the word "unicorn" refers to other words in the language, as in "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" — RussellA

The word "unicorn" refers to the definition of the word "unicorn"? Why don't all words do this?

It remains a fact that if the word "unicorn " in language depends on its existence on the fact of there being a unicorn in the world, then the word "unicorn" would not exist. — RussellA

If the existence of the word is dependent upon the existence of the object, that may be true. However, you said earlier that the existence of the word is dependent upon the word referring to the object. If that were true then we could no longer speak about any extinct animal for the names of those animals would no longer exist.

Within his theory that meaning is use in language, in the sentence "bring me the slab", the word "slab" is not being used, as it would be in Referentialism, in naming a slab in the world, but is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language — RussellA

What do you think the difference is? If meaning is use in language, then the word has to be used in some way. What other use does the word have if it is not being used to refer to an object in the world?

You say here that the word "is being used in the sense of meaning is use in language". But that is not a specific use a word can have; it's a general phrase about what gives any word its meaning. What you have said is similar to: "this word is being used to get its meaning from its use", which is circular. Wittgenstein gives various examples of different uses of language at PI 23.

It would not make sense for Wittgenstein to be in opposition to Referentialism, but then use the word "slab" to name a slab in the world. — RussellA

To repeat, Wittgenstein opposes Referentialism because it views reference as the only use that words can have. His opposition does not imply that words cannot be used to refer; only that they have more uses than this.

As the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs in the world, there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world. Therefore, the word "slab" in language cannot be referring to something in the world. — RussellA

How does that follow? You say that there can be the word "slab" in language whether or not there are slabs in the world (i.e. whether there are slabs in the world or not). Do you think this implies that there are not slabs in the world? Or, why do you say the word "slab" can't be used to refer to something in the world?

If the word "slab" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no slab in the world then there would be no word "slab" in language, but that is not the case. — RussellA

Try the same with the word "unicorn". If the word "unicorn" did refer to something in the world, then, if there was no unicorn in the world then there would be no word "unicorn" in language. Since there is the word "unicorn" in language, then there must be a unicorn in the world. This is the absurd consequence of your argument.

Sentences 1) and 2) are contradictory, in that in sentence 1) the word "slab" doesn't refer to a thing in the world but in sentence 2) the word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world. — RussellA

The word "slab" does refer to a thing in the world. However, the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of any slabs. This is no different to the word "unicorn" or the name of Wittgenstein's deceased "Mr. N.N."

Sentence 1) encapsulates the core of the PI in that the meaning of a word is its use in language. — RussellA

Yes, except you mistakenly believe this implies that words cannot be used to refer to objects in the world.

The word "slab" can be used to refer to either an existing or to a non-existing slab. The only difference is whether the slab exists.

The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world.
— Luke

You write that "slabs exist in the world", and also write that there can be the word "slab" in language even if there is no slab in the world.

So what you are really saying is that "slabs exist in the world even if there is no slab in the world" — RussellA

That does not follow.

I said that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, just as the meaning of the word "unicorn" does not depend on the existence of unicorns. However, regardless of this fact about meaning, slabs do exist in the world.

There cannot be a correct use of a word such as "table". — RussellA

Then neither can there be an incorrect use of the word. It follows that there cannot be a correct or incorrect use of any word. But then language would be like a game of chess where each player makes up their own individual rules about what to do with the pieces. And that just means there wouldn't be any game of chess (or any language).

Within different contexts there are different sets of family resemblances. Is it correct to say that this is a "table"? — RussellA

That was the point of my quote of PI 69. You might say it's a table. There will always be borderline cases (in addition to more obvious and clear cut cases). This is a result of there being no strict definition (for most) of our words. Again:

Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a [table] is? — But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. — Wittgenstein, PI 69

We might agree (for some special purpose) that a table must have four legs and a table top, in which case the photo you posted would not count as a table. But unless we agree to something like this, then the concept of table has no clear boundary. Does this make the concept unusable? Not at all.

Yes, that is Wittgenstein's position, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on there being a slab in the world. — RussellA

That's true. The meaning of the word "slab" does not depend on the existence of slabs, as PI 40 indicates. Nevertheless, slabs exist in the world.

What in the world has judged that an apple sitting on a table is a different object to the table it is sitting upon? — RussellA

Language users.

3) If within the world, there is nothing that is able to judge which parts are connected and which aren't, then objects, entities and events cannot exist in the world. — RussellA

69. How would we explain to someone what a game is? I think that we’d describe games to him, and we might add to the description: “This and similar things are called ‘games’.” And do we know any more ourselves? Is it just that we can’t tell others exactly what a game is? — But this is not ignorance. We don’t know the boundaries because none have been drawn. To repeat, we can draw a boundary — for a special purpose. Does it take this to make the concept usable? Not at all! Except perhaps for that special purpose. No more than it took the definition: 1 pace = 75 cm to make the measure of length ‘one pace’ usable. And if you want to say “But still, before that it wasn’t an exact measure of length”, then I reply: all right, so it was an inexact one. — Though you still owe me a definition of exactness. — Wittgenstein, PI

Replace the word "game" with the word "table" in the above section. We don't need to draw any strict boundary for the concept to be usable (in language). But we can and might do so for a special purpose.

Can you show me the rule for the correct use of the word "table"? — RussellA

No. But a child can be taught how to use the word correctly.

As I see it, the whole point of the PI is in denying that any word gets its meaning from referring to objects in the world. — RussellA

It depends what you mean by "gets its meaning from". This seems to suggest that names have their meanings bestowed upon them by the objects they refer to; as if the object somehow gives the word its meaning, instead of those who use the word. I don't see how this would work. The point of PI 40 is that the users of the name give the name meaning, not the object or person to which the name refers. The meaning of the name does not cease to exist when the object or person ceases to exist. You also seem to have the impression that Wittgenstein's rejection of this view implies that words cannot refer to objects, but we obviously can and do sometimes use words to refer to objects. According to Wittgenstein, in many or most cases the meaning of a word is its use.

The child has a concept of "table", as only having four legs, and points to an example in the world of what it believes to be a table. Its parent may believe that the child's concept is wrong, as for the parent a "table" may have either three or four legs .

However, as far as the child is concerned, they are not wrong, in that they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a "table". — RussellA

Are you saying that there is no way to determine whether the parents or the child is correct? What if the child points to an apple or to the ceiling and says "table" because they believe they have pointed to an example of what they believe to be a table. Can we not correct the child?

Wittgenstein does not endorse this sort of relativism.

201. ...there is a way of grasping a rule which is not an interpretation, but which, from case to case of application, is exhibited in what we call “following the rule” and “going against it”...

202. That’s why ‘following a rule’ is a practice. And to think one is following a rule is not to follow a rule. And that’s why it’s not possible to follow a rule ‘privately’; otherwise, thinking one was following a rule would be the same thing as following it.

258. ...One would like to say: whatever is going to seem correct to me is correct. And that only means that here we can’t talk about ‘correct’.

There are rules for the correct use of the word "table". If a child uses the word incorrectly, then we correct them.

From Wikipedia Direct Reference Theory, the PI opposed Referentialism — RussellA

Referentialism says that pointing out an object in the world is the only use a word can have. Wittgenstein says that words can also have other uses. As we pointed out to you earlier, Wittgenstein does not deny that words can be used to refer to objects. What he rejects is that words are only used to refer to objects.

When one says "the child points at a table", this is a figure of speech for "the child points at an example of its concept of "table"" — RussellA

This implies that it is impossible for the child to be wrong; that the child must always point to a table, no matter what they point to, as long as it aligns with the child’s concept of “table”.

However, this is inconsistent with your earlier comment:

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word. — RussellA

If the child’s concept determines what is or what isn’t (an example of) a table, then here we cannot talk about “success” or “failure”.

Do you want to say that it is impossible to determine whether the child has successfully pointed to a table? Can we never teach anyone to speak a language?

After a bit of pondering, I will stick my neck on the line and say that, at the core of Philosophical Investigations, with its language games, family resemblances and Forms of Life, no word names an object in the world...

We know when the child understands the meaning of the word "table", when we ask the child to point to a "table" and they successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling. They know how to use the word. — RussellA

Mustn't the child point to a table, i.e. "an object in the world", in order to "successfully point to a table rather than to an apple or the ceiling"?

The concept "table" only exists in the mind and not the world. What exists in the world are particular examples, particular instantiations, of our concept of the word "table". — RussellA

Those particular instantiations of our concept of the word "table" are tables, which are objects in the world.

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game. — RussellA

You're asking me to bring you a table, not to bring you my concept of "table". If a child can successfully point to a table, then I can successfully bring you one.

In the sentence "bring me a table", the word "table" is not referring to either my or your concept of "table", because, as with the beetle, it has dropped out of consideration in the language game. — RussellA

That's right, the word "table" is not referring to either of our concepts of "table", but to the object in the world that we call a "table". Why, then, do you think that "no word names an object in the world"?

The word "table" in the sentence "bring me a table" is not referring to a table in the world, to an object in the world, but is referring to the many examples of things in the world experienced over decades and multiple locations as having a family resemblance and been named "table" by a community, of which the thing in front of me is just one particular example. — RussellA

Is this thing in front of you - this object in the world; this particular example of a table - not a table?

1) As with Augustine, the word "slab" gets its meaning from referring to a slab in the world.
2) The word "slab" doesn't get its meaning from referring to a slab in the world, but instead gets its meaning from being read in context within the other words used in the text.

I can understand 1), in that language is grounded within the world, but I cannot understand 2), where language becomes self-referential without any possibility of being grounded in the world .

I agree with Wittgenstein that not all words refer to objects in the world, but I am unclear as to his position. Does he believe that no word gets its meaning from referring to an object in the world ? — RussellA

Wittgenstein is critical of Augustine's picture of language for failing to consider that words can have other possible uses besides naming objects (as nouns):

These [Augustine's] words, it seems to me, give us a particular picture of the essence of human language. It is this: the words in language name objects — sentences are combinations of such names. —– In this picture of language we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

Augustine does not mention any difference between kinds of word. Someone who describes the learning of language in this way is, I believe, thinking primarily of nouns like “table”, “chair”, “bread”, and of people’s names, and only secondarily of the names of certain actions and properties; and of the remaining kinds of word as something that will take care of itself. — Wittgenstein, PI 1

However, Wittgenstein does not deny that some words do name objects, or can refer to things in the world. He is critical of the view that language primarily names objects and the rest is just a sort of filler. He criticises Augustine's picture for failing to consider that there can be other kinds of words, or that words can have other uses besides naming objects, and that the meaning of a word is not always or only the object to which the word refers. Consider the builder's language game in section 2. "Slab!" is not used merely as a reference to the object, but as a command to have the object brought to the builder. See sections 19-20.

1) The word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence, such as "I want five apples". Even before I use the sentence "I want five apples" in the world, the word "five" has a meaning because it has a use within a sentence.

2) The word "five" has a meaning because the sentence it is within has a use in the world. For example, my saying "I want five apples", the shopkeeper hearing me, who then starts to count out five apples. If the shopkeeper doesn't hear me, and doesn't count out five apples, then as the sentence has no use in the world, the word "five" has no meaning.

Which reading is correct. Or is there another reading? — RussellA

I'm inclined to say that 2) is the correct reading, but I don't think there's any real distinction between 1) and 2). In short, because all use - including the use of a word in a sentence - is a use in the world.

In 1) you seem to be referring to conventional meaning, or how the word is commonly (actually) used. A dictionary lists such conventional meanings. Obviously, many words have more than one conventional meaning/use. But it is in actual use - in a specific context (embedded in specific acts in the world) - where a word finds its actual meaning(s); where it is used to have one or more of these conventional meanings, or possibly an unconventional meaning.

All the conventional ways that a word is commonly used (or all the meanings that a word commonly has) is not necessarily the meaning that a word does have in an actual instance of use. Consider poetry, metaphor, double entendre, proper nouns, etc.

It is not yet clear what "I want five apples" means apart from any particular use of that sentence in the world. Obviously, we can imagine how the sentence might commonly or conventionally be used, but there are likely to be other ways that it could be used, and therefore other meanings that it could have. For example, "Five" could be a variety of apple or "five apples" could be a brand name or a code phrase or a double entendre or a nickname, etc.

If the shopkeeper doesn't hear you, then just say the same thing again but louder. It doesn't imply that the sentence has no use in the world or that the word has no meaning. You could use the same sentence again here or elsewhere with the same meaning. But the one word or sentence doesn't necessarily have to be used the same way, to have the same meaning, in every situation.

I wonder what happens to reality when we sleep — Cidat

Much like in the movie Dark City, all the buildings get rearranged and everyone's identities and memories are altered.

When Wittgenstein writes that words don't have meaning but only a use... — RussellA

Wittgenstein never says this. He says that the meaning of the word "five" was not in question in the shopkeeper scenario; not that it has no meaning.

Wittgenstein does not endorse but rejects the Augustinian picture of language wherein "Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands."

At 43, he tells us that for a large class of cases, "the meaning of a word is its use in the language".

At 1, he says that with regards to the shopkeeper's actions: "It is in this and similar ways that one operates with words." Do you think the shopkeeper was wrong to count out five red apples in response to being handed the slip of paper? Do you think that the word "five" means something else (or nothing at all) in this scenario?

But I’ll entertain any thoughts on Cavell’s assessment of how to read Wittgenstein more profitably. I always find people take him to be explaining language or offering it as a solution to skepticism, when it is simply a window to see that each thing works differently, not to justify claims about how we play games or follow rules or dream of our own world, but as examples to see why we insist on a requirement (certain knowledge) that they fail to meet. — Antony Nickles

I'm not sure what you mean by "explaining language", but I don't see why it cannot be both. That is, Wittgenstein does provide "a window to see that each thing works differently" and/or a reflection on "why [traditional philosophers] insist on a requirement (certain knowledge) that they fail to meet" as you say, but he also does this via looking at how language actually works. From the Augustinian picture of language to language-games to (linguistic) meaning-is-use, to rule-following (particularly in mathematics and language), to the private language argument and beyond, Wittgenstein is forever banging on about language and grammar. I think it would be difficult to argue that his focus is not on language. After all, language is the vehicle of philosophy, and Wittgenstein's philosophical investigation gets it importance from "destroying [..,] only houses of cards, and [...] clearing up the ground of language on which they stood."

I said that "Ouch!" is a sentence, not that "ouch" is a sentence. — RussellA

I don't disagree that "Ouch!" is a sentence. What I disagree with is your assertion that "ouch" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour. Given your assertion that "ouch" is a noun, I asked you to use it in a sentence as a noun.

The word "ouch!" is an exclamation, and according to the University of Sussex, an exclamation can be a sentence. — RussellA

I agree that "ouch" is an exclamation. This is what any dictionary tells us. However, the dictionary does not say that "ouch" is a noun. I have asked you for an example of using "ouch" in a sentence as a noun to support your assertion and to demonstrate that "ouch" is a noun.

Use it in a sentence.
— Luke

If someone can see me, they see a picture of me wincing. If someone cannot see me, and hear me say "ouch!", they can replace the word "ouch!" by a picture of me wincing, ie, the word "ouch!" names the picture of me wincing.

The word "ouch!" names a picture, and a picture is a noun. Therefore, in the sentence "Ouch!", the word "ouch!" is being used as a noun. — RussellA

You said that the word "ouch" is a noun, like the word "house" is a noun.

I asked you for an example of how the word "ouch" might be used in a sentence (as a noun). If I were to ask you for an example of how the word "house" might be used in a sentence (as a noun), you could cite an example such as:

"I live in a very big house."
"This house is made of bricks."
"His house was painted yellow."
"We take our shoes off in this house."

You did not give an example of how the word "ouch" might be used in a sentence. Instead, you said that the word "ouch" is a sentence. Would you likewise say that the word "house" is a sentence? If not, why not?

Could you provide an(other) example of how the word "ouch" might be used in a sentence (as a noun)?

"Ouch" as a noun names a pain behaviour. — RussellA

Use it in a sentence.

If not naming the pain behaviour directly and the private sensation indirectly, then what purpose does the word "ouch!" have in the language game? — RussellA

As I've already told you: saying "ouch" doesn't name pain behaviour; saying "ouch" is pain behaviour.

To say that "ouch" names a pain behaviour is to treat it as though it were a verb, such as "wincing". You don't (typically) describe a person as ouching. A person uses the word "ouch" to express their pain. The word "ouch" is not used as a name or as a description of anyone's behaviour.

“Ouch” isn’t the name of anything; it’s what you say when you hurt yourself. — Luke

An English speaker would say "ouch", an Indonesian speaker would say "aduh", meaning that exclaiming "ouch" is not an innate behaviour but is rather learnt as part of a language. — RussellA

I've been addressing your mistaken belief that:

the word "ouch!" names a set of particular observed behaviours in the world — RussellA

Therefore, I don't see how your response about learning language is relevant.

It’s not about context. “Ouch” is not a behaviour. Saying “ouch” (or saying anything) is a behaviour.

As W says at 15: “naming something is rather like attaching a name tag to a thing.”

“Ouch” isn’t the name of anything; it’s what you say when you hurt yourself.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour.

"Ouch!" can only name the behaviour. — RussellA

What behaviour does it name?

"Ouch" is not the name of a behaviour; it is an expression of pain. One does not name anyone's pain as "ouch". One says "ouch" when they are in pain; to express their pain. As you note, the behaviour of saying "ouch" replaces the behaviour of wincing. However, that does not mean that "ouch" is a synonym for "wince". Wincing is the name of a behaviour, but "ouching" is not.

"Wince" is the name of an expression of pain, whereas (to say) "ouch" is an expression of pain. Wincing and saying "ouch" are both behaviours that express pain. "Ouch" is not the name of an expression of pain. Saying "ouch" is an expression of pain.

So we are left with the quandary of how to talk about a private language, something that is outside the scope of knowledge, something non-epistemic, using language, a language game, that is by its nature inside the scope of knowledge, something epistemic. — RussellA

We can talk about it in a public language; I see no issue there. However, the concept of a private language turns out to be incoherent, so the assumption that such a thing is possible should be rejected.

If that one is pain is outside the scope of knowledge, something that cannot be talked about in the language game, does that mean that item 5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? is a meaningless statement? — RussellA

That I am in pain can be talked about in the language game. That I am in pain can also be known by others. It is just something that I cannot know. I don't learn of, or doubt, or know my pains. I have them.

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain". — RussellA

Wittgenstein says at 5) that "I know I am in pain" might mean "I am in pain", which is how you read it. But you are ignoring the first part where he says that "I know I am in pain" can't be said of him at all. The point is that "I know" is being misused here. One cannot know they are in pain because being in pain is not something that can be doubted or learned; it is not something that one can come to know or that one can satisfy themselves is true or false. That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic. It's different to those facts that we can doubt or learn or come to know or satisfy ourselves is true or false, such as the capital city of China or the length of the Nile.

This is why it can't be said of me at all that "I know I am in pain", and that all it could possibly mean is that I am in pain.

But this is the same idea as expressed in item 5), inferring that item 5) is referring to one's inner thoughts rather than any public language game. In other words, to one's private language. — RussellA

As I've said several times now, a phrase spoken in English to oneself (or thought in English in "one's inner thoughts") does not constitute a private language. 5) is written in English, not in a private language. "I know I am in pain" is also written in English, not in a private language. 5) does not refer to a private language.

There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language.
— Luke

It is the difference between keeping a diary in PI 258 and the beetle in the box in PI 293. — RussellA

No, it's not. A (private) language understood only by the speaker is the definition of a private language.
Besides, the beetle in the box has no place in the language game and a private language speaker has no language game to play.

As no one else can know my inner thoughts, no one else can know my inner language. This inner language is a type of a private language. If I am saying "I am in pain" in my inner language, only I can hear it. — RussellA

"I am in pain" is an English phrase, and is not part of a private language, by definition. Again, Wittgenstein tells us at 243 (my emphasis):

But is it also conceivable that there be a language in which a person could write down or give voice to his inner experiences — his feelings, moods, and so on — for his own use? —– Well, can’t we do so in our ordinary language? — But that is not what I mean. The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 243

It must not be possible, in principle, for another person to understand the language. Saying to yourself in your inner language "I am in pain" is something that any English speaker could understand.

You believe that 5) is Wittgenstein. I am unsure.

As I wrote in my last post:

If we make the assumption that Wittgenstein is a sensible person, this infers that 3) is Wittgenstein. As 3) says that 2) is wrong, this infers that 2) is the interlocutor.

As it is unclear whether 5) is referring to a private language or the language game, it is unclear whether this is Wittgenstein's opinion or the interlocutor's — RussellA

It seems very clear to me that 5) is not referring to a private language, and I don't understand how it possibly could be. What makes you think that it is?

He is not just saying that a private language understood only by the speaker is impossible, but that the very existence of a private language is impossible. — RussellA

There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language.

Wittgenstein agrees in PI 304 that we can have private inchoate feelings, ie, sensations, but argues that no one else can ever know what these private feelings are... These private inchoate feelings can only be given form within a community of other minds using a language game, thereby breaking the problem of solipsism. Within the language game, when I say "I am in pain", I am not taking about my private personal experience, but rather talking about the concept of pain that exists in the minds of the community of which I am part. — RussellA

The point of 304 (and elsewhere) - at least, on my reading - is that the concept of "pain" is not based on the private feeling that nobody else can perceive, but on the expression of the sensation; on the behaviour (that others can perceive). I take this to be the point of 307, for example.

The concept does not exist only "in the minds of the community", but also in their behaviour. One may demonstrate that they don't understand a concept by what they say or do.

In a private language, to say "I am in pain" requires no justification, other than "I know I am in pain because I am in pain", in which event the word "know" has no function. — RussellA

If a private language can be understood only by the speaker, then to whom is one saying "I am in pain" (in English)? The English language is not a private language, so I don't understand what you mean.

However, in the language game, to say "I am in pain" does require a justification. — RussellA

I don't believe that it always, or even often, requires a justification. I think the only time it might require justification is if others didn't believe you were actually in pain or if you had to prove it for some reason.

For example, "I know I am in pain because I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress". — RussellA

Have you ever said this? Has anyone?

In the language game, the word "know" does have a definite function. — RussellA

I agree with you on that much.

But the only situation where to say "I know I am in pain" requires no justification is in a private language, — RussellA

I agree that one does not need to justify one's sensation of pain to oneself.

as Wittgenstein attacks the idea of the possibility of a private language, 5) cannot be Wittgenstein's position but that of an interlocutor. — RussellA

What does 5) have to do with a private language?

A private language can only be understood by its speaker. "I know I am in pain" is an English phrase and the English language is spoken by over a billion people on Earth. Therefore, "I know I am in pain" is not part of a private language.

Since I don't follow your connection between 5) and a private language, I see no reason to accept that 5) is said by an interlocutor.

You have said a lot, but you did not address my previous post or answer my question, namely:

Why do you think the interlocutor would contradict himself? — Luke

Do you acknowledge that your numbered sections 2 and 5 contradict each other? I don't understand why you would attribute two contradictory statements to Wittgenstein's interlocutor. If you aren't going to address the content of my posts, then I have little interest in responding further.

I will just point out where I think you are going wrong in your latest post:

4) Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

It is not immediately obvious whether Wittgenstein is referring to 2) or 3). — RussellA

It is immediately obvious.

At the end of 3, Wittgenstein says: "other people very often know when I am in pain". The interlocutor responds at 4 with: "Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself". Wittgenstein then corrects them at 5 with: "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain."

As regards my private language, — RussellA

What do you mean by your "private language"? Do you mean talking to yourself in English? Because that is not a private language.

As regards my private language, the word "know" in the phrase "I know I am in pain" is redundant and serves no useful purpose, and therefore would only make sense if said as a joke. — RussellA

To say something redundant(ly) is not to say something senseless. One can still make sense by saying something redundant. Wittgenstein does not say that "I know I am in pain" is redundant. He says "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain." It is senseless to say "I know I am in pain"; it is not merely redundant.

The problem within 7) is that Wittgenstein seems to be mixing up references on the one hand to a private language, ie, "myself", and on the other hand to other people and the language game, ie "other people". — RussellA

I don't understand what you mean by "a private language, ie. "myself"". Are you saying that you are a private language?

But the phrase "but not to say it about myself" initially seems to be within a private language — RussellA

I don't think you understand what is meant by a private language. At 243, W states: "The words of this language are to refer to what only the speaker can know — to his immediate private sensations. So another person cannot understand the language."

Wittgenstein repeatedly attacks the assumption that a private language is possible (or is a coherent concept).

My reading of PI 246, where Wittgenstein is unbolded and the interlocutor is bolded

2) Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it
[...]
5) It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA

These two bolded sentences - which you believe are both said by the interlocutor - contradict each other. I don't see why the interlocutor would say both that "only I can know whether I am really in pain" and "It can't be said of me at all...that I know I am in pain".

Why do you think the interlocutor would contradict himself?

It is more likely that the second sentence is not the interlocutor's.

I agree that his sentence "Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it." is that of the interlocutor.

However, I am not so sure that his sentence"Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!" is that of the interlocutor or his own position. — RussellA

If we revisit the context in which the latter sentence occurs:

Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —

In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. —

Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! — — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

I would consider "Yes, but all the same..." to be a reaction or response to Wittgenstein's unbolded remarks that immediately precede it, which I believe are made in a different voice. I don't think "Yes, but all the same" makes sense other than as a disagreement with what came before it. That is, I don't see that it would make sense for Wittgenstein to say that people very often know that he is in pain and then to follow up with "Yes, but all the same..." This does not sound to me as though it is in agreement with, or a continuation of, his preceding remarks or that these are given in a singular voice. I could not imagine someone speaking and then reacting to their own comment with "Yes, but all the same..."

For example, Wittgenstein writes that he has sensations
PI 246 Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them

He also writes that he doesn't doubt his sensations
PI 246 - The truth is: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself.

He also links indubitability with certainty.
From the SEP article on Certainty: Ludwig Wittgenstein also seems to connect certainty with indubitability.
From OC 115: If you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty.

In PI 246 he is linking certainty with knowing.
Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

As the trail leads from his having sensation that he doesn't doubt, to linking indubitability with certainty and then linking certainty with knowing, this suggests that this statement is his own position rather than that of an interlocutor. — RussellA

This all hangs on your assumption that he is linking certainty with knowing in PI 246. I don't believe that he is. I believe that this line ("Yes, but all the same...") is given in the voice of the interlocutor instead of in Wittgenstein's own voice. I can see that what you've said here all follows if you assume that it isn't given in the voice of the interlocutor. But I disagree, and your mere assumption to the contrary is not an argument for why my reading is incorrect.

If I said "I don't know I am in pain", this means that I don't know the meaning of the concept "pain", — RussellA

If you did not know the meaning of the concept "pain", I think it would be more natural for you to say "I don't know what "pain" means". Alternatively, "I don't know I am in pain" sounds to me like broken English, and I can't make much sense of it.

Therefore, it is allowable within the language game to say "I know I am in pain", as it has the same meaning as "I am in pain". — RussellA

You're allowed to say anything, but whether you make any sense is another matter. Wittgenstein indicates that it does not make any sense to say "I know I am in pain".

PI 246 is contradictory in that it doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept — RussellA

It's unclear what distinction you think there should be between sensation and concept, or how you think this distinction would help. However, Wittgenstein does discuss how words might refer to sensations at 244.

If 246 seems contradictory, it may be because Wittgenstein speaks in more than one voice, where he often gives voice to common philosophical assumptions/confusions before giving his corrective responses to them. The voice that expresses common (mistaken) philosophical assumptions is sometimes referred to in the literature as Wittgenstein's interlocutor.

I would say that there are two instances of the interlocutor's voice at 246. I will highlight Wittgenstein's interlocutor in bold (and extra spacing) in the quote below. The other sentences are Wittgenstein's responses:

246. In what sense are my sensations private? —

Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it. —

In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain. —

Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself! —

It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean — except perhaps that I am in pain? Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour — for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them. This much is true: it makes sense to say about other people that they doubt whether I am in pain; but not to say it about myself. — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations

Wittgenstein is saying that it is said that only I know that I am in pain, whereas others can only surmise it. But he is surely saying that this is wrong because others also know that I am in pain. — RussellA

He says that others (often) know when he is in pain. He does not say that he (also) knows when he is in pain. As he states later in the passage, it can't be said of him at all that he knows he is in pain.

Wittgenstein is saying that others know I am in pain, but not with the same certainty that I know when I am in pain. — RussellA

This is stated in the interlocutor's voice, giving voice to the mistaken philosophical assumption that only the person in pain can know with any certainty that they are in pain. He immediately provides a correction to this in the following sentence, stating that it can't be said of him at all that he knows he is in pain.

Wittgenstein is saying that when others say "he knows he is in pain", this is grammatically incorrect and means no more that "he is in pain". It is possible that someone could use a grammatically incorrect phrase as a joke. — RussellA

He is making a stronger statement than this. It is not merely that it is redundant to say "I know" (that I am in pain). Wittgenstein tells us (here and in other places) that it is nonsense to say he knows he is in pain; that it does not make sense to say it.

However, in order to say "I am in pain", this presupposes that not only "I am having the sensation of pain" but also "I know the concept of pain". For example, if I didn't know the concept of pain, I wouldn't be able to distinguish between "I am in pain" and "I am hungry". Therefore the proposition "I am in pain" is shorthand for "I am having the sensation of pain and I know the concept of pain". — RussellA

This would suggest that we always append "and I know the concept of x" to every concept we ever talk about, or every word we ever use. However, I don't think that's what "I am in pain" means, and I don't believe we are always talking about our knowledge of concepts in everything we say. I imagine that only a very small percentage of discussion (or language use) is about our knowledge of concepts. Also, sometimes we don't know the concept of x when we talk about or use the word 'x'.

Other people cannot be said to learn of my sensations only from my behaviour,—for I cannot be said to learn of them. I have them.

The key word is "only". It is true that other people cannot learn of another's sensations purely from that person's behaviour if they didn't have their own sensations that produced the same behaviour in themselves. — RussellA

I agree that the key word is "only" here. I also think this is an important part of the Wittgensteinian puzzle. However, I don't see how this supports your assent to the statement: "I know I am in pain."

Wittgenstein is saying that although it makes sense for others to doubt that I am in pain, it makes no sense for me to doubt that I am in pain. — RussellA

If it makes no sense to doubt (that I am in pain), then it makes no sense to know (that I am in pain).

309. “I know what I want, wish, believe, feel, . . .” (and so on through all the psychological verbs) is either philosophers’ nonsense or, at any rate, not a judgement a priori.
310. “I know . . .” may mean “I do not doubt . . .” — but does not mean that the words “I doubt . . .” are senseless, that doubt is logically excluded.
311. One says “I know” where one can also say “I believe” or “I suppose”; where one can satisfy oneself... — Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations - PPF/PI II

PI 246 is contradictory in that Wittgenstein doesn't distinguish between sensation and concept. On the one hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a concept: If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself and on the other hand he uses the word "know" to refer to a sensation: It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? — RussellA

Wittgenstein doesn't use "know" to refer to a sensation. Knowledge isn't a sensation. The only sensation he refers to here is pain.

It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

The word "know" seems to be redundant in the two propositions "I know I am in pain" and "I am in pain". Does that mean we can reject the idea that we can know our private sensations. — RussellA

I don’t believe redundancy is the reason why “it can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain.” What sort of joke would it be to redundantly say “I know I’m in pain”?

The reason one cannot know their private sensations relates to the grammar of the word “know”, which Wittgenstein spends more time examining in On Certainty.

In order for something to be known/knowable, it must be able to be learned, doubted and surmised and we must be able to satisfy ourselves of its truth or falsity. It is because one cannot learn, doubt, surmise, etc. about their own private sensation that it cannot be known.

n PI 246, Wittgenstein writes that he knows his private sensations with certainty, whereas other people only know his private sensations with less certainty. — RussellA

Let me repeat your quote of PI 246 with some emphasis:

In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. — RussellA

Wittgenstein rejects the idea that we can know our private sensations.

Wittgenstein in PI 246 writes that we know our private sensations:
In what sense are my sensations private?—Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.—In one way this is wrong, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know when I am in pain.— Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself I—It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. — RussellA

I don’t believe that the quote supports your reading.

I am now fully convinced that trying to explain anything to you will always be a hopeless effort. — Metaphysician Undercover

Obviously you are unable to provide a quote because you never did explain what "the meaning of the meaning" means. I suppose you are not going to address the rest of my post, either.

You should stop blaming others for your failure to defend your arguments.

I can't agree because I don't know what "the meaning of the meaning" means. You did not explain it.
— Luke

And the last week or so of discussion was not absorbed by you at all? — Metaphysician Undercover

Did you explain what "the meaning of the meaning" means during the last week or so of discussion? If so, I must have missed it. Please provide a quote.

If the meaning is the definition, then the meaning of the definition is what? - the meaning of the meaning?
— Luke

Yes, that's quite obvious and I don't see why you can't agree. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can't agree because I don't know what "the meaning of the meaning" means. You did not explain it.

How can you say that the meaning of a word is different from the word. And, that the definition is a "phrase", which is a group of words, yet you claim that the meaning of the phrase is not different from the phrase? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not every phrase is a definition. To give the definition of a word is to give the meaning of a word. Just as you have "always said": the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. Both the definition of the word and the meaning of the word are (often) expressed as a phrase. The definition is the meaning. The definition is both the meaning of the word defined and the meaning of the defining phrase. The definition is not a meaningless phrase or string of words requiring definition. The word and the phrase should both have the same meaning, otherwise it would not be a definition (or, at least, it would be a very bad definition).

Why do you think that the meaning of a word is different from the word, yet the meaning of a group of words is not different from the group of words? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because words and phrases are things that have meanings and can be defined, whereas a definition is the thing which defines them; which has the same meaning as them.

See, you separate the word from its meaning, as two distinct things, yet you combine the phrase, which is the definition, with its meaning, as one and the same thing. You are not consistent. Do you honestly believe that the phrase, which is a group of words, and the meaning of that group of words is one and the same thing, yet also believe that the meaning of a single word is distinct from that word? What is it about a group of words which makes it the same as its meaning? — Metaphysician Undercover

Not every phrase, or group of words, is a definition. The definition of the word is the meaning of the word, as you have "always said".

Here's a suggestion, a way which we might be able to get past this problem. Maybe we should consider that the definition is not really the meaning, even though we've both already agreed that it is. The definition is just a group of words, the phrase, and the meaning of the word is something completely different from this group of words, which is the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

I can see how you changing your position on this matter would help you to get past your problem, but I believe that the definition really is the meaning. To define a word is to give its meaning; it is not to give a meaningless phrase that requires definition.

Your childish behaviour is very frustrating Luke. — Metaphysician Undercover

The only childish thing here is your ad hominem argument.

Let's start from the top, and see if we can get some agreement. Do you agree that there is a difference between a word, and the meaning of a word? — Metaphysician Undercover

Yes.

If so, do you also agree that there is a difference between a definition, which is a group of words, and the meaning of the definition? — Metaphysician Undercover

No.

If, as you claim, you have "always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word", then how can the definition be different to the meaning? If the meaning is the definition, then the meaning of the definition is what? - the meaning of the meaning?

I would agree that a definition is (typically) a phrase, but the meaning of that phrase is not distinct from the definition. There is not the definition on one hand and the meaning of the definition on the other. As I said in my first response to your accusation of conflation that started all this:

I strongly disagree that there is a distinction between a definition and its meaning. — Luke

A definition considered as a meaningless phrase, or a meaningless group of unconnected words, is not a definition at all.

And, if we were to state the meaning of the definition, we ought not state the original word as that meaning, or else we'd have a vicious circle which would get us nowhere fast. — Metaphysician Undercover

I've never argued that a word can only be defined by simply repeating the word. I have been arguing against your assertion that there is a distinction between a definition and its meaning. Calling my questions and arguments against your assertion "childish behaviour" is no defence of your assertion.

I've always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not always said that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word. Our disagreement over this matter began when you accused me of "conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation". You asserted that meanings and definitions "are separate", with the distinction between them being that meanings are always understood by a reference to examples while definitions are not. You said:

It appears like you are conflating the definitions with their meaning, or interpretation. These are separate. We refer to things, like examples, to understand meaning, while the definition does not explicitly refer to those examples. So, for example "human being" might be defined as "rational animal". Then we could point to a number of people, as examples, to demonstrate the meaning of "rational animal". Or, we could give examples of what it means to be "animal" and what it means to be "rational". In both of these cases, the examples are referred to in demonstrating or interpreting the meaning, they are not referred to by the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

To now claim that you have "always said" that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word is not true. However, you have at least since acknowledged that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word.

I've also maintained that there is a difference between the meaning of the word defined, and the meaning of the phrase which is the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

You have not "maintained" that there is a difference between the meaning of the word defined, and the meaning of the phrase which is the definition - or not for long, anyway. You have only begun to articulate this distinction in your last post or two, as a result of my counter-arguments.

And I still disagree with your assertion in its new articulation. To give the definition of a word is to give the meaning of the word is to give the meaning of the phrase which is the definition. If you acknowledge that the meaning of the word is the definition of the word, then how can the meaning of the phrase which is the definition (of the word) be any different to the meaning of the word?

To give the meaning/definition of the word "bachelor" is (often) to give a phrase which is the definition, and that phrase has a meaning which is the meaning of the word. If it weren't, then the meaning/definition of the word "bachelor" would not have been given.

Then you would not respect the fact that there is a difference between what the word means, i.e. its definition, ("what has happened") , and what the definition means (the type of thing that might be remembered). — Metaphysician Undercover

Since you've stated it a couple of times now, I thought you had acknowledged that the definition of a word is the meaning of a word. However, now you're reverting to there being a difference between them that I should respect? Unless you can clearly articulate this difference and respond to my arguments against it, then I'm afraid I don't see it.

After you reread, and recognize that there is a difference between the meaning of "past", as "what has happened", and the meaning of that phrase, the definition, which I explained as the type of thing which might be remembered, then we might be prepared to proceed with the discussion. — Metaphysician Undercover

I disagree that "past" means "the type of thing which might be remembered". It's not a different "type" of meaning (i.e. the meaning of a phrase that is the definition) or whatever you are arguing; it just simply doesn't mean that.

You strongly imply here that "the meaning of the phrase" is the definition, and you have already said that the meaning of the definition is the meaning of the word. So, what difference is there between the meaning of the phrase that is the definition and the meaning of the definition?

As I read through these paragraphs, I find that I'm not actually disagreeing with Witt, so my wording is not as accurate as it should be. — Sam26

:up:

I think Wittgenstein would say that recognizing a private sensation does not assist in using a word appropriately. Think of PI 265, the train time-table example. He might say using language correctly shows we recognize the private sensation (or maybe ….we experience the private sensation). — Richard B

Yes, you're probably right.

The definition of the word is the meaning of the word. The meaning of the definition is something different from the meaning of the word.

If the meaning of the word, and the meaning of the definition of the word, were both exactly the same, then the definition would tell us nothing meaningful, and it would be absolutely useless. The meaning of the word would be the definition [of the word]... — Metaphysician Undercover

The meaning of the word is the definition of the word. You said so at the beginning of the quote. Were you wrong?

Luke, the definition of a word is the meaning of the word defined. — Metaphysician Undercover

That's right. You accused me of "conflating the definitions with their meaning" and you claimed "These are separate" in this post. Here you are saying the opposite.

Luke, the definition of a word is the meaning of the word defined. The definition itself , also has meaning. — Metaphysician Undercover

What is the difference between "the definition of a word" and "the definition itself"?

The definition itself , also has meaning. Therefore, there is a difference between "the definition", which is the meaning of the word defined, and the definition's meaning, which is the meaning of the definition, and something other than the meaning of the word defined. — Metaphysician Undercover

You appear to be saying that the definition of a word has two different meanings:
(i) the meaning of the word defined, and
(ii) the definition's meaning.

How do these two differ? (You have merely asserted that they differ. I'm asking how they differ.)

The definition of a word is the meaning of the word. Then of course, the definition itself has meaning. And, the meaning of the definition is not the same as the meaning of the word defined. Why is this so difficult for you? — Metaphysician Undercover

Because you are simply repeating the assertion without explanation.

If definitions were as you imagine them to be, they would have no meaning at all.

Let's define a "bachelor" as "an unmarried man".
The definition of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".
The meaning of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".

The problem (your confusion) here is that you seem to think that nobody is allowed to now ask what "unmarried" means.
— Luke

Why are you now trying to turn the table? This is what you insisted, That the meaning of the word, its definition, and the meaning of the definition must be one and the same. I'm the one one trying to talk sense into you. and it appears like you are now coming to respect the difference between the definition "unmarried man", in your example, and the meaning of that definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

The definition and the meaning of the word "bachelor" are one and the same; they are both "an unmarried man". It says so right there in the quote.

This might help me to understand better:

If we take the statement "The definition of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man"" -- Which part (or what) do you consider to be the definition? And which part (or what) do you consider to be "the meaning of the definition"?

Yes, I made a distinction between the meaning of a word, (its definition), and the meaning of the definition. — Metaphysician Undercover

What’s the difference between a definition and its meaning? In other words, what is the difference between the definition of a word and the meaning of a word? You are speaking of a definition as though it has no meaning. How can a definition have no meaning?

If there was not a difference between these two, the definition would mean the exact same thing as the word itself means. — Metaphysician Undercover

The definition of the word does “mean the exact same thing” - or does have the same meaning - as the meaning of the word. What difference is there? To define a word is to give its meaning.

Definitions, if they were actually like this, would do nothing yo help us understand the meaning of the word. — Metaphysician Undercover

If definitions were as you imagine them to be, they would have no meaning at all.

Let's define a "bachelor" as "an unmarried man".
The definition of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".
The meaning of "bachelor" is "an unmarried man".

The problem (your confusion) here is that you seem to think that nobody is allowed to now ask what "unmarried" means.