Yes that was the point I was making. — neomac

Good to see we agree here.

NATO can be repurposed also defend the West from the Rest. And if NATO expansion in Sweden or Finland is not a problem, neither should have been NATO expanding in Ukraine. — neomac

There is a big difference.

First, there is basic political stability. No one would entertain the notion that some faction of the Finnish military or intelligence would "cause trouble" and actively try to start a war between Russia and NATO. Even putting aside recent history, Finland is stable and predictable whereas Ukraine is not, so having a 1000 km border with an unstable country that is apart of NATO is a recipe for trouble making.

However, there is also another big military difference in that Finland does not host any Russian naval bases, whereas Ukraine hosted one of Russia's most important ports.

There is a lot of pretty common sense reasons Russia would view Ukraine in NATO as a major threat to its security, which has no parallel with Finland. Of course, "never say never" but I seriously doubt anyone in Russia, Finland or the whole NATO seriously believes in any conflict between Finland and Russia, with or without Finland in NATO.

It doesn't need to be over to assess how poorly Russian are military performing. Even they themselves are complaining about it in their national TV. — neomac

For now. Things can change. Now, if you say this is one negative for now, then we agree.

However, there are also negatives on the Ukrainian side. The "humiliation" only exists insofar as Ukraine can sustain military gains on the battle field.

Although I would never exclude some brilliant deceptive operation, it seems pretty unanimous that Ukraine is suffering heavy losses in these offensives. If that is simply unsustainable then the offensives will burn themselves out and Russia will reverse the tide.

Also, from my observations over the years, Putin, the Kremlin and the Russian military run a very different information game (call it propaganda or public relations -- same word to me), since they know that they can't actually stop the West's propaganda (maybe learned something from Soviet times) or maybe they just have a flare for the dramatic, but whatever the reason, they often let negative speculation run wild and then simply accomplish the task or present their case much later. For example, a lot of what we've witnessed in the information battle in this war happened nearly identically in Russia's intervention in the Syrian war.

For example, weeks and weeks of ATGM's taking out Russian tanks almost verbatim reproduction in Ukraine, the West crying from roof tops of Russian incompetence, can't even take an airfield, can't even take Aleppo ... or then only with siege tactics etc. Putin, Kremlin and the Russian military did not respond to all this "embarrassment" (running to show many tanks survived, many were decoys, and I expect many were staged since video proof was needed for funding and propaganda of these groups).

So, if Russia is confident that Ukraine cannot sustain this offensive, then the greater the despair the greater the catharsis and euphoria when the tide is reversed. And such an observation is not "copium" but psychology 101 and hinges on the "if" statement. If Ukrainian gains are sustainable then the greater the despair the greater pressure to start use tactical nuclear weapons or justify some other policy shift.

Point being, simply because the US brings out general after general to say "things are fine" right up until the day "allies" are falling of US cargo planes to their death, does not mean we should expect the same from the Kremlin.

Whether by design or just his personality, Putin's way of dealing with repetitive propaganda from the West (which Russian's aren't exposed to same as us) is long, detailed and fairly exhaustive presentation of his point of view and asking any question journalists ask. I am happy to believe it is a staged performance, but it is good communication none-the-less as the West's propaganda machine doesn't get into these nuances or rebutting anything Putin says, so leaves Putin with the "last word" so to speak (only in Russia).

Globally, Russia is officially China's "friend", and whatever meaning is in that, China isn't trash talking Russian internally. Indian, Africa, and South American media has been fairly Russian sympathetic, and I definitely get a a sort of "pay back" for colonialism vibe from such sources.

Most importantly, even the Western media is forced at some point to recognise Russia is "winning" if they clearly are. This was what was happening before these offensives. Ukraine was "resisting" heroically around Kiev and the withdraw from the North was a huge victory for Ukraine and Embarrassment for Russia, war crimes rinse repeat, but after some time even the Western media had to recognise that Russia was winning, especially after Ukraine retreat from major centres like Donetsk.

Point is, embarrassment based on how things appear to be or then what Western media is saying now, doesn't have any long lasting value if thing turn out differently.

Indeed, embarrassing can actually backfires as it removes the whole "if Ukraine falls, Poland and the Baltics are next!" and "fight them there so we don't fight them here" overall justification, without which it can be hard to sustain support for the war within NATO for long. If the war has proven Russia is not a threat to NATO, then there is no actual NATO based reason (being a defensive organisation) to supply arms to Ukraine, and some members may start to take the point of view this is a regional border conflict that doesn't concern them seeing as it is evident Russia cannot take all of Ukraine, much less all of Easter Europe.

Playing devil's advocate: — neomac

A healthy exercise! for those of us who appreciate the hellscape we live in, anyhow.

- Expansion of NATO (Sweden and Finland) possibly Ukraine — neomac

Sweden has essentially zero military significance.

Finland in NATO doesn't really change anything as there's extreme low probability that Finland would house NATO nuclear missiles or be a staging ground for a NATO invasion of Russia, which is also unlikely to happen anyways.

The only military scenario where Finland in NATO is relevant is if Russia planned on invading either Finland or then NATO countries, which again is very low probability.

- End of economic cooperation between Russia-Germany (destruction of North stream) — neomac

This is arguably much worse for Germany and the EU and NATO than it is for Russia and its friends, in particular China.

So what end of economic cooperation between Russia and German harms or benefits, very much depends on your point of view.

- Militarization of Europe — neomac

Again, if there's not really a future scenario where Russia and NATO do battle in conventional means, then militarisation of Europe means nothing but wasted funds (that may lead to further European economic troubles and breakup).

- Western Russophobia & military humiliation of Russia — neomac

The Russophobia seemed at fever pitch before the war, with the whole Russia-gate thing.

As for military humiliation, the war is not over.

The Russian strategy, seems to me, is to wait until winter and see how long and how much European citizens are willing to suffer in order to support indefinite war. As Bill Gates has recently drawn attention to, the difference between a mild and severe winter is a factor of three in terms of gas requirements.

- Besides boosting American companies selling weapons and shale gas, of course. — neomac

Higher energy prices cause severe economic harms to Europe and also harm the US economy, contributing to both economic problems and domestic political instability.

The West is promising that they are "handling it," but that remains to be seen.

And, again, the extent to which there is real pain and disruption doesn't change the immense competitive advantage to the rest of the world that hasn't sanctioned Russian energy, in particular China and India.

The idea that US energy companies profiting from a war ... is somehow good for the US / NATO and bad for Russia in any geopolitical sense is foolish. It's basically making the argument that the war is good for war profiteering.

Now Biden is ready for peace and the "armageddon" argument comes in handy. — neomac

Debatable if Biden is now ready for peace. He certainly doesn't say anything along those lines.

Rather, the previous idea of trying to deter Russia's use of a nuclear weapon with a non-nuclear retaliation obviously makes no sense and is not a deterrent, so they have simply made the logical step of now threatening nuclear retaliation.

In realpolitik terms obviously the US would not retaliate against Russia with a nuclear weapon, it's simply impossible to justify.

The mention of armageddon could be just empty talk, or then it could be simply preparing to deescalate the situation. The US administration has gotten what it wants from the conflict (ending cooperation between Russia and Germany, militarisation of Europe, boosting energy profits, is very doubtful good things for NATO as a whole, but it is certainly good for Biden's donors), so "averting nuclear war" is obviously a good rational to end the conflict in one way or another if it's now simply becoming a headache to deal with.

Mainly on the hope of the sanctions than the Ukraine military defeating them in open battle. The idea of Russia's "New Afghanistan" makes this point. — ssu

As I mention in my comment, the main narrative at the very start of the war was "Russia's Afghanistan", which links up to the collapse narrative if the parallel is the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan is linked to that. However, a longer term process.

The Russian collapse narrative and prediction as an imminent thing, was also already started as I think the citations I provide are sufficient to establish the fact.

I'm not sure if literally on day 2 people were talking that. You have to give a reference to that. — ssu

The mechanism changes, but the prediction of "collapse" was literally on day two of the invasion.

Analysis: Russia's economic defences likely to crumble over time under sanctions onslaught — Reuters

Moreover, I think Reuters clarifies themselves their meaning 4 days later:

Russian economic collapse will be hard to avoid — Reuters, February 28th, 2022

However, if you don't accept "crumble" as a synonym for "collapse", the following paper was published on the 27th of February, which we could split hairs about being within 48 hours of the invasion, or second full day, or then "pretty close" anyways.

Putin’s War in Ukraine Could Mean the Collapse of Russia
Ukraine War Presages Russia’s Inevitable Collapse - — 1945

And if you take other synonyms of "collapse" then the scope is much wider:

Putin’s Blunder
Ukraine Will Make Russia Regret This War — Foreign Affairs, February 25th, 2022

There are all sorts of headlines along these lines, with "Mistake" or some variation.

However, the main message at the time was "Russia's Afghanistan", and we debated that a lot here in the early days of the war.

Could Ukraine be Putin’s Afghanistan? — Brookings institute, February 25th, 2022

However, the point of mentioning that people were literally predicting collapse on day 2 is to emphasise just how long this collapse narrative has been going on. If we consider the first month of the war:

Invasion of Ukraine could cause societal collapse in Russia | Expert explains Putin's miscalculation — CTV news, youtube

Russia's Economic Collapse: How Sanctions & War are Crushing Putin - — TLDR News, youtube

Russia Economy Heading For Collapse — Bloomberg Markets and Finance, youtube

Russia’s Looming Economic Collapse — The Atlantic

How close is Russia to collapse? — The Spectator

Russians Fleeing As Nation Faces Economic Collapse — Forbes

This is by no means a systemic search, and these talking points usually first emerge on television which is harder to search, but this idea Russia will collapse being predicted literally from day 2 and that narrative being sustained is well supported.

Of course the mechanisms of collapse change, from economics to morale to military, but that is simply necessary when the previous predictions of collapse don't come true; if you want to keep saying Russia will collapse then you need to continuously come up with new reasons.

You also simply ignored completely pretty much the most anti-democratic move possible which is straight-up banning 11 opposition parties including the second largest party in the country:

During the weekend, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy’s government suspended 11 Ukrainian political parties citing their alleged “links with Russia”. While the majority of the suspended parties were small, and some were outright insignificant, one of them, the Opposition Platform for Life, came second in the recent elections and currently holds 44 seats in the 450-seat Ukrainian Parliament. — Why did Ukraine suspend 11 ‘pro-Russia’ parties? - Aljazeera

Opposition press is NOT banned in Ukraine. They un-liscenced three TV channels from broadcasting but didn't ban them. Plenty other outlets are still on, and even those 3 TVs are still operating, but just on YouTube. — Olivier5

Again, how is that freedom of the press?

Moreover:

Banned journalists, media, websites

The Ukrainian government and President Petro Poroshenko have banned journalists, media and websites.[83] The new sanctions in May 2017 targeted 1,228 people and 468 companies.[80] The decision was condemned by Reporters Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and Committee to Protect Journalists.[82][71][83] — Freedom of the press in Ukraine, Wikipedia

Which, notably, is press and journalist banning 5 years before the war, reported by a source you cited as authoritative a few posts ago.

↪boethius RSF = Reporters Sans Frontières. — Olivier5

Yes, a typo which I already corrected.

Yep. Olivier5 really takes those 6 points very seriously. Apparently they're worth sacrificing thousands of innocent lives for in a massive land war. — Isaac

Well, when you've framed things as Hitler vs. The Buddha, it might be hard point of view to introspect from.

You go to war with the points you have, not the points you wish for.

According to RSF, there's vast difference between the two countries in terms of freedom of press and violence towards journalists. — Olivier5

Ukraine is ranked 126 and Russia 148.

Ukraine has a score of 36,79 and Russia 43,42.

This is in the context that the top score, Finland, is 6,38, and the bottom Eritrea scores 84,83.

I fail to see the "vast difference" between Russia and Ukraine on this ranking.

And Reporters Without Borders being a Western organisation with head quarters in Paris, it's certainly not biased towards Russia, so stands to reason bias could easily account for a the 5-6 point difference, if not more.

Since WW2. It is forbidden in many democratic countries to spread hateful lies by way of press. — Olivier5

With. Due. Process.

And "hateful lies" is not even enough to be convicted of hate speech or slander.

Where's the proof, in a fair court, these 3 TV stations were spreading "hateful lies"? And what law was even broken.

Again, in the "name of freedom" no fundamental freedom is worth preserving in Ukraine for that fight.

Enemy operatives spreading propaganda cannot be classified as "free press". They are on a mission to disinform. — Olivier5

Was there due process that they were actually "enemy operatives" or then what is the classification "enemy operatives" based on?

Likewise, what's the definition of "enemy propaganda" other than anything the Ukrainian state doesn't like?

More to the point, since when did freedom of the press not include the freedom to propagandise?

An argument against people staying in power too long, nominating puppets to reign in their place, and changing the constitution to retain power beyond set limits. Power corrupts. — Olivier5

So you're saying Robert C. Byrd serving in the US senate over half a century (51 years) establishes US is not a democracy?

Furthermore, your argument is simply that there's flaws and corruption in the Russian democratic system ... but that's true for Ukraine and the US.

Nope. A lot of independent journalists operate there. Likewise, Ukrainian opposition has not been persecuted, and the war in Dombass has nothing to see with the mass killings in Chechnya. — Olivier5

What are you talking about?

Ukraine shuts TV channels it accuses of spreading ‘Russian disinformation’ — Financial Times

Ukraine: Zelenskiy bans three opposition TV stations — DW

Is the exact opposite of journalists being "free to operate there".

That the same guy heads the country for decades. — Olivier5

What kind of argument is this?

Merkel was Chancellor of Germany from 2005 to 2021.

Also, the whole point of introducing term limits in the US was so that someone genuinely popular with the people (due to serving average people's interest rather than elites) couldn't be in power so long as to be able to implement effective policies. It's completely anti-democratic that someone who's popular cannot stand for election.

That most opposition figures have been killed or jailed, and their parties persecuted. — Olivier5

Sure ... and that's not true for Ukraine? And, in both cases the argument will be the same that they are foreign controlled operators.

And again, isn't this the bread and butter of the CIA to get rid of political opposition, democratic or otherwise, around the world?

That all free press is banned from the country. — Olivier5

Same as Ukraine.

That entire regions have been massacred like Chechnya. — Olivier5

Isn't the Ukrainian war on the Donbas since 2014 an exact analogous situation?

Furthermore, this has nothing to do with democracy. A people can be for war. US has massacred whole countries, literally millions dead, with democratic support.

... Indeed, I seem to remember the US having their own little internal disagreement that resulted in far more dead than in Chechnya, and that the whole American civil war thing is one of the greatest example of democracy "winning".

That one can go to jail for 15 years for criticizing the war, even if only by wearing a tshirt. — Olivier5

Again, is it more free in Ukraine?

Likewise again, if a majority of Russians are in favour of such policies, it's still democratic.

The equating "democracy" with "anything I think is good" is not a sound argument. Democratic process (to one standard of democracy or another) can result in things I think are bad ... but it's still democratic.

What criticism of Russian democracy does not also hold for Ukraine? Or for the US for that matter.

If you say some people think Russian elections are fixed ... I hate to break it to you, but some people say US elections are fixed, and that "Trump won" for example.

But, you don't even need fraudulent elections for minority rule if you have a setup like US electoral college and senate anyways.

And the whole idea of "fighting for democracy" is completely laughable when the US / NATO is allied with the likes of Saudi Arabia and various other kings, despots and tyrants.

If the West was going to "democratise the world" Russia would be far down on the list.

Of course, the first step would be changing the policy of overthrowing democratically elected governments that have policies "against US interests", and I think it's safe to say we're a long way away from that.

If people want to refer to WWII allied idealism ... then "we had elections even in a war and kept freedom of movement and freedom of speech and didn't ban opposition parties and so on (well, kept to freedom quite a bit anyways)" was a big part of that argument that the allies were fighting for democracy against tyranny.

The Nazi argument for tyranny was that it makes a more efficient war fighting machine.

So, anytime Ukrainian sympathisers excuse Ukrainian anti-freedom policies in that it's needed to fight the war, that's literally what the Nazi's said.

Ukraine is a democracy, while Russia is not. It makes a difference in my book, and obviously for Ukrainians. — Olivier5

Russia is also a democracy, and arguably a bit more democratic than Ukraine at the moment, to the extent you can argue Russia hasn't banned as much opposition parties and media.

Also, Ukraine stopped the fundamental freedom of movement of military age men essentially day 1 of the war, whereas Russia has not. "Voting with your feet" has been multi decades war cry of supporters of the status quo in the West, particularly the US, and that way of voting has been denied to a large section of Ukrainian society.

You may say "but of course the Ukrainian state doesn't want men to leave!" but that's a totalitarian argument and not a democratic one.

There is also not much controversy over the opinion that Putin is supported by a majority of Russians.

Compared to the US senate, that's a "point for democracy" in favour of Russia.

Sure, the Russian state makes use of propaganda that affects the opinions of Russians, but the idea the US state doesn't do likewise would be laughable, and the idea Ukraine isn't also propagandising its own citizens would be a total break with reality.

"Who's more democratic" between these 3 parties is not some truism you can just throw out there, and Ukraine is certainly not a contender for "exemplary democracy".

Apologists for Ukraine when it comes to their language laws, banning opposition media and major parties, purging any dissidents, banning men from leaving the country, will say that of course they need to do these things to fight Russia.

Maybe so, but the corollary is they are not fighting for democracy, but for totalitarian principles.

And "extreme nationalists" (aka. Nazi's) in Ukraine are quite coy about saying the war is good for society as it allows them to reduce "friction".

Yet Ukraine does get to have a say in what it people believe. — apokrisis

This is so bizarre.

Ukraine get's a say in what its individual citizens believe?

What's Ukraine other than just the collection of individual citizens? at least when it comes to beliefs and saying things?

And you mention freedom all the time ... isn't freedom of thought the first and most fundamental?

Yet Ukraine does get to have a say in what it people believe. — apokrisis

And the whole planet should find Putin worth stopping - but in the context of the degree to which he threatens the world order that we need to construct, rather than the degree that it protect the world order that underpinned a fossil fuel consumption based model of humanity.[/quote]

Thanks for finally confirming the obvious, that proponents of the Ukrainian war effort do not evaluate Ukrainian well being, but rather a larger "international order". That you want Ukrainians to fight for an entirely new international order, rather than protect the existing one, is definitely an interesting spin.

But if I understand you correctly, your argument is meant to solve the problem that a forever war with Russia, never compromising in order to weaken the Russian state (which I have no issue accepting it does), is obviously not in the interests of Ukrainians by simply overlooking their interest by simply saying Ukrainian state speaks for Ukrainians and says what they believe (certainly no one else is talking about Ukrainian beliefs, seen as the opposition parties and media have been banned) and the Ukrainian state wants Ukrainians to keep fighting (without ever any compromise), so that serves your objective and Ukrainian state clearly agrees to be a tool in this wider "international order" game, and so all is well.

Yet the fact is that the battlefield here is limited: Ukrainian troops will stop at the Russian border. The West can keep up such aid as it's giving now for quite a while. And now the mobilized troops can basically be formed into meaningful units for a spring offensive. Putin can likely continue the war longer than anticipated. Still, a collapse is also possible, although rather unlikely. — ssu

Yes, "collapse" has been predicted since literally day 2 of the invasion. Of course, always "possible" as you note.

Making gains at the very edges of Russian occupied territory is extremely debatable in significance.

Russia is certainly focused its defensive efforts most in the land bridge from Russia to Crimea to the Canal. Taking Kherson, as I've stated far before this new offensive started, would only be step 1, and a long way to go from there as you note.

The actual status of the military situation I think boils down to what cost for the Ukrainians have these gains come at and if such losses are sustainable.

Yet the fact is that the battlefield here is limited: Ukrainian troops will stop at the Russian border. — ssu

It should also be noted that this is an immense strategic advantage for Russia, as although Ukraine is limited in this way, Russia is not. A Russian offensive can enter Ukraine at any point along the Russian-Ukraine border, and perhaps Belarus as well.

The actual front line is the entire border, which allows tactical moves such as flanking the forces in Kharkiv by an offensive coming to their North as well as strategic moves of a salient somewhere in the North again.

Certainly human, political and material costs have been high for the Russians, which the media points out in fine detail, but what is left out of Western media is the costs to the human and material costs to the Ukrainians, and political costs to the West.

The key point will be the winter and it seems to me that the Kremlin and Russian forces has succeeded in "keeping it together" until then.

Political pressure with Russia is definitely reached a maximum (but clearly not a breaking point), but there is also the other side in that pressure is also mounting within EU countries, and winter hasn't even arrived yet.

I agree that the Russia plan is likely exactly as you say to see winter through and then launch a winter / spring offensive before the melt and testing the EU's appetite for another year of the war.

Nuclear threats remain, fortunately for now, clearly in the deterrence "utility" of downward pressure on the amount and kinds of arms to Ukraine.

It turns out there is no debate.
— frank

Yes. If you decide to ignore all counterarguments, that tends to be the outcome. — Isaac

The summary.

I think the response to Putin using nuclear weapons wouldn't be a nuclear escalation. And naturally the West is trying to make a sincere warning that it would be a bad thing to do. — ssu

I agree, the danger of larger scale nuclear is more in the cycle of retaliation continuing at some point going haywire.

"Asymmetric moves" such as blowing up the Nord Steam pipe (whoever it was) may have unintended consequences and be a lot worse than even the perpetrators thought it would, soliciting a retaliation in turn much stronger than expected.

We can agree then that Mearsheimer was correct in that Ukraine giving up it's nuclear weapons was a very bad idea: with them it could have deterred Russian imperialism. — ssu

That this is the main conclusion people are drawing from this conflict, a new cycle of nuclear proliferation has certainly already started. The actual use of nuclear weapon would simply super charge that in my opinion.

Of course, the "next Ukraine" could easily be some poor country that the US wanted to bomb.

So there is at least some skin in the game for the US as well to diffuse the situation. Of course, the net present bombing value is pretty low of nations you don't even know you hate yet, but, still, it is there, it is something.

MacArthur wanted to use nukes in Korea. Thank God he got cashiered. It must have been tempting though, at Chosin. — RogueAI

There's actually two reasons for not using nukes in Korea.

One was the political ramifications, which are obvious and more-or-less the same as today.

But the other reason was the fear that the mountainous terrain would render the nukes not so effective, and that the world would actually fear them less and not more after their use.

Same argument has been presented here that nukes wouldn't be effective.

However, apart from the situation not being the same, Ukraine being quite flat, it's also not the same situation technology wise with the kinds of nukes and speed at which they could be fabricated.

US policy back in Korea days was to build 600 nukes (it was reckoned the magic number) and to then simply destroy the Soviet Union. Anything less and you have protracted war, but 600 was reasoned to be "enough" to destroy the Soviet Union as a going concern.

Of course, it's anyone's guess if the US would have gone through with it, but the soviets developing nukes put an end to that plan.

The danger today is of course escalation does go out of hand and leads to full on nuclear war.

It definitely seems now the general mood, a sort of ethereal nihilism that civilisation has wandered into and launching nukes maybe just the next tic toc meme: felt cute, might delete the planet in 20 minutes.

It is frightening, and even if low probability, something to be worried about. A small risk of nuclear war is still unacceptable morally speaking.

However, even if nukes are used and there is no escalation to nuclear exchange (which I would put my money on, and not simply because it's the scenario I can spend money), the use of a nuke usher in crazy nuclear proliferation and that would get out of hand later.

If the great powers cannot manage world affairs responsibly, everyone is going to want nukes and the great powers will also go back to having even more.

It's not a good thing to throw into the mix of climate change and resource depletion of various kinds.

I know they are more than some random dude on the internet. Even if it is opinion, I prefer it from someone with a name and credible credentials. — apokrisis

That makes absolutely zero sense on a debate forum.

Point here is to present analysis and then defend or reformulate it in light of critique and rebuttal.

Making a bold claim, then trying to switch the burden of proof is a a common fallacy.

Simply because the Western media repeats again and again bold claims without justification, does not make it the default position that any dissenters must overcome a high burden of proof to critique, just makes it propaganda.

I commented on the odd reluctance of apologists to source their talking points. I might also remark on what seems to be a tactic of confusing the discussion with non sequiturs. — apokrisis

You clearly don't understand what sources are about.

Sources are about facts, not analysis or opinion and certainly not questions to other parties to a debate.

@Isaac has already explained this to you, but I'll explain it again with some examples.

First of all, even having a source when the other side does not, doesn't "win" an argument in any case. If someone on a corner of the internet is making wild claims about a situation no one else witnessed ... by definition there would be no contradictory source.

However, is it reasonable to accept any wild claim about events no one else witnessed? Obviously not, the first followup question to a sourced claim is "well, how credible is this source."

To make a long story short, in a war there are few credible sources. Every source of information could be propaganda or part of some deceptive campaign.

Indeed, one baseline of reliability commentators like to rely on is when both Ukraine and Russia are saying the same thing, seems bullet proof, but even then we must reserve skepticism as one side maybe simply saying what the other side wants to believe for the purpose of deception.

And pointing out that pretty much anything could be deceptive is not "apologetics" it's simply obvious.

Which is why the narrative of Russian incompetence is so essential to Western propaganda, as the only way to take everything Ukrainian Intelligence says, retired US generals, and the Western media at face value with zero criticism, or followup questions is to first believe Russia is irrational (as even taking the Western narrative at face value is replete with contradictions that are only resolvable if Putin, the Kremlin and the Russian military are irrational actors).

Or, as @Tzeentch has accurately described:

A lot of claims, but what verifiable data are they based on?

The nature of war is messy - Clausewitz called it friction. In giant operations like these things go wrong, and they go wrong all the time. Logistical congestion is the norm rather than the exception - in a situation where both sides are trying to kill and hamper each other there is never enough ammunition, fuel, troops, fire support, etc. You can't predict an enemy whose primary concern is to be unpredictable, etc. — Tzeentch

In other words, there is very little reliable information about any statistically relevant information. Pointing out some anecdotes of failure, morale problems, mistakes, logistical problem, etc. doesn't establish as much or more of the same problems on the Ukrainian side.

All that is established is that "shit happens".

Any honest analysis progresses in several stages, first considering the "undisputed facts" that all parties to the discussion do actually agree on and what to make of them.

For example, undisputed facts are:

1. Russia currently occupies nearly 20% of Ukraine and has successfully pacified these regions.
2. Russia has secured what Western analysts before the war pointed out would be a big strategic victory of creating a land bridge to Crimea and securing the water supply to Crimea.
3. Russian lines are not currently "in collapse" due to morale, logistics, mutiny, etc. as is claimed essentially everyday on my news feeds.
4. Ukraine recently launched a major offensive that recaptured area in the least relevant strategic location, that is now making very slow progress, while Russia also makes progress in other areas of the front.

So, whatever the "absolute competence" of the Russian military it is not so great to have lost all of their land gains since the start of the war, nor lose the strategically vital land-bridge to Crimea canal and Kherson. Indeed, this strategic heart of the whole operation is not currently even under threat.

There is also no reason that all your arguments that the Russian military is not a good meritocracy etc. do not also apply to Ukraine, or the US for that matter. Certainly the US has a lot more technology and equipment and bases around the world and spends much more money than Russia, doesn't make them more competent and less financially wasteful and corrupt ... and ... the war is actually with Ukraine and not the US.

Ukraine was actually ranked as more corrupt than Russia by some metrics before the war. Why wouldn't your analysis not also apply to Ukraine? Not to speak of all the authoritarians of one flavour or another throughout history that fought successful wars, and there being zero evidence that democracy, even "true democracy" without reproach or blemish, is some sort of magical super weapon on the battlefield.

Because I cannot take you seriously.
— apokrisis

What an odd response to being asked what data one's views are based on.

I guess I'd be pretty reluctant to share my sources too, if all I had were newspaper articles and confirmation bias. — Tzeentch

Whether or not the various alternative narratives here have been sourced is easily checked,
— Isaac

I have indeed googled to see where your talking points might be sourced. Strangely nothing respectable is turning up. So I can only continue to say either pony up or expect to be treated dismissively. — apokrisis

You think the idea of sourcing things is a talking point?

Russia isn't going to use nuclear weapons. They already hold enough territory to claim victory and there is very little chance of Ukraine mounting the types of offensives that would allow them to retake it, especially after the mobilization. — Tzeentch

I agree this is likely.

All of this nuclear fear-mongering is based on the assumption that Russia is losing and Putin is desperate. I don't think this is the case at all. Considering the amount of troops they have had deployed it's plausible that their initial war goals have already been reached. — Tzeentch

The nuclear fear-mongering has a lot of different reasons.

Even if Putin believes he can't "lose" at this point, he'd still want to deter more weapons shipments to Ukraine.

Even if the US believes Ukraine has already "lost", it would still want to keep sending weapons to Ukraine so that they don't lose even harder or to simply bleed Russia and increase the cost of their victory. Of course, the US would not want Russia to change the dynamic by using nuclear weapons, so would want to deter Russia from crossing that line by presenting escalation pathways, nuclear or then conventional (but then may turn nuclear later if the escalation continues).

The logic right now is that the US is trying to convince Russia it will respond conventionally an impose a cost higher than whatever is gained by the use of nukes in Ukraine. Of course, just as it's not rational for US to nuke Russia for nuking Ukraine, it would not be rational for Russia to nuke the US for a non-nuclear retaliation.

Next step is of course Russia trying to convince the US that Russia's non-nuclear and entirely rational retaliation for a non-nuclear US retaliation wouldn't be worth it for the US.

Of course, in that process of threatening non-nuclear retaliations, at some point one party tries to convince the other "well, ha, if you did that then I would use nuclear weapons, so there, checkmate".

For example, US policy is to view even conventional attack on its carriers as a nuclear attack on US soil. Now, how not-A is viewed as literally A is anyone's ontological guess, but nevertheless that is the stated policy. If you believe the US would carry through on that policy, then you are less likely to attack a carrier (as a state actor at least).

So, even if both parties are still far from any circumstance in which nuclear weapons are likely to be used ... it is still rational to deter the other's current policies with said nuclear weapons.

Then there's also just political rhetoric of the blame game for the home audience as well as setting up the threat of nuclear war as the reason for a resolution of some sort (which does not seem likely but maybe plays a roll if people believe resolution needs to happen at some point).

Don't undersell their commitment to historical restorations, they're now using T-62s and T-64s, they're using 60-70 year old tank designs. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, this matters little if Ukraine has does not have better tanks in the situation.

The reason Ukraine is now asking for Western tanks maybe because it is running out of Soviet tanks.

However, Western tanks may not be a practical solution for a lot of reasons.

Making mountains from soundbites is a cancer in modern politics. There is a sea of solid, legitimate reasons to dislike Liz Trusts without resorting to that. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Usually yes, but discussing the use of nuclear weapons I think is an exception.

The West has made mountains of every mention of Putin not even mentioning nukes but indirect language of tools and so on.

When it comes to nukes there is very good reason to make mountains of few words.

Context matters. This is like Tucker Carlson's latest shitty attempt to prove the US attacked the Nord Stream pipeline by playing a soundbite from a response specifically about Nord Stream 2, which never even opened, and was already canceled after the invasion began. — Count Timothy von Icarus

I would agree this doesn't prove anything, but it is clearly a direct threat, and if you are threatening to stop Nord Stream 2 in some vaguely unspecified and clearly illegal way (the legal way would be "oh, we'll convince Germany with sound economic arguments") it stands to reason you maybe threatening Nord Stream 1 as well, which accomplishes the same thing.

The context here is a hypothetical where the PM of a country with what is essentially a "no first strike" doctrine gets dragged down to a bunker and given the "Letters of Last Resort," which are specifically to be used in the event of a nuclear strike on the UK or a decapitation strike that kills the PM and other senior leadership in an expected attempt to disrupt C&C before a nuclear strike. — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, she does not mention she too agrees it's a last resort, nor implies any understanding there is choices that remain, does not hesitates to say she will "do her duty to launch" (which does not make sense, it's not the PM's duty to launch but duty to decide if indeed the circumstances justify it, and would therefore be other people's duty to launch; that the military believes there is only one further course of military action available does not exclude the civilian authority deciding on another course of action, such as capitulation; exactly why the military is subordinate to the civilian authority in a democracy, in that morality and politics is a wider scope of consideration than the exercise of force and the interests of the people are not synonymous with the interests of the government, much less the leadership or military as such).

Of course, the interaction is supposed to be just basics of MAD: "we'll retaliate!" For, if you do not think your opponent would retaliate, even when retaliation would be a net-loss for your people (inviting both another nuclear strike and more nuclear fallout generally speaking) ... then maybe rational to first strike to force a surrender, which maybe entirely rational to do after a first strike. It's called MAD because it's predicated on making your opponent believe you will not act rationally after a first strike.

On a side note, I find the concept fairly interesting. There are supposedly five letters with the options:

-retaliate with a nuclear strike;
-do not retaliate with nuclear weapons;
-the crew should use their own judgement;
-place the submarine under an allies control, often the US in a NATO context
-if all hope is lost, find Harry Potter — Count Timothy von Icarus

Again, she basically says she'll do her duty (to launch) and not choose what she believes as PM to be in the interest of the UK among the 5 options. So, maybe she didn't understand the question (in which case you should ask clarification) or then, as I say, the question and answer was predetermined but the interviewer went off script. Again, do you want someone who isn't paying attention to detail when nukes are being discussed ... in charge of launching said nuclear weapons?

However, if your retort would be that the whole thing is more insight into the "professional sportification" of politics than UK nuclear policy, I would agree.

As for the letters themselves, clearly those are most of the basic options available, and also there's no plausible scenario at the moment where the decision to use nuclear weapons by a member of NATO is not a US decision.

In terms of US policy, again involving very few words, but the policy recently changed from no-first use, to "defend vital interests". Analysts have written a lot about that too; again, I think for good reason.

Russian language and culture suppression made Putin do it!!! Gentlemen! Here are the facts, not stories,... :snicker: — ssu

These are facts. And the point of this fact is simply to establish the obvious that the Kremlin has obviously been thinking about conflict in Ukraine since 2014, if not before. So, maybe they came up with some sort of game plan in that minimum 8 year period.

The subject is what geopolitical overall strategy may the Ukraine war be apart of. That the war in Donbas is a viable or sufficient or even relevant justification for the invasion or not is a different question.

So according to you Russia's commitment to modernizing it's armed forces is proven by a single test firing of an experimental missile? The massive footage of Russia scraping the bottom of the barrel with 50 year-old tanks sent to Ukraine, with the mobilization troops in conditions that show total unpreparedness for them doesn't refute this modernization, because they test whatever exotic missile they have? Incredible pro-Russian propaganda. :rofl: — ssu

Again, this fact simply establishes that the full scale invasion follows successful weapons development.

Perhaps these are connected in some sort of coherent thought about the subject matter.

The relevance of hypersonic missiles is that, even according to Western analysts, they cannot be shot down with any current technology, and so renders moot the multi-decade anti-missile defence investment of the West to protect key military assets such as bases and aircraft carriers.

US only has a butchers dozen of aircraft carriers so you'd only need a similar amount of hypersonic nuclear missiles to take all or most of them out. Do Russians have enough such missiles? Do they actually work reliably? We don't know.

Whow. I really haven't heard such blazing over the top apologism from anyone in this thread for Putin. — ssu

Again ... the position I'm arguing against is the idea Putin has no plan whatsoever, nothing connects the dots, it's just one mistake and blunder to the next and the Russian state will collapse months ago.

Definitely I would agree an equally compelling case as to the one I've rebutted could involve Putin thinking of some, if not all, of the factors I listed, but nevertheless thought the war would be over by now, that Ukraine would negotiate and not fight (from Putin's perspective at least) beyond any rational reason to do so, and that Russia simply lacks the capacity to sustain the conflict in Ukraine and Geopolitically.

It's called a debate, I've come up with a proposal that argues against that of my opponent (that Putin has no any plausible geopolitical plan; the bar set is basically even remote plausibility, which is a low threshold); the stage is open for anyone to argue my proposal is not plausible or some other proposal is more plausible (such as Putin did have a plan, but it relied on Ukraine settling and we're not in uncharted territories).

This was basically totally normal during Cold War. — ssu

I don't disagree, they are still acts of war.

And, my position is that basically the policy framework is the same as in the cold war with each side doing as much as they can "get away with" to obstruct or weaken the other.

Of course, there's no objective standard of what acts of war are ok and which aren't, it's somewhat subjective to the other side.

For example, bringing nuclear missiles to Cuba turns out was "too much" for the Americans, and the Soviets therefore backed off to maintain the basic policy framework.

In this situation in Ukraine, what would be "too much" for the Russians I honestly don't know, but what's clear is that (so far) support to Ukraine has been in this policy framework of not harming Russia in any vital way.

On a spectrum that involves giving nuclear weapons access to Fidel ... what US is doing in Ukraine is pretty low-key in comparison.

Of course, as always, MAD policy requires trying to make the other side believe you're willing to use nuclear weapons, so how far is the rhetoric to the actual use of nuclear weapons I honestly have no clue, but obviously closer than before the war.

What we can analyse is that the US does not have any obvious response to Russia using nuclear weapons in Ukraine. It's obviously not an act that would trigger all out nuclear war, nor even that a nuclear response would be reasonable. Of course, US would like Russians to believe they are unreasonable. So, who is deterring who more to not-do-what is the question.

Likewise, we may not know what the US would do, but there are obvious ramifications with Russia's friends and own population and so on, so launching nukes to win a battle is not some sort of casual decision. I'd argue tactical nuclear weapons are a big advantage to have in a war, but there's still plenty of other reasons not to use them, some of which may explain why they have so far not been used.

Let's not make things more complicated than they are. This war could be over tomorrow and everything back to normal if the regime had the good sense of offing Mr. Putin. One bullet would be enough. — Olivier5

Who's disputing that Russia could withdraw entirely from Ukraine, whatever definition, tomorrow?

Question was what geopolitical strategy might there be to explain ... Russia obviously not doing the above and in the process of withdrawing.

If you want to say Russia is in the wrong and no amount of Ukrainian KIA is too little to demonstrate that moral conviction (just not you personally), even without any theory of a pathway to victory now or later, and, largely due to that lack of a feasible plan,Russia wins, ok, feel free to argue that's a good moral and political idea.

However, was I commenting on that one way or another?

And what's "One bullet to the head would be enough" other than wishful thinking that A. that is likely to happen and B. that would change Kremlin policy rather than consolidate it?

And yet you say my analysis is off the mark?

Sometimes your side loses a contest, doesn't matter who was right or wrong, just how reality plays out.

Furthermore, the entirety of my last posts is trying answer the simple question of why would Putin and Xi start this contest of geopolitical confrontation.

Certainly they thought it was a good idea at the time, or why would they do it?

People are free to argue they thought it was a good idea for other reasons (that the war would certainly be over in 3 days and the preparation for a longer war and sanctions was coincidence) or then free to argue that perhaps they did have a plan that seemed good to them, perhaps what I propose hits some key points, but they will nevertheless lose before the mighty-might of the USA. Likewise, there's also the theory available that Russia feels cornered and these are moves from a weaker position; that they cannot actually accomplish any of the key points, or then those points don't matter, but it is a "good try" to avoid the much stronger US position and containment strategy.

The question was basically demonstrate any plausible geopolitical sense at all for Putin's actions, so I've proposed one as a starting point for discussion.

There are certainly alternatives available to what I propose in terms of what the Kremlin's real plan was and is, as well as the chances of success, which I do not say it must and will succeed but only that there are reasons to believe it is possible to come out stronger in comparative terms after such a conflict (indeed, even if the conflict is a blunder and bad for everyone, it improves Russia and China's relative position of geopolitical strength anyways; intentions, plans, actions and results are all related but also distinct from each other).

Certainly USA does not risk state collapse anymore than Russia, and arguably less, so it's a question of changing relative geopolitical balance of power and paying a price to try to do so.

And definitely I would agree Putin is taking serious risks to do so, my argument is only that there is facts around that support the idea the risks are calculated and the whole thing is not a miscalculation, essentially by definition, for the simple reason that the West disapproves.

The war does not achieve Western values and ambitions as manifest by Western social media; that is for certain, but that in itself does not make it a mistake from some other point of view. Maybe from Putin's point of view NATO is evil.

You may say you don't care about Putin's point of view. Ok, but then you don't care about diplomacy with Putin, and if you don't care about diplomacy you are essentially committing to the idea that unlimited Ukrainian suffering and dying is justified to demonstrate your (a non-Ukrainian) commitment to rebuking diplomacy with Putin.

Since this isn't really a coherent argument, but rather reactionary ideological emotionalism maintained in a cocoon of tweets and memes and the soothing voices of ex-generals, then it is no surprise, from this point of view, that fantasy is required to support such an emotional state suppressing any and all rational criticism (that can distinguish between wish and responsible action); you know, fantasy of the kind that Putin will be shot tomorrow and it will all end in a sea of flowers in rifles and the rise of the Russian 60s hippy collapsing the Russian state in a red haze of rad techno tunes. Revolution. Fresh.

Did you forgot the USSR and the German very very Democratic Republic? — Olivier5

The Nazi state did not collapse in WWII, but they lost the war maintaining the state even under conditions of sending children to fight to keep defending the state and even after Hitler died.

Russia and the West did not roll into a failed state but accepted surrender of an intact state and then oversaw state transition and reorganisation.

If anything, Nazi Germany is a testament to just how resilient states apparatus is, even under the most brutal of conditions of literally fighting to the bitter end far beyond any rational hope or moral theory of any kind whatsoever other than state worship.

As for the Soviet Union, again this involved no state collapse as the USSR was a supranational governance of different states and the collapse of the USSR was an orderly transition to new state reorganisation of state power, as far as legal structures go.

Whole reason the current war is happening is precisely because the fall of the Soviet Union did not involve any state collapse, neither Ukraine nor Russia, but mere reorganisation of the existing state power within the Soviet Union.

An analogy on a small scale would be Brexit, which clearly does happen.

However, even if you want to consider them both state collapse, neither are examples of states collapsing under the conditions of having gained territory in a war and suffering less losses than their opponent.

The original proposed mechanism for state collapse was the sanctions, which are still there, but again there are no examples of state collapse due to sanctions. So, no surprise that didn't work for the first time this time. If anything, sanctions make the state weaker in some ways but stronger internally relative their own population.

The new proposed mechanism is state collapse due simply to an unpopular war ... arguably supported by a majority of Russians, so, again, has never caused state collapse before and there has so far been no argument put forward here nor elsewhere that "this time it's different".

↪boethius This also reads like fiction.

I really think people here have a tendency to extrapolate all sorts of stories from a minimum of facts. — Benkei

As @Isaac mentions, the question of "show me one plausible scenario" requires extrapolation to answer.

However, I am at least putting undisputed facts about the past together, rather than telling a story about the future Russian state collapse with neither plausibly sufficient, if any, facts nor any historical precedent that states have any tendency at all to collapse in such situations before.

What are facts:

1. War has been going on since 2014 with Russian language and culture suppression, that, at minimum, is likely to attract the Kremlins attention as a problem to deal with.

2. We know there have been giant gas fields discovered in the Donbas and around Crimea (experts, industry and nations certainly believe it's there in any case).

3. Russia heavily invests in modernising its armed forces since 2014 as well as preparing for sanctions. That the Russian economy and currency survive essentially maximum sanctions is I think good evidence they adequately prepared for the latter, and that one of the first things they do is launch a hypersonic missile is good indication of the former; the war launched, by definition, after accomplishing these pre-conditions.

4. We know Putin went to Xi to get, if not a blessing, a common understanding on the war and what China's policy would be.

5. We know Germany rejected approving Nord Stream 2 and the West has been "punishing" Russia over Crimea and the Donbas war in various ways since 2014.

6. We know energy crisis is hurting the West at China, India et. al. benefit, in at least relative terms.

7. Lastly, we know Putin is a sophisticated enough in his thinking and planning to navigate the halls of power for several decades without any major self-inflicted harms to himself or Russia, and certainly doing better than his predecessor which is the only objective comparison standard. Certainly anyone can lose their grip on reality at any moment, but there is no indication that's true of Putin so far.

8. We know that Russia prepared and successfully carried out rapid occupation of a majority of the 4 regions they are in the process of annexing.

The proposal of the Western media and many sympathisers is that these facts are unrelated by any coherent viewpoint from Putin, the Kremlin or the Russian military. That it's all one big miscalculation at best and irrational at worst (that's the acceptable spectrum of opinion on the issue).

Now, regardless of whether a plan ultimately will works or not, is independent of whether a plan makes sense and certainly if a plan exists in the first place. I can lose pretty badly but still have a reasonable plan of action given my capacities and the circumstances.

Indeed, especially if you believe the West is intrinsically superior, US the super power and Russia a joke, then if the USA is "out to get Russia" (which their propaganda since well over a decade would suggest, framing Russia as the adversary, moving missiles closer to Russia, attacking directly Russian interests such as Syria, supporting a coup in Ukraine etc.), then it's entirely possible we are seeing the best geopolitical plan possible ... yet it may still not work due to intrinsic weaknesses.

For example, if we were to duel in some way on your area of professional expertise, I would assume I would lose but that doesn't mean I can't come up with a good plan, try to surprise you in some way, make things chaotic and create chances of victory by mere happenstance roll of the dice than meticulous planning.

Indeed, the right kind of chaos favours the weaker party ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now. But chaos can also favour the equal or even stronger party (a solid structure can more easily withstand chaos that can easily overwhelm an unprepared adversary) ... which is exactly why we maybe seeing chaos right now.

Who is weak geopolitically and who is strong cannot be determined by observing Western media.

A. US has aircraft carriers and a lot of bases and high-tech spying, strategic isolation from conventional attack at home, technology expertise and tech multi-national corporations, world reserve currency but lot's of debt, obviously nuclear weapons, and allies (that the current trajectory will significantly weaken economically and diplomatically speaking)

B. Russia and China together have critical commodities, production capacity of tangible goods, some high tech weapons and large land armies impractical for NATO to attack, no debts and in fact lot's of different reserves, also lot's of spies but more focus on lower-tech humans, and if not allies then many friends who are strengthening economically and diplomatically in the current trajectory (at least in relative terms).

The world currently is more ideologically aligned with Russia and China than the US and NATO. Authoritarianism in all its forms is on the ascendancy (even in NATO).

If you can:

A. Knock out the US' allies as relevant parties to world affairs (i.e. isolate the US).
B. Fracture the world economy so US tech multinationals are less relevant and setup an energy arbitrage situation providing China, India and co. competitive advantage across the board.
C. Create an alternative to the USD as world reserve currency.
D. Create a situation where nations are desperate for real access to goods and commodities rather than debts to purchase them.
E. Counter US military power with some key leverage points (hypersonic missiles) and building a non-sea based Asian trade system.
F. If your lower-tech intelligence can at least mitigate US higher-tech intelligence enough to operate.

Then you will unseat the US as the world's superpower.

The war in Ukraine in combination with real environmental and depletion problems, puts pressure on all the above points.

Of course, for it to be some "plan" you'd have to know things in advance such as the West bringing down massive sanctions.

However, you don't actually have to "know" that, you just have to be sophisticated enough to simply have two ways things can go: detente and peace with the West or then extreme escalation: Simply put the choice on the table by starting a big war. The EU, if not the US, definitely took the blue pill of continuing to live in their illusions. As for the US, certainly a formidable opponent and, at the least, we can certainly suspect Russia and China to at least believe direct confrontation was and still is a worthwhile contest compared to the alternatives.

I don't know what Putin's ambitions are. But if he thought using tactical nukes would give him Ukraine, I think he would use them. — Paine

Yes, until now nuclear deterrence has limited arms shipments to Ukraine and things like:

Suddenly, clearing Ukrainian air space would not look so provocative. — Paine

As NATO denied Zelensky's request for a no-fly zone despite being a literal social media deity.

However, what would precede the use of nuclear weapons would be a framing war of who's provoking who, such as the long range missiles.

The US is giving (not selling) arms to Ukraine, providing training and managing strategy and tactics "indirectly" via "advice", and providing the intelligence required for planning and targeting. These are obvious acts of war along with the sanctions.

Of course, as long as NATO maintains it's current policy of not supporting the Ukrainians "too much" there's no reason for Russia to use tactical nuclear weapons, but of course that possibility and the strategic and diplomatic problem it would create has been the deterrence so far for the policy to drip-feed support to Ukraine to ensure Russia cannot actually lose.

Again, if that wasn't the policy, why is US sending more HIMARS to Ukraine now? Obviously they aren't "essential" to US defence, so why not just send them before if you want Ukraine to win?

Also, there's still a bunch of escalation steps available between now and the use of tactical nuclear weapons, of which the Nord Stream attacks are a next step.

Definitely, circumstances would need to be that China and India would not change their current policies (or then that's what the Kremlin believes), which is a high bar.

I mean, it's a dumb question. What is the answer supposed to be: "well, after we've come under nuclear attack, I might start having second thoughts about the doctrine of retaliation?"Or maybe "hmmm, I suppose I be paralyzed by fear and unable to act?" All you can really say about strategic deterrence is "yes, no doubt should exist, we will retaliate." Hell, you'd say that even if you're arsenal didn't actually work. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question is not dumb and the answer is not "we will retaliate".

Nearly certainly, the question and answer is setup before hand, precisely to just nuclear sabre rattle.

Maybe watch the video before commenting.

The interviewer does not say "will the UK retaliate if it comes under nuclear attack", the question does not even include a scenario, just that the PM is brought down to the bunker to order a nuclear attack (implying it's not even her decision) and the question is actually just how she feels about it.

The prime minister of the UK then does not demonstrate any understanding of what was just said, and (very likely) went with a pre-penned response by (I assume) whoever the interviewer was implying controls her actions in the scenario, and so simply declares she'd do it no hesitation. But that wasn't the question, and then the interviewer reiterates that again and she just delivers her response again.

Likely what happened was the Q and A was setup before hand, but the interviewer took creative license or then what to ask wasn't clear enough, and, in any case, the interviewer would assume the prime minister of the UK would be able to interpret words about the use of nuclear weapons correctly and think 2 seconds for an appropriate response.

My guess would be that the interviewer was asked to frame the question presuming the nukes needed to be launched (so not a policy question) and so that the PM could just affirm her willingness to do so as part of classic MAD protocol. However, the interviewer discovers it's difficult to frame a question that presumes nukes need to be launched (especially to the PM who is presumably the deciding person on this) so the scenario doesn't really make any sense, and to avoid "assuming you're launching nuclear weapons ... would you be launching nuclear weapons?" in order for things to make sense then if you are assuming nukes are being launched then a sensible question in that framing would be something like "how would you feel about that?".

Everyone else in the nuclear chain of command makes sense to ask "you are ordered to carry out a nuclear strike, do you do your duty?" and the journalist mistakingly starts with this framing, but (seems midway through) the journalist realises that makes no sense to ask a PM so he recovers by switching to the question of feeling.

A half-way competent politician would then correct the framing of the journalist (who has no onus of making sense) and then answer a properly framed question and not answer a word salad, especially on the subject of nuclear weapons.

A half-way competent politician would either reframe the question as "if you are asking if all other courses of action have been exhausted and [with the other people involved] it is decided a nuclear launch is the only option remaining, then yes the UK will make use of it's nuclear weapons to defend the United Kingdom and our allies" or then "of course I [and the rest of the people involved] will do everything possible to avoid a nuclear war, but if those terrifying circumstances arise we will not hesitate to defend the United Kingdom and our allies".

However, not correcting the framing of a question as serious as the use of nuclear weapons and then answering the wrong question (the question was about feeling and not duty) simply demonstrates a lack of cognitive competence in terms of interpreting what people are saying, self-awareness (being the PM discussing nuclear weapons), and of course a total and complete lack of emotion and empathy (to not even address the feelings question when it is asked the second time! she simply is unable to process the information as she lacks the emotional capacity to do so, which also explains the tax cuts to the rich in the middle of a energy cost crisis) from someone you'd very much want to be cognitively competent (as they have the power to launch nuclear weapons).

Now, I get it, the political right nowadays has a mental and emotional expectation from the highest offices of governance of literally elementary school, but that reference point is dumb. Demonstrating the prime minister of the UK has as much composure, argumentative sophistication and understanding of social interactions as an 8 year old is not an appropriate standard of high state office.

Putin can be a mediocre autocrat and still have more than one reserve plan, he can be clouded by ambition and still think strategically a few years ahead, these aren't difficult tasks. — Isaac

I've been meaning to ask you as an actual professional of these things what would need to be proven for a judge to consider an actor "irrational". Maybe people would propose some other standard, but I think it's an interesting reference point regardless.

Your summary above is spot on: you need a lot more than some mistakes to consider someone irrational. And ... it's one of those "call me in 300 years" to even really be sure what was a mistake or not. Russia totally collapse with this a contributing factor as @ssu says may happen; sure, big mistake, no dissenting opinion from me on that one ... but people pretend like that has already happened somehow.

It used to be called "voting with one's feet", in the good old days of the USSR. — Olivier5

Again, any evidence this has a chance to stop the war? Will all these people be signing up to fight to Ukraine?

How many will just return to Russia after they get their first energy bill?

Propaganda victories can be short lived (for example if Ukrainian gains are stopped and reversed the recent euphoria will be a distant memory) ... and obviously no amount of propaganda produces victory, although it is pleasant to hear.

No. I asked for a geopolitical account by which he might be understood as a rational actor.
— apokrisis

Why would you be asking me for such an account, what makes you think I have one? — Isaac

I'll give it a shot.

The West insists the war is a "mistake" or "miscalculation" as basically Westerners don't approve. I think this sentiment is more-or-less just the emotional praxis of cancel culture applied to Russia and with zero context.

The war is presented as something happening totally out of the blue and unprovoked.

Obviously it's not out of the blue and has been going on since 2014 and teasing Ukraine joining NATO and therefore moving NATO weapon systems into Ukraine, and in the meantime arming and training Ukraine, is obviously a provocation. Of course, one can argue that these conditions do not satisfy a just war hypothesis along US' standard of invading Iraq (or then argue both aren't a just war), but, putting the moral evaluation aside, the context is important to actually understanding the situation.

For, after the civil war broke out there was 2 agreements (agreed by all sides) to end the fighting, the Minsk accords:

The Minsk agreements were a series of international agreements which sought to end the Donbas war fought between armed Russian-backed separatist groups and Armed Forces of Ukraine, with Russian regular forces playing a central part.[1] The first, known as the Minsk Protocol, was drafted in 2014 by the Trilateral Contact Group on Ukraine, consisting of Ukraine, Russia, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),[2][3][4] with mediation by the leaders of France and Germany in the so-called Normandy Format. After extensive talks in Minsk, Belarus, the agreement was signed on 5 September 2014 by representatives of the Trilateral Contact Group and, without recognition of their status, by the then-leaders of the self-proclaimed Donetsk People's Republic (DPR) and Luhansk People's Republic (LPR). This agreement followed multiple previous attempts to stop the fighting in the region and aimed to implement an immediate ceasefire.

A map of the buffer zone established by the Minsk Protocol follow-up memorandum
The agreement failed to stop fighting,[5] and was thus followed with a revised and updated agreement, Minsk II, which was signed on 12 February 2015.[6] — Minsk agreements

Azov sympathisers like to say these agreements aren't "fair", well then Ukraine didn't need to sign them.

Again, regardless of the moral status these agreements obviously failed.

Getting into the geopolitics, the context of the war going on since 2014 (and ethnic Russians dying in it) and Russia signing agreements that would create a ceasefire (and mainly Azov and co. continuing the fighting), doesn't matter for Western media but it does matter to other geopolitical actors that Russia deals with.

The war is not out of the blue, and Russia has essentially since 2015 to make their case to their friends and allies that a larger war is inevitable. Simply because the West just ignored this issue, does not mean Russia did and literally 7 years of being able to point to Russia signing the Minsk agreements and Ukraine and the West not implementing them can go a long way to explain when the sanctions came down, essentially no country outside the West joined in, and the West was all Pikachu face all of a sudden.

Likewise, cutting the water to Crimea was a real headache for the Russians, with Crimean agriculture about to be seriously damaged (without fresh water, not only is agriculture more difficult, but salt water seeps in from the sea, from what I've read). And we can't forget the Nazi's, who nearly any Russian, from Putin to the lowliest peasant, is going to be angry about. From the Russian perspective "D-day" wasn't the cathartic moment that defeated the Nazi's, but 20 000 000 dead Russians, and it wasn't so cathartic. So it does not only stir hatred for Nazi's, but also hatred for the West which Russia views as ungrateful for their sacrifice in dealing with Hitler's war machine (an actual existential war with a genocidal maniac, not just rhetoric).

Now, simply because there's nearly a decade to prepare militarily, economically and diplomatically for the war, doesn't mean it's a good idea, but the context that it's not some random act out of the blue, obviously prepared diplomatically in direct and indirect ways, may indicate there is a thought out geopolitical plan, in addition to things like meeting with Xi before the war was launched.

We don't know what conversations between Putin and Xi are like, but we can make an educated guess.

From the Chinese perspective, US is constantly talking about a pivot to Asia (aka. China) and constantly talking about China as the rival super power and so on. The war in Ukraine essentially opens a second front with the US, they now are "pivoting" back to the Europe.

From the Russian perspective, they are constantly sanctioned and threatened with more sanctions, so economic relations aren't friendly and all economic ties with the West are a double edged sword, as easily a benefit as painful leverage (for the exact same reasons as the West is suddenly lamenting it's economic ties).

Unlike in Soviet times, there is now alternative sources for advanced technology. We're also at the end of Moores law for a single processing core, so advanced technology does not improve as it once did in any case.

What this means is not only is there no strong technology dependence relations, but China and India now compete with the West as technology suppliers. You can say Western technology is still "better" but China and India are trying very hard to catchup. One thing that would allow them a competitive edge across the board: cheaper access to energy.

So, let's say Putin determines that the West's failure to deal with Ukraine and make them implement Minsk and the constant propaganda and sanctions and threat of sanctions, all means that the West just aren't good partners, just a source of constant headaches, and China and India can provide everything the West provides in terms of components and technicians to run a commodity based economy of things both China and India really need (being the world's factory).

Now, I have zero problem accepting that the preferred outcome of the war in Ukraine would have been a negotiated peace in the first week of the war with Ukraine, every day since, and even now. However, the levels of preparation for both the war (taking over the south in less than a week) and also economic sanctions (Ruble didn't collapse, infrastructure didn't stop working) tells me at least that the possibility of a long war and total sanctions was thought through and accepted as a second best scenario.

Why would this be? Well, if Putin's perspective is either the West are good partners or then not-partners, he would be in the position of being unable to implement this policy himself. If Putin just randomly one day kicked out all Western corporations from Russia, no one in Russia would understand the move and he's gone insane and all that.

However, if the West implements sanctions that forces Western corporations to leave Russia ... that's not Putin's doing, Chinese and Indian corporations come in and are super happy. Russia is still a sizeable market ... so imagine doing your best to compete, with lower prices and marketing and bribes and stuff, struggling for market share and ROI, and then your competitors just up and leave. It's a pretty great feeling.

So, geopolitically, the value Russia is providing China and India as an outcome of this war, is not really questionable. In return, India and China purchase the energy and commodities and don't sanction Russia.

Of course, that's not really a payment to do the war, just conditions that allow the war to happen.

So what is Russia getting from the war other than just kicking out unreliable partners (from it's point of view)?

Militarily speaking, the Azov sea is a traditionally very weak spot for Russia and the 2000 km border with Ukraine means Russia can be invaded on a massive front just like it did to Ukraine, goes both ways. How much do these things matter in a nuclear age I honestly don't know, both in terms of the real truth and what the Kremlin actually thinks about these conventional military considerations.

So, even ignoring any real military gains, apparently there's giant gas fields right under the Donbas and around Crimea.

I'll stop the analysis here for now, as I need to go to a meeting, but if a Schism with the West and taking these gas fields are a primary motivating factor, with protecting ethnic Russians (whether genuine concern for Putin or not) easy pretext for the war, then one is left to wonder who is baiting who.

Did the US bait Russia into this "mistake" or did Russia bait the US into massive sanctions and refusing reasonable peace deals to take these gas fields and create Russia-India-China alignment? For, the US' analysis was that this would be Russia's "Afghanistan" and so weaken Russia in conventional military terms, which is certainly true in terms of using up Soviet stockpiles. However, if the Soviet stockpiles had a shelf life anyways ... and short term conventional weakness doesn't mean much when you have 6000 nuclear weapons, and therefore the gas fields, water to Crimea, and creating an alternative global financial system is "worth it".

That the Russian invasion of Ukraine is only Western propaganda? Sure. — ssu

What are you talking about?

The issue under discussion was how Ukraine would be victorious, or Russia not-victorious, through military means, such as the collapse of the Russian state.

And I was asking for a citation from this thread or an actual argument.

I know people state that Russia will collapse or that Ukraine will "be victorious", what I'm asking for is how?

The closest I've seen to an actual argument is that low morale will simply lead to the complete dissolution of the Russian armed forces. An argument with zero supporting evidence except anecdotal that some Russians aren't happy (which is not surprising).

The US diplomatic strategy ... finally just talking directly to Russia after all this time insisting only Zelensky can be discussed with ...

Seems to be to try to convince Russia that a conventional military strike on Russian forces would follow the Russian use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine.

This seems to be grasping at diplomatic straws.

First, if the use of tactical nuclear weapons produces an easy victory in Ukraine then the loss of some military assets elsewhere is simply a "cost of doing business".

Second, the easy retaliation for the US striking Russia (a country the US is not at war with) can just be using more nukes in Ukraine, absolutely destroying every base, command centre, logistics hub etc. absolutely decimating the Ukrainian capacity to wage war.

What would be the US response to that? Just a larger conventional strike? And again, even if Russia didn't retaliate against NATO it is easily a net benefit in military terms.

Or, are these "private talks" just the US seeing they've achieved their policy objectives for their constituents the arms dealers and are now willing to wrap things up?

If people have arguments that conventional weapons are a deterrence to nuclear weapons, people are free to explain that. Likewise, why wouldn't Russia simply retaliate with tactical nuclear weapons against the bases which launched these attacks against its forces?

If they did, why would NATO retaliate for that with nuclear weapons of its own if the whole purpose of the conventional attack was to avoid using nuclear weapons, as a full scale nuclear war over Ukraine makes no sense any everyone in NATO knows that.

Solution: resolve the situation diplomatically which is suddenly US and EU officials are talking about.

↪boethius Wasn't that your idea? — Olivier5

You state that once the territories are annexed that there's nothing left to negotiate.

There is obviously the rest of Ukraine that can be negotiated as well as the use of nuclear weapons, such as trying to negotiate that not happening.

Something the US is currently doing:

Biden adviser: US in private talks with Russia over nuclear weapons to avoid public ‘tit for tat’ — The Hill

Another word for "private talks" is "negotiation".

Right on, boethius. No one has ever convincingly explained or made any sound hypothesis that this war might not be a victory for Russia. Because it's all just Western propaganda. Like the talk that Russia would invade Ukraine, in the first place. — ssu

Please cite the hypothesis if it's been made.

And, you've already moved the goal posts as your criteria for "not victory" includes things like technically winning a war but it "has some consequences".

What was under discussion was the idea that if Ukraine fights long enough the Russian state would simply collapse. This was the proposed mechanism of "win".

What a splendid idea! The West could nuke Moscow and Saint Petersbourg, putting Putin in a stronger position to negotiate peace. — Olivier5

Impossible to make sense of your statement here.