Ok, well if that's the sense in which you're using it, then fair enough. Thanks for clarifying. It makes sense to me, given your examples, although not so much with regards to references to the past, present and future. Something about that strikes me as intuitively wrong. The differences are harder to ignore.

Ok, well if that's the sense in which you're using it, then fair enough. Thanks for clarifying. It makes sense to me, given your examples, although not so much with regards to references to the past, present and future. Something about that strikes me as intuitively wrong. The differences are harder to ignore. — Sapientia

I think this may clash a little bit with intuition not because it contradicts common sense but rather because it doesn't mesh well with the way propositions with empirical content are commonly treated in philosophy, and, in particular, with the use of predicate logic and tense logic. There is a tendency, in analytic philosophy, to make time figure as part of the content of empirical propositions. This is implicitly assumed when time is represented by the tense of a verb.

When time is rather understood, in a more Kantian way, not as part of the content of an empirical thought (i.e. a thought that relates directly to a possible experience) but rather as part of the form of this thought, then counterintuitiveness of the claim that the two sentences "I ate eggs this morning" and "I ate eggs yesterday morning" can express the same thought is alleviated. We have to remember that we don't perceive the time at which we perceive sensible things in addition to perceiving those things (even when there is a clock nearby). One's ability to rationally relate those two forms of expression (about eggs) is constitutive of one's ability to keep track of time and hence, also, to think temporal thoughts and grasp their logical forms. This may need to be argued more fully, but I am veering off topic. I was hoping to come back to Martha's ability (or rather, lack thereof) to genuinely express thoughts.

Interesting. Good food for thought.

This may need to be argued more fully, but I am veering off topic. I was hoping to come back to Martha's ability (or rather, lack thereof) to genuinely express thoughts. — Pierre-Normand

The discussion veered (or at least drifted) off topic many, many pages back.

But, going back to the topic, I doubt whether I'd have much to say that hasn't already been said, and probably said in a better way than I could. I found myself in agreement with early posts by yourself and Marchesk, which reflect the view of Searle, so I am therefore more in agreement with Searle with regards to the Chinese Room than against him.

This post earlier on made a good point, I think:

Let's say we give a test subject a rulebook and then feed them sets of symbols. For example, whenever they see:

å ß ∂

Then they write down:

ç

Now, do these symbols mean anything? Does the set of rules for computing the correct symbol (or symbols) result in some sort of understanding?

And I'll grant that there is an understanding (given a certain meaning of the word) in how to go from one set of symbols to another (based on the rules). But is that what we're doing when we speak? Searle's contention is that it is not, such that the Chinese room can't be said to understand Chinese. — Marchesk

But, going back to the topic, I doubt whether I'd have much to say that hasn't already been said, and probably said in a better way than I could. I found myself in agreement with yourself and Marchesk. This post earlier on made a good point, I think: — Sapientia

Yes, I agree with Marchesk, and with Searle, that an ability merely to respond to external stimulations in accordance with algorithmic rules can't, in itself, constitute understanding.

Searle, however, believes that human verbal behavior is meaningful because the intentional content of speech acts are derivative from the intentional contents of the mental acts standing behind them, and he also believes that the latter contents ("intrinsic intentionality") are an emergent biological property instantiated in some mysterious way in human brains.

I agree with Michael that this is a mistake and that the proper place to look for understanding and intentionality is the public behavior of an agent in the world; and meaning is thus best reflected in the use of linguistic expressions. I think such an agent, though, must be a living rational animal and can't be a computer. Michael may be disagreeing with this. Our long digression may have just begun to touch on some disagreement about what forms of public behavior are constitutive or expressive of genuine ("intrinsic") understanding and intentionality.

A subjunctive conditional is a counterfactual conditional, and the T-schema doesn't seem to use a counterfactual conditional. If it did (pun intended) it would look like this:

"the cat is on the mat" would be true if the cat were on the mat and "the cat is on the mat" wouldn't be true if the cat were not on the mat.

Which is (from here, where ">" differs "→"):

(C > P) ∧ (¬C > ¬P)

And transposition applies to subjunctive conditionals as well, which gives us:

(C > P) ∧ (P > C)

And this subjunctive biconditional, like any biconditional, can be read in either direction, and so as:

The cat would be on the mat iff "the cat is on the mat" would be true.

It should go without saying that it does not follow from the argument in the paragraph directly above that by making that statement, I would be implying that I am a small mammal in the family Leporidae. — Sapientia

I agree. The Great Whatever's criticism is due to (mis-)interpreting the statement as the above.

Yes, I agree that that's a valid reductio ad absurdum, and it seems to me that @Michael must either revise his position or bite a bullet that makes his position implausible.

X iff "X" is true follows from "X" is true iff X.

"X" is true iff X follows from If X then "X" is true and If not X then "X" is false.

So if you want to reject X iff "X" is true then you must reject either If X then "X" is true or If not X then "X" is false. But such a rejection would allow for the situation where the cat is on the mat but "the cat is on the mat" is false or where the cat is not on the mat but "the cat is on the mat" is true. Isn't that a reductio?

So if you want to reject X iff "X" is true then you must reject either If X then "X" is true or If not X then "X" is false. But such a rejection would allow for the situation where the cat is on the mat but "the cat is on the mat" is false or where the cat is not on the mat but "the cat is on the mat" is true. Isn't that a reductio? — Michael

I don't think that that reductio is more compelling than TGW's. Being forced to conclude that nothing existed before language is worse than allowing the logical possibility that, e.g. the cat is on the matt, but "the cat is on the matt" isn't true. But the latter isn't necessary, anyway. It's only necessary for times in which language doesn't exist. One can maintain that for all times in which language exists, it is impossible. Or one could maintain that it is possible at all times, but rarely - if ever - has been the case since the existence of language.

Being forced to conclude that nothing existed before language is worse... — Sapientia

Why is that the conclusion? All I've done is reversed the order of the T-schema. X iff "X" is true means the same as "X" is true iff X.

So let's see if it does:

Premise 1: nothing existed before language iff "nothing existed before language" is true
Conclusion: Therefore nothing existed before language

Certainly doesn't follow. There's a missing premise in The Great Whatever's alleged reductio.

... than allowing the logical possibility that, e.g. the cat is on the matt, but "the cat is on the matt" isn't true.

And yet that would entail dialetheism, wouldn't it? So supposing that the conclusion is that nothing existed before language, isn't this metaphysical reconsideration more reasonable than the logical possibility of a contradiction?

I'd say it is. The choice between a counterintuitive conclusion and a contradiction is an easy one.

Why is that the conclusion? All I've done is reversed the order of the T-schema. X iff "X" is true means the same as "X" is true iff X. — Michael

How can you explain the state of affairs before language? Would that not be an example of X without "X" being true, on account of there being no language, and therefore no "X"?

How can you explain the state of affairs before language? — Sapientia

By using language. How do we explain anything?

By using language. — Michael

Are you trolling me? I'm not amused by your reply. Please explain to me in sufficient detail how you would explain the state of affairs before language without having to concede that at that time, it would be the case that X, but "X" would not be true, and therefore, that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time. Or perhaps you accept that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time. Do you?

Please explain to me in sufficient detail how you would explain the state of affairs before language without having to concede that at that time, it would be the case that X, but "X" would not be true. — Sapientia

The T-schema doesn't say X happened iff "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time; it says X happened iff "X happened" is true.

If dinosaurs walked the Earth then "dinosaurs walked the Earth" is true. If dinosaurs didn't walk the Earth then "dinosaurs didn't walk the Earth" is false. Therefore "dinosaurs walked the Earth" is true iff dinosaurs walked the Earth.

The argument is valid. So if you want to reject the conclusion then you must reject one of the premises. Which one do you reject?

The T-schema doesn't say X happened iff "X happened" was said at the time; it says X happened iff "X happened" is true. — Michael

And I didn't say that the fact that the sentence wasn't said at the time is problematic. I said that the nonexistence of language is problematic. If language didn't exist, then sentences didn't exist. If sentences didn't exist, then they could not have been true.

Do you therefore accept that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time?

Do you therefore accept that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time? — Sapientia

This is like asking "do you accept that the King of France is not bald?" It's a nonsensical question.

Again, if you want to reject "X" is true iff X then you must reject either "X" is true if X or "X" is false if not X.

So which one do you reject?

This like asking "do you accept that the King of France is not bald?" — Michael

How so? There is no King of France, yet there was a time before language. I am simply asking whether or not you think that, at that time, it would have been the case that X, but "X" would not have been true.

And it's irrelevant. If you want to reject "X" is true iff X then you must reject either "X" is true if X or "X" is false if not X.

So which one do you reject? — Michael

What you've said doesn't make it irrelevant for reasons I've already explained. Are you trying to shift the burden? Being forced to commit to the claim that nothing existed before language is a damning logical consequence, and the only way that I see to avoid it is to accept that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time. If you would word that last part differently, then speak up.

How so? There is no King of France, yet there was a time before language. I am simply asking whether or not you think that, at that time, it would have been the case that X, but "X" would not have been true. — Sapientia

You're asking if a non-existent sentence was or wasn't true. But that's like asking if the non-existent King of France is or isn't bald.

What you've said doesn't make it irrelevant for reasons I've already explained. Are you trying to shift the burden?

I'm not shifting any burden. I'm telling you that if you reject "X" is true iff X then you must reject either "X" is true if X or "X" is false if not X. I want to know which. You're free not to answer, but I'd consider that quite telling.

Being forced to commit to the claim that nothing existed before language is a damning logical consequence

I'm not agreeing with that conclusion. I don't think it follows. But even if it did, being forced to reject either "X" is true if X or "X" is false if not X is a much more damning consequence as it leads to contradictions. Rather undermine your ontological commitments than undermine logic.

...the only way that I see to avoid it is to accept that "X iff 'X' is true" was not true at that time.

Which is like accepting that the King of France is not bald in the present.

@Michael Argh! I see that you're as annoying as I am, in that you post a comment, but then edit it without my noticing. I have missed much of what you've said.

:D

Apologies (oops, I did it again).

You're asking if a non-existent sentence was or wasn't true. But that's like asking if the non-existent King of France is or isn't bald. — Michael

Just as there is no King of France to be or not to be bald, there were no sentences to be or not to be true. Therefore, it could not have been the case that there was a true sentence, despite there being a state of affairs which would correspond to such a sentence if such a sentence existed.

I'm not shifting any burden. I'm telling you that if you reject "X" is true iff X then you must reject either "X" is true if X or "X" is false if not X. I want to know which. You're free not to answer, but I'd consider that quite telling. — Michael

I am rejecting the claim that "X entails 'X' is true" has been the case since before language existed. Feel free to address that rejection and it's logical consequences, and I'll cooperate.

I'm not agreeing with that conclusion. I don't think it follows. — Michael

It is one horn of a dilemma which follows from the premise that whenever X has been the case, "X" has been true, and the premise that there has been a time in which X was the case, but in which there was no "X" to be true. In order to avoid contradiction, you must reject at least one of those premises. I suggest rejecting just the former premise, because I think that it's more plausible that the former premise is false, and that the latter premise is true. If you reject the latter, but not the former, then you face absurdity, such as that language has always existed and/or that nothing existed before language.

Which is like accepting that the King of France is not bald in the present. — Michael

I can rephrase it in a way that might avoid that objection, and I believe that I have basically done so in my first paragraph in this post. Rather than implying that there was a sentence which was not true, I am implying that there was not a sentence which was true.

Therefore, it could not have been the case that there was a true sentence, despite there being a state of affairs which would correspond to such a sentence if such a sentence existed. — Sapientia

I know. As I said before, the T-schema doesn't say "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time iff X happened. It says "X happened" is true iff X happened.

I am rejecting the claim that "X entails 'X' is true" has been the case since before language existed. Feel free to address that rejection and it's logical consequences, and I'll cooperate.

But nobody has said that. What I've said is that "X" is true iff X.

It follows from the premise that whenever X has been the case, "X" has been true, and the premise that there has been a time in which X was the case, but in which there was no "X" to be true.

No it doesn't. You can't derive "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time iff X happened from "X happened" is true iff X happened.

I know. As I said before, the T-schema doesn't say "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time iff X happened. It says "X happened" is true iff X happened. — Michael

I know that it doesn't say "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time iff X happened. But, unless it is limited to a certain period of time, it does imply that if X happened, then "X" was true. You yourself said that it works both ways.

But nobody has said that. What I've said is that "X" is true iff X. — Michael

I know that nobody has claimed that. I have said that it is a logical implication. You've also said that the biconditional works both ways, such that X iff "X" is true, which, unless it is only applicable to a certain period of time, implies that when X was the case, there must have been "X", and "X" must have been true.

Are you, or are you not, claiming that your principle applies only to a certain period of time?

No it doesn't. — Michael

To be more precise, it is one horn of a dilemma which follows from the premise that whenever X has been the case, "X" has been true, and the premise that there has been a time in which X was the case, but in which there was no "X" to be true.

Please see the edited version of my comment.

You can't derive "X is happening" was truthfully said at the time iff X happened from "X happened" is true iff X happened. — Michael

That's not what I said. Unless you're now backtracking, you said that the biconditional works both ways. I'm addressing it the other way around, and precisely as I worded it.

But, unless it is limited to a certain period of time, it does imply that if X happened, then "X" was true. — Sapientia

The T-schema doesn't say "X" was true iff X happened. It says "X happened" is true iff X happened.

You yourself said that it works both ways.

What I said is that the T-schema can be read in either direction, either as 1) "X happened" is true iff X happened or as 2) X happened iff "X happened" is true. This is an elementary fact about material equivalence. X ↔ Y can be read as Y ↔ X.

And notice that 2) isn't X happened iff "X" was true.

It is one horn of a dilemma which follows from the premise that whenever X has been the case, "X" has been true

But that's not the premise. The premises are:

"X" is true if X
"X" is false if not X

The conclusion "X" is true iff X necessarily follows and is equivalent to X iff "X" is true. So as I said, if you want to reject this conclusion then you must reject one of the above premises, but to reject one of the above premises is to invite contradictions.

What I said is that the T-schema can be read in either direction, either as 1) "X happened" is true iff X happened or as 2) X happened iff "X happened" is true. This is an elementary fact about material equivalence. X ↔ Y can be read as Y ↔ X.

Notice that 2) isn't X happened iff "X" was true. — Michael

But your T-schema wasn't that specific. It was general enough to imply the second version of 2).

X iff "X" is true — Michael

See? Let X be: the pre-linguistic universe exists. It follows that if the pre-linguistic universe exists, then "the pre-linguistic universe exists" is true. You must maintain that this was the case at the time for sake of consistency, or accept that the principle in bold applies only to a certain period of time, or abandon the principle in bold as formulated.

But your T-schema wasn't that specific. It was general enough to imply the second version of 2). — Sapientia

"My" T-schema is just the T-schema, which is: "X" is true iff X. It doesn't imply the second version of 2).

Let X be that the pre-linguistic universe exists. It follows that if the pre-linguistic universe exists, then "the pre-linguistic universe exists" is true. You must maintain that this was the case at the time for sake of consistency

So I must maintain that it was the case that if the pre-linguistic universe exists then "the pre-linguistic universe exists" is true? The grammar of this is all wrong. You're mixing your tenses.

Rather I must maintain that if the pre-linguistic universe existed then "the pre-linguistic universe existed" is true. Which is the T-schema.

... or abandon the principle in bold, as formulated.

If I abandon X iff "X" is true then I must abandon "X" is true iff X, and if I abandon "X" is true iff X then I must abandon "X" is true if X or "X" is not true if not X. This leads to contradictions.

So I ask you, ought I do this? Do you do this?

So I must maintain that it was the case that if the pre-linguistic universe exists then "the pre-linguistic universe exists" is true? The grammar of this is all wrong. You're mixing your tenses. — Michael

Yes, that is what you must maintain, although that is not the only way that you could word it, and I don't recall having worded it that way, so if there is a problem with the grammar in the paragraph quoted above, then it seems trivial and of your own creation.

Unless you qualify that the principle is not timeless and that it depends on certain circumstances, then you must commit to a version of what I'm trying to say which preserves the meaning. You must word it in such a way as to show that the principle would have applied at that time, in the present tense.

You must maintain that when it was the case that the pre-linguistic universe existed, at that time, it must also have been the case that there existed a true sentence: "the pre-linguistic universe exists".

Rather I must maintain that if the pre-linguistic universe existed then "the pre-linguistic universe existed" is true. Which is the T-schema. — Michael

You must maintain that as well, but that is beside the point.

If I abandon X iff "X" is true then I must abandon "X" is true iff X, and if I abandon "X" is true iff X then I must abandon "X" is true if X or "X" is not true if not X. This leads to contradictions. — Michael

No, in a suitably revised or qualified form, it need not lead down that path.

So I ask you, ought I do this? Do you do this? — Michael

No, you should do what I've suggested.

No, in a suitably revised or qualified form, it need not lead down that path. — Sapientia

There is no way to avoid it. I've provided you the argument:

"X" is true if X
"X" is false if not X

The conclusion "X" is true iff X necessarily follows and is equivalent to X iff "X" is true.

Do you agree with the premises?

You must maintain that when it was the case that the pre-linguistic universe existed, at that time, it must also have been the case that there existed a true sentence: "the pre-linguistic universe exists".

No I don't. The T-schema doesn't imply this. The T-schema only says that if the pre-linguistic universe existed then "the pre-linguistic universe existed" is true.

There is no way to avoid it. I've provided you the argument:

"X" is true if X
"X" is false if not X

The conclusion "X" is true iff X necessarily follows and is equivalent to X iff "X" is true.

Do you agree with the premises? — Michael

Assuming that the conclusion is true, does it follow that it has always been true? No. Which is my point. I am arguing in favour of the position that the conclusion is dependent on time and circumstance.

No I don't. The T-schema doesn't imply this. The T-schema only says that if the pre-linguistic universe existed then "the pre-linguistic universe existed" is true. — Michael

I have given you the opportunity to qualify whether or not the principle is timeless and dependant on certain circumstances, but you have not done so. I don't know what else I can do. I have demonstrated that it does imply what I've said that it implies if it is timeless and independent of circumstance. However, if you qualify that it's dependent on time and circumstance, then TGW's criticism - which I have reiterated - can be avoided.

You must maintain that when it was the case that the pre-linguistic universe existed, at that time, it must also have been the case that there existed a true sentence: "the pre-linguistic universe exists". — Sapientia

That doesn't seem right.

*edit



I apologize for my brevity; it's more of a place holder while I collect my thoughts. I'm a slow thinker, but wanted to put something down to commit to add more.

Very informative. Are you going to elaborate? Or are you waiting to be asked?

Edit:

I apologize for my brevity; it's more of a place holder while I collect my thoughts. I'm a slow thinker, but wanted to put something down to commit to add more. — Soylent

Ok.

Assuming that the conclusion is true, does it follow that it has always been true? No. Which is my point. I am arguing in favour of the position that the conclusion is dependent on time and circumstance. — Sapientia

It's true and never has been or will be false. Furthermore, its truth is not dependent on special circumstances. It's necessarily true.

Your words are sounding like the King of France example again.