I'm of the opinion that one ought to obey laws with a threshold of reprehensibility (i.e., threat to safety and survival), at which point one ought to become a refugee. Disobedience of a specific law judged by the individual to be immoral is to act, to a degree, as a freeloader on that society. Furthermore, morality, unlike law, is not the sort of thing that can be maintained by force. To be immoral is to act on immoral principles, and is not measured by the outcome. The law is concerned with outcomes with some thought given to principles, but primarily the purpose of law is to condition behaviour. Morality conditions the character of the agent and the aim of morality is virtuous character.

Your answer, as well written as it is, only reaffirms the presupposition in the performative significance. If personhood (or marriage) is not presupposed to be categorical then the performative significance is altered but not eliminated.

The counterfeit currency example seemingly relies on a mistaken theory of currency value. In representative currencies, a counterfeit note has no value because the promise of the respresentation is false. The counterfeit note can have value not connected to the representation (e.g., as a work of art), but as a representative currency the value is always nil because the note does not have a corresponding good to ground the value. That owes to the nature of the currency, not the accuracy of the symbol of representation. Other forms of currency, for instance a commodity currency, the value is tied to the characteristics of the genuine article and the counterfeit, and can be non-zero and measured by degree. In fiat currencies, the counterfeit note has value in proportion to the fiat. If the institution that issues the value declaration confers value to a counterfeit note, it becomes legal tender, regardless of the accuracy.

But I would not equate personhood with the acquisition of those capabilities either since the latter is a matter of degree while the former is a categorical distinction. — Pierre-Normand

Is there an argument in favour of viewing personhood as a categorical distinction as opposed to a matter of degree, or are you presupposing that position?

The truth is that if someone really wanted a gun, they will almost always be able to find a way to get a gun. — discoii

That may not be true. Our economy has made it easy to get a gun if desired, but we could make it considerably harder if needed.

It also gives the well water that much desired new baby smell. — Hanover

If you can't defeat a position, at least disarm it with absurdity.

I'm just fooling around. It's important to keep a sense of humour, even about topics like abortion and infanticide; after all, if we can't laugh at ourselves, what's the point of forcing women to bear children.

Generalized label - Liberal (Canada)

Form of government- i) Benevolent dictator ii) Direct democracy.

Form of economy - Extreme on either side, favouring capitalism based on present state.

Abortion - Unrestricted in first-trimester; legalized but regulated/watched otherwise (including some cases of permissible infanticide).

Gay marriage - If marriage must be a part of society, let everyone marry whomever they want (with mutual consent).

Death penalty - Oppose on practical grounds.

Euthanasia - Support, but very cautiously.

Campaign finance - Unrestricted, but with full disclosure.

Surveillance - Propagates paranoia and creates a feedback loop.

Health care - Universal two-tier system with no option to opt-out.

Immigration - Open borders.

Education - Free access; needs reform.

Environmental policy - Must protect our environment at all costs.

Gun policy - Some guns for some; no guns for others.

Drug policy - Legalize/decriminalize most, but restrict access to addictive substances.

Foreign policy - Mind your own business. Do not harm others.

You must maintain that when it was the case that the pre-linguistic universe existed, at that time, it must also have been the case that there existed a true sentence: "the pre-linguistic universe exists". — Sapientia

That doesn't seem right.

*edit



I apologize for my brevity; it's more of a place holder while I collect my thoughts. I'm a slow thinker, but wanted to put something down to commit to add more.

Because sometimes it feels like we're already there? And heavenly bliss is a more fleeting state. — Marchesk

...but this is the best of all possible worlds. Isn't it?

As the old analogy goes, a Martian who knew how to manipulate a chess board to produce all legal moves would still not know how to play, without understanding that one is trying to win. Focusing on symbol manipulation only ignores semantics and pragmatics, without which language is incoherent, and whittled away to an idle assembly of abstractions. — The Great Whatever

This feels like a faulty analogy as well. The manipulation of a chess board to produce legal moves would include rules about situational moves implicit with an understanding of the object of the game (e.g., what to do when in check). In this case, we are making an intuitive judgement that knowing all the legal moves is insufficient to produce an understanding of the game, but we are doing so from a state of ignorance. The scope of knowing ALL the legal moves might in fact entail an understanding of the object of the game.

Yes, since they don't always produce the same output. Animals, and particularly humans, display a great deal of flexibility and variability There is also a question of what determines the proper situation. What is proper in a given situation? Often, human culture defines that.

An example for the wild is an offspring nest where a video camera was setup and streamed online. The mother, for unknown reasons, started attacking the offspring chicks, and failed to feed them properly. That doesn't make much sense from an evolutionary point of view, but life is messy. — Marchesk

That you cite an example of programming gone wrong might handicap rather than help your cause. When everything goes as it should there is mystery, but when it goes awry we make judgements about software or hardware malfunctions. The mother attacking the chicks is outside the normal output behaviour and curiosity might lead to an examination of the mother's physiology, wherein a discovery of some physical abnormality is given explanatory power for the behaviour. Computers can malfunction in much the same way. When the output is wrong, we can examine the software code or the hardware parts for a flaw.

The problem I see with the Chinese Room and your above example is that if you buy into the computational theory of mind you can see how each respectively fits into the theory. Alternatively, if you think there's something missing, you see how each respectively demonstrates that position as well. The analogies seem only to illustrate confirmation biases in intuition rather than insight into what is really going on.

Do computers do something more than produce the symbols we program them to produce in the proper situations? — Marchesk

This cuts both ways though, do humans/animals do something more than produce a programmed/hard-wired output in the proper situations?

Computers and robots have shown creativity and novelty within a specific domain.

The claim Searle is making is that no amount of symbol manipulation gets you to understanding, because understanding isn't in the symbols. — Marchesk

You're shifting the terms of understanding. If understanding is granted to the system for the accurate manipulation of the symbols, then human understanding is likewise granted for accurate manipulation of the symbols. It's not enough to have the symbols, one has to have the rules to manipulate the symbols. Searle, and perhaps you, seems to want to isolate the understanding of the Chinese Room participant from the entire system, which includes the set(s) of rules. Martha doesn't need to know the meaning of the output, because the meaning is supplied by the entire system and not a single part of it. Your tongue doesn't need to know the meaning of the words in order to get into the right position to make a sound. The aggregate system is demonstrative of understanding: input to output and all the various computational places in between.

You might object that the computational theory of mind begs the question as well. Humans do have an understanding not present in the Chinese Room, but I don't think appealing to the intuition of the scenario is going to lead us to any insight about what is going on there. The Chinese Room and !Kung-speaking Martha are inadequate to settle the matter because one cannot see past the preconception brought to the example.

Humans understand the symbols the system is outputting. — Marchesk

This seems question-begging. I just don't see how the Chinese Room demonstrates one way or the other that humans understand symbols in a different way than the aggregate of the system. Or if humans do understand symbols differently, why we should exclude the notion that a sophisticated system can also understand symbols, albeit differently.

Forgive my ignorance, but my initial reaction was that the "systems reply" was still suitable. The symbol manipulation has to be meaningful to someone on the output end otherwise the rules are arbitrary. To the output recipient, the system understands the language even if the language is some hybrid of existing language(s).

Addendum:

For my own self-identification it would be better to stick with "weak anti-natalism" by virtue of my reproductive success. Since I have children, the "a" prefix is inappropriate, where some weak version of "anti" might be appropriate since I do have some sympathies.

I mean, that an anatalist would hold an anti-natalist to account for explicitly committing to the claim that one ought not have children, whilst they themselves do so implicitly, is like the pot calling the kettle black.

I think that the difference between the two is somewhat superficial. — Sapientia

This might get into territory that Thorongil is more suited to defend. It seems that anatalism, borrowing from weak anti-natalism, doesn't commit one way or the other in terms of the behaviour of the adherents. A weak anti-natalist as someone that believes having children is not wrong (permissible), can consistently hold the position and have children. In this sense, the prefix "a" meaning "without" might be a cognitive stumbling block to understanding the position since one might self-identify as "anatalist" and have children. In light of that, I'm not sure anatalism is susceptible to the hypocrisy criticism. There might be further obligations that an anti-natalist might feel is implicit in the position, for instance lobbying for policy change regarding infertility treatments.

One aspect I am having slight trouble understanding is the other horn of the position (i.e., but is not right/justified either). If "justified" is understood as "permissible" and "not wrong" is also understood as "permissible", the anatalist position seems to be: "having children is permissible and not permissible". I take "right" in the second half to mean "obligated" (i.e., it is impermissible to not have children), such that the anatalist holds it is permissible to have children and not impermissible (permissible) to not have children. The anatalist position is that having children or not having children are both permissible, and only in the sense describing the life-style commitment does it cash out as practically indistinguishable from anti-natalism, which I would say is a fairly uncontroversial claim.

I might identify as somewhat anatalist as I understand the position, since I have some sympathies to anti-natalism but ultimately feel the position over-reaches in the strong moral claim.

*edit* I have two children, whom I love very much.

It would matter a great deal what fuels the doubt. Doubt about the justification for natalism might be expressed as nihilism or another meta-ethical foundation that makes justification claims dubious. An anti-natalist is not going to express meta-ethical moral doubts while simultaneously holding that one ought not have children. An anatalist might hold both the pro-natalist and anti-natalist to task for any moral obligation. A nihilist might nonetheless have children, whereas Thorongil will not.

I can believe that having children is permissible and still not have children. — Michael

Yes you can, because not having children may also be permissible. Anti-natalism would seem to assert that having children is impermissible, or that "one ought not have children". Thorongil has rejected that view, which was previously held, or at least used to self-identify, for the weaker "anatalist" view, which falls somewhere in the middle. The benefit of anatalism for Thorongil is that it identifies a moral position (i.e., the permissibility of having children or not having children), while also describing the life-style choice Thorongil has adopted as practically "anatalist". There is some dispute about the latter, but for someone that will not seek out medical intervention to have children (Thorongil), I'm not sure where the doubt arises except in a general, "I want to use this label for everyone" sort of way.

I might believe that having children is justified but still not have children. — Michael

If "justified" is understood as an obligation, then it's inconsistent to believe, "one ought to have children", and then act in a way contrary to that belief (e.g., practice elected celibacy).

If "justified" is understood as a permissibility, then it is equivalent to "it is not wrong to have children", which is contained in Thorongil's "anatalism".

Based on your comment, it seems you mean the latter.

Are you saying that he is saying that he is celibate because he is anatalist, or vice versa? It seems to me that it's vice versa — Sapientia

I don't think the celibacy and the weak anti-natalism inform each other. They are different commitments that are cashed out as the same behavioural upshot for Thorongil. Or to state otherwise, Thorongil's celibacy as a lifestyle choice is unlikely to produce children (anatalist) and the moral position that having children is not wrong but also not right is unlikely to produce children (anatalist). Because of the two distinct positions, Thorongil identifies as anatalist rather than anti-natalist.

I do agree though that celibacy simpliciter does not preclude the option to have children, but it may be the case that a person that chooses celibacy has, at least in themselves, tacitly assented to the position that it is not the case that one ought to have children. It might also be significant that Thorongil hasn't committed to a strong position either by disclaiming the weak anti-nalalist position with the word "could". That is different than saying "the weak anti-natalist is also someone whose lifestyle..." Celibacy from inopportunity is not anatalist in the weak "anti-natalist" sense and neither is infertility.

I understand the difference, I was also trying to understand Thorongil's position in relation to anatalism. I understood the celibacy comment to describe that Thorongil identifies as an anatalist both because it is not justifiable to have children, and also because the lifestyle commitment is unlikely to produce a child by the reproductive upshot. I take that to mean that Thorongil is celibate and will not use artificial insemination or any other medical intervention to have a child. It's a personal identification as anatalist not referring to the moral status of having children.

No, it's not correct to state that a celibate is an anti-natalist, in any sense, simply by virtue of being celibate. The prefix "anti" means "opposed to" or "against", and natalism is the position that reproduction is acceptable — Sapientia

Which is why I think Thorongil settled on anatalism to describe the weak "anti-natalist" position. I think it would be analogous to calling a person who doesn't go to church as irreligious, but irreligious is indistinguishable from the weak anti-religious position, whatever that might be, in behavioural commitments. I'm not sure what purpose Thorongil's use of anatalism serves for describing celibacy, but it seems to be related to the shift away from the anti-natalist self-identification, which might be related to your criticism of "anti-religion" and "anti-abortion" being an inappropriate description (i.e., they're not opposed to it, they just don't do it).

I took the relationship between celibacy and weak anti-natalism in @Thorongil's post to be one of indistinguishability in behavioural commitments, but not moral commitments. A person with a commitment to celibacy will in practice also be an "anti-natalist" in a weak sense by virtue of the reproductive upshot of celibacy. I don't think Thorongil wanted to commit to the position that celibacy entails a corresponding anti-natalist attitude.

Gene theory is a significant discovery that has yet to see the advancements to the degree the others have on your list (I would distinguish it from Germ theory). There is a very exciting time ahead in medicine and gene therapy, a revolution knocking at the door (i.e., CRISPR). I understand your caution about the future of gene manipulation, but it seems inevitable so we should work now to nudge it in the right direction so its not disastrous. Parallel to or piggybacking on the genetic revolution could be an anti-aging technology and a significant life-expectancy boost that seems to be gaining steam right now.

Otherwise, you might be right that the technological revolution is over. It's hard to predict discoveries since they're either outside our current scope of vision or we treat them as an incremental step of advancement on existing technology.

It does seem we are outside a usual cycle of creative destruction with digital automation and online services. Human nature will be put to the test to see how people will remain productive, if at all. My guess is there will be an increasing turn to luxury and entertainment and production will be focused in that direction (e.g., YouTube stars, Etsy shops).

It's not suggesting that, it's suggesting that people should work on improving themselves so that most marriages stop being disastrous (50% divorce rate in US, don't forget ;) ). — Agustino

The other 50% end in the death of one spouse, which sounds more disastrous without proper context.*

*edit @Bitter Crank's response undermines my sass.

If you're omniscient, then you must also know that you are. — jorndoe

Per the link provided:

Fitch's paradox asserts that the existence of an unknown truth is unknowable. — Wikipedia entry for Fitch's paradox of knowability

A limiting condition of omniscience is knowing all that is knowable. If one's own state of omniscience is unknowable, then one can be omniscient and not know one is by virtue of the unknown truth of one's own omniscience being unknowable.

I'm curious: if omniscience is knowing all the members in the set of knowable propositions, can the set of knowable propositions be an empty set? Can a being be omniscient by virtue of not knowing anything? It seems that the set of knowable propositions must at least contain tautologies. Is there anything we can put in the set, or remove from the set?

More proof. If you were omniscient, you would have known that you would want to delete all this. You would just not have posted it in the first place. — Bitter Crank

I did know, but I also knew that posting anyways and asking for it to be deleted was better than not posting it in the first place in order to elicit your insightful response. :)

Yes, if by traditional philosophy you understand the philosophy which gives reason an undue priority in the world, and makes an arbiter out of it. — Agustino

I wonder if you're going too far the other way, in particular with the judgement of "undue". It's not entirely obvious to me whether the priority of reason in the philosophical tradition is warranted or not. In part, the philosophical tradition is an attempt to settle the issue of where reason stands in relation to knowledge acquisition. Indeed, a good portion of the tradition can be regarded as an inquiry into setting the limits of reason. Your declaration strikes me as too presumptuous.

If I understand John's claim as well, your shift from deduction to custom is not a shift from reason to something otherwise, but just a shift in the form of reasoning. Induction is still a reasoning faculty albeit distinct from deduction, but using custom as an arbiter is still deferring to reason.

It might be helpful if you begin by saying what you think is the difference and at least provide an idea of what you understand the words to mean aside from providing examples. It seems by the use of examples that you've applied some principle to distinguish metaphysics from religion.

As for me, I would say metaphysics is a broader category than religion such that religious dogma is contained in the set of metaphysics. Religion also typically involves ritual whereas metaphysics does not. Theistic belief can be irreligious insofar as it commits to a metaphysics but not ritual practice.

Do we have a duty to the unborn, and if so, is there a limit, our children, their children, their children's children? — Cavacava

Our duties to future generations are limited by the length of the causal chain between our actions and the outcome. If the causal chain is long and there are multiple opportunities for intervention, then our obligations are diminished. A short causal chain confers more responsibility on the acting agent even if the time duration is long (the force of such an obligation will likely be negated by the affect heuristic). Part of the challenge of getting people to act on climate chain is a perceived ambiguity in the length of the causal chain. Scientists warn we are close to or passed a point of no return for action, indicating a short causal chain, and are also proposing long-term solutions that work on the scale of generations, which seems to indicate a longer causal chain for intervention. Those two are not mutually exclusive, but it can make it difficult to discern the scope of our present obligation. Another problem is that new technologies, even within view to us now, can extend the causal chain and diminish the obligation.

God is unknowable. You tell me how we very finite, narrow-minded, pig-headed, flesh-embodied beings can "know" anything about a being who is infinite, immortal, invincible, all knowing, and always present everywhere. — Bitter Crank

Knowledge of God, including but not limited to whether God exists, can be acquired through a divine knowing event. Knowledge of God can be satisfied in the individual as long as the justified true belief conditions have been satisfied. If an omnipotent being wants to confer knowledge to another being so as to satisfy the conditions of knowledge, it is not immediately obvious to me how that acquisition of knowledge could/would fail.

P1: If God or a Greatest Possible Being (GPB) exists, and God wants a finite being to know, as a justified true belief, a finite detail of God's nature, then the finite being will know a finite detail of God's nature.
Assume: God or a Greatest Possible Being (GPB) exists, and God wants a finite being to know, as a justified true belief, a finite detail of God's nature.
C: The finite being will know, as a justified true belief, a finite detail of God's nature.

The above argument doesn't show there is knowledge of God, but is meant to argue how such knowledge is possible. There will be a challenge in showing the assumption is true without the presupposition of the existence of God, and the truth of the assumption might rely on the very assumption being made, but at least the argument is valid.

The weak agnostic simply lacks knowledge of God. The strong agnostic knows that there is no God. — Thorongil

This doesn't make much sense in light of your statement,

The Greek word gnosis means knowledge, while the prefix a is a negation. So the agnostic is "without knowledge," — Thorongil

How can a form of agnosticism claim knowledge when the word means, "without knowledge"?

Versions of agnosticism can be distinguished by the missing feature of the knowledge claim (i.e., justification, truth, or belief). An agnostic can be one that lacks knowledge because they lack belief (atheist) and also an agnostic might come down on the conditions of justification or truth (e.g., there is insufficient justification for the statement "God exists" and so one cannot make a knowledge claim or one cannot know, "God exists" because the statement is false, or likely false). I'm not sure how to distinguish any of those as a "strong agnostic" claim or a "weak agnostic" claim, unless you take strong agnosticism is the one claiming that "God exists" is false by virtue of knowledge of the truth condition of "God exists", in which case strong agnosticism is a self-defeating position.

I understand the distinction between weak and strong agnosticism is the strength of the claim in terms of the possibility of knowing. Weak agnosticism claims, "I do not know if 'God exists' is true" and strong agnosticism claims, "'God exists' is unknowable". An atheist (strong or weak) can be a strong or weak agnostic depending on the missing feature of the knowledge claim. A theist is more likely to be a weak agnostic, if agnostic at all, wherein knowledge is unnecessary for confidence in belief (i.e., faith does the job), but would likely not commit to the strong agnostic claim that "God exists" is unknowable.

1. X is a bachelor, and is therefore an unmarried man.
2. X is bachelor, and is unmarried if and only if X never marries.

By your contention, 2 is false because 1 also satisfies the conditions of what it means to be a bachelor and one must be committed to say that the mere name "bachelor" is sufficient to make one a bachelor, if even one has married or not.

*edit* 2 is false, please disregard this comment.

The logical equivalence must not introduce new terms.

"wrong to x" is only logically equivalent to "ought not x". The introduction of prevention is implied by the word "allow", but not logically contained.

No it's not:

P15 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.

I'm going to try a different approach since I think I partially see what you're saying.

This is what I want P15 to say, and it may or may not depending on how it's unpacked:

It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering cause by food production practices

The only means to prevent gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is to adopt a vegan diet (I think you deny the statement says this)

There are some for whom it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.

Those people for whom it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food procuction practices.

It is wrong to allow is logically equivalent to ought not allow.
If not allow gratuitous suffering is equivalent to adopt a vegan diet.
Then "those for whom ought not allow gratuitous suffering" is logically equivalent to "those for whom ought to adopt a vegan diet".

A preliminary thought is that 1 and 2 are functionally indistinguishable and by the principle of identity of indiscernibility I need not commit to the position that 2 precludes 1. In other words, P6 satisfies both 1 and 2 because they are identical.

then that rules out the possibility that gratuitous suffering is preventable simply by virtue of being gratuitous suffering. — Sapientia

I see your point now and will take some time to give it proper consideration.

1. If one is a bachelor, then one is an unmarried man.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries. — Soylent

I noticed that I inverted the antecedent and the consequent. I apologize. The correct version is below:

1. If one is an unmarried man, then one is a bachelor.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries.

If there's one condition, then "therefore not conditionally" is false.

I would say it's more akin to:

1. If one is a bachelor, then one is an unmarried man.
2. One is unmarried if and only if one never marries.