What is the tenseless version of existence then? — Mr Bee

That everything at all times exists (some say exists "simpliciter"); i.e. the block universe theory.

I have no clue what the notion of saying something exists means other than saying that it either was, is, or will be — Mr Bee

The link above will probably explain it better than I can.

If time flows, then it must flow with respect to something, and that something has to be an external time. — Inis

I understand. I was actually defending eternalism/B-theory in my first post (if only a little).

What's the question of illusion? — Inis

B-theorists hold that the flow of time is an illusion and that the universe is static. How do we experience illusions in that case (or experience anything at all)?

I have no idea. Maybe we could just say "There is motion" or "Everything is in motion", and time is a way that we measure or mark that. Perhaps more simply it's the fact that we age, but that's probably circular. It's a difficult question. But so is the question of illusion for B-theorists.

And if these three sets are all that exhaust what you mean by the "set of objects contained in the universe" then to say that something "exists" under your use of the term is just another way of saying that it either "was, is, or will be", all of which are temporal forms of existence. So this doesn't really offer up a new form of existence at all, one that isn't reducible to a tensed version of existence. — Mr Bee

Couldn't it equally be said that the tensed version of existence is reducible to the tenseless version? Your argument strikes me as somewhat unfair to B-theorists, since if language is necessarily tensed, then B-theorists are not even able to describe their view of time. I sense that you are probably aware of the issues, and I understand that the B-theory may not be strictly identical to "non-presentism", but this may help some readers (perhaps):

Presentism is the view that only present objects exist. According to Presentism, if we were to make an accurate list of all the things that exist – i.e., a list of all the things that our most unrestricted quantifiers range over – there would be not a single non-present object on the list. Thus, you and I and the Taj Mahal would be on the list, but neither Socrates nor any future grandchildren of mine would be included. And it’s not just Socrates and my future grandchildren, either – the same goes for any other putative object that lacks the property of being present. All such objects are unreal, according to Presentism. According to Non-presentism, on the other hand, non-present objects like Socrates and my future grandchildren exist right now, even though they are not currently present. We may not be able to see them at the moment, on this view, and they may not be in the same space-time vicinity that we find ourselves in right now, but they should nevertheless be on the list of all existing things. — A Defense of Presentism, Ned Markosian

§68. The interlocutor summarises what he takes to be Wittgenstein's position: the concept of number is "the logical sum" of all the different kinds of numbers. W says that "This need not be so". The concept can be given a definite boundary, but we can still use the concept without giving it this precise definition (and we normally do not). There is no need to clearly demarcate once and for all what counts and what does not count as a "number" for our everyday usage of the word. Wittgenstein states that this kind of imprecise definition also applies to the word "game". "For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game, and what no longer does?" A boundary can be drawn (if we want), although none has so far been drawn; and yet this lack of precision never bothered us before. However, Wittgenstein's interlocutor worries that without a precise definition "then the use of the word is unregulated - the 'game' we play with it is unregulated." Wittgenstein responds that the use of the word still involves rules, despite the fact that it is not "everywhere bounded by rules".

§69. W asks how we would explain to someone what a game is. He suggests we would describe games (maybe provide some examples) and then perhaps add "This and similar things are called 'games'." The important point: it is not ignorance which prevents us from providing a precise definition or explanation; it is the vague nature of the concept itself. Again: "We don't know the boundaries because none have been drawn". "[W]e can draw a boundary - for a special purpose", but a boundary is not necessary to the use of the concept. Wittgenstein wryly adds that the same also applies to the concept of exactness, which itself remains vague unless we decide to define it more precisely for a special purpose: "you still owe me a definition of exactness".

That's why I see a probable paradox in what Witty is arguing. He's saying that the concept "game" has no boundary unless someone gives it a boundary by using it for a specific purpose. — Metaphysician Undercover

Wittgenstein is referring to the conventional use of the word, not to a special purpose use. ("To repeat, we can draw a boundary - for a special purpose.") The conventional use does not have a definite, precise or "rigid" boundary. ("For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game, and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, for there aren’t any drawn yet.") But this is unproblematic. ("...this never bothered you before when you used the word “game”.")

Perhaps this is where our confusion started (mine as well as yours): you initially claimed that Wittgenstein was "removing the need for a definition from the existence of a concept". This may be seen as partly right, but only if we take "definition" to mean precise definition (which I wasn't). Because what Wittgenstein is saying is that an inexact, non-rigid, vague definition works just as well in many cases.

This relates to his comments in the following/concurrent sections relating to inexactness and vagueness, and his signalling that words/sentences do not require a precise meaning/definition to be useful (e.g. "stay roughly here"). A boundary can be given to a term to make it more precise ("for a special purpose"), but it is not required for the conventional use/usability of a term.

Hold on, you've added an extra condition "in this context". — Metaphysician Undercover

The point of this thread is to discuss and understand what Wittgenstein is saying in the text. Therefore, I'm not adding an "extra condition" by talking about context; this context has been created by what he is talking about in the text and, in particular, in the section of the text that we are currently discussing. I didn't make up these examples for context:

Consider, for example, the activities that we call “games”. I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on. — PI 66

Likewise with numbers:

cardinal numbers, rational numbers, real numbers, and so forth. — PI 68

This is what Wittgenstein is talking about. So, if you take Wittgenstein to be saying here that the words "game" or "number" can mean anything at all, then you are misreading him.

Do you understand that he is saying that he can use the word "number" in a way such that its meaning is not bounded by a definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

No, I don't see him saying that the concept has no definition whatsoever, as you claim; only that the concept is not everywhere circumscribed by rules. Therefore, this leaves some rules/boundaries/definition to the concept.

Boundaries are rules, but not all rules are boundaries. — Metaphysician Undercover

For example?

So he has excluded definitional boundaries as the type of rules which apply in the concept of "game". However this does not mean that the concept is unregulated. We can conclude that the concept is regulated in a different way, rules other than definitional boundaries are what govern the conception of "game". — Metaphysician Undercover

What do you mean by "definitional boundary", and how is it different from a rule?

Do you see the difference between a network of similarities, and a boundary or a limit to this network? The network of similarities is necessary for the existence of a concept, a boundary to the network is not necessary. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's fine, except your claim was that no boundary or definition is required for the concept of a game whatsoever. This implies that the word, in this context (of "board-games, card-games, ball-games, athletic games, and so on"), can mean anything at all. But the word "game" (in this context) has a circumscribed meaning/definition/usage, even though it is not everywhere circumscribed.

I understood Wittgenstein as insinuating that one's private experience of red, i.e. phenomenal red, is neither a necessary nor sufficient estimation of the public use of optical red. The purpose of ostensive definition is to 'set up' the estimation of optical red in terms of phenomenal red, and vice versa, without either being semantically reducible to the other, since while they conceptually overlap they are not conceptually equivalent.

Yet at the same time Wittgenstein pointed out that the meaning of physical concepts such as optical red cannot be meaningfully said to transcend the holistic totality of one's experiences, due to the meaning of utterances resting upon use and demonstration.

So I understood Witty as rejecting the epistemologies of both phenomenalism and physicalism, whilst being close in spirit to metaphysical pluralism - not in the sense of substance pluralism but in the sense of use pluralism and family resemblance. — sime

Hi sime. I had to replace your use of 'optical red' with 'the word "red"' to make sense of this. It was unclear to me which section you were referring to with your comments, or whether you were commenting on the text as a whole, but it sounds like a reasonable summary of PI 58. (I think!)

"For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn." It's all right there, a boundary or definition is not necessary. There is no need for a definition or boundary of the concept "game", yet the word still has meaning and is useful. — Metaphysician Undercover

Nowhere does he say or even imply: 'There is no need for a definition or boundary of the concept "game"'.

For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word "game".) "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play with it is unregulated."——It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too. — PI §68

Rules are boundaries. When the interlocutor suggests, as you do, that the use of the word or the 'game' we play with it is unregulated, Wittgenstein responds that it may not be everywhere circumscribed by rules, but this does not mean that it has no rules.

§66. What is common to all the activities that we call "games"? Wittgenstein urges the reader not to automatically assume the answer, but to "look and see" whether there is anything common to them. Wittgenstein notes that some games might be played for competition while others are played for entertainment, and that some require more skill or luck than others. However, the important point is that "if you look at them, you won't see something that is common to all, but similarities, affinities, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: don't think, but look!"

I find the current sections so iconic that it is difficult to provide a summary and not to simply quote them in their entirety.

It's what you called "fictional", I called it "imaginary". Wittgenstein referred to it in this way: "'what has the colour' is not a physical object". When he says that there is something which has the colour red, but this thing is not a physical object, doesn't this imply "imaginary red" to you? Or do you hold a difference between a fictional object which is red, and an imaginary red? I think you're trying to make something out of nothing. — Metaphysician Undercover

There is a difference between real horses and fictional horses. But is there a similar difference between real unicorns and fictional unicorns? No, because horses are real, whereas unicorns are not. You are conflating this distinction with your use of the term 'imaginary', only to muddy the waters. You have not yet named an imaginary (i.e. fictional) colour; you have only named the memory-image of a real colour. Besides, I fail to see what your talk of fictional colours has to do with the text.

Also, as I explained earlier, Wittgenstein does not preclude physical objects and is not speaking exclusively about non-physical objects at §58. Therefore, he is not talking about an "imaginary red". That is a very distorted reading and I think you are putting too much emphasis on the final sentences of this quite difficult section to be drawing any specific conclusions from it.

Of course he speaks of imaginary colours. Look at 56-57. He speaks of bringing the memory of the colour before "the mind's eye", and he even says the "memory-image". "And don't clutch at the idea of our always being able to bring red before our mind's eye even when there is nothing red any more." — Metaphysician Undercover

At §56-57, he raises the putative possibility that a memory-image could play the role of a paradigm or sample, but he raises this possibility only to reject it: "we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal" (§56) and "If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it." (§57)

I think you misunderstand. He clearly removes the need for a definition. Reread 68-69. He says that we can give a concept boundaries, close the frontier, but this is not necessary. It is done for a particular purpose. Nevertheless, for Wittgenstein this does not mean that there are not rules involved. What this means is that the rules at play here are other than definitions or boundaries. If we want to look for the rules involved with the concept of "game" we must look for something other than a definition or a boundary. — Metaphysician Undercover

Where is your textual support for these claims?

Hasn't he already rejected ostensive definition as insufficient for learning types? — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does he do this? Again, support your claims with textual references.

Look, I'm not going to rehash everything that we've already gone over. Anyway, I would only be repeating the points that Fooloso4 made earlier. If his comments didn't convince you then I doubt that mine will either. Besides, I don't have the patience to try and correct what appears to me to be your deliberate misreadings. If you have textual support for your claims that are not blatantly taken out of context, then I look forward to seeing them. Otherwise, this is just derailing the discussion.

Right, so what I was pointing out, is that I thought that Wittgenstein's representation of the imaginary "red" was not quite correct (I had a slight disagreement). — Metaphysician Undercover

Where does Wittgenstein speak of an "imaginary red"?

He resolves the contradiction, by admitting that "In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists", with the following qualification as to what this means, "and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour".

So let me explain my disagreement. He has allowed that "exists" can refer to imaginary colours. — Metaphysician Undercover

As I explained in my previous post, and as is clear from the quote, he does not speak of imaginary colours:

In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists, and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour...particularly where ‘what has the colour’ is not a physical object. — PI 58

If I speak of a white unicorn, that doesn't make the colour imaginary. Also, red is not an imaginary colour.

But when he says this means "something exists that has that colour", and allows that "'what has that colour' is not a physical object", I think that he doesn't properly represent how an "imaginary colour" really exists. — Metaphysician Undercover

Probably because he is not talking about imaginary colours or how they exist. It is the coloured object which is imaginary (actually, "non-physical" is Wittgenstein's description).

It is not a case of a non-physical object having the colour red, it is a case of a definition. So the colour "red" is defined into existence, as an object, just like the mathematical objects are defined into existence. They exist as objects so long as the definition is adhered to — Metaphysician Undercover

What about all of Wittgenstein's talk of ostensive definition? How do you account for that? If I point at a red object to explain the meaning of the word "red", is that defining "red" into existence? Firstly, I didn't invent the word, so no. Secondly, our ability to sense and distinguish red as a colour is, for the majority of us, part of the human experience. I would have a hard time explaining the meaning of the word in this way if nobody else could distinguish the colour. Therefore, I wouldn't consider it entirely as "defining the colour into existence". Anyway, this seems to be taking us far from the text.

So, in all of this, right back to that point at 58, he is removing the need for a definition from the existence of a "concept". — Metaphysician Undercover

No, he is pointing out that the concept of a game or a number (and probably many more concepts) is not "everywhere bounded by rules" (§68). The concept can be made more rigidly bounded or defined for some purpose if we desire, but it is otherwise not so exactingly defined (§69). However, this doesn't mean that (until we make the definition more exact) it is not defined, or that "he is removing the need for a definition".

To know what red is, or what a game is, does not require that one knows a definition. He is presenting the concept as something other than requiring a definition. Accordingly, I know what 'red' is if I can point to a red thing. And, he has completely separated this from "I know what red is if I can recite a definition of 'red'". — Metaphysician Undercover

He is not "presenting the concept as something other than requiring a definition". An ostensive definition is also a definition. Are you suggesting that the only true definition is in (numerical) terms of wavelength, or what did you have in mind?

As expressed by my disagreement above, I am not yet convinced that this separation, and the way it's expressed at 58, is accurate. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see this as being expressed anywhere at §58.

It is implied that if I can recite the definition of red, yet cannot point to a red thing, then I do not know what red is. — Metaphysician Undercover

A strange way to put it: "I do not know what red is". If you mean by this that you do not know some of the ways to use the word "red" (in this example), then that would be correct.

in short, if what has been so far focused on is difference and variety, §65 begins to broach the question of similarity - it asks about the 'general form of the proposition', and of what can be said about this general form (of which, one imagines, the various 'cases' have been 'species', as in genera-species). — StreetlightX

Maybe I'm just misreading, but this seems to overlook that one of Wittgenstein's main motivations in the Tractatus was the discovery/development of the general form of the proposition (e.g. TLP 4.5, TLP 5.47, TLP 6).

Replace "red" with the made up colour, let's call it "X". Suppose someone proposes that we combine a specified multiplicity of precise wavelengths of light, for a lab experiment or some other purpose, and we call this colour "X". The point is that "X" has meaning but it has not yet been created, and not yet been seen. So "X" has meaning even though there is nothing, not a physical object, nor in the mind, which has that colour. It's getting off track of the text, just an opinion. but I just thought I'd put that out there as a possibility. Words like "red" may be given meaning through definition. We can define things into existence, if imaginary things qualify as having existence. Isn't this like Sam26's example of "God"? — Metaphysician Undercover

Okay, but it's just not clear to me what you're arguing for or against here. Is it something in particular that Wittgenstein has said? Something seemingly related to this is what Wittgenstein says at the end of §58:

In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists, and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where ‘what has the colour’ is not a physical object. — PI 58

However, Wittgenstein is talking about the coloured object being non-physical or perhaps fictional, whereas you appear to be talking about the colour (itself) being non-physical. I don't follow why you are raising this possibility.

Do you not find that my quoted passages from 65-77 are a good indication of what Wittgenstein is doing in that section? https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/comment/243311 What do you think I'm missing, or misrepresenting? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, your quoting of Wittgenstein gives a good indication of what Wittgenstein is doing. I'm more trying to understand what you are doing, which is why I have requested you to support your assertions/questions with textual references.

It is implied that red is a thing which exists when we say things like "red is a colour". So we do use red in this way, like if I were to say "I know what red is", or "red is my favourite colour", etc.. I agree that Wittgenstein's solution is to say that what this means is that there is something which has that colour.

But as per my discussion with Fooloso4 on this subject, I am not convinced of this solution. We can say "red is a colour", and "red" can have meaning, in that context of being designated as a colour, without there being anything which has that colour. We can know "red is a colour" without there being anything which has that colour. So it appears like we can give words like "red" a meaning through a definition like that, so that the word has meaning within that logical structure, without the necessity of there being a thing which has the colour red. So it seems to me that Wittgenstein's solution doesn't really capture what it means for "red" to exist in the imagination. There doesn't need to be a thing which has the colour red, for "red" to have meaning, because "red" can have meaning by definition (or context within a logical structure). — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see what you're getting at here except that we can make up a name for a non-existent colour (when would we ever use such a name?). Anyhow, what does this have to do with the phrase "Red exists" or our preceding discussion?

I disagree. I think we commonly use "red", as well as the other colours in this way. For example: "Red is my favourite colour". "I pick red as the colour to paint my room." "What colour is it?" "The primary colours." "The colours of the rainbow." "Blue is the colour of the sky". And so on. — Metaphysician Undercover

My comments were made in response to your use of the statement "Red is a colour", not any of these other statements.

But notice that there seems to be a special requirement. "Red" is used here in the context of "colour", and it is this context of usage which gives the impression that red is an independent thing. It isn't an independent thing though, because it relies on this necessary relation with "colour" for its existence (via usage) as a thing.. This is the "essentialism", or necessity within a concept, which Wittgenstein may be trying to reject, or at least showing that it can be rejected. When red is defined as necessarily a colour, it gets existence as a thing, by being restricted to being a member of that category, "colour". — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't think anybody is questioning whether red is a colour.

In Wittgenstein's upcoming discussion of concepts, he removes all of this nonsense of a constructed necessity, (boundaries are constructed for a purpose), to get down to the bare bones of what a concept really is. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see it as "getting down" to any "bare bones". He just tries to describe, and urges us to "look and see" (§66), how language is actually used. §93 may also be relevant here.

Perhaps it is because our readings of the text are so far removed, but I find your comments to be quite disconnected from the text. Given that we are trying to read it together, could you please provide more references to the text to support your assertions in future. This may help to reduce confusion and determine where/how you disagree.

I'm not sure whether your views have changed in the interim, Meta, but here's my belated response.

The problem is that meaning is use . And, we use "red" in this way, as if the word refers to a thing, "red exists", "red is a colour", etc.. So if we claim "red exists" doesn't really say anything about a thing named red, it only says something about how we use the word, then we must look to the use of the word for its meaning and we find that we use the word as if there is something called "red" which exists, So that's what "red exists" actually means. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't see that we ever really say "red exists", though. At least, I've never used the phrase outside of a philosophical discussion... However, Wittgenstein is not saying that we don't use this phrase (at §58); just that if we do, then it is typically used to mean that there is something which has that colour.

He seems to propose, at the end of 58, that what "red exists" really means is that there is something existing which has the color red. And when he suggests "what has that colour" is not a physical object, he must be referring back to the "mind's eye", or memory, at 57. — Metaphysician Undercover

What he suggests is that "what has that colour" can also include non-physical objects, i.e., in addition to physical objects. He is neither excluding physical objects from being coloured, nor implying that only memory-images can be coloured.

However, I would say that it's doubtful that he has proved at 55-57 that for "red" to have meaning requires that there is something which has that colour. — Metaphysician Undercover

This is not what he is trying to do. He is demonstrating problems with the metaphysical/Tractarian view of names; a view which can be traced back to Plato. For example, from the Tractatus:

3.2 In propositions thoughts can be so expressed that to the objects of the thoughts correspond the elements of the propositional sign.
3.201 These elements I call “simple signs” and the proposition “completely analysed”.
3.202 The simple signs employed in propositions are called names.
3.203 The name means the object. The object is its meaning. (“A” is the same sign as “A”.)

3.26 The name cannot be analysed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign. — Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (Ogden translation)

It appears to me that the word "red" could still have meaning when there is no red physical object, nor such a colour in anyone's mind, as this is the case when we create imaginary scenarios. So one might say "red is a colour", while there is no red physical object, nor the image of a red colour in any mind, and "red" would have meaning in this imaginary scenario. This is demonstrated by Fooloso4's example, "greige" is a colour. In this case "greige" has meaning, as a colour, and there is nothing, in the physical, nor the mind, which has that coulour. The word "greige" receives its meaning from the context of use, "is a colour" — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that the word "red" gets its meaning from its use in the language. However, with regards to your example, the statement "red is a colour" is typically something that might only be said when teaching somebody the meaning of the word "red" (or "colour"). Per Wittgenstein's remarks in On Certainty, it would in most cases be highly unusual and out of place to utter this statement amongst a group of fluent speakers (again: outside of a philosophical discussion).

There is a collection “Remarks on Colour”, but I don’t know how much light it will shed on the current sections of the PI. — Fooloso4

I also skimmed through this collection prior to my first post on section 58, and I agree that it sheds little light on these concerns. Thanks for the detailed reading :up:

Yes. I won't quote it all, but the Hacker and Baker exegesis of 58 opens with:

58 draws together the elements of the preceding remarks and diagnoses the roots of the misleading metaphysical picture of the Theaetetus (quoted in §46) and hence too of logical atomism

.

and concludes:

sentences of the form ‘Red exists’ do have a role, but it is neither to make metaphysical statements nor to make metalinguistic ones. It is merely to note that there are things thus coloured.

So I think StreetlightX and yourself got it just about right: Wittgenstein rejects both the metaphysical and metalinguistic roles. In reality, "Red exists" is used to denote neither that red exists (in and of itself) nor that "red" has a meaning, but "merely...that there are things thus coloured".

See also and .

§58 is a dialectical nightmare. — StreetlightX

Agreed! This section was difficult. I'm not sure about the thesis-antithesis reading, even though that's how I originally read it. I wasn't satisified with my previous post on §58, so I've had another go. Hopefully this adds something to further clarify the matter.

§58. “I want to restrict the term ‘name’ to what cannot occur in the combination ‘X exists’.

Note that the opening paragraph is in quotation marks, (possibly) signalling that it is being spoken by Wittgenstein's interlocutor and/or by someone with a metaphysical/Platonist attitude.

Wittgenstein's interlocutor appears to be using the term 'name' in the Platonic sense given at §46. Wittgenstein says at §46, quoting the Theaetetus: "...everything that exists in and of itself can be signified only by names; no other determination is possible, either that it is or that it is not ... But what exists in and of itself has to be ... named without any other determination."

And so one cannot say ‘Red exists’, because if there were no red, it could not be spoken of at all.”

'Red' is therefore a name (which signifies a simple) in the Platonic sense. Note also that the meaning of the name is being (illicitly) identified with its "object" here.

More correctly: If “X exists” amounts to no more than “X” has a meaning - then it is not a sentence which treats of X, but a sentence about our use of language, that is, about the use of the word “X”.

Is this Wittgenstein's or Plato's view? Is Wittgenstein applying his concept of 'meaning is use' here? Or is he simply following Plato's metaphysical assumption that we are unable to attribute existence and non-existence to simples, which therefore leads him to say that ""X exists" amounts to no more than "X" has a meaning"?

Or, is this instead a natural inference from the previous statement that "if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all"? Therefore, if there is red then it can be spoken of, i.e., if "X exists" then (this amounts to) "X has a meaning".

I tend to think it is the latter.

It looks to us as if we were saying something about the nature of red in saying that the words “Red exists” do not make sense. Namely, that red exists ‘in and of itself’. The same idea - that this is a metaphysical statement about red - finds expression again when we say such a thing as that red is timeless, and perhaps still more strongly in the word “indestructible”.

The view that "the words "Red exists" do not make sense" leads us to think that this has metaphysical implications regarding "the nature of red" (the "object") itself.

But what we really want is simply to take “Red exists” as the statement: the word “red” has a meaning. Or, perhaps more correctly, “Red does not exist” as “‘Red’ has no meaning”.

Instead of adopting the metaphysical view, what we really want is to replace the empirical statement with the grammatical statement.

Only we do not want to say that that expression says this, but that this is what it would have to be saying if it made sense - that the expression actually contradicts itself in the attempt to say that just because red exists ‘in and of itself’.

Platonists do not take "Red exists" to be saying "the word "red" has a meaning"; Platonists instead want it to be a statement about the nature of red (i.e. about the colour itself). However, the expression "Red exists" actually contradicts itself in the attempt to say that ("Red exists") precisely because the Platonic view does not allow the attribution of existence to red ("in and of itself").

Whereas the only contradiction lies in something like this: the sentence looks as if it were about the colour, while it is supposed to be saying something about the use of the word “red”.

Clear enough, I think.

In reality, however, we quite readily say that a particular colour exists, and that is as much as to say that something exists that has that colour. And the first expression is no less accurate than the second; particularly where ‘what has the colour’ is not a physical object.

In reality - which the metaphysical viewpoint is not - there is no problem in saying that red exists, where this is used to mean that something exists which is red. Saying "Red exists" is no less accurate than saying "something exists which is red", particularly where that something does not physically exist (e.g. it may exist as a memory, or as a fictional object). [This stumped me at first but I think StreetlightX may be right about the reference to fictional objects.]

Yes, I was also questioning this while writing the post. However, it seems to me that there is no clear boundary unless/until we decide to give it one for some purpose.

For I can give the concept of number rigid boundaries in this way, that is, use the word “number” for a rigidly bounded concept; but I can also use it so that the extension of the concept is not closed by a boundary. And this is how we do use the word “game”. For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a game, and what no longer does? Can you say where the boundaries are? No. You can draw some, for there aren’t any drawn yet. — PI 68

§65. Wittgenstein now anticipates criticism that despite all his talk of language-games, he has not yet defined a clear boundary of what is and is not language; of what is essential and inessential to language; or of "what is common to all these activities, and makes them into language or parts of language". Wittgenstein expects his critics to complain that he has let himself off the hook regarding the concerns of his Tractatus and his attempt to find the general form of the proposition. Wittgenstein concurs. He has not defined a clear boundary, because there isn't one. "Instead of pointing out something common to all that we call language, I’m saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common...but there are many different kinds of affinity between them". This leads into the discussion of family resemblances...

§61. At §60, Wittgenstein considers a language-game in which someone is ordered to bring or move about objects which are composed of several parts. He states that there are two ways to play the game: (a) names are given to composite objects only; or (b) names are given to their parts only ("and the wholes are described by means of them"). At §61, Wittgenstein asks whether an order in (a) has the same sense as an order in (b). He states that he would concede that they do, particularly since that is how he described it, although he notes that it has not yet been established what is meant by "the same sense" here.

§62. W supposes that the person given the order must consult a table which co-ordinates names and pictures in order to bring the required object. W asks whether the person will do the same "when he carries out an order in (a) and the corresponding one in (b)?" He answers: "Yes and no". W states that we may say the point of the two orders is the same, but it is not always going to be clear what the 'point' of the order should be. W draws an analogy to a lamp which has the essential purpose of giving light, but which also has the inessential purposes of being an ornament, filling a room, etc. W notes that there is not always a clear boundary between essential and inessential.

§63. It could be said that a sentence in (b) is an analysed form of a sentence in (a), which "readily seduces us into thinking that the former is the more fundamental form". We might think that the person with the unanalysed form is lacking something compared to the person with the analysed form who "has got it all", however "can't I say that an aspect of the matter is lost to the latter than to the former?"

§64. W proposes an altered version of language game (48) in which "names signify not monochrome squares but rectangles each consisting of two such squares". A half red, half green rectangle is called "U"; a half green, half white one called "V", etc. W asks us whether we could imagine a people who only had the combined names (i.e. "U", "V", etc.) without having the individual colour names. He asks how these symbols stand in need of analysis, and whether it possible to replace this game by (48) now that we have no names for individual colours. He asserts: "It is just a different language-game".

§59. The idea that a name signifies some indestructible element of reality is a presupposition; a "particular picture" that is not given to us by experience. W suggests that we get this idea by seeing composite things (such as a chair) as being composed of constituent parts. "We say that the back is part of the chair, but that it itself is composed of different pieces of wood; whereas a leg is a simple constituent part. We also see a whole which changes (is destroyed) while its constituent parts remain unchanged."

§60. Wittgenstein asks whether the statement "My broom is in the corner" is actually a statement about the broom's constituent parts of its broomstick and brush. He suggests that the latter statement is a "further analysed" form of the former statement, which articulates something hidden in the former. But is this what the person making the statement really meant: the constituent parts? We don't typically consider the constituent parts when we ask someone (e.g.) to hand us a broom, as this is unnecessary in most cases. W raises this point because the philosophical tendency is to think that the further analysed form is somehow better, more true, or even the goal of philosophical thinking (such as in his Tractatus).

I have also just returned from holidays and I wanted to provide a more comprehensive exposition of §56 and §57 in response to the latest discussion between Fooloso4 and StreetlightX. However, it appears I may be too late. But I will post it anyway, since I've written it. I also wanted to welcome Fooloso4 who I think has been providing an excellent reading of the text.

§56. Assume that there were no (external) samples available in the language, and instead "we bear in mind the colour (for instance) that a word signifies". Wittgenstein immediately diagnoses the problem with this assumption:

"But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?"

W will return to this issue of an internal standard more forcefully in the private language 'argument'.

W continues on to say that if we use a sample instead of our memory-image, then there may be cases in which we seem to remember the sample as being (e.g.) darker than it was before. Therefore: "Aren't we as much at the mercy of memory as of a sample?". He appears to reject this suggestion with the following example (of a sample): "Imagine that you were supposed to paint a particular colour “C”, which was the colour that appeared when the chemical substances X and Y combined." W notes that if we seem to remember the colour produced by the chemical combination as being brighter or different than it was before, then our memory must be at fault (since it is assumed that the chemical combination always reproduces the same colour). Hence: "This shows that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal."

Further points:
W suggests that the memory-image (i.e. our bearing in mind the colour) and our ability to recall it via memory is what makes "the colour in itself...indestructible". But he then criticises the use of a memory-image as the standard/paradigm.

W states: "(For someone might feel like saying: “If we had no memory, we would be at the mercy of a sample.”)" Although W does not say as much, it is doubtful that any language-game could be played without memory, for then we could not remember how to play it. However, the point here is not the general use of memory in the language-game, but rather the use of a memory-image as a standard in the language-game.

§57. W posits a metaphysical concept of colour: “Something red can be destroyed, but red cannot be destroyed, and that is why the meaning of the word ‘red’ is independent of the existence of a red thing.” - Certainly it makes no sense to say that the colour red (as opposed to the pigment) is torn up or pounded to bits." The next line I do not understand as I am unfamiliar with the phrase, but Wittgenstein asks whether we don't say “The red is vanishing”? The "But don't we say..." indicates Wittgenstein's objection to the metaphysical concept. If we are to assume the metaphysical concept then W will not allow us the move of relying on samples or memory-images of red, as these should not be required if red is actually independent of the existence of a red thing. Wittgenstein deflates the metaphysical concept: "For what if you cannot remember the colour any more? - If we forget which colour this is the name of, the name loses its meaning for us; that is, we’re no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And then the situation is comparable to that in which we’ve lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language."

58. Wittgenstein (in the role of his interlocutor) states that one cannot say 'Red exists' because "if there were no red it could not be spoken of at all". Wittgenstein provides a less problematic way of viewing it: If 'Red exists' is meant only to say that 'Red' has a meaning, then it is a grammatical proposition rather than an empirical proposition. That is, analogous to the standard metre example, it is a means of representation rather than something that is represented, and so it yields no sense to say either that red exists or red does not exist.

To believe that red must exist despite being unable to say that red exists (per the opening statement), one may be tempted to the metaphysical statement that red exists 'in its own right', or that red is 'timeless' or 'indestructible'.

Wittgenstein states that we want to take "Red exists" as "'Red' has a meaning", and "Red does not exist" as "'Red' has no meaning". However, this is not what those bewitched by the metaphysical picture are really trying to say when they say "Red exists", "but that this is what it would have to be saying if it meant anything." Those in the grip of the metaphysical picture appear to be contradicting themselves by saying "Red does not exist"; but the contradiction is really just a confusion regarding the grammatical and empirical propositions.

56 ...This shews that we do not always resort to what memory tells us as the verdict of the highest court of appeal.

57 ...For suppose you cannot remember the colour any more?—When we forget which colour
this is the name of, it loses its meaning for us; that is, we are no longer able to play a particular language-game with it. And the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language,
58. "I want to restrict the term 'name* to what cannot occur in the combination 'X exists'.

The statement of 56 seems clear, memory does not always have the final word in making such decisions. However, at 57 he seems to say that if we forget, then the meaning is gone. So in this sense, memory would be the "highest court" because it determines whether something has meaning or not. Also, it suggests that meaning is not indestructible as was earlier suggested, because when the memory is gone, so is the meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

Context is key. At 56 he states that memories can be unreliable, however a (e.g. colour) sample can be used as the criterion of correctness (e.g. to help resolve disputes).

57 opens with the suggestion that "the meaning of the word 'red' is independent of the existence of a red thing," and so suggests a scenario which does not require samples. If we have no samples to rely upon and if we also forget what colour the name refers to, "the situation then is comparable with that in which we have lost a paradigm which was an instrument of our language".

No problem Sam. I very much agreed with the rest of your post; just thought I might be missing something.

However, meaning resides in a multitude of uses that may not have any one property that corresponds to that meaning. Hence, Wittgenstein's talk about games and family resemblances. This isn't the case though with all meanings (speaking in terms of properties). For example, part of what it means to be a triangle resides in the idea that a triangle has three sides. That said, the concept still gets its meaning in terms of how we use the word triangle, as opposed to pointing to some thing that is a triangle. — Sam26

Hi Sam

I'm not sure if I follow this. You say that "meaning...may not have any one property" corresponding to it, except in some cases such as a triangle. But you also say that a triangle's property of having three sides is only "part of" its meaning. You then go on to say that the concept of a triangle gets its meaning from its use anyway. So, I don't follow your point about meaning possibly having only one property.

56. Having rejected the illicit presumption that the meaning of a word is its (external) object at 55, Wittgenstein now attacks the equally illicit presumption that the meaning of a word is something internal/mental.

Following on from his remarks at 55, using the example of a colour, he asks whether we could proceed without a paradigm/sample if instead we were to "bear in mind" the colour that a word represents. He suggests that such memories could provide us with the "indestructible" element sought at 55. However, the problem with this consideration is one which will famously return later:

But what do we regard as the criterion for remembering it right?

55. At 40, Wittgenstein told us that "the word "meaning" is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that 'corresponds' to the word." Here he continues to try and undermine this common presumption that a word's meaning is its object.

He states that it must be possible to describe the state of affairs in which everything destructible is destroyed. He highlights the illicit presumption: "...this description will contain words; and what corresponds to these cannot then be destroyed, for otherwise the words would have no meaning." He repeats his earlier argument that the meaning of a person's name is not its bearer. He instructs the reader that what would be required for a name to lose its meaning is not the destruction of its signified object, but instead the destruction of the paradigm associated with the name's use.

No, only that it can be - if that's it role in a particular language game. — StreetlightX

You're talking about whether a name (or its bearer) can be a standard, whereas my question and your original statement were about whether a name requires a standard. The latter is what I take Wittgenstein to be referring to at the end of section 55. This is unrelated to a name's (or its bearer's) role in the language game.

As for the question - sure - Nothing, N.N. - these are citied explicitly as names which have meaning even when their 'bearers' no longer exist. — StreetlightX

So you're saying that a person's name is an example of a name that is used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm?

What about Buddha or Genghis Khan or Hitler? I'm not doubting that these names have meaning - of course they do - but isn't there also some standard associated with using these names, whereby we can go wrong in their use, or which allows us to make true or false statements about their bearers? Do standards/paradigms only exist for things such as metres? Why can't the names of people or fictional objects also have standards/paradigms/samples/exemplars?

I'm not sure what it means to speak of a fictional name being a sample though — StreetlightX

I never said that a fictional name was a sample; I suggested that fictional names had samples/standards. E.g. if I wanted to find out details about Harry Potter then I could read one of the books. Likewise, if I wanted to find out information about Hitler, then I could read a history book.

This discussion actually hearkens back to §40-§45, where the question of whether words need 'bearers' in order to have meaning was raised. There, Witty concluded that no, they do not. This, however, is something of an exception: they don't ... unless a sample is involved in the use of words. — StreetlightX

I question whether this is not more of a rule than an exception. Firstly, note that Wittgenstein is specifically discussing names at §55 and not simply words. Thus, are there any examples of names which are used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm, i.e. without a standard of comparison?

One might think of it this way: there are games in which the point is to check if something measures up to the sample; in the absence of such a sample, there would be no point to the game - there would be no meaning to our words. But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).* — StreetlightX

I find it interesting that Wittgenstein chooses an example here that is most likely fictional. Even if it is not, there are certainly other meaningful names in our language which are more clearly fictional. We needn't say that these names of fiction lack samples, because the public works of fiction which give meaning to these names can equally be used as independent standards of comparison to teach the meanings of the names and to help settle disputes.

To paraphrase 51(end of) to 54 the way I interpret it;

In order to see more clearly we must look close up. (51)
But what prevents us from looking close up in philosophy? (52)
Well, rules play a different role in different games, there's no generalisable rule for us to find beyond simply describing it. (53)
And sometimes, the only way we know these rules is by observing the other players in each and every game. (54)
So that is what prevent us from looking close up in philosophy, the desire to find some generalisable rule rather than to describe. — Isaac

Not that I disagree, but it's also worth noting that at §51, immediately before W counsels the reader to "look at what really happens in detail", he asks whether the signification of the colour by the sign consists in a mental correspondence between sign and colour, such that the colour always comes before our minds when using the sign. I think that what Wittgenstein is also doing here is continuing his sustained attack on the idea that meaning is mental (or spiritual or occult). At §52, he says that an empirical investigation is superfluous if one presupposes an explanation and disregards empirical facts, which strikes me (at least in part) as a criticism directed at those who presuppose the explanation just described, i.e. the mental account of correspondence/meaning.

In both cases a chart is referred to establish correspondence, so why does Witty distinguish (2) and (3) with a ‘however, also…”? — StreetlightX

Very nice. I overlooked the important distinction between uses (2) and (3) in my reading. This gives a lot more sense to the final sentence. Thanks.

(1) Where people are simply thought that such and such a sign corresponds to such and such a square. — StreetlightX

Just a small correction: I think you mean "taught".

As I said in my previous post, I'm now using the 4th edition.

§54. W asks us to consider cases "where we say that a game is played according to a particular rule". W states that the rule might be used to help to teach someone how to play a game; or the rule could be "a tool of the game itself". Or the rule might not be taught or written down or expressed at all, except via its expression in the play of the game.

One learns the game by watching how others play it. But we say that it is played according to such-and-such rules because an observer can read these rules off from the way the game is played - like a natural law governing the play.

W asks how an observer can distinguish between "the players' mistakes and correct play" in this case. He answers his question:"There are characteristic signs of it in the players' behaviour". As an example of this, W asks us to consider the characteristic behaviour of somebody correcting themselves when they make a slip of the tongue. W states that this is recognisable even if we don't know the person's language.

Consider that the same rule may be expressed in various different ways. The table is only one way of expressing the rule. The table replaces the role of "memory and association". The various ways that the same rule may be expressed, are an indication of, or actually are, the various roles that the rule has in the game. — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes, that seems to make more sense. Thanks.