As I see it, free will is important to many because without it would mean each of is nothing more than an atomaton, which is anathema to the notion personal freedom. If I have no freedom of choice how can I be praised or blamed for what I do? For Christians this has the added consequence of robbing the concept of sin/salvation of any meaning. So most people are loath to even entertain the idea of no free will. Free will is almost always regarded as a given.

Any exception to free will is seen as temporary constraint. "I am free to to do this or that unless someone/thing comes and prevents it. Of course this isn't at all what the issue of free will is about. Free will is about the idea that, aside from any external constraints, "I could have chosen to do differently if I wished." So I think a decent working definition of "free will" is just that: the ability to do differently if one wished, which is a very common definition of "free will."

Those who most disagree with this are most often hard determinists, people claiming that everything we do has a cause. And because everything we do is caused then we could not have done differently, therefore it's absurd to place blame or praise. A pretty drastic notion, and one rejected by almost everyone. So whatever else is said about the issue of free will ultimately it must come down to this very basic level: Are we free to do other than what we chose or not? I say, No you are not. Free will is an illusion. But before going into why, we first need to get rid of the term "choice" because it assumes to be true the condition under consideration, freedom to do what we want. So no use of "choice," "choosing," or any of its other cognates.

Here's how I see it.
There are only two ways actions take place; completely randomly, or caused. By "completely randomly" I mean absolutely and utterly random, not an action which, for some reason, we do not or cannot determine a cause. This excludes things such as the "random" roll of dice. Dice land as they do because of the laws of physics, and although we may not be able to identify and calculate how dice land it doesn't mean that the end result is not caused. This is the most common notion of "random" events: those we are unable to predict and appear to come about by pure chance. The only place where true randomness, an absolutely uncaused event is said to occur is at the subatomic level, which has no effect on superatomic events, those at which we operate. And I don't think anyone would suggest that's how we operate anyway, completely randomly: what we do is for absolutely no reason whatsoever. So that leaves non-randomness as the operative agent of our actions. We do this or that because. . . . And the "cause" in "because" is telling. It signals a deterministic operation at work. What we do is determined by something. Were it not, what we do would be absolutely random in nature: for absolutely no reason at all. But as all of us claim from time to time, we do have reasons for what we do. And these reasons are the causes that negate any randomness.

So, because what we do obviously has a cause, could we have done differently? Not unless the causes had been different. If I end up at home after going for a walk it would be impossible to end up at my neighbor's house if I took the exact same route. Of course I could take a different route and still wind up at home, but I would still be in the same position of not ending up at my neighbor's. To do that there would have had to be a different set of circumstances (causes) at work. But there weren't so I had no option but to wind up at home. The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with our decisions. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did. There was no freedom to do any differently.

What does this all mean then? It means that we cannot do any any differently than what we do. Our actions are caused (determined) by previous events and nothing else. Even our wishing to think we could have done otherwise is a mental event that was determined by all the cause/effect events that led to it. We think as we do because. . . . And that "because" could never have been any different than what it was. The operation of our will is at the mercy of everything that directs it. We have no will to do anything other than what we're caused to do. In effect then, a free will does not exist, nor does choice.

Of course this means that blame and praise come out as pretty hollow concepts. If you cannot do other than what you did why should you be blamed or praised for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. Of course we can still claim to have free will if we define the term as being free of external constraints, but that's not really addressing free will, and why free will exists as an issue. The free will issue exists because people claim "I could have done differently if I had wished." Problem is, of course, they didn't wish differently because . . . .


.

Lida Rose
Not at all. Pain and misery in this world is just a sample of what goes on in hell. — Wheatley

No doubt not even close to Hell, but okay.

God wants us to know what hell feels like in this world so we don't sin, and up in actual hell, which is unimaginably horrible and painful. Isn't God merciful? — Wheatley

As long as you've asked, considering that he inflicts pain and misery to some degree or another on everyone, including those who have no idea there's a Get-Out-Of-Hell card that can be played, No, he isn't merciful at all, but rather comes across as a divine masochist who doesn't give a **** about anyone other than those fortunate to be let into his game. Everyone else be damned, as it were.

He gives us the gift of knowing what hell feels like, so smart people will make decision not to sin. Its people who are unable to make rational decisions that have to worry, but most of us dont care about them (pfff, losers...). — Wheatley

And ain't that nice. All those who, through no choice of their own, happened to have been created dumb or unable to make rational decisions please line up at gates 6 through 666 for the next train to Hell. The ignorant may board at gates 667 through 6,666.

Clearly God believes pain and misery is extremely beneficial to mankind. — Wheatley

Then obviously Heaven is Hell and Hell is Heaven.

Aside from the old saw that time exists to keep everything from happening at once, it only exists where successive events occurs. If absolutely nothing, and I mean a b s o l u t e l y n-o-t-h-i-n-g occurs then time. " a nonspatial continuum that is measured in terms of events which succeed one another from past through present to future." does flow (exist).

the idea of eternal damnation as a punishment is unfair. — Wheatley

Only to a fair god and morally-minded people.

Conclusion: Either God is fair and merciful, or he sends people hell eternally. — Wheatley

Why can't god be an immoral slave owner (the god of Abraham does condone slavery) who delights in infecting children with bone cancer? After all, as an omniscient and omnipotent being the god of Abraham certainly has the power to foresee such an affliction and prevent it.

Eternal damnation is just one of the pieces that goes into the construction of the Christian scheme to draw in and keep paying members to its various organizations.

The Scheme:

1. Tell people there is an unseen, loving, benevolent, all powerful being (god) who will look after them, help them when asked to, and even protect them when such protection goes unrecognized.

2. Tell them this can all be achieved in part by praising him, promising your fidelity to him, and loving him.

3. Tell them that if they have lived led a life that pleases this god, and meets one additional requirement, he will see to it that after they die they will spend the rest of their "life" in a paradise (heaven).

4. Tell them that to accomplish this they will have to become members of your organization, support it with time and money, and adhere to all its beliefs and requirements.

5. Make sure they understand that your organization, and no other, possesses the true means of accomplishing all of the above.

6. Then tell them about the additional requirement. Tell them they must accept god's only son, Jesus, as their savior from what god will do to them if they don't meet the requirements as laid out by your organization.

7. Tell them that if they don't meet these requirements god will not send them to heaven after they die, but instead send them to hell, a place of fire and brimstone where they will suffer in anguish for all ETERNITY. A payback sometimes called Eternal Damnation.

8. Tell them that when they come meetings to hear more about the goodness of their new found god and his threat of eternal damnation they may leave their offerings to their adopted religious organization in the form of cash, check, or credit/debit card.

Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. — Lida Rose

But, conversely, your experience of choosing is supported by determinism?[/quotte]
Any such choosing is no more than an illusion.

— Echarmion

No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. — Lida Rose

Logically, there have to be some things that don't have any further machinery behind them. Otherwise, you run into an infinite recursion of machinery behind machinery. Do you agree? — Echarmion

Why does there "have to be"?

Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. — Lida Rose

That's not actually true. Quantum physics aren't deterministic in this sense. There are multiple outcomes from a single cause. — Echarmion

I've already conceded that QM events may be random, and I'm not about to qualify determinism every time I mention its ubiquity.

Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm. — Lida Rose

There is no foundational explanation of space and time, cause end effect, either. Physics describes those, but it doesn't provide a "foundational explanation". — Echarmion

See here

And

See here

If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary. — Lida Rose
— Echarmion

The process is known, as I have already pointed out. It's just that this process is for some reason considered "not good enough" because it doesn't look like the kind of explanation we see in physics. But physics is just another product of the mind.

Naming a process and presuming to "know" it doesn't explain it.

An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else. — Lida Rose

Illusion is the wrong word. Illusion suggests a percept, and the notion of free will you're describing is not a percept. Feelings of control, feelings of agency behind an action, and feelings of authorship are percepts, but none of those are based on perceiving alternate futures. — InPitzotl

I'll let you figure out out which meaning I have in mind.


il·​lu·​sion | \ i-ˈlü-zhən
   \
plural illusions
Definition of illusion

1a(1) : a misleading image presented to the vision : optical illusion
(2) : something that deceives or misleads intellectually
b(1) : perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature
(2) : hallucination sense 1
(3) : a pattern capable of reversible perspective
2a(1) : the state or fact of being intellectually deceived or misled : misapprehension
(2) : an instance of such deception
b obsolete : the action of deceiving
3 : a fine plain transparent bobbinet or tulle usually made of silk and used for veils, trimmings, and dresses

(Source: MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY)

But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary. — Lida Rose


And yet this is rather implied by "I could have done otherwise," unless we take that to mean nothing more than "I was capable of doing otherwise." — Kenosha Kid

Not if one takes the definition of "arbitrary" into consideration

ar·bi·trar·y
/ˈärbəˌtrerē/

adjective
adjective: arbitrary
based on random choice or personal whim, rather than any reason or system.

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead. — Lida Rose

Perhaps not "just as well". — Kenosha Kid

The illusion assumes equal opportunity.

On which, I notice whenever I see this question in the context of philosophy instead of psychology, the actual process of decision-making never enters into it. The act of choosing may as well be instantaneous and arbitrary, and therefore is not realistic. — Kenosha Kid

But for perhaps the rare exception, I don't believe a free willer sees any of his choices as arbitrary.

The "just as well" point is pertinent, for instance. Human decision-making involves a human in a given mental and emotional state, in a given situation, within a given interval of time (short for urgent problems, long for non-urgent ones), weighing up the potential efficacies of each of a tiny subset of available options drawn from personal experience and emotional reactivity from an uncountably large number of actual possibilities to affect a desired outcome. It sounds deterministic... because it probably is. — Kenosha Kid

:up:

Ah, sorry for not being clear. I meant to ask what your definition of an illusion is in this context. — Echarmion

Okay,
An illusion in this context is: the impression that when you do (did) something, you could
just as well choose to do (have chosen to do) something else.

But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears. — Lida Rose

So, this makes me wonder why you dismiss the thing you have first-hand experience of. — Echarmion

Because my experience isn't supported by appealing to a free will as its cause. No one has yet to divulge the machinery that drives a free will decision. They simply assert "It Is," and walk away. Meanwhile, it's well agreed upon that everything else in the universes is deterministic. Every outcome is preceded by cause/effect events that inexorably led up to that very outcome and no other. Except, that is, stuff people decide to do. The stuff people decide to do is controlled by free will, and what's free will . . . . . . . ? "HEY! look at that rabbit over there in the underbrush. Ain't he big. Must go a good five pounds, at least."

You're asking for an explanation, but why do you expect there to be an explanation? — Echarmion

Because If there is no foundational explanation for free will then why bother to accept it as true, other than to save oneself from the onerous thought that a person has no control over their thoughts or behavior? One may as well suppose that faeries are at its helm.

You expect choice to be the result of some other, more basic process, but I don't think there is a rational reason to expect that. — Echarmion

If there's no basic process (reason) for choosing A over B then the event could just as well be one of choosing B over A, there being no reason for either. A mental world of true randomness; we do things for absolutely no reason what so ever. When it comes to human activities, mental or otherwise, we may as well take "because" out of our vocabulary.

No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so. — Lida Rose

What is an illusion in this context? — Echarmion

The impression that when you do (did) something, you could just as well choose to do (to have done) something else instead.

But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else. — Lida Rose

Well you asked for an operation. If you didn't want to hear about it, why did you ask? — Echarmion

But I do want to hear about it, only something more than the name of an operation I've already dismissed as true. If you truly want to claim choosing is an explanation then tell us the process by which one arrives at choosing A rather than B. I'm all ears.

Have a nice day — Lida Rose

Thank you, you too, and I mean that sincerely! Behind all these terminals, we're all just ordinary people.

But let's keep the idle chat down (and the sarcasm)... this forum has a purpose... it's a community of people with a shared interest. That's what we're all here for, and that's whose stage you're borrowing from our kind hosts. — InPitzotl

You're quite right, and I apologize for the characterization.

having the "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action" to be more precise. — Pantagruel

Well it's that precision that makes all the difference. So yes, "capacity to act" is the same thing as having the "capacity to initiate an action"

So if you can "initiate" an action that is the definition of autotelic. — Pantagruel

I always thought "autotelic" meant something like having a purpose not outside itself, (yup, it does---just looked it up) and the purpose to initiate a whole slew of things certainly exists outside the act of initiation.

I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. — Lida Rose


You don't have direct personal experience of yourself choosing between two options? — Echarmion

No, like everyone else, I only have the illusion of doing so.

Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B? — Lida Rose

The operation you perform when you choose. Namely, weighing all the different reasons for choosing one or the other and deciding which side tips the scale. — Echarmion

But one doesn't, in fact can't, choose. (We're talking freely choose as with a free will) A person can only do what they're inexorably led to do, and nothing else.

Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP — Lida Rose

And that thing in your OP comes from your intuitions. You have libertarian intuitions; that is, you intuit PAP. But you're not the only one with intuitions; compatibilists have intuitions too. But there's an overall context implied by the fact that you're posting on a philosophy forum... I would think people actually interested in philosophy should be interested in analyzing and questioning their intuitions, especially if the intuitions are not universal.

where I said, "This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you (A)cannot do other than what you did

But that means less than what you're making it out to mean. A rabbit (B)can go into my shed, but an adult blue whale (B)cannot go into my shed. I had lemonade last night, but I (C)could have had milk. (A), (B), and (C) all use different senses of the world could/can.

You're presenting a pet theory... that one (D)cannot be assigned praise/blame if one (A)cannot do other than what they do. But why (D)can't they? Why (D)can't someone be assigned praise/blame based on whether or not the (C)could have done otherwise as opposed to (A)could have?

I don't think your pet theory has weight; rather, I think your intuition's messed up.

why should you be praised or blamed for them?

If I choose with intention, because I chose with intention.

To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter."

The rock is not an agent; people are agents. People act with intention; rocks do not go to places due to intentions. People actually mean to do what they (intentionally) do; rocks do not. Those are significant and relevant differences. It's impossible to blame a rock for being where it is because the rock didn't "mean" to go there, but the same cannot be said of a person acting with intent. In fact, it's not even the actual act we tend to hold people responsible for... it is just the intent behind it. (This isn't always true, but in the ways relevant to praise/blame it's true enough for government work as they say).

That we (A)can't do other than what we will do is simply a consequence of the fact that there's only one reality, but we still in that reality are causes of the thing we intend. Determinism doesn't conflict with the fact that we act based on intentions; in fact, the suggestion that we act based on intentions is causal by nature.

In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. — Lida Rose

I'm not buying into that narrative. From start to end, this is a public forum, and when you reply someone it's like ringing their doorbell, especially with this setup. Also, you're not merely indicating your disinterest; you're advancing arguments. And this is not "a whole other path of discussion", it is the thing you're discussing... you're explicit here that you're interested in praise and blame in this previous reply.

I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism — Lida Rose

But your alleged interest does not compel me to share it. And your discussion about compatibilism is where the primary weakness of your argument against the ability to assign blame/praise lies. In theory we could talk about original causation as a third mechanic (besides determinism/randomness), but I think the biggest problem is your acceptance of PAP. It's reasonable to reject original causation until the burden is met demonstrating that it is indeed a possible mechanic, and whereas libertarians tend to demonstrate this by appealing to the fact that we have free will and that it's impossible without PAP, I don't see that as compelling... especially when PAP itself is suspect.

something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it — Lida Rose

...of course it hasn't "worked"; I don't share your interest in forestalling discussions of why you're wrong, and your conveying that interest doesn't compel me to share it.

I think a serious consideration of compatibilism will reveal the flaws in your argument. I could possibly be in error here, but if I am, then I have a vested interest in correcting that error, which counters your vested interest in forestalling discussion of it.

So our interests conflict.

and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. — Lida Rose

...but that's the thing... you don't have to reiterate your disinterest in it. All you have to do is not reply. This is a public forum, not your email inbox. So others may be interested in the flaws of your arguments even if you aren't.

But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile: — Lida Rose

In this case, inaction speaks louder than words. But it's also irrelevant to me anyway. Disinterest is not a compelling argument. — InPitzotl

Have a nice day

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Here's what I don't get about this type of argument. — Pantagruel

Not an argument at all, just two definitions.

The very definition, "having the capacity to act" is equivalent to "initiating an action" i.e. autotelic behaviour. — Pantagruel

No it isn't. Whereas "capacity " is a noun indicating "actual or potential ability to perform, yield, or withstand," "initiating" is a verb showing "to begin, set going, or originate."

I personally find the whole free will debate a bit fishy, on all sides... people have been arguing this stuff for well over 2 millennia... certainly something's off. I find that incredibly interesting.But I find it a bit suspicious that this thread had "Praising A Rock" in the title, — InPitzotl

Suspect away, but just to remind you, it comes from my OP where I said,

This means that praise and blame come out as pretty hollow concepts. As I mentioned, if you cannot do other than what you did why should you be praised or blamed for them? To do so is like blaming or praising a rock for where it lies. It had no "choice" in the matter. — Lida Rose

that you wrote a 1000+ word op on a philosophy forum complaining about free will, that compatibilism allows for assigning praise and blame in such a way that none of your points stick, and that you find no interest in it. — InPitzotl

1,172 words to be exact, but who cares other than yourself? And, you mistake argument for complaint. Moreover, I never brought up compatibilism. I believe you were the first to do that.

There is something to this 2+ millennia old idea of compatibilism... it's not a reaction to (at least the modern) determinism. Several people besides me have already pointed this out. Just in case you're interested (the proper way to show lack of interest is to not reply). — InPitzotl

No it isn't. In polite discourse the proper way to indicate one's disinterest in going down a whole other path of discussion is to let it be known. I have an interest in forestalling any further discussion about compatilibism, which is why I said "I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics"; something that obviously hasn't worked because here you are still wanting to talk about it and me having to reiterate my :yawn: with it. But be assured, this will be my last word about it to you. :smile:

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Well the conflicting case here is that of compatibilist free will. So a good model of that would start with an agent. Agents are entities that interact with the world continuously. Agents act with intention; i.e., they direct their behaviors towards goals. The intention per se, being an intention, can be described loosely as a meaningful direction of behavior. So if we are discussing free will, we are discussing the selection of an intention to act upon. In your question you're labeling these as Y and Z. In this compatiblist model, the nature of the options is that of counterfactual goals... Y is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Y, and Z is something that "could" be done in the sense that there exists a known way to initiate an action and direct it towards Z. In a (minimally considered; Pfhorrest gives a more common practical criteria) compatibilist choice, the agent considers two such counterfactual goals and selects one of them to commit to act towards. Given compatibilism's definitive nature, the hypothesis is that this choice occurs in a way compatible with determinism... so in our model we can just commit to that and say that the choice happens deterministically.

Since you are asking the question of "how", I think that deterministic part is the part that bugs you, so let's get that out of the way. We may presume full determinism here. Compatibilists contend that only one outcome can happen in a deterministic universe. But as you apparently contended, only one thing will happen anyway. This would drive a libertarian nuts, since libertarians presume that unless there's some "ontic" way in which the considered-but-not-chosen path "could" happen, that it's impossible to assign responsibility to the agent. But compatibilists don't presume such a thing; all a compatibilist needs (minimally) to assign responsibility is to establish that it was the agent that made the choice. Compatibilist choices aren't "routings" of "reality itself" towards one of many "ontic futures"... they are merely selections of an action to commit to among a set of counterfactual considerations. So to a compatibilist it's simply not relevant how many of those futures there are... what's relevant is simply whether or not it was the subject that did the choosing (see first part of the post again). — InPitzotl

Compatibilism is the wimp's "Yah-but" way of skirting around their acceptance of determinism, and I have absolutely no interest in their "apologetics."

I like your thinking and writing. — NOS4A2

Thank you.

The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determined where I ended up. So to is it with what we do. We do what we do because all the relevant preceding cause/effect events inexorably led up to that very act and no other. We HAD to do what we did.


This is a fundamental point you’re making. But I think it’s an argument for free will rather than against it, because isn’t the cause to each one of your actions, within each anterior state, yourself? — NOS4A2

External factors aside, yes.

If so it follows that you are the cause of your own actions. If you are both cause and effect, what other than yourself can determine your actions? — NOS4A2

I'm not saying the determining causes must come from without, but only that they rob the will of freedom . . .whatever their origin. A person must do whatever he has been directed to do by all the relevant cause/effect events leading up to the moment of the doing. There is no such thing as choosing. To paraphrase: "The previous chain of cause/effects inexorably determine what a person does."

Thing is, if there aren't any determinant causes, as some people claim, then exactly what is the Operation that induces a person to choose A over B?

The fact remains, you could not have chosen to have a hot dog (see the OP), which is something free willer denies.

Again, let's backtrack. Here are your definitions:

Will is the capacity to act decisively on one's desires.
Free will is to do so undirected by controlling influences. — Lida Rose

Will, as defined here, requires that a subject is a controlling influence. Free will, as defined here, seems to suggest that it is an ability to be a controlling influence without having a controlling influence, which is just a contradiction. — InPitzotl

Yesterday, post #4 by my count (Why the hell can't this site at least number posts?) I changed my definition of free will to "The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate." to better reflect the concept. Truly sorry you missed it.

How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? — Lida Rose

Nope; that's not my burden. It's your definition. If you want to talk about blameworthiness/praiseworthiness (for example), you have to show how lacking this vacuously impossible property makes such assignments impossible. — InPitzotl

Only, because I changed my definition, let's try it your way.

Define "free will" however you like and then tell me how the will goes about choosing Y over Z?

But you said earlier that "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it." A non-deterministic world is just a world with randomness; randomness is the lack of determination, determination is the lack of randomness. — Pfhorrest

You're absolutely right. I posted it amid three Zoom conference calls and in considering the issue during my free time failed to connect nondeterminism with randomness :facepalm: which may be because I seldom see randomness in this context referred to as nondeterminism. :shrug: AND, "indeterminism." is the proper word describing events that don't happen deterministically.

Did you see my tip for how to edit earlier?

Click the little pencil icon below and to the left of your post. You may need to click a "..." icon there first, to reveal the pencil icon. — Pfhorrest

Ahhh,
1.Highlight,
2.click on "Options"
3. click on the pencil
4. make the correction

Thanks.
It would help newbies a lot if these functions were plainly laid out somewhere.

The way you construe free will, the relevant possibilities are a determining world and a nondeterministic world. — Pfhorrest

Fine, but where does that get us? NOTE, I'm taking your " nondeterministic world" to only apply to the will. The rest of the world would be entirely deterministic, with the possible exception of quantum events.

Free will as you construe it stand the same (impossible) in either scenarios, and so doesn’t really mean anything. — Pfhorrest

No, in a nondeterministic world free will has the possibility of existing, which it doesn't have in a deterministic world.

What would “having free will” look like, in an imaginary world where you had it? — Pfhorrest

I haven't the faintest idea. You'd have to as a free willer.

That imaginary world can’t be deterministic, and it can’t be nondeterministic, so what would you actually imagine “free will” to be? — Pfhorrest

By default it would have to be a nondeterministic (see my NOTE above) world.

I agree that if (A1) the universe is deterministic, then (B) the outcome will be what it will be. However, I can derive (B) from a much weaker premise than (A1); namely, I can derive it from (A2a) the past is fixed (i.e., there are facts about the past, and they do not change), and (A2b) A2a applies at all points in time including future points. But that leads to a question of what you mean by free will again. — InPitzotl

I fail to see the import of the fact that A2a, the past is fixed, although true, bear B, the outcome will be what it will be. It's like, Okay, so what?

Here's how it works. Assume I have free will by this definition, and I will use that to perform an act a few moments from now. I will either do A, or I will do B; right now I haven't made up my mind (and again we're presuming it will be done by free will). But by A2a, tomorrow I will have done one of these things; perhaps I can resolve to even say tomorrow: "Yesterday I did X", where X is either A or B. I can possibly do that because by tomorrow, a few moments ago will be yesterday; and per A2a there's a fact about what I did, and it will not change. But everything I just said, by A2b, is true today (bear with me, lots of qualifiers). So today, it is true that tomorrow I will be able to say "Yesterday I did X" where X is either A or B, and be able to say it factually. Therefore, today it is true that the outcome of what I do a few moments from now will be what it will be (e.g., what it will be tomorrow). — InPitzotl

Again, so what? The problem is you've yet to demonstrate the mechanism by which the will freely works. How does the will go about choosing Y over Z? If you say it's because of M then you have the added task off showing how M works as it does. And if you say it's because of J &W then the same requirement applies to them as well. It's turtles all the way down---or back as the case may be.

That conclusion suggests you’re employing an incoherent notion of “freedom” that doesn’t actually distinguish some possibilities from others, since in every possible scenario it renders itself impossible. — Pfhorrest

Damn web site. :rage: I don't know if it makes any difference, but what I meant to say, but was unable to correct, is "Whether an event is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom to create it."

And, just what are these relevant possibilities?

1.___________

2. ___________

3. ___________

4. ___________

A gave a more useful concept that actually distinguishes between things we care above early in the thread. — Pfhorrest

This isn't making sense. Please rephrase.

I just mean that it doesn’t matter how well determined the process is, how much randomness features in it; it doesn’t matter for the purpose of freedom. — Pfhorrest

You're right. Whether an act is wholly determined, wholly random, or a combination of the two, it robs the will of all freedom.

From my book, the chapter on Free Will. Would love to get your thoughts, dear all. — Shashidhar Sastry

I was going to reply, but decided not to so as not to take the thread off course. I suggest you make a separate thread to get feedback on your book. It looks interesting. Flawed, but interesting. :chin:
.

So let's play our own predict-a-pig game. I have a box with a light bulb, a button, and a two way switch (left/right) on it. You're charged to press the button on the box, but before you do, you have to pull a Nostradamus. Your charge is to predict whether the bulb will light up or not. To indicate your prediction, if you think the bulb will light up, you should ensure the switch is in the left position. If you think it will stay off, you indicate that by ensuring the switch is in the right position.

If you believe in fate, then you can easily win my challenge. All you need is a Nostradamus. That bulb is either going to be lit or not; just figure out which one and you're nearly done. Indicate that knowledge with the switch position, and my evil complicated box design will be thwarted. — InPitzotl

In as much as the ability to predict X or any kind of knowledge of the factors behind it has absolutely nothing to do with the operation of determinism I fail to see their relevance here. The outcome will be what it will be.

What does necessity mean in this context? (I'm good on fate btw, but I think too many people confuse fate with determinism). — InPitzotl

The fact of being required.

The processes that lead to that outcome could be determined or not, — Pfhorrest

How could it not be determined?

Will is desire. Free will is when you are free to desire what you desire to desire. — Pfhorrest

Ahhhh, so that's it. I've always wondered what being free to desire what you desire to desire was called.

Will basically is just desire, specifically whichever desire it is that ultimately moves you to act. — Pfhorrest

But why is one desire ultimately more persuasive than another desire? And how did that "more persuasiveness" arise?

Free will is the ability to control what you desire, or at least which desire it is that ultimate moves you to act. — Pfhorrest

First you said that will is desire, "Will basically is just desire," but now you're saying that will that's free controls desire. Free will controls itself? Fine, but then something has to work as a causal (deterministic) agent.

To be free of will, in the useful functional sense above, is for your desires about {which of your desires are causally effective on your behavior} to be causally effective on your behavior. — Pfhorrest

Hmmmm. :roll:

To be free of will in the sense of being free from determination is not only useless, but counterproductive, leaving your actions random, uncontrollable by you, and so you unaccountable for them. — Pfhorrest

I think I agree.

In the menus on the left, bottom section, you want "Useful Hints and Tips". — InPitzotl

Thanks. But no ability to edit? Boy, that's almost a membership breaker.

Back to the drawing board with this, for rewrite, adjustment, clarification. Is not a desire a controlling influence? Even "controlling influence" is a problem. If it controls, it's more than an influence, and if it's an influence, then in itself it does not control.


You're right, it's poorly worded. I'll go along with:

"The power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate."


Not chosen? Not "influenced"?


In as much as the possible randomness of quantum events doesn't affect neural processing, being chosen and being influenced would be caused reactions.

And I need a bit of help here in quoting folk here. Exactly how is it done? I've been cutting and pasting, and attaching names. ALSO, is there an edit function?

Thanks for your help.

It's interesting that after bemoaning the nature of a deterministic universe you end up saying,

". . . I do not believe in pure determinism. The way I see it, it implies a universe which was pre-ordained in the moment of creation and whose evolution is ruled by sort of a cosmic DNA. "

It's as if because you don't like the implication it can't be true. Liking or not liking something because it does not sit well with a person is hardly justification to dismiss it, unless, that is, one feels their feelings should trump reason and evidence.

As for one's existence not making any difference to the world at large, on average this will forever remain an unknown. For some like Dr. Martin Luther King, Joseph Stalin, and Donald Trump there's no doubt that their existence was destined to make an impact on the world, but so too was the illicit sexual conduct of Maria Anna Schicklgruber that resulted in the birth of Alois Hitler Sr., Adolph's father. As you've hinted, one simply never knows the role one will play in history. You may have already made an enormous difference to the world, OR perhaps none at all, But for sure, as just an average Joe you can't conclude you haven't or won't.

Having gone through a journey of discovery, I find I have firmly landed as a hard determinist. But I am having a heck of a time finding any writing that addressed how we should live our mental lives as a hard determinist. I have a lot of ideas on the topic but was hoping not to have to try to reinvent the wheel. My moderate search over the last few months has only turned up a few paragraphs that directly address this problem. I'm hoping to find a writing on how to view justice, personal motivation, and the like, for a hard determinist. Anybody know of such a how-to writing??

Please note, I'm brand new here, having joined just a few minutes ago, so please forgive any formatting gaffs.

Thank you.

As for your difficulty living as a hard determinist, keep in mind that any problem you may have is/was inevitable, and there is no such thing as choosing to make it better. That said, let me offer a few insights that may register and help out.

Although there's no such thing as free will, from what I've seen of like-minded folk we all eventually come to live with the illusion and act accordingly. We can't do otherwise. As a hard determinist myself, long ago I was persuaded to give up trying to focus on the inevitability of my actions and those of others. It led nowhere and was obviously a fruitless pursuit. So while intellectually aware that I never choose to do anything, I put this realization in the closet (I do take it out when discussing free will) and live the illusion---of course I have no choice in the matter. And living the illusion means accepting the injustice of holding people personally responsible for some of the hurtful and harmful things they do. Of course this also makes praise a pretty hollow concept as well, but that's simply the other side of the coin. What does save a person living such a two-faced existence is the surprise of the unexpected. None of us knows what's around the corner. So with this plus an acceptance of the illusion---putting the truth of determinism in the closet---life ain't all that bad.

I praise and blame just like a dyed-in-the-wool free willer, I can't do any differently.