It's a magnificent film — Tom Storm

For me, Marlowe in the “Long Goodbye” was, in spite of his goofy, sloppy appearance, a man with a fierce moral center. It’s ironic to me that the main character in “Heart of Darkness” was also named Marlow, and also a man of moral strength in a jungle of corruption. I’m sure that’s a coincidence, but I wish it weren’t.

Just finished "The Big Sleep" by Raymond Chandler and now starting his "Farewell, My Lovely." — Jafar

After Watching a couple of movies based on Chandler‘s work, a few months ago I decided to read some of his novels along with some by Dashiell Hammett. I was surprised at how different they were from the movies. Much more convoluted and, I thought, unconvincing plots and uninteresting characters. Maybe you should take that with a grain of salt given that my favorite Chandler movie is the “Long Goodbye” by Robert Altman. That was widely criticized as being far from the standard vision of Philip Marlowe, but it’s one of my all-time favorites.

On somewhat related note, there is a TV show on Netflix right now, “Spade”, that is also a revisionist presentation of Hammetts main character. I only watched one episode, but I thought it was done very well.

have read one or two Dostoevsky novels and feel qualified to speak about the rest — Jamal

Hey, I resemble that remark.

I think the plan you’ve laid out is the right one for someone new to philosophy.

I have a bit of a different attitude towards philosophy than most people here do. I once started a discussion called "You don't need to read philosophy to be a philosopher" which may or may not be true. I certainly have read philosophy books, but generally on subjects where I have a specific interest.

For me it all starts with what I know, what I believe, what I value, and what I see. This is from one of my favorite philosophers, Emerson:

To believe our own thought, to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, -- that is genius. Speak your latent conviction, and it shall be the universal sense; for the inmost in due time becomes the outmost,--and our first thought, is rendered back to us by the trumpets of the Last Judgment. Familiar as the voice of the mind is to each, the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is, that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men but what they thought. A man should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across his mind from within, more than the lustre of the firmament of bards and sages. — Emerson - Self-Reliance

That's what philosophy is for - to help us "learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which flashes across [our] mind from within." It's about self-awareness. How we think. What we value. How we know what we know. How should we act. For me that means everything starts with your own ideas - what's important and interesting to you. Philosophy is a tool to help you figure things out that matter to you. So, what matters to you?

Are you sure with these numbers? — Linkey

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Classical_Athens

As far as I know, in ancient Greece the "lottocracy" was trusted more than democracy, — Linkey

The population of ancient Athens was about 250,000 people with only about 30,000 able to vote. That's comparable to a large town or small city. In the US, about 250,000 million people are eligible to vote.

What I like about it is that my vote really matters and no one cares about yours. — Hanover

Yes, this is true. My daughter lives in Michigan, another state where votes matter. I had just moved here when "Don't blame me, I'm from Massachusetts" became a popular bumper sticker.

Some of your questions are trivial. Concerning the necessity to gather information before voting, I have an idea of using a lot: a group of 200 random people would be chosen, the state will give them the money for studiing the subject, and possbly they will vote instead of the whole population. This is one implementation of the "lottocracy", for me there are better ones, but they are more difficult for explaining. — Linkey

So somehow you’ve gone from hundreds of millions of people voting on laws to 200 people voting. I don’t think you’ve thought this through very well.

An interesting instance in unit voting: — Hanover

As the article notes, it seems a lot like the electoral college system. I place both of them under the classification of “seemed like a good idea at the time.”

Proportional representation is an electoral system that elects multiple representatives in each district in proportion to the number of people who vote for them. If one third of voters back a political party, the party’s candidates win roughly one-third of the seats. Today, proportional representation is the most common electoral system among the world’s democracies.

In the US Senate we have the opposite of this. Each state gets two senators, no matter what it's population. That means California, with 34 million people, gets the same number as North Dakota with 750,000. Something similar happens with our presidential elections - each state gets a slate of electors matching its number of senators and congressmen. Whoever gets the majority of votes in 49 of the states gets all the electors from that state. One state, Nebraska, has proportional representation for presidential electors.

What if we made it mandatory form a quorum with at least half of the possible attendees? — javi2541997

In my town, that would be about 4,000 people. As I noted, only about 200 choose to come.

One of the major problems in referendum and initiative is that much more HEAT than LIGHT is required to get a measure passed. — BC

And this would be worsened a hundred-fold if the OP's plan for internet voting were implimented.

It's much more direct than your town electing representatives to meet and make decisions. — BC

When towns get to be a certain size, they do elect representatives to the town meeting by district.

How many people make up a quorum? — BC

Good question. I don't think there is a quorum. I'm not sure of that.

On the other hand, who is held responsible (later) for bad decisions? An elected assembly is in office long enough for bad decisions to sometimes come home to roost. — BC

There is also an elected board of selectmen and an unelected town manager who make the short term decisions. Town meeting mostly deals with budgets and other big issues.

No, we don't have a 'democracy' like the town meetings of New England. — BC

I really like the idea of the town meeting and I've enjoyed participating. It can be inspiring and effective on a very small scale, i.e. a few hundred people. After that it becomes cumbersome and breaks down. I live in a town of about 14,000 people and the crowd at town meeting is usually a couple of hundred, although it's open to all registered voters. Is that direct democracy?

We have a short fiction contest here once or twice a year. What you have written is at least as good as many of those submitted for the contest. You should hang around and turn it in as your entry.

Probably there is no big difference, but I am not sure these two systems will always produce the same results. For me, the system I described is evidently optimal. — Linkey

Millions of people in dozens of jurisdictions disagree with you.

This is a good idea, but maybe I don't fully understand the principle from your quote. — Linkey

The quote describes it simply and clearly and it's easy to understand. You should read it again.

It is quite unclear how to solve this problem; — Linkey

For me, the best system can be as follows: if we have e.g. 3 candidates, each voter ranks each candidate with 1-3 numbers, and rank 1 means 10, 2 means 5, 3 means 0. — Linkey

Why would we possibly bring in a new system when there is an existing one, ranked choice voting, that has been in use for a long time and works well?

A am sure that the best political system would be a “referendum democracy”: if an online referendum will be performed at least each week, and these referendums should cover not only laws, but also decisions within the competence of the judiciary power (fines and punishments). — Linkey

This would be a monstrous, horrible, monumental disaster.

Theoretically, this problem can be solved as follows: the voter does not just vote for one of the candidates, but gives each candidate a score on a ten-point scale. — Linkey

There is already a better system than this in place in a number of jurisdictions. It’s called ranked choice voting. This from the web - https://campaignlegal.org/democracyu/accountability/ranked-choice-voting

Ranked choice voting is a process that allows voters to rank candidates for a particular office in order of preference. Consider a race where four candidates – A, B, C, and D – are running for a single seat such as Governor. In an election utilizing RCV, voters simply rank the candidates 1-4, with the candidate ranked as “1” being the voter’s highest preference for Governor. If a candidate is the first choice of more than half the voters, that candidate wins the election. But if no candidate gets the majority of the vote, the candidate with the least amount of support is eliminated, the second choice support for that eliminated candidate are redistributed, and this process continues until a candidate wins more than half of the vote.

Published in 1924, Burtt's work explores how the shift to a scientific worldview in the 17th century was underpinned by (often unstated) metaphysical assumptions.

I find the metaphysics of science interesting, so I bought it. I’ve only just started reading, but it looks pretty good so far. I especially like that he has been very specific about what’s included in the metaphysics of modern pre-quantum physics as well as medieval and ancient science.

But I don't understand how anything Anderson says refutes a potentially physicalist understanding of the world. He refutes reductionism very well, but my attempt to invent a "best we can do now" version of physicalism was not meant to affirm reductionism, quite the contrary. — J

I think the only way the kind of physicalism you described can be tenable is if we buy into reductionism. I can easily identify phenomena that are obviously not physical, e.g. the mind, society. The only way those can be reasonably considered physical is if you could support the claim that they are reducible to physics.

I read the first issue online. I don’t think I’ll read anymore. Thanks for the quick summary. A little too creepy for me.

So they don’t live happily ever after?

There is a conceptual understanding of "me" operating in the world. But the direct, first person realisation of being conscious precedes any other knowing, and is "absolute" in the sense that I don't need anything else for that. — Carlo Roosen

This is an argument we have here all the time - the hard problem of consciousness. As I see it, there is no hard problem of consciousness.

I was wondering, even while I do agree with the premises to some extend and it seems logically correct, I do not agree with the answer. — Carlo Roosen

Here's my take. Neither of the premises is true. Neither is false. Whether reality is deterministic or we have free will can not be verified or falsified empirically.

The author's argument against scientism doesn't claim to show science is irrational, but rather that it's core principle (that the scientific method is the only way to render truth about the world and reality) cannot be established with the scientific method - which he asserts makes it self-defeating. — Relativist

He said more than that. He said science can not be shown to be a rational method of inquiry. My post was an attempt to refute that. We don't have to take this any further. I just thought his argument was sloppy and wanted to express my disagreement.

Indeed, that science is even a rational form of inquiry (let alone the only rational form of inquiry) is not something that can be established scientifically. For scientific inquiry itself rests on a number of philosophical assumptions: that there is an objective world external to the minds of scientists; that this world is governed by causal regularities; that the human intellect can uncover and accurately describe these regularities; and so forth. Since science presupposes these things, it cannot attempt to justify them without arguing in a circle. And if it cannot even establish that it is a reliable form of inquiry, it can hardly establish that it is the only reliable form. — Relativist

I don't think this argument holds water. Or maybe it's nihilistic. To start, I don't think science is the only valid way of understanding the world. Is it valid? Yes, I think so. Is it rational? Yes, I think it is. What standard would we apply to determine rationality? Here's a first shot.

• It's a formal system of study with established and documented methodology.
• The assumptions and presuppositions underlying that methodology are understood and acknowledged.
• The results are documented.
• Procedures for data reporting, reduction, verification, and interpretation are included in the system methodology.
• The results can be compared with observations in the real world and predictions made before the study takes place.

As I indicated, that's just off the top of my head. Looking at this now, it strikes me this is really just a description of the scientific method. The position described in the quoted text is just Hume's problem of induction. It's always seemed obvious to me that the perfect refutation of that position is that induction works. Beyond that, it strikes me that if the scientific method is not rational, then there is no rational way of knowing the world.

I have a number of friends who would, if pressed, probably deny that there's anything out there except the physical world. But nor would they claim that you can use the fundamental entities of physics to explain macro-phenomena like economic behavior. — J

I think there are a lot of people out there, probably mostly physical scientists, who do think psychology, sociology, and economics are nothing but physics.

Not necessarily. We can construct a sort of "best we can do right now" position that would go: "Sure, we have loads of unanswered questions about how physical realities interact, and how they can be causally effective. But at the end of the (scientific) day, I'm betting that the answers will still fail to reveal anything beyond the physical. We have to wait and see, but my money is on physicalism." — J

As I see it, this is not a "best we can do right now" issue. It's not a question of inadequate theory and technology, it's that it is not possible. Here's a link to one of my favorite papers - Anderson's "More is Different." Written in 1972, but it always gets brought up when this subject is discussed.

https://www.tkm.kit.edu/downloads/TKM1_2011_more_is_different_PWA.pdf

there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality,
— T Clark

Such as? — Wayfarer

I first came to this realization through the Tao Te Ching. "The Tao that can be spoken is not the eternal Tao." It has become a central part of my understanding of how the world works - reality is not objective, it is a mixture of an external non-human existence interacting with our human nature. Kant described something similar when he talked about aspects of reality, i.e. space and time, that we know a priori. Recently I've been reading Konrad Lorenz who connects Kant's a priori with evolution. He says that we have evolved to survive through an interaction between objective reality and our biological nature. In his understanding, human nature is a reflection of objective reality. I don't see it that way, but I think his understanding of the mechanism is correct. Here's a link to an article of his.

https://archive.org/details/KantsDoctrineOfTheAPrioriInTheLightOfContemporaryBiologyKonradLorenz

I have some other ideas about this too, but I haven't got them put together enough to go into them here.

an Aeon essay by Evan Thompson, Adam Frank and Marcello Gleiser — Wayfarer

I don't remember participating in the discussion five years ago. This time I read the essay you linked. I was disappointed to see it was the same argument you and I go back and forth with every month or so. First off, any philosophical discussion that brings in quantum mechanics is immediately suspect. They trotted out the old QM interpretation that reality is dependent on observation while ignoring the fact that those interpretations are unfalsifiable. Their other prime example was the hard problem of consciousness.

My biggest gripe is that there are good arguments for the involvement of us humans in the establishment of reality, but they ignored them.

the real challenge for physicalism is to explain the lawlike behaviors, if there are such, of the entities studied in psychology, sociology, history, literature – in short, the human sciences. — J

That's why I mentioned reductionism. For many in the physical sciences, the disciplines you listed can ultimately be reduced to physics. That's not how I see it.

And if you responded by telling her that her discipline did not produce objective facts and theories, was in short not scientific, she would laugh at you, — J

It's not clear to me that, when we get to that level of organization, we are still dealing with phenomena that are deterministic and comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding.

So in order to defend physicalism, I think a philosopher has to argue for why physicalism is not reductive in the sense just described. — J

I would guess that most people who agree with the physicalist approach also agree that a reductionist approach is also correct. I think the argument could be made that they are the same thing.

[edit] in last paragraph changed “is not also correct” “to is also correct.”

But I think that can be problematised by pointing out that while physicalism does provide a background context that is inviting towards scientific inquiry, none of the successes of science required physicalism– the scientific method and its accompanying tools being enough to do the job. — Baden

Method will get you only so far. Once we've collected it we have to process it, validate it, interpret it, and fit it into existing or new theories. Does methodological naturalism tell us how to do that? Can it be done without physicalism? I'm not saying it can't, but I'm not sure.

So, wherein lies the attraction of physicalism for scientists? The majority associate themselves with the doctrine, but why? Why not simply maintain metaphysical agnosticism? Is it simply because, as above, physicalism resonates with the idea of scientific inquiry? Is it just an honorary badge to display anti-idealist credentials? Do scientists generally even know or care what they’re committed to? — Baden

This is all metaphysics, which I don't think many scientists care about or are aware of. They, along with most people here on the forum, think that the underlying basis of their understanding of reality is self-evident and eternal.

My central criticism is not that physicalism is wrong—it's unfalsifiable — Baden

Yes, it's unfalsifiable, you know, metaphysics and stuff. This is true of the isms you've discussed in OP and all those we discuss every day here on the forum.

2. Physicalism is unscientific.
The core metaphysical assumptions of most metaphysically naturalist / physicalist positions may be summarized as follows:

A. There is only one substance, that substance is physical and that substance encompasses all known and all potentially knowable phenomena
B. The universe is deterministic.
C. The universe is comprehensively and ultimately law-given and law-abiding. — Baden

To keep it simple, I want to talk about physics here, not all science. Isn't it true that physicalist questions are the only ones physics is capable of answering? As we move up the hierarchies of scale, then maybe it makes sense to talk about non-physicalist answers, e.g. what is the nature of the mind. We have a lot of arguments about that here on the forum, e.g. every consciousness discussion ever. This is the place in the discussion where reductionism raises it's ugly head.

The consequences of this apparent circularity are somewhat jarring. Physicalism does not really do away with the supernatural, but must presume there is some, in principle, discoverable law to account for it, and simply redefine it as natural as necessary. — Baden

It seems to have worked so far.

Pragmatism over all. — Banno

Guilty as charged.

This is presumably non-trivial. What empirical inference made from observation of the real world is involved? — Banno

Good question Mr. Hume. I'm not sure where it comes from. I'm not sure if it's something we figure out from seeing that certain things seem to recur in certain situations or if it's something more built in. But it certainly is justifiable based on observation and by the fact that our species continues... for now.

Nuff said.

it's a description made possible by those distinctions and observations. — Hallucinogen

That's what justification means in this context - empirical evidence. You're just playing with words.

How many do you have to have observed for your premise to be justified?
— T Clark

Just one. — Hallucinogen

Sorry, no, that's not how it works. It's clear your premise is nothing but a "seems to me" proposition, i.e. an unjustified assumption.

There are things you can know independent of the 'real' world.

"I am conscious" is one. — Carlo Roosen

Of course my consciousness is an aspect of the real world that I know by observation.

therefore 1 + 1 = 2 — Carlo Roosen

I see two ways of looking at this. First, arithmetic is directly related to counting, a human activity involving observation and requiring learning. Second, looking deeper, there is scientific evidence that humans have an innate numerical ability. Very young babies seem to have an ability to understand quantity. I have been touting a book by Konrad Lorenz, "Behind the Mirror." In it, Lorenz claims that this kind of innate ability is a direct result of evolution. He even makes the point explicitly that, even though the ability is built in, ultimately it results from our and our ancestor's interactions with the world.

If we say "if 1) reality is determistic and 2) we have a free will, it follows 3) we exist outside reality". Where does this go wrong? — Carlo Roosen

This seems like a gigantic non-sequitur. What does this have to do with the discussion we are having? Besides that, your understanding of the determinism vs. free will issue is very different from mine. This is not the place to take that up.

Is it possible that with solid premises and correct logical steps, we cannot always accept the conclusion? — Carlo Roosen

All non-trivial logical premises ultimately involve empirical inferences made from observations of the real world. Given the obvious uncertainty associated with those observations, there are no “solid premises” in any kind of unconditional sense.

The ontology of causation and contingency don't depend on our epistemology about them, or keeping track of them. — Hallucinogen

In our previous exchange, you claimed your initial premise is justified "...by distinguishing events and observing entities..." How many of those ((10^80)^80)^80 interactions have you observed? How many do you have to have observed for your premise to be justified?

OK, the particles = the objects denoted by the terms. "Starting from zero" = beginning of the sequence. "Moving outward and bouncing off each other" = the transformations of the sequence. — Hallucinogen

Ok, so there are maybe (10^80)^80 sequences all interacting with each other. Or maybe ((10^80)^80)^80. And there is no one except maybe a hypothetical "necessary being" could keep track of even one of those sequences for more than a few steps. There comes a point where causation, or contingency, loses meaning.