No doubt not even close to Hell, but okay.Lida Rose
Not at all. Pain and misery in this world is just a sample of what goes on in hell. — Wheatley
As long as you've asked, considering that he inflicts pain and misery to some degree or another on everyone, including those who have no idea there's a Get-Out-Of-Hell card that can be played, No, he isn't merciful at all, but rather comes across as a divine masochist who doesn't give a **** about anyone other than those fortunate to be let into his game. Everyone else be damned, as it were.God wants us to know what hell feels like in this world so we don't sin, and up in actual hell, which is unimaginably horrible and painful. Isn't God merciful? — Wheatley
And ain't that nice. All those who, through no choice of their own, happened to have been created dumb or unable to make rational decisions please line up at gates 6 through 666 for the next train to Hell. The ignorant may board at gates 667 through 6,666.He gives us the gift of knowing what hell feels like, so smart people will make decision not to sin. Its people who are unable to make rational decisions that have to worry, but most of us dont care about them (pfff, losers...). — Wheatley
Then obviously Heaven is Hell and Hell is Heaven.Clearly God believes pain and misery is extremely beneficial to mankind. — Wheatley
Only to a fair god and morally-minded people.the idea of eternal damnation as a punishment is unfair. — Wheatley
Why can't god be an immoral slave owner (the god of Abraham does condone slavery) who delights in infecting children with bone cancer? After all, as an omniscient and omnipotent being the god of Abraham certainly has the power to foresee such an affliction and prevent it.Conclusion: Either God is fair and merciful, or he sends people hell eternally. — Wheatley
Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. — Lida Rose
But, conversely, your experience of choosing is supported by determinism?[/quotte]
Any such choosing is no more than an illusion.
— Echarmion
Why does there "have to be"?No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. — Lida Rose
Logically, there have to be some things that don't have any further machinery behind them. Otherwise, you run into an infinite recursion of machinery behind machinery. Do you agree? — Echarmion
I've already conceded that QM events may be random, and I'm not about to qualify determinism every time I mention its ubiquity.Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. — Lida Rose
That's not actually true. Quantum physics aren't deterministic in this sense. There are multiple outcomes from a single cause. — Echarmion
See hereBecause If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm. — Lida Rose
There is no foundational explanation of space and time, cause end effect, either. Physics describes those, but it doesn't provide a "foundational explanation". — Echarmion
If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary. — Lida Rose
— Echarmion
The process is known, as I have already pointed out. It's just that this process is for some reason considered "not good enough" because it doesn't look like the kind of explanation we see in physics. But physics is just another product of the mind.
An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else. — Lida Rose
Illusion is the wrong word. Illusion suggests a percept, and the notion of free will you're describing is not a percept. Feelings of control, feelings of agency behind an action, and feelings of authorship are percepts, but none of those are based on perceiving alternate futures. — InPitzotl
Not if one takes the definition of "arbitrary" into considerationBut for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary. — Lida Rose
And yet this is rather implied by "I could have done otherwise," unless we take that to mean nothing more than "I was capable of doing otherwise." — Kenosha Kid
The illusion assumes equal opportunity.The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead. — Lida Rose
Perhaps not "just as well". — Kenosha Kid
But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary.On which, I notice whenever I see this question in the context of philosophy instead of psychology, the actual process of decision-making never enters into it. The act of choosing may as well be instantaneous and arbitrary, and therefore is not realistic. — Kenosha Kid
:up:The "just as well" point is pertinent, for instance. Human decision-making involves a human in a given mental and emotional state, in a given situation, within a given interval of time (short for urgent problems, long for non-urgent ones), weighing up the potential efficacies of each of a tiny subset of available options drawn from personal experience and emotional reactivity from an uncountably large number of actual possibilities to affect a desired outcome. It sounds deterministic... because it probably is. — Kenosha Kid
Okay,Ah, sorry for not being clear. I meant to ask what your definition of an illusion is in this context. — Echarmion
Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. Except, that is, stuff people decide to do. The stuff people decide to do is controlled by free will, and what's free will . . . . . . . ? "HEY! look at that rabbit over there in the underbrush. Ain't he big. Must go a good five pounds, at least."But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears. — Lida Rose
So, this makes me wonder why you dismiss the thing you have first-hand experience of. — Echarmion
Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm.You're asking for an explanation, but why do you expect there to be an explanation? — Echarmion
If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary.You expect choice to be the result of some other, more basic process, but I don't think there is a rational reason to expect that. — Echarmion
The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead.No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so. — Lida Rose
What is an illusion in this context? — Echarmion
But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears.But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else. — Lida Rose
Well you asked for an operation. If you didn't want to hear about it, why did you ask? — Echarmion
You're quite right, and I apologize for the characterization.Have a nice day — Lida Rose
Thank you, you too, and I mean that sincerely! Behind all these terminals, we're all just ordinary people.
But let's keep the idle chat down (and the sarcasm)... this forum has a purpose... it's a community of people with a shared interest. That's what we're all here for, and that's whose stage you're borrowing from our kind hosts. — InPitzotl
Well it's that precision that makes all the difference. So yes, "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action"having the "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action" to be more precise. — Pantagruel
I always thought "autotelic" meant something like having a purpose not outside itself, (yup, it does---just looked it up) and the purpose to initiate a whole slew of things certainly exists outside the act of initiation.So if you can "initiate" an action that is the definition of autotelic. — Pantagruel
No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so.I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. — Lida Rose
You don't have direct personal experience of yourself choosing between two options? — Echarmion
But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else.Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B? — Lida Rose
The operation you perform when you choose. Namely, weighing all the different reasons for choosing one or the other and deciding which side tips the scale. — Echarmion
Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP — Lida Rose
And that thing in your OP comes from your intuitions. You have libertarian intuitions; that is, you intuit PAP. But you're not the only one with intuitions; compatibilists have intuitions too. But there's an overall context implied by the fact that you're posting on a philosophy forum... I would think people actually interested in philosophy should be interested in analyzing and questioning their intuitions, especially if the intuitions are not universal.
where I said, "This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you (A)cannot do other than what you did
But that means less than what you're making it out to mean. A rabbit (B)can go into my shed, but an adult blue whale (B)cannot go into my shed. I had lemonade last night, but I (C)could have had milk. (A), (B), and (C) all use different senses of the world could/can.
You're presenting a pet theory... that one (D)cannot be assigned praise/blame if one (A)cannot do other than what they do. But why (D)can't they? Why (D)can't someone be assigned praise/blame based on whether or not the (C)could have done otherwise as opposed to (A)could have?
I don't think your pet theory has weight; rather, I think your intuition's messed up.
why should you be praised or blamed for them?
If I choose with intention, because I chose with intention.
To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter."
The rock is not an agent; people are agents. People act with intention; rocks do not go to places due to intentions. People actually mean to do what they (intentionally) do; rocks do not. Those are significant and relevant differences. It's impossible to blame a rock for being where it is because the rock didn't "mean" to go there, but the same cannot be said of a person acting with intent. In fact, it's not even the actual act we tend to hold people responsible for... it is just the intent behind it. (This isn't always true, but in the ways relevant to praise/blame it's true enough for government work as they say).
That we (A)can't do other than what we will do is simply a consequence of the fact that there's only one reality, but we still in that reality are causes of the thing we intend. Determinism doesn't conflict with the fact that we act based on intentions; in fact, the suggestion that we act based on intentions is causal by nature.
In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. — Lida Rose
I'm not buying into that narrative. From start to end, this is a public forum, and when you reply someone it's like ringing their doorbell, especially with this setup. Also, you're not merely indicating your disinterest; you're advancing arguments. And this is not "a whole other path of discussion", it is the thing you're discussing... you're explicit here that you're interested in praise and blame in this previous reply.
I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism — Lida Rose
But your alleged interest does not compel me to share it. And your discussion about compatibilism is where the primary weakness of your argument against the ability to assign blame/praise lies. In theory we could talk about original causation as a third mechanic (besides determinism/randomness), but I think the biggest problem is your acceptance of PAP. It's reasonable to reject original causation until the burden is met demonstrating that it is indeed a possible mechanic, and whereas libertarians tend to demonstrate this by appealing to the fact that we have free will and that it's impossible without PAP, I don't see that as compelling... especially when PAP itself is suspect.
something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it — Lida Rose
...of course it hasn't "worked"; I don't share your interest in forestalling discussions of why you're wrong, and your conveying that interest doesn't compel me to share it.
I think a serious consideration of compatibilism will reveal the flaws in your argument. I could possibly be in error here, but if I am, then I have a vested interest in correcting that error, which counters your vested interest in forestalling discussion of it.
So our interests conflict.
and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. — Lida Rose
...but that's the thing... you don't have to reiterate your disinterest in it. All you have to do is not reply. This is a public forum, not your email inbox. So others may be interested in the flaws of your arguments even if you aren't.
But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile: — Lida Rose
In this case, inaction speaks louder than words. But it's also irrelevant to me anyway. Disinterest is not a compelling argument. — InPitzotl
Not an argument at all, just two definitions.Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose
Here's what I don't get about this type of argument. — Pantagruel
No it isn't. Whereas "capacity " is a noun indicating "actual or potential ability to perform, yield, or withstand," "initiating" is a verb showing "to begin, set going, or originate."The very definition, "having the capacity to act" is equivalent to "initiating an action" i.e. autotelic behaviour. — Pantagruel
Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP where I said,I personally find the whole free will debate a bit fishy, on all sides... people have been arguing this stuff for well over 2 millennia... certainly something's off. I find that incredibly interesting.But I find it a bit suspicious that this thread had "Praising A Rock" in the title, — InPitzotl
This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be praised or blamed for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. — Lida Rose
1,172 words to be exact, but who cares other than yourself? And, you mistake argument for complaint. Moreover, I never brought up compatibilism. I believe you were the first to do that.that you wrote a 1000+ word op on a philosophy forum complaining about free will, that compatibilism allows for assigning praise and blame in such a way that none of your points stick, and that you find no interest in it. — InPitzotl
No it isn't. In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism, which is why I said "I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics"; something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile:There is something to this 2+ millennia old idea of compatibilism... it's not a reaction to (at least the modern) determinism. Several people besides me have already pointed this out. Just in case you're interested (the proper way to show lack of interest is to not reply). — InPitzotl
Compatibilism is the wimp's "Yah-but" way of skirting around their acceptance of determinism, and I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics."Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose
Well the conflicting case here is that of compatibilist free will. So a good model of that would start with an agent. Agents are entities that interact with the world continuously. Agents act with intention; i.e., they direct their behaviors towards goals. The intention per se, being an intention, can be described loosely as a meaningful direction of behavior. So if we are discussing free will, we are discussing the selection of an intention to act upon. In your question you're labeling these as Y and Z. In this compatiblist model, the nature of the options is that of counterfactual goals... Y is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Y, and Z is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Z. In a (minimally considered; Pfhorrest gives a more common practical criteria) compatibilist choice, the agent considers two such counterfactual goals and selects one of them to commit to act towards. Given compatibilism's definitive nature, the hypothesis is that this choice occurs in a way compatible with determinism... so in our model we can just commit to that and say that the choice happens deterministically.
Since you are asking the question of "how", I think that deterministic part is the part that bugs you, so let's get that out of the way. We may presume full determinism here. Compatibilists contend that only one outcome can happen in a deterministic universe. But as you apparently contended, only one thing will happen anyway. This would drive a libertarian nuts, since libertarians presume that unless there's some "ontic" way in which the considered-but-not-chosen path "could" happen, that it's impossible to assign responsibility to the agent. But compatibilists don't presume such a thing; all a compatibilist needs (minimally) to assign responsibility is to establish that it was the agent that made the choice. Compatibilist choices aren't "routings" of "reality itself" towards one of many "ontic futures"... they are merely selections of an action to commit to among a set of counterfactual considerations. So to a compatibilist it's simply not relevant how many of those futures there are... what's relevant is simply whether or not it was the subject that did the choosing (see first part of the post again). — InPitzotl
Thank you.I like your thinking and writing. — NOS4A2
External factors aside, yes.The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did.
This is a fundamental point you’re making. But I think it’s an argument for free will rather than against it, because isn’t the cause to each one of your actions, within each anterior state, yourself? — NOS4A2
If so it follows that you are the cause of your own actions. If you are both cause and effect, what other than yourself can determine your actions? — NOS4A2
Yesterday, post #4 by my count (Why the hell can't this site at least number posts?) I changed my definition of free will to "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." to better reflect the concept. Truly sorry you missed it.Again, let's backtrack. Here are your definitions:
Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose
Will, as defined here, requires that a subject is a controlling influence. Free will, as defined here, seems to suggest that it is an ability to be a controlling influence without having a controlling influence, which is just a contradiction. — InPitzotl
Only, because I changed my definition, let's try it your way.How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose
Nope; that's not my burden. It's your definition. If you want to talk about blameworthiness/praiseworthiness (for example), you have to show how lacking this vacuously impossible property makes such assignments impossible. — InPitzotl
You're absolutely right. I posted it amid three Zoom conference calls and in considering the issue during my free time failed to connect nondeterminism with randomness :facepalm: which may be because I seldom see randomness in this context referred to as nondeterminism. :shrug: AND, "indeterminism." is the proper word describing events that don't happen deterministically.But you said earlier that "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it." A non-deterministic world is just a world with randomness; randomness is the lack of determination, determination is the lack of randomness. — Pfhorrest
Ahhh,Did you see my tip for how to edit earlier?
Click the little pencil icon below and to the left of your post. You may need to click a "..." icon there first, to reveal the pencil icon. — Pfhorrest
Fine, but where does that get us? NOTE, I'm taking your " nondeterministic world" to only apply to the will. The rest of the world would be entirely deterministic, with the possible exception of quantum events.The way you construe free will, the relevant possibilities are a determining world and a nondeterministic world. — Pfhorrest
No, in a nondeterministic world free will has the possibility of existing, which it doesn't have in a deterministic world.Free will as you construe it stand the same (impossible) in either scenarios, and so doesn’t really mean anything. — Pfhorrest
I haven't the faintest idea. You'd have to as a free willer.What would “having free will” look like, in an imaginary world where you had it? — Pfhorrest
By default it would have to be a nondeterministic (see my NOTE above) world.That imaginary world can’t be deterministic, and it can’t be nondeterministic, so what would you actually imagine “free will” to be? — Pfhorrest
I fail to see the import of the fact that A2a, the past is fixed, although true, bear B, the outcome will be what it will be. It's like, Okay, so what?I agree that if (A1) the universe is deterministic, then (B) the outcome will be what it will be. However, I can derive (B) from a much weaker premise than (A1); namely, I can derive it from (A2a) the past is fixed (i.e., there are facts about the past, and they do not change), and (A2b) A2a applies at all points in time including future points. But that leads to a question of what you mean by free will again. — InPitzotl
Again, so what? The problem is you've yet to demonstrate the mechanism by which the will freely works. How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? If you say it's because of M then you have the added task off showing how M works as it does. And if you say it's because of J &W then the same requirement applies to them as well. It's turtles all the way down---or back as the case may be.Here's how it works. Assume I have free will by this definition, and I will use that to perform an act a few moments from now. I will either do A, or I will do B; right now I haven't made up my mind (and again we're presuming it will be done by free will). But by A2a, tomorrow I will have done one of these things; perhaps I can resolve to even say tomorrow: "Yesterday I did X", where X is either A or B. I can possibly do that because by tomorrow, a few moments ago will be yesterday; and per A2a there's a fact about what I did, and it will not change. But everything I just said, by A2b, is true today (bear with me, lots of qualifiers). So today, it is true that tomorrow I will be able to say "Yesterday I did X" where X is either A or B, and be able to say it factually. Therefore, today it is true that the outcome of what I do a few moments from now will be what it will be (e.g., what it will be tomorrow). — InPitzotl
Damn web site. :rage: I don't know if it makes any difference, but what I meant to say, but was unable to correct, is "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it."That conclusion suggests you’re employing an incoherent notion of “freedom” that doesn’t actually distinguish some possibilities from others, since in every possible scenario it renders itself impossible. — Pfhorrest
A gave a more useful concept that actually distinguishes between things we care above early in the thread. — Pfhorrest
You're right. Whether an act is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom.I just mean that it doesn’t matter how well determined the process is, how much randomness features in it; it doesn’t matter for the purpose of freedom. — Pfhorrest
From my book, the chapter on Free Will. Would love to get your thoughts, dear all. — Shashidhar Sastry
So let's play our own predict-a-pig game. I have a box with a light bulb, a button, and a two way switch (left/right) on it. You're charged to press the button on the box, but before you do, you have to pull a Nostradamus. Your charge is to predict whether the bulb will light up or not. To indicate your prediction, if you think the bulb will light up, you should ensure the switch is in the left position. If you think it will stay off, you indicate that by ensuring the switch is in the right position.
If you believe in fate, then you can easily win my challenge. All you need is a Nostradamus. That bulb is either going to be lit or not; just figure out which one and you're nearly done. Indicate that knowledge with the switch position, and my evil complicated box design will be thwarted. — InPitzotl
The fact of being required.What does necessity mean in this context? (I'm good on fate btw, but I think too many people confuse fate with determinism). — InPitzotl
How could it not be determined?The processes that lead to that outcome could be determined or not, — Pfhorrest
Ahhhh, so that's it. I've always wondered what being free to desire what you desire to desire was called.Will is desire. Free will is when you are free to desire what you desire to desire. — Pfhorrest
But why is one desire ultimately more persuasive than another desire? And how did that "more persuasiveness" arise?Will basically is just desire, specifically whichever desire it is that ultimately moves you to act. — Pfhorrest
First you said that will is desire, "Will basically is just desire," but now you're saying that will that's free controls desire. Free will controls itself? Fine, but then something has to work as a causal (deterministic) agent.Free will is the ability to control what you desire, or at least which desire it is that ultimate moves you to act. — Pfhorrest
To be free of will, in the useful functional sense above, is for your desires about {which of your desires are causally effective on your behavior} to be causally effective on your behavior. — Pfhorrest
I think I agree.To be free of will in the sense of being free from determination is not only useless, but counterproductive, leaving your actions random, uncontrollable by you, and so you unaccountable for them. — Pfhorrest
Thanks. But no ability to edit? Boy, that's almost a membership breaker.In the menus on the left, bottom section, you want "Useful Hints and Tips". — InPitzotl
Having gone through a journey of discovery, I find I have firmly landed as a hard determinist. But I am having a heck of a time finding any writing that addressed how we should live our mental lives as a hard determinist. I have a lot of ideas on the topic but was hoping not to have to try to reinvent the wheel. My moderate search over the last few months has only turned up a few paragraphs that directly address this problem. I'm hoping to find a writing on how to view justice, personal motivation, and the like, for a hard determinist. Anybody know of such a how-to writing??