'Objective and independent' stands in contradiction to 'within language'. — Wayfarer

Isn't it admirable within philosophical language to be objective and have an independent point of view?
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We cannot consider a mind-independent world, because to consider anything is to make it the subject of thought. You refer to 'the mind dependent' and 'mind independent' as if these are two separate realities, but that is comparison that can't be made. — Wayfarer

Yet we consider a mind-independent world every time we talk about the Universe before life began on Earth. For example, The Origins of the Universe by Michael Greshko
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I'll bow out now unless I have something to add specific to the text. — Wayfarer

The question is, is a discussion about the terms "mind dependent" and "mind independent", which Kant didn't use, relevant to a text that does refer to "phenomena" and "noumena"?

Kant was saying that pure intuitions and concepts are the the properties of our minds which work with pure reason in CPR. He is not interested in where they came from — Corvus

Possibly, but his philosophy isn't complete without asking where these a priori pure intuitions and a priori Categories came from.
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For example 2+2=4 is A priori knowledge, which is universally and necessarily true in the whole universe.----------------That sounds like extreme idealism. We are talking about the universally and necessarily true knowledge, and it exists. Again it is nothing to do with the physical universe. Knowledge exists in our understanding. Universally doesn't mean the physical universe. It means "under all conditions". — Corvus

When you refer to "universe" do you mean a universe within the mind or a universe external to the mind?
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You just committed a self-contradiction here. You shouldn't even be able to write about it, if above were true. — Corvus

From the Principle of Sufficient Reason, an appearance must have a cause, which may well be unknown. This unknown cause can be called "x", or even "Thing-in-Itself".
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But I know they exist, because I read about them. Just because I know something doesn't mean that I must believe in it too.-----------------I have demonstrated how the official definitions could be false, but you have gone back to the false official definition ignoring the real life demonstration and evidence. — Corvus

How can you know atoms exist, yet not believe in their existence?

When you say "Innatism", it denotes psychological or biological nature rather than epistemic, conceptual nature, and it has nothing to do what Kant was meaning for A priori. — Corvus

For Kant there is a priori pure intuition of space and time and the a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories)

These are necessary for the possibility of experience, and are priori to experience. They don't come from the mind but are part of the mind.

My question is, where did these pure intuitions and pure concepts come from?

From a perspective of today, I can explain them using the concept of Innatism, in that we were born with them as part of the structure of the brain as a consequence of 3.5 billion years of evolution.

If not from Innatism, where do you think our pure intuitions and pure concepts came from?
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For example 2+2=4 is A priori knowledge, which is universally and necessarily true in the whole universe. — Corvus

For Kant there is a priori pure intuition of space and time and the a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories).

For example, the Categories include quantity, quality, relation and modality, and quantity includes such things as all, both, most and some.

This allows us when looking at a set of objects to make judgements such as "all the objects green", "both objects are blue", "most of the objects are orange" and "some of the objects are purple".

Then, given ten objects of which six are orange, some of these statements will be true and some will be false. For example, the statement "most of the objects are orange" will be true.

As no situation can be imagined whereby given ten objects of which six are orange, the statement "most of the objects are orange" will not be true, meaning that it is universally and necessarily true.

However, the Categories don't apply to unknown Things-in-Themselves, but only to known Appearances.

As this is the case, then what does universal and necessary refer to. They cannot refer to the world of Things-in-Themselves, as these are unknowable, but can only refer to the world of Appearance, as only this is knowable, and the world of Appearance only exists in the mind of the perceiver.

Therefore, it is true that a priori knowledge is universally and necessarily true in the whole universe, but this universe only exists in the mind of the perceiver, not in any world that exists outside the mind of the perceiver.
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Justified true belief has stronger ground than a knowledge via heard through the grapevine. I really don't believe the electrons, atoms and Andromeda galaxies exist, because I have never seen them, or been there. But I know they exist, because I read about them. — Corvus

Knowledge is justified true belief, so knowledge has a stronger ground than belief.

If from the grapevine one hears the belief that atoms exist, and the grapevine justifies the claim, and in fact atoms do exist, then, and only then, is this knowledge.

But that is an oxymoron — Wayfarer

If the concept of "apple" didn't exist, how could we be talking about the concept of "apple"?
If the word "apple" wasn't real, how could we be writing about the word "apple"?
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Werner Heisenberg, who aside from being one of the architects of quantum theory, also wrote on its philosophical implications, said that electrons 'do not exist in the same way that flowers or stones do' — Wayfarer

Consider the mind and a mind-independent world.

As regards a mind-independent world, as flowers and stones are sets of elementary particles, flowers and stones must exist in the same way that elementary particles exist.

As regards the mind, as flowers, stones and elementary particles are concepts in the mind, elementary particles exist in the same way that flowers and stones do .

It is true that elementary particles, flowers and stones exist differently in the mind to how they exist in a mind-independent world.

As regards a mind-independent world, Plato's Forms are aspatial and atemporal, which is not the case for elementary particles.
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I too am an empirical realist - there really are apples - but I also recognise the sense in which they exist for a subject. Another kind of being might not see them at all, or might see them in a completely different way. It doesn't mean that they don't exist, but that they don't have inherent existence — Wayfarer

Yes, for the Empirical Realist, the apple that is perceived is a mere representation, not something that is mind-independent.

When you say the apple exists, but doesn't have inherent existence, what do you mean?

I don't think your depiction of a priori as subjective is correct — Wayfarer

I agree that my innate ability to see the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm is not a subjective ability, although my seeing the colour red is a subjective experience .
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The problem with that view is that the manner in which electrons can be said to exist is not at all straightforward.........................We have to get our head around the role of the mind-brain in constructing/creating what we perceive as reality. — Wayfarer

Do electrons really exist?

It depends what you mean by "exist". The Merriam Webster Dictionary includes "exist" as "to have real being whether material or spiritual".

It depends what you mean by "real". The Merriam Webster Dictionary includes "real" as "having objective independent existence".

From my belief in Neutral Monism, I could ask the same question about apples: "Do apples really exist?"

My answer would be that yes, "apples" and "electrons" do exist, and they exist as concepts in the mind.

My answer would also be that "apples" and "electrons" are real in that they have an objective independent existence within language.

If A priori is just innate to you, and all different from person to person, then what is the point of A priori? Would it not better just as well call it as Relative concept rather than A priori? There must be some universality and necessity in truth on A priori, and that was what Kant was after in CPR.........................I can't know what your perception of WL700nm would be like, and that was the point. — Corvus

The point of the a priori is that it distinguishes two very different approaches to the relationship between the mind and the world.

It distinguishes between Innatism, the philosophical belief that one is born with certain ideas and knowledge, and Locke's idea that the mind at birth is a blank sheet, a tabula rasa, devoid of all ideas or knowledge, where all our ideas and knowledge arrive from experience.

For Kant, the mind has a role in constructing what we perceive as reality:
A239 - We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves.

I agree that there is the question as to the universality and necessity of such a priori ideas and knowledge :
Introduction - Kant also sought to defend against empiricists its underlying claim of the possibility of universal and necessary knowledge - what Kant called a priori knowledge, knowledge originating independently of experience, because no knowledge derived from any particular experience, or a posteriori knowledge, could justify a claim to universal and necessary validity.

As Hume showed, no a posteriori knowledge can justify a universal and necessary validity, in that a scientist can draw a conclusion from 1,000 measurements, yet that conclusion may be negated by the 1,001st measurement.

It is true that for me, my a priori ideas and knowledge, because they are a priori, ensure a universality and necessity to what I cognize. However, humans do not exist as a hive mind but as separate individuals.

My a priori ideas and knowledge ensure a universality and necessity to what I cognize, and your a priori ideas and knowledge ensure a universality and necessity to what you cognize. The question is, is there any reason to believe that your a priori ideas and knowledge are the same as my a priori ideas and knowledge. If not, even though there is a universality and necessity to our individual ideas and knowledge, our separate ideas and knowledge don't necessarily share a common universality and necessity.
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I know the Andromeda Galaxy exists, but I don't believe it exists. — Corvus

I think that this should be the other way round: "I believe the Andromeda Galaxy exists, but I don't know it exists"

The SEP article on The Analysis of Knowledge discusses knowledge as justified true belief. First one has a belief, and then one tries to justify this belief, and if one's belief is true, then one has knowledge

IE, belief comes before knowledge.
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Yes, but my question was how do you know it is real or illusion? — Corvus

The Merriam Webster Dictionary includes the meaning of "illusion" as
1a1 - a misleading image presented to the vision
1a2 - something that deceives or misleads intellectually
1b1 - perception of something objectively existing in such a way as to cause misinterpretation of its actual nature

If I perceive a tree, how do I know there is a real tree in the world or the tree only exists in my mind.

The Direct Realist would say that they perceive a tree, and the Indirect Realist would say that they perceive a representation of a tree.

For the Indirect Realist, if "illusion" means 1a2 or 1b1, then the tree is an illusion as the viewer is being misled in thinking that what they perceive of necessity actually exists in the world. If "illusion" means 1a1, then the tree is not an illusion, as the viewer is not being misled in thinking that their perception doesn't exist.

A priori means that it is universally true under all circumstances. — Corvus

The IEP article on A Priori and A Posteriori writes: An a priori concept is one that can be acquired independently of experience, which may – but need not – involve its being innate, while the acquisition of an a posteriori concept requires experience.

A Priori does not mean universally true for all people at all times. A priori means in a sense innate within a particular person. My private subjective experience of colour when seeing a wavelength of 700nm is innate to me.

How can you know that when you are look at a wavelength of 700nm, your private subjective experience of colour is the same as mine?
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How / Why do you justify your belief in something that you cannot prove it exists? — Corvus

I cannot prove that electrons exist, yet I believe they exist. I justify my belief from the numerous scientific articles that I have read that say that electrons do exist.

Do you believe that the Andromeda Galaxy exists? Can you prove that it exists?
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what is the relation between the colour you perceive (red), and the WL700nm? — Corvus

Totally mysterious. What do you think the relationship is?
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How does he know for certain what he is conscious of is not an illusion? — Corvus

Isn't this the argument against Direct Realism, in that if Direct Realism was true, the external world would be exactly as we perceive it. However, in the case of illusions, there is an obvious difference between our perception and reality. For example, when a pencil is placed in a glass of water, it can look crooked. But it isn't really crooked.

Kant was definitely not a Direct Realist.

How does the Direct Realist know when looking at something in the world, such as a tree, that what they think they are looking at is just an illusion?
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Does this mean, if something was conscious of itself, then it could be inside him? — Corvus

Not everyone agrees with Kant's Transcendental Argument.

If I am conscious of the passing of time, then I must be conscious of two different moments in time. But how is this possible if I only exist at one moment in time?

Any popular media based information will be flatly rejected as propaganda in all philosophical discussions unless proved and verified otherwise — Corvus

Yes, every source is open to doubt, even the SEP, which is the premier reference work in philosophy.

We know it is the premier work in philosophy because the Stanford Department of Philosophy says so. They write: The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (SEP) is the premier reference work in philosophy, and covers an enormous range of philosophical topics through in-depth entries.
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When you say, we impose space and temporal forms on the sensory experiences, it does imply we can also choose not to impose as well. — Corvus

No, because this imposition is a priori, and as priori is beyond choice. In the same way that when I see the wavelength of 700nm I have no choice as to what colour I perceive .
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Wasn't Kant refuting the rationalists rather than idealism? If it were idealists, who were they? — Corvus

As the Wikipedia article on Transcendental arguments concludes: He has not established that outer objects exist, but only that the concept of them is legitimate, contrary to idealism

From the Britannica article on Rationalism: Rationalism, in Western philosophy, the view that regards reason as the chief source and test of knowledge.

From Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy:Idealism is now usually understood in philosophy as the view that mind is the most basic reality and that the physical world exists only as an appearance to or expression of mind, or as somehow mental in its inner essence.

In B275, Kant mentions Berkeley as an example of a Dogmatic Idealist, someone who declares the existence of objects outside us to be either false or impossible

Kant is refuting Idealism as a belief rather than Rationalism as a method .
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What is the proof of the legitimacy of the concept that things exist independently of the mind? — Corvus

Speaking as an Indirect Realist, none. I believe that things exist independently of the mind, and can come up with reasons to justify my belief, but cannot prove it. Such is the nature of Indirect Realism.

This is a question for the Direct Realist, who does believe that they directly perceive things that exist independently of the mind.
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Any relevant quotes for this argument from CPR? — Corvus

In B275 is the section on The Refutation of Idealism

He includes the Theorem: The mere, but empirically determined, consciousness of my own existence proves the existence of objects in space outside me.

In B276 is the section Proof

I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This persistent thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me. Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. Now consciousness in time is necessarily combined with the consciousness of the possibility of this time-determination: Therefore it is also necessarily combined with the existence of the things outside me, as the condition of time-determination; i.e., the consciousness of my own existence is at the same time an immediate consciousness of the existence of other things outside me.

In other words:

1) I am conscious of my existence in time
2) Therefore I am conscious of something persisting in time
3) But this something that persists in time cannot be inside me, as this something cannot be conscious of itself
4) Therefore as this something that persists cannot be a representation inside me, this something that persists must be outside me.
5) Concluding that there must be something outside me, refuting Idealism which believes there is nothing outside me.

I don't subscribe to the most of Wiki info. — Corvus

As with most sources, whether Fox or CNN, whether the BBC or Talk TV, one has to make a personal judgement as to whether the source makes a logical and reasoned case.
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From the traditional logic perspective, they insist that contents is not dealt by logic. Fair enough on that. But from all the other logic, content itself is important part of logic. If you read Bolzano's Theory of Science, you would agree. — Corvus

What is a Transcendental argument

From the Wikipedia article on Transcendental arguments, which presumably uses transcendental logic, Kant used transcendental arguments to show that sensory experiences would not be possible if we did not impose their spatial and temporal forms on them

In the Critique of Pure Reason (1781) Kant developed one of philosophy's most famous transcendental arguments in 'The Deduction of the Pure Concepts of the Understanding'.[8] In the 'Transcendental Aesthetic', Kant used transcendental arguments to show that sensory experiences would not be possible if we did not impose their spatial and temporal forms on them, making space and time "conditions of the possibility of experience".

An example of a Transcendental argument is used by Kant in his refutation of idealism. Idealists believe that things have no existence independently of the mind. His Transcendental argument does not prove that things exist independently of the mind, only that the concept that things exist independently of the mind is legitimate.

Kant argues that:
1) since idealists acknowledge that we have an inner mental life, and
2) an inner life of self-awareness is bound up with the concepts of objects which are not inner, and which interact causally,
3) then we must have legitimate experience of outer objects which interact causally.

I can make a similar Transcendental argument:
1) A postbox emits a light having a wavelength of 700nm, and because I have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, I perceive the colour red.
2) I perceive the postbox as red not because the postbox is red but because I perceive the postbox as red.

My argument doesn't prove that the postbox is not red, but only the possibility that the postbox is not of necessity red.

Is "bachelors are unmarried" an analytical statement

As regards the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", when thinking about what the words refer to, as both "bachelor" and "unmarried men" refer to the same thing, the statement is analytic. However, when thinking about the sense of the words, as the sense of "bachelor" is different to the sense of "unmarried men", they don't refer to the same thing, and so is not an analytic statement.

IE, the content or sense of the words must be taken into account , not just their form or reference.

They sounded to have read somewhere about the traditional logic, and it is the only form of logic in existence, and have been opposing on the view that Logic can require contents for its operation. :roll: — Corvus

The SEP article on Kant’s Transcendental Arguments, section 3, shows that Kant is still relevant today.

Kant-inspired transcendental arguments against scepticism about the external world were developed with vigor in the mid-twentieth century, notably by P. F. Strawson, most famously in his Kantian reflections in The Bounds of Sense (1966). These arguments are often reinterpretations of, or at least inspired by, Kant’s Transcendental Deduction and his Refutation of Idealism.

The article writes that Strawson’s most famous transcendental argument in 1966 is modelled on the Transcendental Deduction, where Strawson's target is sense-datum experience.

However, according to the Wikipedia article on Logic, logic only deals with the form of an argument and not the content of an argument:
Logic is the study of correct reasoning. It includes both formal and informal logic. Formal logic is the science of deductively valid inferences or logical truths. It studies how conclusions follow from premises due to the structure of arguments alone, independent of their topic and content.

However, the Wikipedia article assumes the possibility of the separation of form from content. But that cannot be the case, in that if all the content was removed, what form would be left. If all the metal was removed from the Eiffel Tower, what would remain?

What pitfalls must i avoid in reading this section? — AmadeusD

I would say that the biggest pitfall is reading it in isolation of secondary sources, which might include:

IEP - Immanuel Kant: Logic
He insists that formal logic should abstract from all content of knowledge and deal only with our faculty of understanding (intellect, Verstand) and our forms of thought.

SEP - Kant’s Transcendental Arguments
Among Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) most influential contributions to philosophy is his development of the transcendental argument. In Kant’s conception, an argument of this kind begins with a compelling premise about our thought, experience, or knowledge, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a substantive and unobvious presupposition and necessary condition of this premise.

The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic - Clinton Tolley - University of California
Unlike the traditional logic, which focuses only on the form of thinking and judging, Kant intends his new transcendental logic to focus on the content of thinking and judging, albeit in a very abstract manner.

Generation Online - Transcendental Logic
Kant defines transcendental logic, on the other hand, as a subdivision of general logic, and distinguishes it from general logic in so far as transcendental logic does not abstract from all the contents of knowledge, but takes from transcendental aesthetics the forms of pure intuition of space and time into consideration, thus abstracting from empirical contents, whilst still accounting for pure intuitions.

These secondary sources point at a distinction between the importance of the form of a logical statement in traditional logic and the importance of the content of a logical statement in transcendental logic

Perhaps this means that a logical stalemate is as much dependent on its content as its form.

Once again….red is not a thing. Wavelength is a thing, but is not an sensation. — Mww

Of course, sensations in the mind are caused by things in the world. Au revoir.

I’ve never seen 700nm. — Mww

Exactly, the object perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same object in the world causing the perception. Knowledge of the phenomena does not of necessity give us knowledge of the noumena, as the Direct Realist insists it does.

For over 300,000 years, humans did not know that the cause of their perception of the colour red was the wavelength of 700nm. Only in the last 200 years have humans discovered that the colour red they perceived in the mind doesn't actually exist in the world. Perhaps coincidentally, about 200 years ago, Kant wrote CPR.

That objects don’t exist contradicts the human experience. — Mww

1) When we perceive the colour red, the colour red doesn't exist in the world, what exists in the world is a wavelength of 700nm.
2) When we perceive a bent-stick, there is no bent-stick in the world, it is a straight stick in water.
3) When we perceive an elliptical coin, there is no elliptical coin in the world, it is a circular coin on its side.
4) When we perceive a mountain to be the same height as a person, a person the same height as a mountain doesn't exist.
5) When we perceive the two sides of a road approaching each other in the distance, the two sides of the road in the world are in fact parallel.
6) Whe one perceives a pink elephant, there is no pink elephant in the world, only an hallucination caused by delirium tremens.
7) When we perceive an apple, apples don't exist in the world, what exists in the world are
fundamental particles and fundamental forces existing in space and time.

The object that we perceive in our mind is not of necessity the same as the object that exists in the world, meaning that the object we perceive in our minds does not of necessity exist in the world.

Only the Direct Realist would say that the phenomena we perceive in our minds is the same as a noumena that exists in the world.

JMD Meiklejohn version CPR is only 500 pages long (the 2nd edition only). All the other versions are 700 - 800 pages because they combined the 1st and 2nd Editions into one book. — Corvus

I am using the Cambridge Edition, translated and edited by Guyer and Wood, which includes the first and second editions.

Now all you gotta do is figure out exactly what that means, and how it reflects on the human cognitive system overall. — Mww

What does it mean that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

As with the colour red, where we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, it means that we have the innate ability to perceive objects in space when looking at the world.

It means that neither the object nor the space that we perceive actually exist in the world, but there is definitely something in the world that we can name for convenience as object and space that has caused our perception of an object in space.

As you say, on the other hand, the pure physicalist may insist the extension of objects, and the relation of objects to each other, is impossible without the necessary condition of empirical space. But in CPR no pure physicalist excuses are to be found, except the natural existence or possible existence of real things. — Mww

Kant in his Prolegomena made clear that he believed space is empirically real

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real.
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Kant in the Prolegomena was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

In his Prolegomena, Kant wrote that space is real and exists outside of ourselves:
Here’s something else that can be proved ·as a requirement for the intellectual management· of experience, but can’t be shown to hold of things in themselves: Our outer experience not only does but must correspond to something real outside of ourselves. That tells us this much: there is something empirical—thus, some phenomenon in space outside us— ·the existence of· which can be satisfactorily proved. ·That’s all it tells us·, for we have no dealings with objects other than those belonging to possible experience; because objects that can’t be presented to us in any experience are nothing to us. What is empirically outside me is what appears in space.

It is true that in the CPR Kant writes that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

Kant argues that our perception of space is not a posteriori derived from experience, but must be a priori in order to underlie all experience.

A24/B38 - 2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.

Understanding A24/B38 using the analogy of perceiving the colour red, we can only perceive the colour red because we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. The fact that we perceive the colour red doesn't mean that the colour red exists in the world. In fact, it is the wavelength of 700nm that exists in the world, and this wavelength of 700nm is the cause of our perception of the colour red.

The fact that we do perceive the colour red suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called" red". There is a dualism in reference, in that red may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

The fact that we do perceive space as an outer intuition suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called "space". There is a dualism in reference, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

Where does Kant write in the CPR that space is not empirically real?

There is a dualism in reference of the word space, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. Whilst Kant does discuss space as referring to what we perceive, where does Kant in the CPR write that space as referring to the cause of what we perceive doesn't exist?

By second-handing the content of the original, the poster is merely holding with the opinion of the secondary author, rather than presenting his own in accordance with the actual reading of the text. — Mww

The poster presents their own opinions as to both the primary and secondary sources

The OP of this Thread suggests a reading group of the CPR, reading the book and sharing thoughts about it. There is no restriction within the OP that only the primary source must be used.

To ignore secondary sources about such a complex book would be foolhardy, in that very few of us have had the time to read the almost 800 pages, analyse and study the almost 900 paragraphs, and compare and contrast the CPR within the body of his other works.

As long as these secondary sources are referenced, and on the assumption judged worthy of inclusion, reasons should given for sources that support one's position and reasons given against sources that don't support one's position.

The use of secondary sources shows that one is not trying to reinvent the wheel, but is constructively building on different debates and different perspectives of academics over a period of 200 years who have devoted their careers to this particular topic.
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Please refrain from repeating yourself — Mww

"Repetition is the mother of learning"

I try to make my posts complete, and if a particular quote or idea helps to make the post understandable then I will use it, regardless of how many times I have used it before.

Nevertheless, it is true matter depends on a source outside the mind, an external thing appearing to the senses. — Mww

I agree, otherwise Kant's Transcendental Idealism would just be a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism.
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Irrelevant. Color is just another sensation, given from an undetermined appearance..................................So you’re saying the something we perceive might not be the something that caused our perception. So what? — Mww

Yes the colour red is a phenomena, but there are different opinions as to the relationship between a phenomena in the mind and its cause, a noumena in the world.

I would guess that half of the Forum are Direct Realists and as such have no regard for the CPR, whilst the other half are Indirect Realists, for whom the CPR might be relevant.

The Direct Realist, such as Austin and Searle, holds the position that if they perceive a red postbox there is a red postbox in the world, ie, in perceiving a phenomena in the mind they are also perceiving the noumena in the world.

The Indirect Realist such as Kant, holds the position that what we perceive might not be the same thing that caused our perception, in that although we perceive the colour red we might be looking at a wavelength of 700nm. IE, the phenomena perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same as what caused this perception.

Colour is a phenomena in the mind, but colour can also be used to enable a metaphorical understanding of the relationship between phenomena and noumena. George Lakoff makes the point that the metaphor is fundamental in how humans understand complex abstract ideas.
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How do you get from the fact they are different sizes, that space is real? — Mww

If space wasn't real, how could things be of different sizes?
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If I think object, the extension of it is given. If I need not go beyond the conception of a body, I need not consider space. And because it’s an analytic judgement, true because of itself, there’s no need for the synthetic a priori judgment the pure intuition of space provides. — Mww

A proposition may be analytic or synthetic

A7/B11 - “…. when I say, “All bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it….”

A7/B11 - On the contrary, if I say: "All bodies are heavy," then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.

It is true that a body by its very nature is extended in space, in that the word "body" means being extended in space. This is analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

Similarly the word "unicorn" means a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead. This is also analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

The fact that I can say "all bodies are extended" and "unicorns have a a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" does not presuppose that either bodies or unicorns exist in the world.

If I want to know whether "bodies" or "unicorns" exist in the world, this requires a synthetic judgement.

In Kant's Realism, he does believe that objects exist in the world

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, in his Prolegomena he was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

For Kant, bodies exist in the world, even if we only have transcendental knowledge of them. As by definition of the word "body", such bodies are extended in space, this means that if the body is real then the space the body extends into must also be real.

In the preface CPR, Kant sounds like he is on duty to reinstate Metaphysics as the queen of all Science. — Corvus

To reinstate a scientific metaphysics in place of traditional metaphysics, from his position as Scientific Realist.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's position thus required him not only to undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience and its extension into natural science.
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He is not talking about the space in empirical reality in CPR (it is presupposed existence). — Corvus

:up: As a thing-in-itself it cannot be talked about (like the Fight Club)

come up with a whole bunch of ideas demonstrating how space isn’t real..........From which follows necessarily, that the knowledge of things is the determinant factor for their reality, the space of them utterly irrelevant, insofar as the knowledge is remains regardless of the space of it.................If you say, space is that which is contained in an empty bucket, what have you actually said? — Mww

Space allows me to compare sizes. For example, the distance between the two sides of a garden bucket is less that the diameter of the Milky Way Galaxy.

If space wasn't real, then the garden bucket would be the same size as the Milky Way Galaxy.

Imagine how practically impossible it would be to talk about things, if it were denied from the outset such things were not, and could not, be thought as extended in space. From the perspective of the thesis itself, it was never meant to imply there actually is such a thing as space into which things extend, but only that the constitution of the human intellect can’t function without the transcendentally given objective validity granting it. — Mww

I agree that it would be impossible to talk about things if we denied they could be extended in space, but it is Kant's position that there is in fact a space into which things extend.

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism:
Kant in the Prolegomena was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them. He pointed out that his idealism is merely a formal idealism, and it is only the form of objects that is due to our minds not the matter of the objects, in that the matter we experience depends on a source outside of the mind.

This does not mean that the matter in space we perceive as appearance is the same as the matter in space that exists outside our perception of it. For example, thinking about the analogy of colour, we perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. Our perception of the colour red has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm, yet what we perceive, the colour red, is different to what caused it, a wavelength of 700nm.

We can talk about there being the colour red in the world even though the colour red doesn't exist in the word, yet although the colour red doesn't exist in the world there was something, a wavelngth of 700nm, that caused our perception of the colour red.

For Kant as a Empirical Realist, there has to be something in the world for us to be able to perceive something, but the something we perceive doesn't of necessity have to be the same thing as the something that caused our perception in the first place.

I don't think he was denying space and time for empirical reality at all. He presupposed it. But he had to postulate space and time as pure intuition in CPR in order to give ground for necessity of a priori knowledge such as Geometry and all the Metaphysical judgments, which are supposed to be superior to the natural science based on the space and time of the empirical reality. Inevitably Kant was a dualist. — Corvus

As you say, Kant wanted to combine the two schools of rationalism and empiricism.

However, not to show that Metaphysics is superior to the Natural sciences, but rather better explain both Metaphysics and the Natural Sciences. Neither Metaphysics nor the Natural Sciences could be properly understand without first amalgamating both rationalism and empiricism.

Kant's synthetic a priori amalgamating transcendental idealism and empirical realism is necessary to better understand both Metaphysics and the Natural Sciences. He was a dualist.

Exactly. Existence of matter. Things. Objects. That which appears to human sensibility. That of which sensation is possible. That for which phenomena are given. In Kant, space and time are none of those. — Mww

I agree that matter and space and time are different kinds of things, in that I can imagine space empty of matter, yet I cannot imagine matter not being in a space. But the fact they are different kinds of things does not mean they cannot both be real, albeit we only they are real transcendentally.

This doesn't answer Guyer's and Woods statement in the Introduction to the CPR that for Kant, space and time are empirically real.
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

If we all accept that for Kant matter is empirically real, then how could it be the case that matter is empirically real yet the space and time that this matter is existing within is not empirically real?

What does it mean that the matter is real yet the space and time it exists within is not real?

Th only conclusion is that if matter is empirically real, then the space and time that it is existing within must also be empirically real.

Despite the direct textual references refuting that opinion, you both continue the misunderstanding — Mww

Is it the case that for Kant, space and time are empirically real?

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real.

Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Kant writes that a transcendental idealist can be an empirical realist

A370 - The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito, ergo sum.

The SEP article on Kant's Transcendental Idealism writes that Kant was an Empirical Realist:
This provides a further sense in which Kant is an “empirical realist”

I would say that the above is some evidence that for Kant, as an Empirical Realist, space and time are empirically real.

If Kant were to think space and time inhere or subsist in themselves, and thereby they represent empirical reality, hence can be properties of things, he contradicts the tenets of his own epistemological metaphysics, not to mention it beggars the imagination as to why he would, on the one hand contradict itself, and on the other spent ten years constructing a philosophy in which it is proved they don’t. — Mww

I'm still interested in Critique of Pure Reason.

For Kant, as an Empirical Realist, space and time and the matter within it are empirically real. However, this can only be established by synthetic a priori judgements, empirically through the sensible intuitions of phenomena and appearance and transcendentally through the non-sensible intuitions and understanding.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Any idea why he had to go that way in CPR? — Corvus

In order to establish what is named today, as I understand it, as Indirect Realism, still not accepted by the Direct Realists after 200 years of debate, including people such as Hilary Putnam and John Searle.

So your view is also for Kant's space and time as both empirical reality and pure intuitions too — Corvus

Yes, for Kant, space and time are empirically real, and space and time are pure forms of all intuitions.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Introduction to CPR - Kant argues that space and time are both the pure forms of all intuitions, or ''formal principle(s) of the sensible world," and themselves pure intuitions. They are the forms in which particular objects are presented to us by the senses, but also themselves unique particulars of which we can have a priori knowledge, the basis of our a priori knowledge of both mathematics and physics. But the embrace of space and time "is limited to actual things, insofar as they are thought capable of falling under the senses" - we have no ground for asserting that space and time characterize things that we are incapable of sensing.

However, this does not mean that we know the reality of space and time in the world, as we can only know them transcendentally.

As an analogy, if I am within a closed room and hear a knocking of the outer wall, I know that there is something outside the room even if I don't know what it is from the principle that every effect has a cause. The fact that I know there is something does not mean that I know what it is.

As an another analogy, although when perceiving the colour red, I know something caused my perception, I don't know of necessity what that something was.

As an another analogy, I know something that exists wrote "So your view is also for Kant's space and time as both empirical reality and pure intuitions too", but I don't know what that something is.

Similarly, Kant knows that space and time are empirically real in the world from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but has no knowledge as to what they really are.

I try not to 100% rely on or accept the internet sites information — Corvus

I agree.
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If you claim that Space and Time was solely pure intuitions and concepts in Kant, and has nothing to do with the physical entity in the external world, then should you not brand Kant as an idealist, rather than Representative Realist? — Corvus

Kant is an idealist in the same sense that an Indirect Realist is an idealist, in that what is perceived is only a representation of something existing outside the mind. IE, because we perceive a bent stick does not mean that the stick is actually bent in the world.

Kant is a realist in the same sense that an Indirect Realist is a realist, in that the representation of something in the mind has been caused by something outside the mind. IE, there is actually something in the world causing our perception of a bent stick.

If, however, Idealism was defined as the belief that there is nothing outside the mind and Realism was defined as the belief that there is something outside the mind, then in that case one could only be a believer in either Idealism or Realism. Under this definition, Kant would be a believer in Realism.
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It is vital to bear in mind that I am not denying Kant said that space and time was a priori pure intuition in CPR. He did. But he also had in mind that space and time is empirical reality out there too, although he doesn't make big song and dance about it. — Corvus

I agree that Kant as a believer in Realism would have agreed that there is a world outside the mind that exists independently of the mind. Within this world there is something that can be called space and time that is the cause for the perception of space and time in our minds.

However, the space and time we perceive in our mind is not of necessity the same as the space and time existing in a mind-independent world that is causing our perception. For example, when looking at a wavelength of 700nm we may perceive the colour red. It is true that the wavelength of 700nm caused our perception of the colour red, but it cannot be argued that a wavelength of 700mnm and our perception of the colour red are in any way similar.

"Space" and "time" can refer to what we perceive in the mind and can also refer to the cause of our perception existing in a world outside the mind. We know our perception of space and time in the mind, but the space and time in a mind-independent world are just names for unknown things.

IE "space" and "time" as pure intuition refer to known perceptions in the mind, whilst "space" and "time" as empirical reality refer to unknown things existing in a mind-independent world causing our known perceptions.

I am not sure if anyone claims that space is internal intuition — Corvus

Apart from Kant:

A23: Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground) Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

A25: Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.

From SEP article on Kant's Views on Time and Space

The distinction between sensation and intuition in Kant’s thinking is fundamental to his overarching conception of space and time. This is the case for several reasons, not least because one should avoid thinking that Kant takes us to have a sensation of space; we have, rather, an intuition of it (see Carson 1997).

This idea comprises a central piece of Kant’s views on space and time, for he famously contends that space and time are nothing but forms of intuition, a view connected to the claim in the Transcendental Aesthetic that we have pure intuitions of space and of time.

@Corvus @Wayfarer

The term "Transcendental Idealism" is central to the Critique of Pure Reason
In the Conceptual Map of the Critique of Pure Reason, the first item is Transcendental Idealism, establishing the importance of the term.

Kant defines "Transcendental Idealism" in the Fourth Paralogism"
A 369 I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.

In today's terms, Indirect Realism, aka Representative Realism.

Kant did propose that the term could be improved
However, Kant did propose that the phrase "Transcendental Idealism" could be improved.
In the Introduction to the CPR:
Specifically, he differentiated his position from Berkeleian idealism by arguing that he denied the real existence of space and time and the spatio-temporal properties of objects, but not the real existence of objects themselves distinct from our representations, and for this reason he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," making it clear that his idealism concerned the form but not the existence of external objects.

Therefore, the term Transcendental Idealism should be treated more as a figure of speech than literally.

It is a transcendental idealism not a transcendent idealism
Note that it is Transcendental Idealism not Transcendent Idealism, meaning that it is about the limits of what we can cognize about our experiences having been determined a priori before having such experiences. It is not about being able to cognize about our experiences beyond limits predetermined a priori .

Kant is putting a limit on our cognitive abilities.

A priori pure intuition of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories)
Space and time are the Categories are both a priori, however, space and time is the necessary foundation for the categories. For example, we have the concept of space and we have the concept of a number such as two, though it is a fact that although we can imagine empty space empty of numbers, we cannot imagine numbers outside of space. Consequently, first is the pure intuition of space and time within which are the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories).

We can use our cognitive facilities on our sensibilities about external objects affecting our sensibilities, but what we are able to cognize is limited by our a priori pure intuition of space and time and the a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories).

What for Kant is the source of the a priori?
Kant says we have no innate knowledge of any particular proposition, ie, "postboxes are red", but he does say that it is not the case that our sensibilities are the cause of what we cognize about them but rather an priori cognitive ability makes sense of these sensibilities, ie, I perceive the colour red rather than the colour green when looking at a wavelength of 700nm

Introduction: Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience. But experience is the product both of external objects affecting our sensibility and of the operation of our cognitive faculties in response to this effect (A I, B I), and Kant's claim is that we can have "pure" or a priori cognition of the contributions to experience made by the operation of these faculties themselves, rather than of the effect of external objects on us in experience.

IE, Kant's position is that of Chomsky's Innatism rather than Skinner's Behaviourism.

Understanding Transcendental Idealism using the analogy of colour
When a wavelength of 700nm enters my eye, I see the colour red because I have the innate ability to see the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. When a wavelength of 300nm enters my eye, I don't see the colour ultra-violet, because I don't have the innate ability to see the colour ultra-violet when looking at a wavelength of 300nm.

This is the meaning of transcendental in "Transcendental Idealism", in that the colours I can see when looking at different wavelengths has been limited by a priori conditions of perception. and has the consequence that because I can see a colour such as red, this doesn't of necessity mean that the colour red exists in the world.

The fact that I cannot see the colour ultra-violet when looking at a wavelength of 300nm is why the term isn't "transcendent idealism".

"Idealism" because the colour red exists in my mind not the world.

Kant is a Realist because, for him, the cause of our seeing the colour red originated outside our mind rather than within our mind.

The relationship between objects and their properties
Kant does not directly deal with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of our experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for us to have any cognition of objects at all. (Introduction page 6)

As regards properties, suppose I see a red postbox. The postbox is an object and redness is a property. But what are objects? An object is no more than a set of properties, in that if all the properties of an object were removed, no object would remain, in that is it impossible to imagine an object if it has no properties.

So a postbox is the set of properties such as redness, rectangular, extended in space, etc, but as the property redness only exists in the mind of the perceiver and not the world, one can conclude that the object, which is no more than a set of properties, where properties exist in the mind of the perceiver and not the world, also only exists in the mind of the perceiver and not the world.

Therefore, not only do properties such as redness only exist in the mind, but also objects such as postboxes only exist in the mind as concepts.

Interpreting A369
I understand by transcendental idealism that all appearances of objects such as postboxes and properties such as redness are to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, ie, postboxes and the colour red existing in the world, and accordingly, what we perceive as space and time only exists in the mind as a foundation for being able to perceive objects and their properties as mere representations and not as things-in-themselves.

The space, time, objects and properties we perceive only exist in the mind, although we can reason about their existence in the world using the transcendental category of causation.

But hte point is that, i think the claim that those concepts are beyond human cognition, is a placeholder for 'beyond normal, waking cognition'. — AmadeusD

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation — AmadeusD

In my terms, in my normal waking state when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, my seeing the colour red is not a conscious decision, in that I cannot consciously decide to see the colour red rather than the colour green for example. My seeing the colour red is beyond my normal waking cognition to alter.

There are some things that are comprehensible to me not because of any conscious active deliberation on my part about them during my normal waking life, such as the colour red, but because of the pre-determined, a priori, innate and inborn state of my brain that is beyond my conscious ability to subsequently alter. I can only work within the limitations set by the physical structure of my brain.

I interpret this innate and inborn state of my brain with Kant's concept of the a priori.
Introduction to CPR: Kant attempts to distinguish the contribution to cognition made by our receptive faculty of sensibility from that made solely by the objects that affect us (A 2 1-2 /B 36), and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge.

Though, that being said, if I did change my normal waking consciousness by some means, whether chemical or meditation, then I agree that this would change my normal waking consciousness into an altered waking consciousness, possibly allowing me to comprehend things that were not comprehensible to me before.

IE, altering the physical state of the brain would automatically alter what that brain comprehends.

Still not buying the idea of 'build'. — Wayfarer

The word "build" is intended more as a figure of speech than literally.

In fact, when you wrote "Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions", your word "built" was also intended more as a figure of speech than literally, as many machines are in fact built by other machines, as in a car factory.

Your word "built" inferred the figurative meaning "consciously designed" rather than the literal meaning "physically built".

The same for Kant, in that the term "Transcendental Idealism" should also be considered as a figure of speech rather than literally.

As soon as you have to enclose the key word in scare quotes, it's game over — Wayfarer

Machines are built by an external agents, who happen to be conscious humans. Humans are built by an external agent, which happens to be an unconscious world.

The Merriam Webster definition of "build" as "to form by ordering and uniting materials by gradual means into a composite whole" doesn't refer to the cause as being either conscious or unconscious.
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'New' in comparison to what, do you think? — Wayfarer

New in comparison to traditional cognitive science, which conceived of the brain as the source of all cognitive mental processes, rather than the brain being just a part of a body that interacts with its environment.

It is that the mind is not a blank slate which passively receives impressions from the world, but an active agent that dynamically constructs the experience of the world ('the world'). — Wayfarer

:up: I think that Kant would agree.
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But the thing is, we can't see that process from the outside. — Wayfarer

:up: Yes, as an Indirect Realist, I would agree with both Dan Zahavi, who wrote "The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned" and Beau Lotto who said "Is there an external reality. Of course there is an external reality , the world exists, it's just that we don't see it as it is. We can never see it as it is".

If Kant had had the technology in 1781, he could have created the 2021 YouTube video Is reality real? These neuroscientists don’t think so.
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It's an invalid metaphor, as organisms display fundamental characteristics which machines do not. Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions. — Wayfarer

Where does Kant's "a priori" come from?

Yes, machines are built by external agents, ie, humans.

But it seems equally the case that humans have been "built" by an external agent, ie, the world in which they live, the world in which they have evolved and the world in which they have to survive or be wiped out. Not consciously built, but built nevertheless by the situation it finds itself. In the same way that sand dunes have been "built" by the wind acting on the particles of sand, a process of Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.

As the SEP article on Embodied Cognition writes
Unifying investigators of embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its investigation.

As the Wikipedia article on Enactivism writes
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment
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My view is that the idea of mindless nature is specific to a particular phase of cultural development which was dominant in the late modern period, but which I believe is falling from favour. — Wayfarer

If nature isn't mindless, what kind of mind do you envisage nature having?
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Kant would say that it's because the mind has a tendency to seek answers to unanswerable questions. — Wayfarer

Isn't this a lost cause, answering the unanswerable?

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. — AmadeusD

By "approximation", do you mean that the "soul" can be understood as a figure of speech such as "gravity" can be understood as a figure of speech?

Suffering sounds like from "illness" or "pain". No. You were having a groundless belief, and your reason confirmed it as a groundless belief. — Corvus

I always suffer when my beliefs turn out to be groundless.

All living things, from the very simplest, display intentional behaviours and perform tasks which mechanical devices do not — Wayfarer

We could be biological machines. Why should the philosophical doctrine of Determinism not be valid?

But by 'transcending the biological' I mean h. sapiens has capacities and abilities which are beyond those biological functions, amazing though they might be. — Wayfarer

Humans only discovered how to fly 120 years ago. How do we know that in another 120 years humans won't be able to explain our capacities and abilities in terms of our biological functions?

But I see that as reductionist - it reduces culture to a utility in the service of reproduction, or a by-product of it, rather than having an intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that it may be distasteful to think that humans can be reduced to products of mindless evolution, but does this necessarily mean that this is not the case?

man 'the rational animal' is able to grasp through reason principles that are not perceptible to the senses alone — Wayfarer

Is this comparable to a mechanical logic gate which can make decisions based on what is input?

For example, time and space are transcendental ideas; they are not derived from experience but are the necessary conditions under which any sensory experience can occur — Wayfarer

Perhaps what are described as transcendental ideas have derived from the experience of evolving in synergy with the world for more than 3.7 billion years?

For instance, the concept of God, the soul, or the totality of the universe are transcendent ideas because they are beyond the scope of empirical investigation and human comprehension. — Wayfarer

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it?

To believe in something that is not the case is a groundless belief or fallacies, but not an illusion. — Corvus

I believe "I saw an Ichthyocentaur in the garden". I reason that my belief was groundless.

Could I then not say "I was suffering an illusion"?

You’re saying, ideas must refer to something - they must have a real referent that exists ‘out there somewhere’ as the saying has it. That is what I think Magee is referring to when he wrote "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect". It is what later phenomenology refers to as ’the natural attitude’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I cannot have an idea without the idea being about something, in that I can have a concrete idea, such as the idea of a house, or I can have an abstract idea, such as the idea of angst. Such ideas refer to something, which could be a concept such as house or angst, or an instantiation of a concept such as this house or my angst.

Are concepts such as house or angst real? Are instantiation of concepts such as this house or my angst real? Depends what is meant by "real".

Do concepts such as house or angst exist? Do instantiations of concepts such as this house or my angst exist? Depends what is meant by "exist".

I see a house and I feel angst, naively this is just a fact, not to be questioned but accepted for what they appear to be, taking no position as to the reality of what I see, and withholding any conscious opinion as to the ontological status of what I see. What I see is part of a world existing prior to my having perceived it. The Natural Attitude of the phenomenologist and the inborn realism of Bryan Magee.

Within the Phenomenalist's Natural Attitude, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then just its appearance .

So far so good, yet the Phenomenologist goes further than this naive Natural Attitude by freeing themselves of the restrictions of the Natural Attitude by using the principle of Phenomenological Reduction. This recognizes that others are not objects but subjects like myself, where my experience becomes inseparable to the experiences of others and by revealing a transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Within the Phenomenalist's Reduction, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then more than just its appearance.

But how can my concept of a Thing-in-Itself be more than just its appearance, if by definition it is impossible to conceptualise a Thing-in-Itself outside of its appearance?

(Marc Applebaum, Key Ideas in Phenomenology: The Natural Attitude)