What pitfalls must i avoid in reading this section? — AmadeusD

I would say that the biggest pitfall is reading it in isolation of secondary sources, which might include:

IEP - Immanuel Kant: Logic
He insists that formal logic should abstract from all content of knowledge and deal only with our faculty of understanding (intellect, Verstand) and our forms of thought.

SEP - Kant’s Transcendental Arguments
Among Immanuel Kant’s (1724–1804) most influential contributions to philosophy is his development of the transcendental argument. In Kant’s conception, an argument of this kind begins with a compelling premise about our thought, experience, or knowledge, and then reasons to a conclusion that is a substantive and unobvious presupposition and necessary condition of this premise.

The Generality of Kant’s Transcendental Logic - Clinton Tolley - University of California
Unlike the traditional logic, which focuses only on the form of thinking and judging, Kant intends his new transcendental logic to focus on the content of thinking and judging, albeit in a very abstract manner.

Generation Online - Transcendental Logic
Kant defines transcendental logic, on the other hand, as a subdivision of general logic, and distinguishes it from general logic in so far as transcendental logic does not abstract from all the contents of knowledge, but takes from transcendental aesthetics the forms of pure intuition of space and time into consideration, thus abstracting from empirical contents, whilst still accounting for pure intuitions.

These secondary sources point at a distinction between the importance of the form of a logical statement in traditional logic and the importance of the content of a logical statement in transcendental logic

Perhaps this means that a logical stalemate is as much dependent on its content as its form.

Once again….red is not a thing. Wavelength is a thing, but is not an sensation. — Mww

Of course, sensations in the mind are caused by things in the world. Au revoir.

I’ve never seen 700nm. — Mww

Exactly, the object perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same object in the world causing the perception. Knowledge of the phenomena does not of necessity give us knowledge of the noumena, as the Direct Realist insists it does.

For over 300,000 years, humans did not know that the cause of their perception of the colour red was the wavelength of 700nm. Only in the last 200 years have humans discovered that the colour red they perceived in the mind doesn't actually exist in the world. Perhaps coincidentally, about 200 years ago, Kant wrote CPR.

That objects don’t exist contradicts the human experience. — Mww

1) When we perceive the colour red, the colour red doesn't exist in the world, what exists in the world is a wavelength of 700nm.
2) When we perceive a bent-stick, there is no bent-stick in the world, it is a straight stick in water.
3) When we perceive an elliptical coin, there is no elliptical coin in the world, it is a circular coin on its side.
4) When we perceive a mountain to be the same height as a person, a person the same height as a mountain doesn't exist.
5) When we perceive the two sides of a road approaching each other in the distance, the two sides of the road in the world are in fact parallel.
6) Whe one perceives a pink elephant, there is no pink elephant in the world, only an hallucination caused by delirium tremens.
7) When we perceive an apple, apples don't exist in the world, what exists in the world are
fundamental particles and fundamental forces existing in space and time.

The object that we perceive in our mind is not of necessity the same as the object that exists in the world, meaning that the object we perceive in our minds does not of necessity exist in the world.

Only the Direct Realist would say that the phenomena we perceive in our minds is the same as a noumena that exists in the world.

JMD Meiklejohn version CPR is only 500 pages long (the 2nd edition only). All the other versions are 700 - 800 pages because they combined the 1st and 2nd Editions into one book. — Corvus

I am using the Cambridge Edition, translated and edited by Guyer and Wood, which includes the first and second editions.

Now all you gotta do is figure out exactly what that means, and how it reflects on the human cognitive system overall. — Mww

What does it mean that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

As with the colour red, where we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, it means that we have the innate ability to perceive objects in space when looking at the world.

It means that neither the object nor the space that we perceive actually exist in the world, but there is definitely something in the world that we can name for convenience as object and space that has caused our perception of an object in space.

As you say, on the other hand, the pure physicalist may insist the extension of objects, and the relation of objects to each other, is impossible without the necessary condition of empirical space. But in CPR no pure physicalist excuses are to be found, except the natural existence or possible existence of real things. — Mww

Kant in his Prolegomena made clear that he believed space is empirically real

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real.
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, Kant in the Prolegomena was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

In his Prolegomena, Kant wrote that space is real and exists outside of ourselves:
Here’s something else that can be proved ·as a requirement for the intellectual management· of experience, but can’t be shown to hold of things in themselves: Our outer experience not only does but must correspond to something real outside of ourselves. That tells us this much: there is something empirical—thus, some phenomenon in space outside us— ·the existence of· which can be satisfactorily proved. ·That’s all it tells us·, for we have no dealings with objects other than those belonging to possible experience; because objects that can’t be presented to us in any experience are nothing to us. What is empirically outside me is what appears in space.

It is true that in the CPR Kant writes that we have an a priori pure intuition of space

Kant argues that our perception of space is not a posteriori derived from experience, but must be a priori in order to underlie all experience.

A24/B38 - 2) Space is a necessary representation, a priori, which is the ground of all outer intuitions. One can never represent that there is no space, although one can very well think that there are no objects to be encountered in it. It is therefore to be regarded as the condition of the possibility of appearances, not as a determination dependent on them, and is an a priori representation that necessarily grounds outer appearances.

Understanding A24/B38 using the analogy of perceiving the colour red, we can only perceive the colour red because we have the innate ability to perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. The fact that we perceive the colour red doesn't mean that the colour red exists in the world. In fact, it is the wavelength of 700nm that exists in the world, and this wavelength of 700nm is the cause of our perception of the colour red.

The fact that we do perceive the colour red suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called" red". There is a dualism in reference, in that red may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

The fact that we do perceive space as an outer intuition suggests that there is in fact something in the world causing such perception, which may for convenience be called "space". There is a dualism in reference, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. It should be noted that what is referred to by the same term are of different kinds.

Where does Kant write in the CPR that space is not empirically real?

There is a dualism in reference of the word space, in that space may refer either to what we perceive or the cause of what we perceive. Whilst Kant does discuss space as referring to what we perceive, where does Kant in the CPR write that space as referring to the cause of what we perceive doesn't exist?

By second-handing the content of the original, the poster is merely holding with the opinion of the secondary author, rather than presenting his own in accordance with the actual reading of the text. — Mww

The poster presents their own opinions as to both the primary and secondary sources

The OP of this Thread suggests a reading group of the CPR, reading the book and sharing thoughts about it. There is no restriction within the OP that only the primary source must be used.

To ignore secondary sources about such a complex book would be foolhardy, in that very few of us have had the time to read the almost 800 pages, analyse and study the almost 900 paragraphs, and compare and contrast the CPR within the body of his other works.

As long as these secondary sources are referenced, and on the assumption judged worthy of inclusion, reasons should given for sources that support one's position and reasons given against sources that don't support one's position.

The use of secondary sources shows that one is not trying to reinvent the wheel, but is constructively building on different debates and different perspectives of academics over a period of 200 years who have devoted their careers to this particular topic.
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Please refrain from repeating yourself — Mww

"Repetition is the mother of learning"

I try to make my posts complete, and if a particular quote or idea helps to make the post understandable then I will use it, regardless of how many times I have used it before.

Nevertheless, it is true matter depends on a source outside the mind, an external thing appearing to the senses. — Mww

I agree, otherwise Kant's Transcendental Idealism would just be a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism.
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Irrelevant. Color is just another sensation, given from an undetermined appearance..................................So you’re saying the something we perceive might not be the something that caused our perception. So what? — Mww

Yes the colour red is a phenomena, but there are different opinions as to the relationship between a phenomena in the mind and its cause, a noumena in the world.

I would guess that half of the Forum are Direct Realists and as such have no regard for the CPR, whilst the other half are Indirect Realists, for whom the CPR might be relevant.

The Direct Realist, such as Austin and Searle, holds the position that if they perceive a red postbox there is a red postbox in the world, ie, in perceiving a phenomena in the mind they are also perceiving the noumena in the world.

The Indirect Realist such as Kant, holds the position that what we perceive might not be the same thing that caused our perception, in that although we perceive the colour red we might be looking at a wavelength of 700nm. IE, the phenomena perceived in the mind is not of necessity the same as what caused this perception.

Colour is a phenomena in the mind, but colour can also be used to enable a metaphorical understanding of the relationship between phenomena and noumena. George Lakoff makes the point that the metaphor is fundamental in how humans understand complex abstract ideas.
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How do you get from the fact they are different sizes, that space is real? — Mww

If space wasn't real, how could things be of different sizes?
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If I think object, the extension of it is given. If I need not go beyond the conception of a body, I need not consider space. And because it’s an analytic judgement, true because of itself, there’s no need for the synthetic a priori judgment the pure intuition of space provides. — Mww

A proposition may be analytic or synthetic

A7/B11 - “…. when I say, “All bodies are extended,” this is an analytical judgement. For I need not go beyond the conception of body in order to find extension connected with it, but merely analyse the conception, that is, become conscious of the manifold properties which I think in that conception, in order to discover this predicate in it….”

A7/B11 - On the contrary, if I say: "All bodies are heavy," then the predicate is something entirely different from that which I think in the mere concept of a body in general. The addition of such a predicate thus yields a synthetic judgment.

It is true that a body by its very nature is extended in space, in that the word "body" means being extended in space. This is analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

Similarly the word "unicorn" means a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead. This is also analytic, regardless of the nature of the world.

The fact that I can say "all bodies are extended" and "unicorns have a a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" does not presuppose that either bodies or unicorns exist in the world.

If I want to know whether "bodies" or "unicorns" exist in the world, this requires a synthetic judgement.

In Kant's Realism, he does believe that objects exist in the world

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism, in his Prolegomena he was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them.

For Kant, bodies exist in the world, even if we only have transcendental knowledge of them. As by definition of the word "body", such bodies are extended in space, this means that if the body is real then the space the body extends into must also be real.

In the preface CPR, Kant sounds like he is on duty to reinstate Metaphysics as the queen of all Science. — Corvus

To reinstate a scientific metaphysics in place of traditional metaphysics, from his position as Scientific Realist.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's position thus required him not only to undermine the arguments of traditional metaphysics but also to put in their place a scientific metaphysics of his own, which establishes what can be known a priori but also limits it to that which is required for ordinary experience and its extension into natural science.
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He is not talking about the space in empirical reality in CPR (it is presupposed existence). — Corvus

:up: As a thing-in-itself it cannot be talked about (like the Fight Club)

come up with a whole bunch of ideas demonstrating how space isn’t real..........From which follows necessarily, that the knowledge of things is the determinant factor for their reality, the space of them utterly irrelevant, insofar as the knowledge is remains regardless of the space of it.................If you say, space is that which is contained in an empty bucket, what have you actually said? — Mww

Space allows me to compare sizes. For example, the distance between the two sides of a garden bucket is less that the diameter of the Milky Way Galaxy.

If space wasn't real, then the garden bucket would be the same size as the Milky Way Galaxy.

Imagine how practically impossible it would be to talk about things, if it were denied from the outset such things were not, and could not, be thought as extended in space. From the perspective of the thesis itself, it was never meant to imply there actually is such a thing as space into which things extend, but only that the constitution of the human intellect can’t function without the transcendentally given objective validity granting it. — Mww

I agree that it would be impossible to talk about things if we denied they could be extended in space, but it is Kant's position that there is in fact a space into which things extend.

From the SEP article section 2.3 on Kant’s Transcendental Idealism:
Kant in the Prolegomena was apoplectic that Feder and Garve had claimed that his Transcendental Idealism was just a Berkeleyan or Phenomenalist idealism, and pointed out that in the CPR bodies exist in space and that we have immediate, non-inferential knowledge of them. He pointed out that his idealism is merely a formal idealism, and it is only the form of objects that is due to our minds not the matter of the objects, in that the matter we experience depends on a source outside of the mind.

This does not mean that the matter in space we perceive as appearance is the same as the matter in space that exists outside our perception of it. For example, thinking about the analogy of colour, we perceive the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. Our perception of the colour red has been caused by the wavelength of 700nm, yet what we perceive, the colour red, is different to what caused it, a wavelength of 700nm.

We can talk about there being the colour red in the world even though the colour red doesn't exist in the word, yet although the colour red doesn't exist in the world there was something, a wavelngth of 700nm, that caused our perception of the colour red.

For Kant as a Empirical Realist, there has to be something in the world for us to be able to perceive something, but the something we perceive doesn't of necessity have to be the same thing as the something that caused our perception in the first place.

I don't think he was denying space and time for empirical reality at all. He presupposed it. But he had to postulate space and time as pure intuition in CPR in order to give ground for necessity of a priori knowledge such as Geometry and all the Metaphysical judgments, which are supposed to be superior to the natural science based on the space and time of the empirical reality. Inevitably Kant was a dualist. — Corvus

As you say, Kant wanted to combine the two schools of rationalism and empiricism.

However, not to show that Metaphysics is superior to the Natural sciences, but rather better explain both Metaphysics and the Natural Sciences. Neither Metaphysics nor the Natural Sciences could be properly understand without first amalgamating both rationalism and empiricism.

Kant's synthetic a priori amalgamating transcendental idealism and empirical realism is necessary to better understand both Metaphysics and the Natural Sciences. He was a dualist.

Exactly. Existence of matter. Things. Objects. That which appears to human sensibility. That of which sensation is possible. That for which phenomena are given. In Kant, space and time are none of those. — Mww

I agree that matter and space and time are different kinds of things, in that I can imagine space empty of matter, yet I cannot imagine matter not being in a space. But the fact they are different kinds of things does not mean they cannot both be real, albeit we only they are real transcendentally.

This doesn't answer Guyer's and Woods statement in the Introduction to the CPR that for Kant, space and time are empirically real.
Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

If we all accept that for Kant matter is empirically real, then how could it be the case that matter is empirically real yet the space and time that this matter is existing within is not empirically real?

What does it mean that the matter is real yet the space and time it exists within is not real?

Th only conclusion is that if matter is empirically real, then the space and time that it is existing within must also be empirically real.

Despite the direct textual references refuting that opinion, you both continue the misunderstanding — Mww

Is it the case that for Kant, space and time are empirically real?

In the Introduction to CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen W. Wood is the statement that, for Kant, space and time are empirically real.

Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Kant writes that a transcendental idealist can be an empirical realist

A370 - The transcendental idealist, on the contrary, can be an empirical realist, hence, as he is called, a dualist, i.e., he can concede the existence of matter without going beyond mere self-consciousness and assuming something more than the certainty of representations in me, hence the cogito, ergo sum.

The SEP article on Kant's Transcendental Idealism writes that Kant was an Empirical Realist:
This provides a further sense in which Kant is an “empirical realist”

I would say that the above is some evidence that for Kant, as an Empirical Realist, space and time are empirically real.

If Kant were to think space and time inhere or subsist in themselves, and thereby they represent empirical reality, hence can be properties of things, he contradicts the tenets of his own epistemological metaphysics, not to mention it beggars the imagination as to why he would, on the one hand contradict itself, and on the other spent ten years constructing a philosophy in which it is proved they don’t. — Mww

I'm still interested in Critique of Pure Reason.

For Kant, as an Empirical Realist, space and time and the matter within it are empirically real. However, this can only be established by synthetic a priori judgements, empirically through the sensible intuitions of phenomena and appearance and transcendentally through the non-sensible intuitions and understanding.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Any idea why he had to go that way in CPR? — Corvus

In order to establish what is named today, as I understand it, as Indirect Realism, still not accepted by the Direct Realists after 200 years of debate, including people such as Hilary Putnam and John Searle.

So your view is also for Kant's space and time as both empirical reality and pure intuitions too — Corvus

Yes, for Kant, space and time are empirically real, and space and time are pure forms of all intuitions.

Introduction to CPR - Kant's thesis that space and time are pure forms of intuition leads him to the paradoxical conclusion that although space and time are empirically real, they are transcendentally ideal, and so are the objects given in them.

Introduction to CPR - Kant argues that space and time are both the pure forms of all intuitions, or ''formal principle(s) of the sensible world," and themselves pure intuitions. They are the forms in which particular objects are presented to us by the senses, but also themselves unique particulars of which we can have a priori knowledge, the basis of our a priori knowledge of both mathematics and physics. But the embrace of space and time "is limited to actual things, insofar as they are thought capable of falling under the senses" - we have no ground for asserting that space and time characterize things that we are incapable of sensing.

However, this does not mean that we know the reality of space and time in the world, as we can only know them transcendentally.

As an analogy, if I am within a closed room and hear a knocking of the outer wall, I know that there is something outside the room even if I don't know what it is from the principle that every effect has a cause. The fact that I know there is something does not mean that I know what it is.

As an another analogy, although when perceiving the colour red, I know something caused my perception, I don't know of necessity what that something was.

As an another analogy, I know something that exists wrote "So your view is also for Kant's space and time as both empirical reality and pure intuitions too", but I don't know what that something is.

Similarly, Kant knows that space and time are empirically real in the world from the Principle of Sufficient Reason, but has no knowledge as to what they really are.

I try not to 100% rely on or accept the internet sites information — Corvus

I agree.
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If you claim that Space and Time was solely pure intuitions and concepts in Kant, and has nothing to do with the physical entity in the external world, then should you not brand Kant as an idealist, rather than Representative Realist? — Corvus

Kant is an idealist in the same sense that an Indirect Realist is an idealist, in that what is perceived is only a representation of something existing outside the mind. IE, because we perceive a bent stick does not mean that the stick is actually bent in the world.

Kant is a realist in the same sense that an Indirect Realist is a realist, in that the representation of something in the mind has been caused by something outside the mind. IE, there is actually something in the world causing our perception of a bent stick.

If, however, Idealism was defined as the belief that there is nothing outside the mind and Realism was defined as the belief that there is something outside the mind, then in that case one could only be a believer in either Idealism or Realism. Under this definition, Kant would be a believer in Realism.
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It is vital to bear in mind that I am not denying Kant said that space and time was a priori pure intuition in CPR. He did. But he also had in mind that space and time is empirical reality out there too, although he doesn't make big song and dance about it. — Corvus

I agree that Kant as a believer in Realism would have agreed that there is a world outside the mind that exists independently of the mind. Within this world there is something that can be called space and time that is the cause for the perception of space and time in our minds.

However, the space and time we perceive in our mind is not of necessity the same as the space and time existing in a mind-independent world that is causing our perception. For example, when looking at a wavelength of 700nm we may perceive the colour red. It is true that the wavelength of 700nm caused our perception of the colour red, but it cannot be argued that a wavelength of 700mnm and our perception of the colour red are in any way similar.

"Space" and "time" can refer to what we perceive in the mind and can also refer to the cause of our perception existing in a world outside the mind. We know our perception of space and time in the mind, but the space and time in a mind-independent world are just names for unknown things.

IE "space" and "time" as pure intuition refer to known perceptions in the mind, whilst "space" and "time" as empirical reality refer to unknown things existing in a mind-independent world causing our known perceptions.

I am not sure if anyone claims that space is internal intuition — Corvus

Apart from Kant:

A23: Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences. For in order for certain sensations to be related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground) Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation.

A25: Space is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition.

From SEP article on Kant's Views on Time and Space

The distinction between sensation and intuition in Kant’s thinking is fundamental to his overarching conception of space and time. This is the case for several reasons, not least because one should avoid thinking that Kant takes us to have a sensation of space; we have, rather, an intuition of it (see Carson 1997).

This idea comprises a central piece of Kant’s views on space and time, for he famously contends that space and time are nothing but forms of intuition, a view connected to the claim in the Transcendental Aesthetic that we have pure intuitions of space and of time.

@Corvus @Wayfarer

The term "Transcendental Idealism" is central to the Critique of Pure Reason
In the Conceptual Map of the Critique of Pure Reason, the first item is Transcendental Idealism, establishing the importance of the term.

Kant defines "Transcendental Idealism" in the Fourth Paralogism"
A 369 I understand by the transcendental idealism of all appearances the doctrine that they are all together to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, and accordingly that space and time are only sensible forms of our intuition, but not determinations given for themselves or conditions of objects as things in themselves.

In today's terms, Indirect Realism, aka Representative Realism.

Kant did propose that the term could be improved
However, Kant did propose that the phrase "Transcendental Idealism" could be improved.
In the Introduction to the CPR:
Specifically, he differentiated his position from Berkeleian idealism by arguing that he denied the real existence of space and time and the spatio-temporal properties of objects, but not the real existence of objects themselves distinct from our representations, and for this reason he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," making it clear that his idealism concerned the form but not the existence of external objects.

Therefore, the term Transcendental Idealism should be treated more as a figure of speech than literally.

It is a transcendental idealism not a transcendent idealism
Note that it is Transcendental Idealism not Transcendent Idealism, meaning that it is about the limits of what we can cognize about our experiences having been determined a priori before having such experiences. It is not about being able to cognize about our experiences beyond limits predetermined a priori .

Kant is putting a limit on our cognitive abilities.

A priori pure intuition of space and time and a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories)
Space and time are the Categories are both a priori, however, space and time is the necessary foundation for the categories. For example, we have the concept of space and we have the concept of a number such as two, though it is a fact that although we can imagine empty space empty of numbers, we cannot imagine numbers outside of space. Consequently, first is the pure intuition of space and time within which are the pure concepts of the understanding (the categories).

We can use our cognitive facilities on our sensibilities about external objects affecting our sensibilities, but what we are able to cognize is limited by our a priori pure intuition of space and time and the a priori pure concepts of the understanding (the Categories).

What for Kant is the source of the a priori?
Kant says we have no innate knowledge of any particular proposition, ie, "postboxes are red", but he does say that it is not the case that our sensibilities are the cause of what we cognize about them but rather an priori cognitive ability makes sense of these sensibilities, ie, I perceive the colour red rather than the colour green when looking at a wavelength of 700nm

Introduction: Kant agrees with Locke that we have no innate knowledge, that is, no knowledge of any particular propositions implanted in us by God or nature prior to the commencement of our individual experience. But experience is the product both of external objects affecting our sensibility and of the operation of our cognitive faculties in response to this effect (A I, B I), and Kant's claim is that we can have "pure" or a priori cognition of the contributions to experience made by the operation of these faculties themselves, rather than of the effect of external objects on us in experience.

IE, Kant's position is that of Chomsky's Innatism rather than Skinner's Behaviourism.

Understanding Transcendental Idealism using the analogy of colour
When a wavelength of 700nm enters my eye, I see the colour red because I have the innate ability to see the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 700nm. When a wavelength of 300nm enters my eye, I don't see the colour ultra-violet, because I don't have the innate ability to see the colour ultra-violet when looking at a wavelength of 300nm.

This is the meaning of transcendental in "Transcendental Idealism", in that the colours I can see when looking at different wavelengths has been limited by a priori conditions of perception. and has the consequence that because I can see a colour such as red, this doesn't of necessity mean that the colour red exists in the world.

The fact that I cannot see the colour ultra-violet when looking at a wavelength of 300nm is why the term isn't "transcendent idealism".

"Idealism" because the colour red exists in my mind not the world.

Kant is a Realist because, for him, the cause of our seeing the colour red originated outside our mind rather than within our mind.

The relationship between objects and their properties
Kant does not directly deal with objects of empirical cognition, but investigates the conditions of the possibility of our experience of them by examining the mental capacities that are required for us to have any cognition of objects at all. (Introduction page 6)

As regards properties, suppose I see a red postbox. The postbox is an object and redness is a property. But what are objects? An object is no more than a set of properties, in that if all the properties of an object were removed, no object would remain, in that is it impossible to imagine an object if it has no properties.

So a postbox is the set of properties such as redness, rectangular, extended in space, etc, but as the property redness only exists in the mind of the perceiver and not the world, one can conclude that the object, which is no more than a set of properties, where properties exist in the mind of the perceiver and not the world, also only exists in the mind of the perceiver and not the world.

Therefore, not only do properties such as redness only exist in the mind, but also objects such as postboxes only exist in the mind as concepts.

Interpreting A369
I understand by transcendental idealism that all appearances of objects such as postboxes and properties such as redness are to be regarded as mere representations and not as things in themselves, ie, postboxes and the colour red existing in the world, and accordingly, what we perceive as space and time only exists in the mind as a foundation for being able to perceive objects and their properties as mere representations and not as things-in-themselves.

The space, time, objects and properties we perceive only exist in the mind, although we can reason about their existence in the world using the transcendental category of causation.

But hte point is that, i think the claim that those concepts are beyond human cognition, is a placeholder for 'beyond normal, waking cognition'. — AmadeusD

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation — AmadeusD

In my terms, in my normal waking state when looking at a wavelength of 700nm, my seeing the colour red is not a conscious decision, in that I cannot consciously decide to see the colour red rather than the colour green for example. My seeing the colour red is beyond my normal waking cognition to alter.

There are some things that are comprehensible to me not because of any conscious active deliberation on my part about them during my normal waking life, such as the colour red, but because of the pre-determined, a priori, innate and inborn state of my brain that is beyond my conscious ability to subsequently alter. I can only work within the limitations set by the physical structure of my brain.

I interpret this innate and inborn state of my brain with Kant's concept of the a priori.
Introduction to CPR: Kant attempts to distinguish the contribution to cognition made by our receptive faculty of sensibility from that made solely by the objects that affect us (A 2 1-2 /B 36), and argues that space and time are pure forms of all intuition contributed by our own faculty of sensibility, and therefore forms of which we can have a priori knowledge.

Though, that being said, if I did change my normal waking consciousness by some means, whether chemical or meditation, then I agree that this would change my normal waking consciousness into an altered waking consciousness, possibly allowing me to comprehend things that were not comprehensible to me before.

IE, altering the physical state of the brain would automatically alter what that brain comprehends.

Still not buying the idea of 'build'. — Wayfarer

The word "build" is intended more as a figure of speech than literally.

In fact, when you wrote "Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions", your word "built" was also intended more as a figure of speech than literally, as many machines are in fact built by other machines, as in a car factory.

Your word "built" inferred the figurative meaning "consciously designed" rather than the literal meaning "physically built".

The same for Kant, in that the term "Transcendental Idealism" should also be considered as a figure of speech rather than literally.

As soon as you have to enclose the key word in scare quotes, it's game over — Wayfarer

Machines are built by an external agents, who happen to be conscious humans. Humans are built by an external agent, which happens to be an unconscious world.

The Merriam Webster definition of "build" as "to form by ordering and uniting materials by gradual means into a composite whole" doesn't refer to the cause as being either conscious or unconscious.
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'New' in comparison to what, do you think? — Wayfarer

New in comparison to traditional cognitive science, which conceived of the brain as the source of all cognitive mental processes, rather than the brain being just a part of a body that interacts with its environment.

It is that the mind is not a blank slate which passively receives impressions from the world, but an active agent that dynamically constructs the experience of the world ('the world'). — Wayfarer

:up: I think that Kant would agree.
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But the thing is, we can't see that process from the outside. — Wayfarer

:up: Yes, as an Indirect Realist, I would agree with both Dan Zahavi, who wrote "The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned" and Beau Lotto who said "Is there an external reality. Of course there is an external reality , the world exists, it's just that we don't see it as it is. We can never see it as it is".

If Kant had had the technology in 1781, he could have created the 2021 YouTube video Is reality real? These neuroscientists don’t think so.
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It's an invalid metaphor, as organisms display fundamental characteristics which machines do not. Machines are built by external agents (namely, humans) to perform functions. — Wayfarer

Where does Kant's "a priori" come from?

Yes, machines are built by external agents, ie, humans.

But it seems equally the case that humans have been "built" by an external agent, ie, the world in which they live, the world in which they have evolved and the world in which they have to survive or be wiped out. Not consciously built, but built nevertheless by the situation it finds itself. In the same way that sand dunes have been "built" by the wind acting on the particles of sand, a process of Enactivism and Embodied Cognition.

As the SEP article on Embodied Cognition writes
Unifying investigators of embodied cognition is the idea that the body or the body’s interactions with the environment constitute or contribute to cognition in ways that require a new framework for its investigation.

As the Wikipedia article on Enactivism writes
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment
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My view is that the idea of mindless nature is specific to a particular phase of cultural development which was dominant in the late modern period, but which I believe is falling from favour. — Wayfarer

If nature isn't mindless, what kind of mind do you envisage nature having?
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Kant would say that it's because the mind has a tendency to seek answers to unanswerable questions. — Wayfarer

Isn't this a lost cause, answering the unanswerable?

If you've experienced an altered state of consciousness, that conclusion (that a 'soul' is beyond comprehension) is perhaps best thought off as an approximation. IN altered states, things become comprehensible which are not in normal waking consciousness. — AmadeusD

By "approximation", do you mean that the "soul" can be understood as a figure of speech such as "gravity" can be understood as a figure of speech?

Suffering sounds like from "illness" or "pain". No. You were having a groundless belief, and your reason confirmed it as a groundless belief. — Corvus

I always suffer when my beliefs turn out to be groundless.

All living things, from the very simplest, display intentional behaviours and perform tasks which mechanical devices do not — Wayfarer

We could be biological machines. Why should the philosophical doctrine of Determinism not be valid?

But by 'transcending the biological' I mean h. sapiens has capacities and abilities which are beyond those biological functions, amazing though they might be. — Wayfarer

Humans only discovered how to fly 120 years ago. How do we know that in another 120 years humans won't be able to explain our capacities and abilities in terms of our biological functions?

But I see that as reductionist - it reduces culture to a utility in the service of reproduction, or a by-product of it, rather than having an intrinsic reality. — Wayfarer

I agree that it may be distasteful to think that humans can be reduced to products of mindless evolution, but does this necessarily mean that this is not the case?

man 'the rational animal' is able to grasp through reason principles that are not perceptible to the senses alone — Wayfarer

Is this comparable to a mechanical logic gate which can make decisions based on what is input?

For example, time and space are transcendental ideas; they are not derived from experience but are the necessary conditions under which any sensory experience can occur — Wayfarer

Perhaps what are described as transcendental ideas have derived from the experience of evolving in synergy with the world for more than 3.7 billion years?

For instance, the concept of God, the soul, or the totality of the universe are transcendent ideas because they are beyond the scope of empirical investigation and human comprehension. — Wayfarer

How can the soul be beyond the scope of human comprehension as millions of words have been written about it?

To believe in something that is not the case is a groundless belief or fallacies, but not an illusion. — Corvus

I believe "I saw an Ichthyocentaur in the garden". I reason that my belief was groundless.

Could I then not say "I was suffering an illusion"?

You’re saying, ideas must refer to something - they must have a real referent that exists ‘out there somewhere’ as the saying has it. That is what I think Magee is referring to when he wrote "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect". It is what later phenomenology refers to as ’the natural attitude’. — Wayfarer

Yes, I cannot have an idea without the idea being about something, in that I can have a concrete idea, such as the idea of a house, or I can have an abstract idea, such as the idea of angst. Such ideas refer to something, which could be a concept such as house or angst, or an instantiation of a concept such as this house or my angst.

Are concepts such as house or angst real? Are instantiation of concepts such as this house or my angst real? Depends what is meant by "real".

Do concepts such as house or angst exist? Do instantiations of concepts such as this house or my angst exist? Depends what is meant by "exist".

I see a house and I feel angst, naively this is just a fact, not to be questioned but accepted for what they appear to be, taking no position as to the reality of what I see, and withholding any conscious opinion as to the ontological status of what I see. What I see is part of a world existing prior to my having perceived it. The Natural Attitude of the phenomenologist and the inborn realism of Bryan Magee.

Within the Phenomenalist's Natural Attitude, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then just its appearance .

So far so good, yet the Phenomenologist goes further than this naive Natural Attitude by freeing themselves of the restrictions of the Natural Attitude by using the principle of Phenomenological Reduction. This recognizes that others are not objects but subjects like myself, where my experience becomes inseparable to the experiences of others and by revealing a transcendental subjectivity and intersubjectivity.

Within the Phenomenalist's Reduction, my concept of a Thing-in-Itself is then more than just its appearance.

But how can my concept of a Thing-in-Itself be more than just its appearance, if by definition it is impossible to conceptualise a Thing-in-Itself outside of its appearance?

(Marc Applebaum, Key Ideas in Phenomenology: The Natural Attitude)

But in Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world. He doesn't see them as illusion — Corvus

It wouldn't be an illusion if I saw an Ichthyocentaur, but to think that Ichthyocentaurs exist in the world would be an illusion.

I agree that for Kant, Space and Time are a priori condition for our experience of the external world, and doesn't see them as illusions.

However, there are different aspects to the meaning of "illusion". For example, if I walk outdoors and see an Ichthyocentaur walking along the road, one the one hand this is not an illusion as this is what in fact I see, but on the other hand, I may reason that because of its improbability, this is in fact an illusion .

My innate ability to see the colour red is a prior condition of my ability to experience an external world, but this does not mean that the colour red exists in the external world.

On the one hand the fact that I see the colour red is not an illusion, as I truly see the colour red, though on the other hand I can reason that as the colour red doesn't exist in a mind-independent world, my seeing the colour red is in fact an illusion.

Similarly, one the one hand the fact that I perceive things in time and space is not an illusion, as it is a fact that I do perceive things in time and space, but on the other hand, I can reason that what I perceive is not what exists in the world, and in this sense it is an illusion to think that what I perceive also exists in the world.

An appearance can never be an illusion, though one can reason that the appearance is an illusion.

What do the Indirect Realist say about A priori concepts and space and time? Can these be mind-independent? — Corvus

Does what we perceive as time and space exist outside our perception of it?

I can only see a red postbox because I was born with the innate ability to see wavelengths of between about 400nm to 700nm, meaning that I cannot see ultra-violet, as it has a wavelength lower than 400nm.

It is not so much that I have a priori knowledge of the colour red, but more that I have the a priori ability to see the colour red when looking at a wavelength of 650nm.

I can reason that time exists independently of the mind, but as I can only exist in one moment of time, I can only ever perceive one moment in time. This means that I can never perceive the passage of time, as I can never perceive two different moments in time at the same time.

So our perception of time is an illusion

I can reason that objects such as apples exist in a mind-independent world, but this depends on the ontological existence of spatial relations in a mind-independent world, such that the top of the apple is "above" the bottom of the apple. But the ontological existence in a mind-independent world of spatial relations is problematic, because, although matter may experience forces acting upon it, matter doesn't experience spatial relations acting upon it.

So our perception of space is also an illusion.

As an Indirect Realist, I am not saying that there isn't a cause in a mind-independent of our perceptions, but am saying that what we perceive to be in the world doesn't actually exist in the world. When I perceive the colour red, my reason tells me that there is something in the world that caused me to perceive the colour red, but what is in the world is not how I perceive the colour red. Similarly, when I perceive time and space, my reason tells me that there is something in the world that caused me to perceive time and space, but what is in the world is not how I perceive time and space.

I get the idea that Plato’s appeal to the ‘innate wisdom of the Soul’ can be explained naturalistically with reference to evolutionary psychology...But no other evolved species has the capacity for abstract reasoning and language in anything more than rudimentary forms....................So my rather more idealist stance is that the human being is able to transcend the biological. — Wayfarer

Trying to keep the post relevant to Kant through understanding the word "transcendence".

Why cannot abstract reasoning and language be explained within biology?

If abstract reasoning and language could be explained within biology, then it would not be necessary for any transcendence of the biological.

Biological processes are capable of many surprising things. Taking one example at random, the ScienceDaily has a 2009 article Scientists Show Bacteria Can 'Learn' And Plan Ahead

Bacteria can anticipate a future event and prepare for it, according to new research at the Weizmann Institute of Science. In a paper that appeared June 17 in Nature, Prof. Yitzhak Pilpel, doctoral student Amir Mitchell and research associate Dr. Orna Dahan of the Institute's Molecular Genetics Department, together with Prof. Martin Kupiec and Gal Romano of Tel Aviv University, examined microorganisms living in environments that change in predictable ways. Their findings show that these microorganisms' genetic networks are hard-wired to 'foresee' what comes next in the sequence of events and begin responding to the new state of affairs before its onset.

Other examples can be found showing simple mechanical structures looking surprisingly life-like.



The word "transcendental " has different senses

From the Merriam Webster dictionary, "transcend" as a transitive verb can mean
1a to rise above or go beyond the limits of
1b to triumph over the negative or restrictive aspects of
1c to be prior to, beyond, and above (the universe or material existence)
2 to outstrip or outdo in some attribute, quality, or power.

There seem to be two distinct uses. The first is that of being explainable, as in "Great leaders are expected to transcend the limitations of politics". The second is that of being unexplainable, as in "certain laws of human nature seem to transcend historical periods and hold true for all times and all places".

But the fact that something is unexplainable today does not mean that it will be forever unexplainable.

Today we may say that "language transcends biology" in the second sense of the word as unexplainable, but it may well be the case that in the future as we gain more knowledge we may say that "language transcends biology" in the first sense as explainable.

Similarly for Kant in 1781, he may be using the word "a priori" as "transcendental" in the second sense as unexplainable, but today, over 200 years later, with our knowledge of Innatism and Enactivism, we can use the word "a priori" as "transcendental" in the first sense as explainable.

Another case of linguistic aberration? — Corvus

Not really, it depends what the word "direct" is referring to.

The Phenomenological Direct Realist would say that they have both a direct perception (causally direct) and direct cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

The Semantic Direct Realist would say that they have an indirect perception (causally indirect) but a direct cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

The Indirect Realist would say that they have an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world.

I believe that Kant would say that he has both an indirect perception (causally indirect) and indirect cognition of the postbox as it really is in a mind-independent world, ie, the same as what an Indirect Realist would say.

I think your belief in the mind-independent nature of existence is innate. — Wayfarer

Yes, as with Chomsky, I believe in a certain amount of Innatism. As the Wikipedia article on Innatism writes:
In the philosophy of mind, innatism is the view that the mind is born with already-formed ideas, knowledge, and beliefs. The opposing doctrine, that the mind is a tabula rasa (blank slate) at birth and all knowledge is gained from experience and the senses, is called empiricism.

Such Innatism can be combined with the principle of Enactivism. As the Wikipedia article on Enactivism writes:
Enactivism is a position in cognitive science that argues that cognition arises through a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment.

For me, Kant's references to the "a priori" are explained by what we know today as Innatism, a natural consequence of life's 3.7 billion years of evolution in a dynamic dance with the world of which it is a part.

As Bryan Magee wrote: "the inborn realism which arises from the original disposition of the intellect"

Yeah, whenever I read "Indirect X", I always get curious, "Indirect" from what, how and why? — Corvus

In this case, the prefix "in" means "not". Therefore, some people are direct realists, and some people are not-direct realists.

The problem is then knowing what "direct" refers to. Does it mean causally direct or cognitively direct?

The first of these is that if all the characteristics we are able to ascribe to phenomena are subject-dependent then there can be no object in any sense that we are capable of attaching to the word without the existence of a subject. Bryan Magee.

The earth, say, as it was before there was life, is a field of empirical enquiry in which we have come to know a great deal; its reality is no more being denied than is the reality of perceived objects in the same room. Bryan Magee. — Wayfarer

Neutral Monism denies the reality of the Earth

From the position of Neutral Monism, there is only one substance, elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time, and there is only one aspect of it, neither mental nor material, but rather, in some sense, neutral between the two.

From the position of Nominalism, universals and abstracts don't exist in the world.

From the position of Conceptualism, universals and abstracts don't exist outside the mind's perception of them.

From the position of Reductionism, complex systems are no more than the sum of their parts. For example, biological life can be explained in terms of its physical processes and the temperature of a gas can be explained by the average kinetic energy of its molecules in motion.

As regards the question, did the Earth exist before there was life, it depends on what one means by the Earth. In one sense it did exist and in another sense it absolutely didn't exist.

If the Earth is a concept in the human mind, amongst many other concepts such as apples, tables, angst, love, pain, fear, mountains, governments, then prior to the human mind, before there was life, then of course it didn't exist. How can a concept which depends for its existence on the human mind exist before there were human minds to have the concept.

If the Earth is a concept in the human mind, then from the viewpoint of today, I can say that "the Earth existed before there were human minds", as the Earth I am referring to is not something that existed prior to the human mind, but the Earth as it exists as a concept in my mind at this present moment in time.

If the Earth is not a concept in the human mind but exists independently of any human mind, then there are serious problems as to what exactly judges in the absence of any human mind when something is the Earth and when it is no longer the Earth, as the Earth is in a continual process of change. For example, the Earth formed about 4.54 billion years ago by accretion from the solar nebula, a mass of dust and gas left over from the formation of the Sun. What decided that 5 billion years ago the mass of dust and gas was not the Earth, but 4 billion years ago the mass of dust and gas was now the Earth. A human mind could make the judgement, but Bryan Magee is not saying that, he is inferring that in the absence of any human mind, something has judged at what moment in time a mass of gas and dust becomes the Earth.

I agree that if all the characteristics that we are able to ascribe to phenomena are subject dependent then there can be no object in any sense. I agree that if the subject is the human mind and the object is the Earth, if there is no human mind then there can be no Earth. But this ignores Neutral Monism, where if there is no subject, the human mind, there can still be an object, elementary particles and elementary forces existing in space and time.

Only thing about "Indirect Realism" is that, "Indirect" sounds a bit vague. Would it not be better called something like "Representational Realism"? Because appearance and sense-data represent the contents in the mind. — Corvus

Possibly. The Wikipedia article on Direct and Indirect Realism does give alternate names:
In the philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, direct or naïve realism, as opposed to indirect or representational realism, are differing models that describe the nature of conscious experiences.

The problem is, is it possible to describe a theory about which millions of words have been written using just two words.

I think of "Indirect Realism" as a name rather than a description, as the Taj Mahal is the name of and not a description of a building. Similarly I think of "Transcendental Idealism" as a name rather than a description.

I challenge that claim. I see Kant as a qualified realist - he describes himself as being at the same time, an empirical realist but also a transcendental idealist, and says that these are not in conflict. I know that there are deflationary readings of Kant, which attempt to show that he was, at heart, a realist, but then, there are many different interpretations on this point. The key factor in all this is the Kant denies that space and time have mind-independent existence. — Wayfarer

It come down to definition.

Some believe that the world exists in a mind, such as Berkeley, and others believe that there is also a world that exists outside the mind, such as Kant.

I agree with the SEP article on Idealism that within modern philosophy there are sometimes taken to be two fundamental conceptions of idealism:
1) something mental (the mind, spirit, reason, will) is the ultimate foundation of all reality, or even exhaustive of reality, and
2) although the existence of something independent of the mind is conceded, everything that we can know about this mind-independent “reality” is held to be so permeated by the creative, formative, or constructive activities of the mind (of some kind or other) that all claims to knowledge must be considered, in some sense, to be a form of self-knowledge.

I agree with the SEP article of Realism that there are two general aspects to realism:
There are two general aspects to realism, illustrated by looking at realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties. First, there is a claim about existence. Tables, rocks, the moon, and so on, all exist, as do the following facts: the table’s being square, the rock’s being made of granite, and the moon’s being spherical and yellow. The second aspect of realism about the everyday world of macroscopic objects and their properties concerns independence. The fact that the moon exists and is spherical is independent of anything anyone happens to say or think about the matter.

I agree that Kant is described as both an Empirical Realist and Transcendental Idealist. However, Kant did propose that the phrase "Transcendental Idealism" could be improved.
In the Introduction to the CPR by Paul Guyer and Allen Wood:
Specifically, he differentiated his position from Berkeleian idealism by arguing that he denied the real existence of space and time and the spatiotemporal properties of objects, but not the real existence of objects themselves distinct from our representations, and for this reason he proposed renaming his transcendental idealism with the more informative name of "formal" or "critical idealism," making it clear that his idealism concerned the form but not the existence of external objects.

The key factor that Kant denied that space and time have a mind-independent existence is similar to my position as an Indirect Realist in my belief that the colour red has no existence outside of my mind. If I see a red postbox, it is not the case that the postbox is red, but rather the postbox appears red in my mind. The fact that when I taste an apple as sweet does not mean that sweetness exists in a mind-independent world. The fact that I see a spatial relation between two objects, in that I see an apple above a table, does not mean that spatial relations ontologically exist in a mind-independent world.

To see something in the world does not of necessity mean that it exists in the world, as in bent sticks.
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I think that you need the concept of the thing in itself to stand in for what you understand as what is real, independently of any mind, as the mind-dependence of things is too radical a position for you to accept. — Wayfarer

I feel I went to sleep in Dublin and have been teletransported to Königsberg.

Concepts in the mind must refer to something. They cannot be empty terms.

We say that the concept in the mind of a thing-in-itself refers to a real thing existing in a mind-independent world.

But the problem is, things-in-themselves in a mind-independent world are by definition mind-independent.

But the concept in the mind of a thing-in-itself must refer to something. What do you think the concept in the mind of a thing-in-itself refers to?

Hence framing Kant as a Phenomenologist needs close investigation — Corvus

To my understanding, Kant cannot be described as a Phenomenologist, as phenomena are only one part of his "Transcendental Idealism".

As the IEP article Phenomenology writes:

Phenomenology, then, is the study of things as they appear (phenomena).

Kant endorsed “transcendental idealism,” distinguishing between phenomena (things as they appear) and noumena (things as they are in themselves)

On Kant’s view, the I is purely formal, playing a role in structuring experience but not itself given in experience. On Husserl’s view, the I plays this structuring role, but is also given in inner experience.
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Would it be the ground for making Kant an Indirect Realist? — Corvus

:up: I would argue that Kant is in today's terms definitely an "Indirect Realist".