In both cases a chart is referred to establish correspondence, so why does Witty distinguish (2) and (3) with a ‘however, also…”? — StreetlightX
(1) Where people are simply thought that such and such a sign corresponds to such and such a square. — StreetlightX
Possibilities of what? Of dealing with the question raised in §51 regarding the correspondence between signs and things, hence: — StreetlightX
Just a small correction: I think you mean "taught". — Luke
Unless I'm mistaken, you seem to be suggesting that 53 (and I suppose 54) are somehow answering the question raised at 51. I think rather they are contributing to Wittgenstein's overall argument that there is no more general answer to be had than a description. The difference is maybe small, but I think significant. It's like asking someone what colours cars come in and one answers "oh, all sorts, there's red, blue, green...", and another answers "there's red, blue and green.". The difference is only in the ellipses, but the implication of the former is that you'll get no better an answer than such a full list of colours as might, for all practical purposes, be endless. The latter, however, whilst being open to error still, is claiming some complete list might be drawn up. — Isaac
A big part of what I'm trying to do here is establish the 'flow' of the PI, to show the threads that weave from one part to the next, and sometimes it does mean I obscure global implications for local connections, so I appreciate the corrective. — StreetlightX
Also, nice to have you on board! — StreetlightX
Unless I'm mistaken, you seem to be suggesting that 53 (and I suppose 54) are somehow answering the question raised at 51. — Isaac
Where does that sense reside? It resides in the complexity of the language-game, grammar, rules, and actions (correct and incorrect) within social contexts, all of these work together to establish meaning. — Sam26
—An example of something corresponding to the name, and without which it would have no meaning, is a paradigm that is used in connexion with the name in the language-game. — Wittgenstein 55
And of course it's those actions that determine what's correct and incorrect, i.e., "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour. — Sam26
I know you're going beyond the text somewhat, but there are some ambiguities with this reading, I think. First, I'm not clear on what it means to say that actions 'determine' what is correct and incorrect: is it not the case that actions are correct or incorrect? (i.e. you seem to introduce a temporal logic - actions > in/correctness - where I'm not sure there is one; But perhaps you don't quite mean this and I'm over-reading). Second, the "it" in the "the characteristic signs of it" seems to refer to 'distinguishing between mistakes and correct play' and not correct and incorrect play itself - the act of distinction, and not the objects of the distinction, as in, not:
(1) "[the] characteristic signs of it [correct and incorrect] in the player's behaviour"; But:
(2) "[the] characteristic signs of it [distinguishing correct and incorrect play] in the player's behaviour";
This insofar as the immidiately preceeding sentence is:
"But how does the observer distinguish in this case between players’ mistakes and correct play? - There are characteristic signs of it in the players’ behaviour": the 'it' seems to refer to the verb - the act of distinguishing in/correct play by players in the game, and not individual correct and incorrect play in themselves. — StreetlightX
To paraphrase 51(end of) to 54 the way I interpret it;
In order to see more clearly we must look close up. (51)
But what prevents us from looking close up in philosophy? (52)
Well, rules play a different role in different games, there's no generalisable rule for us to find beyond simply describing it. (53)
And sometimes, the only way we know these rules is by observing the other players in each and every game. (54)
So that is what prevent us from looking close up in philosophy, the desire to find some generalisable rule rather than to describe. — Isaac
I wouldn't say that Streetlight is suggesting that this question is being answered. "Dealing with the question" does not necessarily imply answering it. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think that what Wittgenstein is also doing here is continuing his sustained attack on the idea that meaning is mental (or spiritual or occult). At §52, he says that an empirical investigation is superfluous if one presupposes an explanation and disregards empirical facts, which strikes me as (at least in part) a criticism directed at those who presuppose the explanation just described, i.e. the mental account of correspondence/meaning. — Luke
But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).* — StreetlightX
What I mean by "...the actions determine what's correct or incorrect" is that the actions within the social context is the means by which we distinguish what's correct or incorrect. No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow. — Sam26
No action, as I understand it, is intrinsically correct or incorrect, except as it is seen within the game, or as seen within a social context. No more than an arrow is intrinsically pointing, it points within the context of the actions associated with the arrow.
I do think there is a kind of temporal logic to it, i.e., there is an action, then there is the determination if that action is correct or incorrect. How does one separate the action from the act of distinguishing right and wrong, correct and incorrect? There would be no temporal logic if the act itself was intrinsically right or wrong, correct or incorrect. — Sam26
As to your last point, I agree that the "it" in the characteristic signs of it refers to the distinguishing between mistakes and correct play. However, the acts of distinction cannot be separated from the objects of distinction. Don't they go hand-in-hand? — Sam26
This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. We haven't even gotten beyond the problem which is that philosophers are commonly opposed to making such a close-up examination. Why do you simply assume that there are rules inherent within "social context"? — Metaphysician Undercover
This would require the assumption that the game, or "social context" has inherent within it, rules, by the means of which, such a judgement of correct or incorrect could be made. But we have not yet found, in the close-up examination of the details, the existence of any such rules. — Metaphysician Undercover
This discussion actually hearkens back to §40-§45, where the question of whether words need 'bearers' in order to have meaning was raised. There, Witty concluded that no, they do not. This, however, is something of an exception: they don't ... unless a sample is involved in the use of words. — StreetlightX
One might think of it this way: there are games in which the point is to check if something measures up to the sample; in the absence of such a sample, there would be no point to the game - there would be no meaning to our words. But not every game is like this. When I say "Nothung has a sharp blade" (§44), there is no need that Nothung actually be around, and in one piece, for this sentence to have meaning; but something like "is it the same length as Nothung?" would require there to be Nothung around to measure it against (notwithstanding a question like 'is it the same length as Nothung was?).* — StreetlightX
don't understand how it is that you do not agree with this, namely, that any language-game, which by definition is social, necessarily has rules (implicit and/or explicit). — Sam26
Any language-game by definition is a rule-following activity, if not, then there would be no consistency of actions that would make it work. — Sam26
So in essence you're right, from your premise. Wittgenstein has failed to show us the generalisable rule behind what we see in the examples, but that's because his examples are meant to show that there isn't one. — Isaac
[my emphasis]If it requires that one knows a language in order for that person to learn a rule (I.e. if we can only learn a rule through language) then it is impossible that all language-games are rule following activities. — Metaphysician Undercover
I think the issue is that a rule only seems to exist in a general form. — Metaphysician Undercover
Look at the three examples which StreetlightX very aptly laid out. What appears as if it were one rule, may manifest in these three different ways. — Metaphysician Undercover
He wants to look beyond this general sort of form, to determine the form of the specific (particular) rule. — Metaphysician Undercover
So what you call "the generalizable rule", is what is referred to as the "particular rule". — Metaphysician Undercover
We haven't determined which one is the actual particular rule, so we haven't yet found the existence of the particular rule. However, I wouldn't say yet, that he intends to show that there isn't one, because we need to read further ahead. — Metaphysician Undercover
I question whether this is not more of a rule than an exception. Firstly, note that Wittgenstein is specifically discussing names at §55 and not simply words. Thus, are there any examples of names which are used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm, i.e. without a standard of comparison? — Luke
I find it interesting that Wittgenstein chooses an example here that is most likely fictional. Even if it is not, there are certainly other meaningful names in our language which are more clearly fictional. We needn't say that these names of fiction lack samples, because the public works of fiction which give meaning to these names can equally be used as independent standards of comparison to teach the meanings of the names and to help settle disputes. — Luke
As for the question - sure - Nothing, N.N. - these are citied explicitly as names which have meaning even when their 'bearers' no longer exist. — StreetlightX
I'm not sure what it means to speak of a fictional name being a sample though — StreetlightX
So you're saying that a person's name is an example of a name that is used without the involvement of a sample or paradigm? — Luke
I suggested that fictional names had samples/standards. — Luke
Here's where you seem to go wrong. Where did anyone say this? Language would never get anywhere if this was the case. In fact, I've said the opposite, "[t]he rule (known or unknown) is in the bringing of the correct stone in response to the call." Moreover, what do you think learning a rule is all about? When one learns to act in accord with a command, one is learning to follow a rule. It doesn't require that you know a language, or that you know what a rule is. Animals can even participate in rule-governed activities. Think of learning to follow simple commands. The learning of language, and the learning of following rules are things that happen at the same time, viz., if you learn a language, then you are learning to follow rules (implicit or explicit, known or unknown). — Sam26
Are you saying that it seems to you that this is how a rule exists, or that you understand Wittgenstein to be implying this is the case? Because if the latter, I get the exact opposite impression and I'm not sure what line of interpretation has lead you to that conclusion. — Isaac
I don't think it does appear as if it were one rule. Wittgenstein is pointing out three different roles rules can play in games. He's simply saying that rules do not play the same role in every game. This applies to any rule, it's not that one rule plays three different roles, it's that any rule could play any number of roles, there is no generalisable statement we could make about the roles rules play in games beyond a description of the roles rules play in games. That is what our close-to examination has shown. — Isaac
Again, I'm unsure where you've got this impression from. If Wittgenstein was concerned to determine the form of the specific rule then he's going about doing so in a very obscure manner. He'd surely lay out as many language games as he could think of, and go through them one by one to arrive at some kind of Universal Rule Book. But we already have the first draft of such a book, the dictionary. — Isaac
Wittgenstein is claiming that the generalisable rule doesn't exist, so I don't see how it could be what is referred to as the particular rule. You may have to explain this a bit more clearly for me. — Isaac
I know that you've said the exact opposite to this, that's the point. Wittgenstien, has not yet established the relationship between language and rules, to make the conclusion which you have made. So I suggested the very opposite to your conclusion, as still a possibility from what Wittgenstein has so far exposed. Whether a person needs to understand language to learn a rule, or whether a person needs to understand rules to learn a language has not yet been determined. So as much as you might assert that a person cannot learn language without learning rules, these assertions are irrelevant to the text we're reading. — Metaphysician Undercover
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