It can but neither of these is what slab means in the builder's language. — Fooloso4
In the builder's language it cannot be described at all, but what it means can be shown by bringing the builder a slab when he says slab. — Fooloso4
All of its uses are uses within the activity of building. — Fooloso4
In the builder's language it means one thing - bring me a slab. Pointing to a slab does not explain the meaning of "slab". — Fooloso4
a language is not a collection of names. — Fooloso4
There is another problem with the pain behaviour of others. What if the person was acting as if he was in pain? How do you tell if it is genuine pain or acting or pretending to be in pain? — Corvus
You quoted me and then quoted Cavell. You are going to have to explain the connection (or disconnection) if you want me to understand. — Antony Nickles
You haven't been on some the the building sites that I have been on, where a slab of cake has been the highlight of the day. — RussellA
Yes, but we must understand what the slab is before knowing how best to use it. — RussellA
Unless the assistant is a foreign worker who doesn't know the language yet. — RussellA
One can point not only to objects such as slabs, mountains, trees but also to actions such as running, walking, wincing. — RussellA
Yes, as Wittgenstein wrote:PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it? — RussellA
Not to say we do not sometimes chose what we say, but senses (uses) exist outside and prior to us — Antony Nickles
The past criteria of judgement upon whether a word is correctly used (even if it is the individually learned collective wisdom of a community), and the judging itself, is had within a person's internal mental space. — schopenhauer1
my point is that most philosophers never asked for certainty of things like "pain". This is a false assumption — schopenhauer1
If someone like Hume or a Locke had a theory on sensations or whatnot, those are theories and theories are people's best attempt at answering questions, leading to perhaps more questions or useful for constructing various ideas and worldviews. More sharing of in-sights. — schopenhauer1
But Wittgenstein is going further here. What sense can we make in saying that an individual is “judging” something in internal mental space. This, in principle, cannot be learned from the collective wisdom of a community. There is no criteria to teach someone how to do this. So why even use this terms like “judging” or “using criteria” to try to express anything at all for this private activity.
Imagine I produce a bunch of what appears to you as random symbols. And I proceed to tell you that this is a language. If you ask, “how do you use these symbols”, and I reply, “I cannot tell you how to use them, but rest assure I know how to use them in similar ways as how you use your language, and thus it is a language.” I believe you can rightfully say that you have no idea what I am trying say or express. This also goes for these claims of judging private activities within the mind. — Richard B
which ordinary criteria Wittgenstein is claiming are just as relevant for doing philosophy, investigating its issues. — Antony Nickles
He admitted that he tried to make it a more expositional piece but failed — schopenhauer1
...question after question after question with little to no punchline, this itself is unsympathetic to the reader, and lacks empathy. — schopenhauer1
You are overlooking this: "After several unsuccessful attempts to weld my results together into
such a whole, I realized that I should never succeed. ...my thoughts were soon crippled if I tried to force them on in any single direction against their natural inclination.——And this was, of course, connected with the very nature of the investigation." PI, Preface (emphasis added)
It is the motivation to "force" philosophy into a "whole"; a generalized, abstract, single answer, which are the pictures that Wittgenstein is investigating, through which he realizes our fear of skepticism, the desire for a standard of perfect knowledge, which is the revelation/revolution the Investigations is trying to bring about. — Antony Nickles
You may think that's cute and clever and a hipster way of "demonstrating his point".. Maybe even saying the error in understanding of his point mimics the error in our greater understanding (and hence our responsibility to really "get" each other), but it just comes off as pedantic, pretentious, and annoying. — schopenhauer1
Folk have been at pains to try to get you to understand that language games involve both the world and words. It's not one or the other, but both.But is this world in the Investigations a world that exists inside language or a world that exists outside of language? — RussellA
my point, or RussellA rather, is that Witts premise about “use” cannot be solely what picks out meaning. — schopenhauer1
But whatever you want to call it, that is an internal mental phenomenon that has to take place. Not only that, there has to be a sort of internal “understanding” in order to use the word. — schopenhauer1
Well, more that meaning is irrelevant. It's use that is of interest, and asking for a slab in an Australian pub is for some an effective way of improving one's weekend. — Banno
Meaning" is just how the word is used in terms of the context in which we say the word or think it. Nothing more is necessary. — Apustimelogist
"Meaning" is just how the word is used in terms of the context in which we say the word or think it. Nothing more is necessary. — Apustimelogist
But surely there cannot really be a notion of shared meaning based on someones personal pain independently of observable pain-related behaviors. infact it is conditionally independent. the exact nature of the pain is virtually redundant compared to the functional implications. — Apustimelogist
my point, or RussellA rather, is that Witts premise about “use” cannot be solely what picks out meaning. — schopenhauer1
That is Wittgenstein's position! It has been quoted several times including by those who argue as if they disagree with him on this. — Fooloso4
"Knowing is the process of dynamic assembly across multileveled systems in the service of a task. We do not need to invoke represented constructs such as “object” or “extended in space and time” outside the moment of knowing. Knowing, just like action, is the momentary product of a dynamic system, not a dissociable cause of action" ... "We think to act. Thus, knowing may begin as and always be an inherently sensorimotor act." — Apustimelogist
It depends on what we both mean by think. What I meant here was just the internal vocalization of the word which we nonetheless still experience. To me, thinking is just another instance of "use" and state transitions, whether in ongoing vocalizations or those moments where you stop and "think" where in fact its all blank for a second and then suddenly pops another internal vocalization or some form of reaction in accordance to a eureka moment of some sort.. or intensely attending to an equation. To me, these are all the same kind of state transition/ "use" kind of thing. — Apustimelogist
Eh, this gets awfully close to the problem of a hidden dualism. The mental quickly gets covered up with behavior or process, trying to hide evidence of the mental — schopenhauer1
A program that requests and retrieves data. Is that meaning? It makes requests, the requests are used for various outputs. Are these requests actually "meaning-ful? — schopenhauer1
He said the box can be empty no? — schopenhauer1
43. For a large class of cases of the employment of the word “meaning” - though not for all - this word can be explained in this way: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.
Reading more, I guess we agree with the mental in terms of experience. But I am saying that I don't think there is more above that and that the meaning embedded in our experiences is still totally functional... transitions in experience... i experience some context and i experience myself saying a word and then some further experiences follow that etc. — Apustimelogist
Well what do you mean by meaningful here? — Apustimelogist
The use of a word is not something in a box. Meaning is use is a public not private. — Fooloso4
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