1. Gratuitous suffering, by definition, is preventable simply by virtue of being gratuitous suffering (and therefore not conditionally)

The bolded is false. An instance of gratuitous suffering is conditionally true (i.e., the instance satisfies the conditions).

Consider:

P1: a bachelor is, by definition, an unmarried man simply by virtue of being a bachelor (and therefore not conditionally).
P2 Mike is a bachelor on the condition that he is an unmarried man.
P3 P2 contradicts P1
C1 P2 is false

I've addressed your criticism of P6 elsewhere and since P6 remains unchanged my response elsewhere is still applicable. If you feel your objection to P6 is different than the one already presented in this thread, I would gladly address your objection specifically and would appreciate it you could explain how yours is different.

I agree that there is an appearance of redundancy or begging the question by use of the term "gratuitous suffering" early in the argument, but the use is only to make the distinction between gratuitous suffering and other forms of suffering not obliged by the success of the argument. P6, P7 and C3 are useful to show that food production practices are preventable and fit into the larger argument to show that food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering as per the definition.

Considering your comment that one only needs to show that something causes gratuitous suffering and it logically follows that it's preventable, but to show that something causes gratuitous suffering one must show that the suffering is preventable, is there any way to avoid the redundancy?

P15 is of the form:

If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d

¬Pa is true by definition
b is true by empirical evidence
c is true by supportive argument and empirical evidence

d follows from the transitive property applied to O¬a wherein ¬a = b and some b is c.

Let's repurpose your example of transitivity in action.

Let:
a = 2>1
b = 3>2
c = 3>1

If a and b, then c

What justifies c?

Either modus ponens (the affirmation of the antecedent terms).
Or the transitivity of the content of the terms.

But it doesn't. Nowhere in "¬Pa (= O¬a)", "¬a = b", or "c" does "d" appear. — Michael

d is a term and not a predicate statement. The predicate statement contained in d follows from the transitive property. The content of d is contained in "¬Pa (= O¬a)", "¬a = b", or "c" wherein the application of the transitive property on those terms is the term unique term d (i.e., the consequent).

Notice how you're trying to defend the premise by treating it as a syllogism, saying that the consequent follows from the antecedent? As I've pointed out before, it's an invalid syllogism. D can't be deduced from A, B, and C — Michael

No, I said "d follows from the transitive property", which is not the same as saying "d follows from the antecedent". d has a unique feature which makes it a consequent. The defense of d specifically and not the entire premise is the transitive property applied.

I have no idea what you're looking for so until one of us figures out what the other is trying to say, we might be at an impasse.

Let:
a = allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
b = it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet
c = there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet and those that are in a position to adopt a vegan diet are those for whom it would be wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
d = those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices the means to which is only by adopting a vegan diet

If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d

Therefore, d.

¬Pa is true by definition
b is true by empirical evidence
c is also true by empirical evidence
d follows from the transitive property applied to O¬a wherein ¬a = b and some b is c.

The same way one might defend other implications: analysis of terms, empirical observation, supportive arguments, faith or wishful thinking.

if we take P14 as an argument then it fails. — Michael

P14 is NOT an argument, it is a premise.

Using your example above, let A be "2 > 1", let B be "3 > 2", let C be "4 > 3", and let D be "5 > 6".

P1 (A ∧ B ∧ C) → D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D

So:

P1. If 2 > 1 and 3 > 2 and 4 > 3 then 5 > 6
P2. 2 > 1
P3. 3 > 2
P3. 4 > 3
C1. 5 > 6

Have I shown that 5 > 6? — Michael

Yes you have, by modus ponens.

If it's raining then circles are square
It's raining
Therefore, circles are square

Is a valid argument by modus ponens.

P1 may be false and so the argument is unsound, but nevertheless valid.
If you want me to justify the soundness of the premise then that's fine, but acting as if the argument is invalid is silly.

For clarification, you're questioning the soundness and not validity; because it seemed to me that you were questioning the validity by questioning the form as you did here:

That's not the form though, it's:

P1 (A & B & C) → D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D — Soylent

And I'm questioning P1. What justifies the material implication? D certainly can't be derived from A, B, and C. So it must be something else. — Michael

And other comments regarding "valid syllogism".

Nooo......The entire argument is modus ponens. A premise need not be a self-contained argument. P1 is a hypothetical premise wherein the affirmation of D is supported by the affirmative conjuction of A, B and C (which were independently affirmed throughout the larger argument).

I'm not sure I understand your objection. D is derived (entailed?) from A, B, and C as per modus ponens.

P14 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
C6 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2, C3, and C4)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
C7 There are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet. (from P12 and P13)

C8 A vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet (from P6, C6, C7 and P14).

You can't derive d if d isn't in the premises. Consider:

P1. A → B
P2. A
C1. C — Michael

That's not the form though, it's:

P1 (A & B & C) → D
P2 A
P3 B
P4 C
C1 D

So "it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering" is logically equivalent to "one ought not gratuitous suffering". Obviously that makes no sense. Previously I interpreted this as "one ought prevent gratuitous suffering" but you didn't like this one. Is "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable" not the correct interpretation? — Michael

The latter interpretation is preferable.

I was imprecise in my notation. The correct form is: It is wrong to X is logically equivalent to ought not X, and X is "allow gratuitous suffering" where "allow gratuitous suffering" means "to act in such a way so as to not make gratuitous suffering preventable".

Further versions of the argument may have to include some form of that, which might be best stated as your "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable" as per your suggestion.

But Y in "not X = Y" is "adopting a vegan diet is possible". So "some can Y" is "it is possible for some to adopt a vegan diet".

And if "Z" is "it is possible for some to adopt a vegan diet" then "one ought Z" is "one ought make it possible for some to adopt a vegan diet". Which is the conclusion I said follows and which differs from "one ought adopt a vegan diet". — Michael

Let:
a = allow gratuitous suffering
b = it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet
c = there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet and those that are in a position to adopt of a vegan diet are those for whom it would be wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
d = those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet ought not allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices

If ¬Pa (= O¬a)
and ¬a = b
and c
then, d

Therefore, d.

Another step is still needed to get back to "ought adopt a vegan diet".

As I said before, if you want the first premise to be "one ought make gratuitous suffering preventable iff one can make gratuitous suffering preventable" and if you want as the conclusion "one ought adopt a vegan diet iff one can adopt a vegan diet" then you must have as the second premise "one makes gratuitous suffering preventable iff one adopts a vegan diet". — Michael

I don't know why I'm resisting this so much. Let me think on it a bit.

It is wrong to allow X is logically equivalent to ought not X.
not X = Y
And some can Y (Z)

Therefore, ought Z

Yeah, maybe there's something still missing.

I've edited the OP to request that all comments are to respond to the revised (most current) version. That is the one I will be responding to and will not mention premises contained in any other versions unless they are contained in the revised version as well. As far as I can tell, the revised version is the strongest form of the argument I have ever conceived and there is no longer any conditions or information omitted.

It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
Therefore a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet — Michael

I added another term to the implication for the purpose of addressing this issue. I currently stands as:

i) It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices
ii) Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet
iii) There are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.

Therefore, a vegan diet ought to be adopted by those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.

Where, "there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet" are specifically those agents that satisfy the conditions of the moral obligation contained in P1 (see P12 - C7)

The new P14 satisfies the conditions of the objection you raise in terms of the valid syllogism and material implication, which was missing in previous versions.

Why didn't you include that explicitly in the argument in the first place? If your objective here is not to put an argument in what you know to be it's best formulation to scrutiny, but just some sort of test of our critical thinking skills, then I don't agree with your purpose here, and wish to take no further part. I don't feel like playing a game of 'spot the shortcomings in my knowingly inadequate argument'. — Sapientia

I submitted a stripped down version of a similar argument I prepared elsewhere for advice on a formal/logical issue, and so my intention was limited only to a formal analysis. In my estimation the full version was unnecessary for the purposes of the formal issue for which I wished to receive input. In that discussion issues of soundness arose, which prompted me to create this spin-off thread to address those issues. So as to encourage and not invalidate concerns already mentioned in the previous discussion I left the argument the same as the stripped down version presented in the logic section. You give me far too much credit, I don't presume to know much. Any shortcomings I had previously identified may have been given novel attention, including objections and solutions, by the very capable individuals on this forum.

I'm going to offer a revised argument taking into consideration the discussion thus far. I would like to thank everyone that has contributed for their thoughtfulness and civility.

Stipulative Definitions:
Veganism is any diet that does not include sentient animals as the end product in food production practices. Veganism is qualified by the omission of food products In a diet and as such is an act of omission.

Gratuitous suffering is morally impermissible suffering. The necessary and sufficient conditions of morally impermissible suffering is any suffering that is: known, preventable, and preventable at a reasonable cost.

P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable and known and the means to make the gratuitous suffering preventable are reasonable, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. (from stipulative definition)
P2 If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.
P3 Some nonhuman animals are sentient.
P4 Food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans.
C1 Food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals. (from P2, P3 and P4)
P5 If food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals, then some agents know of some gratuitous suffering.
C2 Some agents know of some gratuitous suffering. (from C1 and P5)
P6 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
P7 If it is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet, then gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (elimination from P6)
P8 It is possible for some agents to adopt a vegan diet.
C3 Gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable. (from P6, P7 and P8)
P9 If the means of making the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices preventable is an act of omission and does not present harm to some agents, then the means to make said gratuitous suffering preventable is reasonable.
P10 Adopting a vegan diet is an act of omission (from stipulative definition)
P11 If some agents do not have health concerns (mental or physical) that can only be remedied by adopting a non-vegan diet, then a vegan diet does not present harm to some agents.
P12 Some agents do not have health concerns (mental or physical) that can only be remedied by adopting a non-vegan diet (*edited January 6, 2016 @ 13:06 est by adding P12 and renumbering subsequent premises)
C4 A vegan diet does not present harm to some agents. (from P11 and P12)
C5 The means to make said gratuitous suffering preventable is reasonable. (from P9, P10, and C4)
C6 It is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. (from P1, C2, C3, and C4)
P13 If some agents belong to the sets of "some agents" contained in each of C2, P8, and C4 respectively, then there are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
P14 Some agents belong to the sets of "some agents" contained in each of C2, P8, and C4 respectively.
C7 There are those agents who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet. (*edited January 6, 2016 @ 10:21 am est* from P13 and P14)
P15 If it is wrong to allow gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices and gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet, and there are those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet, then a vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet.
C8 A vegan diet ought to be adopted by all those who are in a position to adopt a vegan diet (from P6, C6, C7 and P15).

This was written on my phone and may contain typographical errors or omission. The above is subject to revision once I have access to a desktop computer to correct obvious errors. I will mark edits as such including a time stamp.

I'll review the argument to see if it is salvageable in light of your criticism or if the amendment has weakened the argument beyond repair. — Soylent

It seems Postmodern Beatnik is more keen than I am, anticipated this problem and performed the heavy lifting here.

ISIS can just kill people. — Landru Guide Us

Below is a rhetorical question and there's no need to respond:

Doesn't ISIS spread mindless self-serving narratives AND kill people? I might be wrong because I don't know ISIS principles and an effort to find out might draw suspicion upon myself (yay democracy!).

The part that bothers me is that if black people had done it, they'd be dead. — Moliere

Just playing Devil's Advocate here, but it might be that you've selected an arbitrary characteristic (e.g., skin colour) as the distinguishing feature. Perhaps white people have more friends in law enforcement (and this itself might be institutionalized racism) and so when a situation like this occurs it's not the colour of their skin that saves them but the personal connections they have to prevent the escalation. In cases where violence erupts, there might be a variety of causes and singling out skin colour is not entirely productive, even if it is somewhat (mostly) appropriate.

You can't have Y as "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" in the premise and then have Y as "adopt a vegan diet" in the conclusion. — Michael

I'm curious if there is a move to be made from Y¹ to Y, where Y¹ is "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" and Y is "to adopt a vegan diet". Perhaps another ancillary argument of the nature of "if it is possible to Y (Y¹) then one ought to Y iff Y is the only means to Z and one ought to Z".

And I'm asking you to defend P1. What reasoning or evidence shows that X and Y implies Z? — Michael

As per my post above, I think this is what you're after or am I missing the meaning of your request?

it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering

Can be read in deontic logic as ¬Pγ (It is not permitted to γ)
¬Pγ is equivalent to O¬γ (One is obligated to not γ)

If ¬Pγ and (¬γ iff ψ), then Oψ
¬Pγ and (¬γ iff ψ)

Oψ

Then is the argument:

One ought make X preventable
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y. — Michael

That's not a charitable reading. The second premise can be stated as X is preventable iff Y (where Y is "it is possible to adopt a vegan diet"). There's no reason to place the possibility outside Y. It is possible that the amendment of Y as suggested by Postmodern Beatnik has changed the conclusion and I haven't properly adopted the premise throughout. It's a remnant of an older version of the argument, but you're quite right to bring it to my attention as being out of place in the current form.

I'll review the argument to see if it is salvageable in light of your criticism or if the amendment has weakened the argument beyond repair.

One ought prevent X
X is preventable iff Y is possible
Therefore one ought do Y. — Michael

This is not my argument though, the first premise is too strong since "One ought to prevent X" is beyond the potency of finite beings. Ought implies can, such that one ought act in such a way that X is preventable by their actions. I cannot be held responsible for the outcome if it is beyond my potency so my responsibility is to my action (i.e., acting so as to render X preventable). *my Kant is showing*

No it's not.

P1: X
P2: Y
C1: Z

It's not modus ponens. The premise "If X and Y then Z" can't be defended as a valid syllogism. — Michael

That's not the argument, the argument is:

P1 If X and Y, then Z
P2 X and Y
C Z

It's in the form "if X and Y then Z". I'm questioning this material implication. If the material implication fails then the premise fails, and if the premise fails then the argument fails. — Michael

I'm glad you left the premise in a formal notation because formally it is valid. I have shown X and Y in the argument and I am trying to arrive at Z so the material implication holds by modus ponens. I take your objection to be directed at the content of the terms, and that is supported by an ancillary meta-ethical argument about the entailment of obligations.

it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering — Soylent

Can be read in deontic logic as ¬Pγ (It is not permitted to γ)
¬Pγ is equivalent to O¬γ (One is obligated to not γ)

If ¬Pγ and (¬γ iff ψ), then Oψ
¬Pγ and (¬γ iff ψ)

Oψ

But the actual phrasing is "X is preventable iff Y is possible". Did you actually mean "X is prevented iff Y"? — Michael

No, preventability is the condition of the moral obligation and not actual prevention. It only matters if the action renders the outcome preventable and not actually prevents the outcome (although acting on the obligation should prevent the outcome if it is accurate and a malicious agent is not acting against your efforts, the actual prevention need not be demonstrated for the obligation to hold).

Then what are the necessary and sufficient conditions? — Michael

Those conditions are outlined in the definition and contained in P1:

Gratuitous suffering is suffering that is
1) Known
2) Preventable
with the later addition of
3) At a reasonable cost

Each condition is necessary, but only taken together are the three conditions sufficient for gratuitous suffering.

Then if it can be shown that I can't prevent gratuitous suffering by adopting a vegan diet then I am not obligated to adopt a vegan diet. — Michael

More or less, but you should be careful with what you mean. I would state it as, "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is not preventable if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". The obligation only holds if the means (i.e., a vegan diet) is suitable or renders the outcome (i.e., gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices) preventable. If multiple actions render the outcome preventable, there is no strict obligation to act on any specific action. Veganism is obligated because it is only means to render the outcome preventable (as per P6).

So, if I adopt a vegan diet will gratuitous suffering be prevented? — Michael

Perhaps. There are complex chains that will be played out by your adoption of veganism that may (or by some chance may not) prevent gratuitous suffering. The specifics of how much, where or the mechanisms of prevention are beyond the scope of this argument.

I'm questioning how "it is wrong to allow preventable suffering caused by food production practices" and "that suffering caused by food production practices which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" imply "a vegan diet ought to be adopted". It certainly doesn't seem to be the case that "a vegan diet ought to be adopted" is derived from the other two sentences. — Michael

I would caution against reducing gratuitous suffering to "preventable suffering". That suffering is preventable is a necessary but not sufficient condition for suffering to be judged as gratuitous.

P9 is a hypothetical so I'm not sure why you're trying to read it as several independent claims absent the hypothetical operator. It's more of a hypothetical move from the trivial moral claim in P1 to the specific means established by P6. More succinctly, if it morally impermissible to allow some outcome and the only way to prevent that outcome is performing or abstaining from a specific action, then it is morally impermissible not to perform or abstain from the specific action.

Where gratuitous suffering does not have a one-to-one relationship with the means of prevention, the prevention does not oblige a specific performance or abstaining of action. A vegan diet (i.e., the means of prevention) is only obligated if it has a one-to-one relationship with the prevention of gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices. The conclusion that "one ought to adopt a vegan diet" follows from the entire argument before it and not a single premise taken in abstraction.

Then consider: "that suffering which is called gratuitous is called gratuitous if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet". How does one then conclude "one ought adopt a vegan diet" from that? — Michael

One doesn't, that is only a single premise and the claim that "one ought to adopt a vegan diet" follows from many premises and conclusions when taken together.

If gratuitous suffering is preventable by definition then the premise "gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet" fails. Gratuitous suffering does not depend on something else (e.g. the possibility to adopt a vegan diet) to be preventable. — Michael

Huh?

It's defined as preventable only insofar as it has some means that satisfies the condition of prevention. Whether food production practices is gratuitous suffering relies on whether there is a means for the prevention of said suffering (e.g., a vegan diet). Food production practices is gratuitous suffering because the suffering can be prevented iff it is possible to adopt a vegan diet. If it was impossible to prevent the suffering of food production practices, that suffering would be considered unpreventable and morally permissible.

It's like saying "bachelors are unmarried men if and only if it is possible to X" (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men"). — Michael

I think it's more akin to the following:

bachelors are called such iff they are men and remain unmarried. (where "bachelors" is defined as "unmarried men").

Maybe you're right though. I regarded the constant back and forth with the definition of gratuitous suffering at each stage needlessly cumbersome, but it might be helpful for clarification.

This is confusing. Are you defining "gratuitous suffering" as "morally impermissible suffering" or as "known and preventable (at a reasonable cost) suffering"? Or is its meaning something else? — Michael

Gratuitous suffering = morally impermissible suffering. Suffering is morally impermissible by the following conditions: known and preventable (at a reasonable cost).

Definition of gratuitous suffering: If suffering is preventable (at a reasonable cost) and known, it is wrong to allow said suffering. Suffering that is wrong to allow is gratuitous suffering.

Gratuitous suffering is morally impermissible by virtue of being gratuitous suffering, and established by the conditions above. By the transitive property:

P1 If any gratuitous suffering is preventable (at a reasonable cost) and known, it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering. (trivial moral claim)

That's not the way the burden of proof works. If you use a premise to make an argument then you must defend that premise; it is not the burden of the other person to disprove it. — Michael

That's only true if i) I feel like the argument needs to be defended and ii) the person opposing the argument hasn't issued a claim that itself needs defense. I have no interest in defending the argument but I am curious what reasons a person gives in response to the argument aside from, "I don't like it". The rebuttal is more interesting to me than the support (unless someone feels compelled to support the argument). I've pondered this argument for a while and I have rejected it too, but that doesn't mean I was right to reject it unless I have reasons for that rejection.

The issue isn't over whether or not there is a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and non-human animals; the issue is over whether or not there is a divergence between the cause of gratuitous suffering in humans and non-humans. — Michael

This might be splitting hairs but your counterexample of capsaicin is duly noted. Is it fair to say a capacity is the potential and the cause is the capacity realized?

Even if you can show that humans and non-human animals have the same capacity to experience suffering, and even if you can show that food production practices causes non-human animals to suffer, you haven't shown that such suffering in non-humans animals is morally impermissible. — Michael

Suffering is morally impermissible and gratuitous if it is known, preventable, and preventable at a reasonable cost. The argument itself aims to show that the suffering of nonhuman animals by food production practices is gratuitous suffering and morally impermissible. P2 is a hypothetical premise introduced with the intention to demonstrate that conclusion and taken along with the other premises shows that food production practices is morally impermissible and obliges a vegan diet.

I take your objection to be the use of "gratuitous" to describe the suffering in the early premises and the appearance of begging the question. I used the term gratuitous to distinguish it from other suffering, where only gratuitous suffering obliges (in)action. It doesn't make much sense to construct a moral argument to talk about non-gratuitous suffering because such suffering is outside the scope of knowledge, potency or too burdensome. I consider it a bit of a trivial distinction, but useful to remind the reader that the only suffering I am talking about falls within that range. If the argument succeeds (and I suspect it doesn't), it only applies to gratuitous suffering.

Emotion is better suited to compel towards a particular belief rather than away from a particular belief. Atheists are emotionally committed to a position insofar as they hold a position, but using emotion to rebut a claim without offering anything in place of the claim is going to fall flat in the emotion department. If atheism is manifested as a negative reaction to particular theistic claims on which the atheist has placed no stakes, then atheism has no recourse to emotion. It would be like trying to get emotionally worked up over Russell's teapot.

And I question your claim that what would cause gratuitous suffering in humans counts as gratuitous suffering in non-human animals. — Michael

I question it too. As mentioned to Postmodern Beatnik, I'm not prepared to defend this claim beyond what I believe is intellectually honest but I would prefer to have grounds to defeat it rather than a mere unsupported assertion that it is dubious. What can you point to that would indicate a divergence between the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering in humans and nonhuman animals? More specifically, is that divergence significant to gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices such that what would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans should not be considered to constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals in relation to food production practices.

it must be the case that the animal is of the understanding that their relative or friend has been killed. So one must show that a) an animal is capable of such an understanding and that b) the animal has such an understanding. The second can be addressed simply by ensuring that the slaughter happens out of sight and hearing of other animals. — Michael

I'm not sure this is the cause of the gratuitous suffering or if it has to be that strong. Is it conceivable a human would still suffer without the specific understanding that a relative or friend has been killed? In humans it's sufficient to recognize that the relationship has ended (by some unknown mechanism) and that recognition per se causes suffering. The suffering of the loss of a relationship that we can identify by virtue of our humanity can in turn be categorized as gratuitous (i.e., unjustified) if the suffering is caused by the intentional actions of moral agents without sufficient warrant. The nonhuman animal doesn't need the capacity to recognize its own suffering as gratuitous, the judgement of gratuitous comes from moral beings on the basis that the suffering is not morally permissible (as per the conditions of the moral obligation). The nonhuman animal doesn't have to identify the cause of or be able to articulate the deep emotional attachment that causes suffering in order to recognize that the nonhuman animal is suffering.

Well could you think of another possible way that some gratuitous suffering could be prevented? — shmik

I would respond in much the same way that Postmodern Beatnik has, insofar as this argument is limited to a particular type of gratuitous suffering that can only be remedied by abstaining from the behaviour that necessitates the eventual slaughter of nonhuman animals. If the intentional killing itself can be regarded as gratuitous suffering, then no matter what steps have been taken to reduce suffering prior to the slaughter, the obligation to prevent gratuitous suffering will be left unfulfilled. Indeed, some of the gratuitous suffering can be prevented through better treatment prior to slaughter, but if slaughter is gratuitous suffering then one will have assess the means by which the gratuitous suffering of the slaughter can be prevented, if at all.

There is room to doubt that the intentional killing of nonhuman animals constitutes gratuitous suffering. The knowledge claim aims to address that doubt; specifically: If some nonhuman animals are sentient and food production practices would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then food production practices constitute gratuitous suffering in some nonhuman animals.

This establishes the metric by which we can judge gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals and is bolstered (or ignored as the case may be) by a risk-averse assumption. We don't know what is going on in the minds of animals, but it's possible that sentience is a necessary and sufficient condition for the capacity to experience gratuitous suffering. If the moral obligation holds (i.e., If any gratuitous suffering is preventable, known and the cost to prevent said gratuitous suffering is reasonable, then it is wrong to allow said gratuitous suffering) then the next step in ascertaining moral obligation is to identify where the conditions are satisfied.

Knowledge: Is there any reason to think that food production practices are capable of producing gratuitous suffering? Well if it would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then it is possible that the practices constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals and by the risk-aversion principle we say that it does constitute gratuitous suffering in nonhuman animals.

What does cruelty have to do with it? The issue was that it caused gratuitous suffering. So you'd need to show that animals suffered gratuitously by being swiftly killed. Furthermore, I think the comparison with humans fails as it seems unlikely that the friends and families of the to-be-killed animal would suffer. — Michael

This comment is out of place because a built-in condition of the argument is to consider what would be gratuitous suffering in humans. That comparison is the basis for the knowledge claim, and part of the gratuitous suffering of intentional killing is the suffering felt by the animals that have relationships with the slaughtered animal (and they do have relationships). If the cruelty of the intentional killing is part of the judgement of why it would constitute gratuitous suffering in humans, then that same judgement applies in some degree to nonhuman animals (with the proviso that the nonhuman animal has a minimal physiological and neurological capacity for said suffering). The appeasement of our moral conscience by claiming it "unlikely" is too weak to ignore a serious moral obligation. I would take the risk-averse assumption over the "unlikely" assumption in case it turns out we reached too far with the obligation and aimed to eliminate suffering that wasn't present rather than not reach far enough and continue to cause preventable gratuitous suffering because of limited understanding or wishful thinking.

Reasonable cost: I have limited the cost to be acts of omission rather than acts of commission as previously stated. I feel that's a fairly reasonable cost.

Prevention: The gratuitous suffering of food production practices includes but is not limited to the intentional killing of nonhuman animals (see knowledge). The prevention must aim at all gratuitous suffering and may require multiple obligations, As it turns out, the argument states that gratuitous suffering can be prevented by a single (in)action: gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices is preventable if and only if it is possible to adopt a vegan diet. Other actions can reduce gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices but only one is capable in itself of preventing the gratuitous suffering caused by food production practices.

I believe it is false because the biconditional is too strong. That said there are ways to fix it up, I've mentioned one using statistics. Another could be to hold that an individual has an obligation even if he doesn't know whether his specific actions will have an effect. Either of these allow you to replace the biconditional with something weaker and still get an obligation as your conclusion. — shmik

I'm not sure I understand what you mean by "too strong". It's strong insofar as it establishes a one-to-one relationship between the means and ends of an action. If another action can be substituted for the adoption of veganism by the individual, the bi-conditional is defeated since it explicitly states the only means for preventing gratuitous suffering is the adoption of veganism by the individual (hence objection ii). Statistics and individual knowledge of the outcome is irrelevant to the scope of this argument. The individual doesn't need to know the specific mechanism or the statistical outcome of the adoption of veganism, only that there is a causal chain (albeit weak) between the adoption of a vegan diet in the individual and the prevention of gratuitous suffering, which is not that outlandish.

There is grounds for P6 that holds regardless of the ambiguity of subject (i.e., adoption of veganism by the individual or collectively). The only way to prevent the gratuitous suffering of the intentional killing non-human animals caused by food production practices is to refrain (directly or indirectly) in the intentional killing of non-human animals (i.e., adopting a vegan diet) The obligation to prevent that specific gratuitous suffering cannot be achieved in any other way, even by improved treatment prior to the killing. I picked a vegan diet because I thought the broader argument was more defensible than a narrowing to vegetarianism.