency, its emotion, its partiality, its diversity, and decides that none of that is going to give us the certainty and universality and rationality that we want to solve skepticism, so we take philosophy out of any context and fashion it to meet the standards that will solve it. — Antony Nickles

Seeing the representation of an object with a word (or any other similar picture) as the only picture out there of how meaning works, Witt turned to look at all the variety of ways different things are meaningful to us. So why this other picture? And his interlocutor keeps going on about having to know, and about rules, etc. So the idea is that the fear of doubt and the black hole of skepticism/relativism cause the philosopher to skip over our regular criteria to fix meaning and word together, to have certain knowledge, normative rules, universal criteria, predetermined, etc. — Antony Nickles

I question whether it is necessarily a fear (e.g. of doubt) that motivates all skepticism or all philosophy. I think the philosopher's desire for an undefined "higher" form of knowledge may also be a contributing factor. I find it difficult to explicate what "higher" means in this regard, except for all the factors that you mention: more universal/objective, more certain, more logical/rational.

I hadn't previously considered what you appear to be presenting here and for which OLP claims to provide a resolution: that at least some traditional philosophical problems are a direct result of this "higher" striving, especially with its byproduct removal of humanity from the picture. This would mean that philosophers end up in some (context-less) problems of their own making.

As Witt says, "back to the rough ground!"

But I think we can say this much: philosophy doesn't come along to add a normative dimension to our lives -- it's already there, and available for philosophy to participate in just as people do ordinarily. Philosophy doesn't stand outside or above life in judgment, but by the same token philosophy can make just the same sort of normative claims as non-philosophers do everyday. — Srap Tasmaner

:100:

Consider that essentialism, representationalism, mental processes, metaphysics, positivism, are all different reactions to the same fear; — Antony Nickles

What fear is that?

Family resemblances are part of a picture in contrast to the picture of representationalism. — Antony Nickles

I think family resemblances are more about a contrast to essentialism rather than representationalism.

Having said that, I am enjoying the ambitious discussion and the links to articles you have been providing. :up:

You increase fairness by expanding access and opportunity. — synthesis

How do you expand access and opportunity?

Redistribution does not work. — synthesis

Redistribution of access and opportunity does not work?

People have to do it (succeed) themselves in order for it to be sustainable. — synthesis

People have to expand their own access and opportunity? - How?

Maybe we should make all tall people shorter, good looking people plainer, smart people dumber, so on and so forth? Yes, certain people have advantages.

The bottom-line...you cannot makes things better by making them worse. People are not equal and never will be. That does not mean you can not make things fairer and they are getting better. — synthesis

Isn't fairness a zero sum game? How can you make things fairer without increasing the advantages of the disadvantaged and decreasing the advantages of the advantaged?

I believe, and I may be miss remembering, that when Einstein wrote that, he wrote that letter to the wife of a friend who had died, so he was trying to offer some consolation. — Manuel

I believe the relevant quote - or, at least, the one I am familiar with - is this:

Now he has departed from this strange world a little ahead of me. That means nothing. People like us, who believe in physics, know that the distinction between past, present, and future is only a stubbornly persistent illusion. — Einstein

The above link gives the source as "Letter to Besso's family (March 1955) following the death of Michele Besso, as quoted in Disturbing the Universe (1979) by Freeman Dyson Ch. 17 "A Distant Mirror", p. 193".