As for the weak or strong emergence, I think the stress in Chomsky's quote should be focused on "Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time." — Manuel

Water as a liquid is a collection of water molecules. One property of a liquid is that it takes the shape of the vessel it is in. One property of a molecule is that it has a definite and rigid structure and doesn't take the shape of the vessel it is in.

It is the case that liquid water has an entirely new property not seen in the individual water molecules from which it is composed. Chomsky calls this radical emergence, saying that this is something that happens all the time.

It is certainly true that liquid's property of taking the shape of the vessel it is in is radically different to the molecule's property of having a rigid structure and not taking the shape of the vessel it is in, but isn't this what we would intuitively expect.

If by "strong emergence" she means that particles in the LHC should show signs of consciousness when they collide, then of course it's not "strongly emergent" in that case. — Manuel

If panpsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness would not emerge from the collision, as consciousness was already present in the particles before colliding.

If panprotopsychism is true, when particles collide, consciousness could emerge from the collision, as a proto-consciousness was present in the particles before colliding.

IE, there are some theories whereby consciousness doesn't emerge, as it is already fundamental and ubiquitous.

We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids. — Manuel

There is only one kind of emergence

I would agree that there is only one kind of emergence. In physics, all our examples of emergence are of the weak variety, such as sound from atoms or liquids from molecules. As you say "We may get a theory of consciousness, we may not, if we do get a theory then we would say the same thing about consciousness as we do about liquids"

As Chomsky said in: Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4)
59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

As Sabine Hossenfelder said in What is Emergence
4min - A lot of people seem to think that consciousness of free will should be strongly emergent, but there's absolutely no reason to think that this is the case. For all we currently know, consciousness is weakly emergent, as any other collective phenomenon in large systems.

Parts exist in the world and wholes exist in the mind

Realism accepts that the parts exist in the world, but it may be argued that the whole, any collection of parts, only exists in the mind of an observer. Atoms may exist in the world, but sound only exists as a concept in the mind of an observer. Molecules may exist in the world, but liquids only exist as a concept in the mind of an observer.

I am taking atoms and molecules as metaphorical parts, in that atoms and molecules are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

Sound may emerge from atoms and liquid may emerge from molecules, but the emergent sound and liquid only exist as concepts in the mind.

The mind is conscious of both the physical parts, the atoms and molecules, and the conceptual wholes, the sounds and the liquids, even though only the physical parts exist in the world.

The emergence of consciousness from neurons hits the barrier of introspection

We are conscious of the atoms and the sounds they emerge into. We are conscious of the molecules and the liquids they emerge into.

How can we understand the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into.

I am taking neurons as metaphorical parts, in that neurons are in turn wholes made up of more fundamental parts.

We arrive at the self-referential problem of being conscious of the neurons and the consciousness they emerge into, ie, being conscious of consciousness itself.

Chomsky said in The Ideas of Chomsky (1977), our mind is inaccessible to introspection:
36min - For example, that same image dominates the rationalist tradition as well, where it was assumed that one could exhaust the contents of the mind by careful attention. You know, you could really develop those clear and distinct ideas, and their consequences, and so on. And in fact, even if you move to someone, let's say, like Freud, with his evocation of the unconscious, still I think that a careful reading suggests that he regarded the unconscious as, in principle, accessible. That is, we could really perceive that theater, and stage, and the things on it carefully if only the barriers of repression and so on could be overcome. Well if what I've been suggesting is correct, that's just radically wrong, I mean, even wrong as a point of departure. There's no reason all that I can see for believing that the principles of metal computation that enter so intimately into our action or our interaction or our speech-- to believe that those principles are all accessible to introspection any more than the analysing mechanisms of our visual system, or, for that matter, the nature of liver is accessible to introspection.

IE, the problem of consciousness emerging from neurons hits the barrier, as Chomsky pointed out, of the inaccessibility of introspection, of consciousness being conscious of itself, and therefore may never be solvable.

Actually you can, you can email him any time, and he would answer. I've met him personally and have asked him about the topic, it was part of my thesis. But, if you have doubts, see the following. See starting min. 59: — Manuel

I feel I have been, as they say, inadvertently "trying to teach my grandmother to suck eggs". Yes, Chomsky at 59min does suggest that he finds no distinction in emergence between weak and strong forms.

59 min - I don't go along with Strawson and as far as he does to defend panpsychism. His argument for panpsychism is based on a serious point . Can there be what he calls radical emergence, entirely new properties somehow developing without any elements of them in earlier structures. I think that happens all the time. There's nothing in the hydrogen atom which says you're a liquid. Changes take place with other levels of complexity increasing that bring about entirely new phenomena. So I don't think that's a strong argument.

Emergence is explained as occurring when an entity is observed to have properties its parts do not have on their own.

Chomsky makes a distinction between being able to understand the nature of reality and developing theories about the nature of reality. We can use the equation f = ma to predict what will happen without understanding why it happens.

page 173 - "Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Chomsky also makes the point that even though the mind may emerge from the physical matter of the brain, the nature of physical matter is still beyond our understanding.

56min - the problem is with the physical. When you talk about reducing Consciousness to physical you don't know what physical is. Physical is just whatever the Sciences say.
58min - whatever matter turns out to be

However, there is a difference between the emergence of the mind from the brain and the emergent behaviour of liquid due to its molecules. In Chomsky's terms, for the brain to mind we have neither a theory nor a grasp, whereas for the molecule to liquid we have a theory but no grasp.

63min - We can understand it to the extent that humans are capable of understanding things . I don't know about you, but I have no grasp of, I can follow the theory that explains how hydrogen and oxygen end up feeling like a liquid, but I have no grasp of it. I can follow the theory okay, and that's the way science works.

It comes down to how emergence is defined. If strong emergence is defined as having neither grasp nor theory, then from brain to mind is strong emergence, and if weak emergence is defined as having a theory but no grasp, then from molecule to liquid is weak emergence.

1) Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4) | Closer To Truth Chats

2) Chomsky - The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

Chomsky and the question "has consciousness emerged from the matter of the brain"

Pity we can't ask Chomsky.

I think it is meant as somewhat ironic — Manuel

p 193 - There is something about the nature of Hydrogen and Oxygen “in virtue of which they are intrinsically suited to constituting water,” so the sciences discovered after long labors, providing reasons “in the nature of things why the emerging thing is as it is.” What seemed “brute emergence” was assimilated into science as ordinary emergence—not, to be sure, of the liquidity variety, relying on conceivability.

Chomsky is distinguishing between strong emergence and weak emergence. With scientific understanding, what used to be thought of a strong emergence is now understood as weak emergence. For example, closing the gap between chemistry and physics with a better understanding of the quantum theory. Today, how consciousness is related to the brain is a mystery. Various theories have been proposed, including strong emergence and panpsychism. But as Chomsky writes, we don't know enough at the moment to come up with a definitive solution.

As the quote in your quoting of him in p.171, says, "even if we are certain it does." We can't doubt that experience comes from the brain. — Manuel

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

Consciousness and matter are certainly related, but that does not mean consciousness has emerged from the matter of the brain. There are other possibilities, for example, panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world, and being fundamental, cannot be described as having emerged from matter.

As for the quote in page 178, the point is stress that it might not only be neurons that are the cause of consciousness, there is a whole lot of other activity going on in the brain. These other parts of the brain likely play an important role on consciousness, but we've still to figure it out. — Manuel

I agree. At this moment in time, Chomsky is saying we don't know enough about the relation of consciousness to the brain to sensibly propose how they are related, whether by emergence or otherwise.

He references Randy Gallistel, who he thinks is persuasive on this topic. — Manuel

page 177 - C.R. Gallistel points out that “we clearly do not understand how the nervous system computes,” or even “the foundations of its ability to compute,” even for “the small set of arithmetic and logical operations that are fundamental to any computation.”

This reinforces my point that Chomsky is saying we don't know how consciousness and brain are related, even to sensibly propose that the mind emerges from the brain, as opposed, for example, to panpsychism, whereby consciousness is fundamental in the natural world.

He doesn't make a difference between strong and weak emergence. He doesn't say it explicitly, but I think it's quite clear. — Manuel

Chomsky: The Mysteries of Nature: How deeply hidden ?

Chomsky makes the distinction between the weak emergence of liquids from molecules and "radical emergence", ie, strong emergence, between two entities that are “absolutely incompatible with one another.”

page 192 - common objection today is that such ideas invoke an unacceptable form of “radical emergence,” unlike the emergence of liquids from molecules, where the properties of the liquid can in some reasonable sense be regarded as inhering in the molecules.

I read Chomsky as saying that we don't know enough about consciousness to even sensibly theorise about its origin, including whether or not it emerges from the physical brain.

page 171: “we do not really understand [because] we are still unable to form a conception of how consciousness arises in matter, even if we are certain that it does.”

page 178: Similarly it is premature to hold that “it is empirically evident that states of consciousness are the necessary consequence of neuronal activity.” Too little is understood about the functioning of the brain

page 192: In Nagel’s phrase, “we can see how liquidity is the logical result of the molecules ‘rolling around on each other’ at the microscopic level,” though “nothing comparable is to be expected in the case of neurons” and consciousness.

According to him, consciousness is emergent — Manuel

Where does Chomsky say that "consciousness is emergent" ?

There is a difference between weak emergence, as liquid from molecules, and strong emergence, as minds from brains.

In the video Noam Chomsky Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, at 13.40 min onwards he says that at the moment we do not understand the principles as to how a mind can emerge from a brain.

"The phrase we do not yet understand however should strike a note of caution."

Newton proved we don't understand motion: we provide descriptions for in our theories — Manuel

Yes, as Chomsky said in the video 9min onwards, we can create theories about something without understanding what that something is.

"Well accordingly the goals of scientific inquiry were implicitly restricted from the intelligibility of nature, which was in fact the criterion for true understanding in early modern science, Galilean science, and its successors, they abandoned that and moved to something much narrower, intelligibility of theories about the world".

Chat GPT says Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. Unfortunately, I have not been able to obtain any quote in this regard. Do you think Chat GPT gave me the right answer? — Eugen

In his video interview Noam Chomsky - Mysterianism, Language, and Human Understanding, Chomsky says:

1min - "I'm cited as one of the culprits responsible for this strange post-modern heresy (New Mysterianism) which I happily accept though I would prefer a different term for it , namely Truism, that's what I thought forty years ago, in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities , which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all"

3min - "The reason it's Truism is that if we are biological organism s, not angels, then our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are . These Truisms, and that is what they are, are commonly rejected in the study of mental faculties , language in particular, that seems to me to be one instance of a curious tendency to treat mental aspects of the human organism differently from so called physical aspects . It is a kind of methodological dualism, which is much more pernicious than Cartesian metaphysical dualism "

As Chomsky says that treating mental aspects differently to physical aspects is a pernicious dualism, it seems clear that Chat GPT is misleading to say that Chomsky does not believe in the complete reductionism of consciousness to matter. It is not about consciousness being reducible to matter, nor matter being reducible to consciousness, rather it is about there being no dualism between the mental and the physical.

What type of mysterianism does Chomsky embrace? — Eugen

As regards type 1 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "our cognitive faculties are similar to those that are called physical capacities and they should be studied much as other systems of the body are ", for Chomsky, consciousness is fundamental, as gravity is fundamental.

As regards type 2 Mysterianism, as Chomsky said "in proposing a distinction between problems which fall within our cognitive capacities, which may be vary hard, but in principle fall within them , and mysteries that do not fall within them at all", for Chomsky some mysteries fall within our cognitive capacities and some fall outside it.

Naming is an event in Tarski's meta-language.

Tarski said that the truth of a statement cannot be found in an object language, but only in a metalanguage

Naming is extra-linguistic. For example, suppose I observe a colour in the world and name it "chekundu". As naming is extra-linguistic, naming is, in Tarski's terms, in a metalanguage. Once this colour has been named "chekundu", then the statement "this colour is chekundu" is true. The truth of the statement cannot be found in the object language itself, but in the act of naming, which is extra-linguistic, and part of a meta-language.

If you like, being true is what we do with felicitous statements; or "P" is true IFF P. — Banno

Given the expression "the bird is blue" is true IFF the bird is blue, "the bird is blue" exists in language, and the bird is blue exists in the world.

The question is, where does this world exist, in the mind or independent of the mind. Wittgenstein in the Tractatus, para 1 "The world is everything that is the case", carefully avoided giving his understanding of where this world existed.

The answer to the question whether is it true that in the world the bird is blue first depends on deciding where this world exists.

Is it true that in a world independent of the mind there is a bird that is blue, or is it true that in the world in the mind there is a bird that is blue.

If there is a realist, metaphysical truth existing in a world independent of the mind, how can we discover this truth, given the inherent problem of trying to understand a world that is independent of the mind when all we have to understand this mind-independent world is the mind.

I observe a colour in the world and name it blue. The statement "the colour is blue" is then true because I have named the colour blue. Regardless of whether the world I have observed exists independently of my mind or exists in my mind, the statement "the colour is blue" is true. IE, "The colour is blue" is true IFF I have named the colour blue.

The problem remains, what mechanism will enable the mind to know what is true independent of the mind?

Three Classic Objections and Responses — Banno

5.2 of SEP Pragmatic Theory of Truth concludes that pragmatic theories of truth do make a difference in shaping inquiry and assertoric discourse, and unlike other accounts of truth "do not block the way of inquiry".

It is also possible to ask this question of the pragmatic theory of truth itself: what difference does this theory make? Or to put it in James’ terms, what is its “cash value”? One answer is that, by focusing on the practical function of the concept of truth, pragmatic theories highlight how this concept makes certain kinds of inquiry and discourse possible. In contrast, as Lynch (2009) notes, some accounts of truth make it difficult to see how certain claims are truth-apt:

consider propositions like two and two are four or torture is wrong. Under the assumption that truth is always and everywhere causal correspondence, it is a vexing question how these true thoughts can be true. (Lynch 2009)

If that is so, then pragmatic theories have the advantage of preserving the possibility and importance of various types of inquiry and discourse. While this does not guarantee that inquiry will always reach a satisfying or definite conclusion, this does suggest that pragmatic theories of truth do make a difference: in the spirit of Peirce’s “first rule of reason”, they “do not block the way of inquiry”

Taking the statements "two and two are four", "torture is wrong", "grass" is green", "force equals mass times acceleration", "DNA is the code of life" or life evolved by natural selection" as examples, what Theory of Truth other than the Pragmatic Theory of Truth is able to give a useful answer as to the truth or falsity of these statements ?

Where is there a realist and metaphysical Theory of Truth that is capable of defining the truth of a statement ?

Which makes us see that truth is relative. — Alkis Piskas

:up:

The verification of the facts offered as evidence! And this may seem to go ad infinitum. So there must be some agreement --between all parts involved-- at some point, where we must conclude definitely about the truthfulness of the statement! This is how court decisions are made about the innocence or guiltiness of the accused when a jury is involved. — Alkis Piskas

As you say, the verification of the truth will go on ad infinitum until someone makes a determination as to the truth of a statement or situation.

I made the metaphorical comment that "truth is what the users of a language say it is."

As your example of a court decision shows, a jury made up of resident citizens and registered electors after deliberation determines guilt or innocence, upon which the judge passes sentence.

In this case, it is the jury after consideration of the evidence that makes the judgement as to the truth. What the jury says is the truth of the matter is then accepted as the truth by the wider society.

The puzzle is to find the flaw in the line of reasoning in the switching argument.

Re-wording my argument:

The puzzle states that one envelope contains twice as much as the other. Let one envelope contain x euros and the other 2x euros.
The player selects one envelope without opening it. This envelope contains either x euros or 2x euros
The puzzle states that the amount in the selected envelope is A

Possibility one
If the selected envelope contains x euros, then A = x
The puzzle goes on to state that the other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2, meaning either 2x euros or x/2 euros.
But the puzzle had previously established that the only amounts in the two envelopes are x euros and 2x euros.
Therefore, the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" leads to a contradiction.

Possibility two
If the selected envelope contains 2x euros, then A = 2x
The puzzle goes on to state that the other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2, meaning either 4x euros or x euros.
But the puzzle had previously established that the only amounts in the two envelopes are x euros and 2x euros.
Therefore, the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" leads to a contradiction.

Conclusion
It seems to me that the statement "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" is where the flaw in the line of reasoning lies, as it leads to a contradiction.

Taken from Wikipedia Two envelopes problem
1) Imagine you are given two identical envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope at will, but before inspecting it, you are given the chance to switch envelopes. Should you switch?
2) Denote by A the amount in the player's selected envelope.
3) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
4) The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
5) If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
6) If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
7) So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is: 1/2(2A) + 1/2(A/2) = 5/4A


Item 4) "The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2" is a problem

1) Two envelopes containing £10 and £20
2) Selected envelope contains A, either £10 or £20
3) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.

Item 4) is a problem as it contradicts item 1).

If the selected envelope contains £10, then the other envelope must contain £20. It is not true that the other envelope may contain either £20 or £5. It cannot contain £5.

If the selected envelope contains £20, then the other envelope must contain £10. It is not true that the other envelope may contain either £40 or £10. It cannot contain £40.

Items 4), 5) and 6) should be reworded as: "the other envelope may contain either 2A if A is the smaller amount or A/2 if A is the larger amount."

It then follows that there is no value in switching.

The trouble with asserting that truth is a property of a statement is in finding a logical process by which the property of truth can be identified.(Tarski's artificial meta-system fails to answer this question.) — A Seagull

I observe a patch of colour and name the colour red. The statement "this patch of colour is red" is then true. Naming is a logical process, in that if I name a patch of colour red then it is true that the patch of colour is red.

Tarski proposed an object language and metalanguage, whereby the truth of a statement cannot be found in the object language but only externally in a metalanguage.

Given the statement "this patch of colour is red" in an object language, it is not possible to know whether the statement is true or false within the object language itself. The truth or falsity of the statement can only be found external to the object language, as Tarski proposed, in a metalanguage .

In an object language there may be a set of words "this patch of colour is red". This set of words is neither true nor false until the words have been given meaning by naming, where naming is external to the object language. The object language cannot name itself, it cannot talk about itself. Once I have named this patch of colour as red, then the statement "this patch of colour is red" becomes true.

Naming is external to the object language, and once the words in an object language have been given meaning by naming, then statements within the object language can then be known to be either true or false by reference to a naming external to the object language itself, ie, in a metalanguage.

What does it mean to say that a statement is true? — A Seagull

We see a patch of colour in the world. I label it as red and you label it as blue. A third person makes the statement "this patch of colour is red".

For me, the statement "this patch of colour is red" is true, whilst for you, the statement "this patch of colour is red" is false.

Whether the statement is true or false depends on what the patch of colour has been labelled.

Who or what determines what a patch of colour is labelled? It cannot be the world, as the world has no language. It could be a god if one believed in a god. It could be a Public Institution, but then one Public Institution could name it red and another name it rouge. Labelling could be up to each individual, but then the truth of a statement would be relative to each individual.

Whether the statement "this patch of colour is red" is true or not depends on what colour the patch of colour has been labelled as.

The problem is that there can be no mechanism of naming that is independent of the users of the language, meaning that naming can only be done by the users of the language. This results in the situation that a word only has meaning to the users of a language because the users of the language have given a meaning to that word.

So what does it mean to say that a statement is true. If the users of a language say "this patch of colour is the colour X" then it is true that "this patch of colour is the colour X".

IE, truth is what the users of a language say it is.

The switching argument, which produces a contradictory strategy for solving the two-envelope problem, starts by subjectively assuming, without evidence, the following conditional distribution, with respect to envelopes A and B whose values are a and b respectively — sime

Starting with the Wikipedia Two Envelopes Problem
Imagine you are given two identical envelopes, each containing money. One contains twice as much as the other. You may pick one envelope and keep the money it contains. Having chosen an envelope at will, but before inspecting it, you are given the chance to switch envelopes. Should you switch?

There are two identical envelopes A and B

Envelope A contains the value a, and envelope B contains the value b.

Either i) if the value a is 10 euros, then the value b is 20 euros or ii) if the value a is 20 euros, then the value b is 10 euros.

The probability of my picking an envelope with 10 euros is 50% and the probability of my picking an envelope with 20 euros is 50%.

What subjectivity are you referring to ?

Yes, that’s what I show in the OP. — Michael

The paradox has nothing to do with probability at all. It's just an improper use of variables when calculating the expected value. :up:

That's the supposed paradox. Switching doesn't increase our expected return, but the reasoning given suggests that it does. So we need to make sense of this contradiction. — Michael

From Wikipedia Two Envelopes Problem

1) Denote by A the amount in the player's selected envelope.
2) The probability that A is the smaller amount is 1/2, and that it is the larger amount is also 1/2.
3) The other envelope may contain either 2A or A/2.
4) If A is the smaller amount, then the other envelope contains 2A.
5) If A is the larger amount, then the other envelope contains A/2.
6) Thus the other envelope contains 2A with probability 1/2 and A/2 with probability 1/2.
7) So the expected value of the money in the other envelope is:
$\frac{1}{2}(2A)$ + $\frac{1}{2}(\frac{A}{2})$ = $\frac{5}{4}A$
8) This is greater than A so, on average, the person reasons that they stand to gain by swapping.

In the first part of the equation: $\frac{1}{2}(2A)$ - the A is referring to the situation whereby the person has the smaller amount, say A is referring to £10.
In the second part of the equation: $\frac{1}{2}(\frac{A}{2})$ - the A is referring to the situation whereby the person has the larger amount, say A is referring to £20.

Therefore, within the same equation, A is referring to two different amounts. Am I correct in thinking that this is why the equation gives a false result.

Can you explain that more about why it cannot be the Real Object? — schopenhauer1

A round object is circular, where the boundary of a circle is the same distance from a centre. For a round object, the distance of the boundary from the centre is the same, not similar, otherwise an ellipse, or a square, or a triangle would be a circle.

Plenty of shapes have been observed in the real world that are approximately round, where the distance of the boundary from the centre is similar, but "similar" does not mean "same". 10 metres is not the same as 1 metre, 1 metre is not the same as 1mm, 1mm is not the same as 1 micron and 1 micron is not the same as the planck length.

A round object can exist as a concept in the mind, but no one has observed a shape in the real world where the distance of the boundary from the centre is the same, meaning known to be the same down to the planck length.

There is a clear distinction between round as a concept in the mind and round as existing in the real world.

If I talk about a round object, for my talk to make logical and coherent sense, I must be talking about something that exists. As the concept of a round object certainly exists in the mind, but a round object is highly unlikely to exist in the real world, I must be referring to the concept in my mind, not an impossible object in the real world.

Can objects be understood without reference to human subjectivity? — schopenhauer1

Object-oriented ontology maintains that objects exist independently of human perception.

Taking an object that is round as an example, there is the Real Object RO and the Sensory Object SO.

I agree that there are objects that are approximately round in the world, but my assumption is that no exactly round object has ever existed or will ever exist in the world, if exactly one means within the Planck length, being ${10^{-35}m}$

If no round object has ever existed or will ever exist, then any talk about round objects cannot be about Real Objects RO but must be about Sensory Objects SO.

I particularly noted that he's Chomsky) prone to saying that language and thought are unique to humans, and he has openly suggested that they are two different ways to talk about the same thing. So, it seems he tends to equate language and thought on a basic foundational or fundamental level — creativesoul

:grin:

If mysterianism is true, that would mean we would be unable to understand ChatGpt's solution to the Hard Problem, but that seems wrong. At the very least, we could ask a series of yes/no questions about consciousness and get quite a bit of understanding about ChatGpt's solution. — RogueAI

Humans are animals.

If someone could show that they enabled the gorilla, for example, but it could be any animal, to understand the American political system through a series of yes and no questions, then I would agree that a superior intellect could enable the human to understand the hard problem of consciousness also through a series of yes and no questions.

The gorilla's understanding is limited by the physical structure of its brain, as is the human's.

I mean, "practice makes perfect" holds good fairly often in my experience — creativesoul

I agree that "practice makes perfect".

The more one practices, the more competent one becomes, ie practice generates competency. The more competent one becomes the better one's performance will be, ie, competency generates performance.

As you say, and as Chomsky says, "competency generates performance".

I'm struggling to comprehend exactly what sort of language or grammar could be innate in such a way as for the user to be competent in it prior to E language acquisition. How is it not a private language? I mean, the very notion of I language seems to require either private meaning or meaningless language... neither seems palpable. — creativesoul

I hit my hand with a hammer and feel pain. I was born with the innate ability to feel pain, it is not something I needed to learn at school. Although I may express my pain using words in an E-language, I don't need an E-language to feel pain. Pain is a concept in my mind.

Chomsky says concepts wouldn't exist without language, and as concepts exist in the mind, this language exists in the mind as an I-language.

Chomsky has said that the relation between thought and language is that of identity:
"Take a look at the human species, what sharply differentiates it from any organic species we know of are two things, possession of language and possession of thought, I have two identifying features of a species. The first question that comes to mind is what is their relation. The simplest relation would be identity ...............language and thought are intimately related. Language has historically been called audible thought"

Chonmsy has said that concepts wouldn't exist without language:
"Even the simplest concepts, tree, desk, person, dog, whatever you want. Even these are extremely complex in the internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto-human history when there was no language they would have been useless. It would have been an accident if they had developed and they would quickly have been lost because you cannot do anything with them"

My feeling of pain is a private concept, full of meaning to me and regardless of others.

As my private concepts make up my I-Language, my I-language has private meaning.

Chomsky is not saying that the I-language uses words, such as "pain", "tree", "circle". He is saying that the I-language has the characteristics of language as generally understood. A syntax of innate rules ensuring that the arrangement of thoughts and concepts are structurally well-formed, and semantic meaning of sense, reference, presupposition, implication in the relationship between thoughts and concepts.

If there was only an E-language and no I-language, inside the mind would be an empty void.

Philosophy doesn't need to be bound by problems. It creates its own problems. It's not even necessarily bound by the university. It created the university. — Moliere

:100:

Philosophy deliberates on those questions that the natural sciences don't need to think about, yet are still important questions.

Chomsky's view holds the reverse... that competence generates performance — creativesoul

Max Verstappen performed well at the 2022 Formula 1 would championships because he was competent driver.

Would anyone say that he only became a competent driver after performing well at the championships.

So 'analytic' for you just means 'true by virtue of some current definition'? — Janus

Yes.

Given the word "mkataba", what does it mean? It has no meaning until someone gives it a meaning. Suppose someone says it means "in a manner that is usually done", but someone else says it means "large hill", who determines what the word should mean. Presumably either an Institution or accepted by common usage . The meaning is decided by convention by the society within which the word will be used. Eventually, once agreed by common convention, it's accepted meaning may be codified in a dictionary.

Similarly with the word "analytic". The fact that we accept that it means "true by virtue of the meaning of the words or concepts used to express it, so that its denial would be a self-contradiction." rather than "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop." must be because of convention.

In para 43 of PI, Wittgenstein wrote "For a large class of cases, though not for all, in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language".

The problem for philosophy, who use language as their primary tool, is that language is something self-referential, a Wittgensteinian language game or a Quinean web of belief. If Quine is correct and the distinction between the analytic and synthetic disappears, philosophy cannot differentiate itself from the natural sciences, where both discuss pragmatic synthetic generalities rather than logical analytic truths.

As with Tarski's Semantic Theory of Truth, where he showed that truth in a language can only be found in a language which is stronger than the language itself, ie, a metalanguage, if philosophy needs to consider analytic truths rather than synthetic generalities, then it must discover how to make the jump from the synthetic linguistic to the analytic extralinguistic.

It is not known. It is manifested in the interaction of ball with ground. It doesn’t need to be apprehended. The object does as it does in relation to the other object. In this case the object rolls down a hill. Properties of solidity and gravity are manifested in the relation of the two objects. — schopenhauer1

I can't resist. How do you know the object "rolls" down the hill, if, as you say "it is not known"?

Professor Chomsky, I've had this question for quite a while now, and this seems the perfect opportunity:

"Many believe that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities. As with Skinner's Behaviourism, they believe that everything is learnt from the environment, including language.

What is the best argument we can use to persuade the Behaviourist of the impossibility that everything we know has been learnt from the environment without any foundation of certain innate abilities already built into the physical structure of the brain?"

it would be a shame not to ask for clarifications. — Manuel

I have a relevant question from before this thread started, that I have not yet found an answer to. Should I put it on the original thread "Guest Speaker: Noam Chomsky" ?

"Many on the Forum seem to believe that the human is born a blank slate having no innate capabilities. As with Skinner's Behaviourism, they believe that everything is learnt from the environment, including language.

What is the best argument we can use to persuade the Behaviourist of the impossibility that everything we know has been learnt from the environment without any foundation of certain innate abilities already built into the physical structure of the brain?"

But that’s what I’m saying, it doesn’t matter how it is labeled- an object manifested the property of rolling by its action with other objects. It may not be judged as round but acts that way. — schopenhauer1

I may be misunderstanding. You say that the object may not be judged as rolling, but it acts as if it were rolling.

How is it known that the object is acting as if it were rolling rather than acting in any other way, such as bouncing?

It isn’t judged, it is an event. Object rolls down a hill. The object interacts with the ground in the way round objects act. It’s manifest in how the object interacts. It’s roundness is manifest in how it rolls. No one needs to label it round to interact as round objects will. — schopenhauer1

You say the object rolled down the hill. Who is to say that it didn't bounce, slide, skid, glide, skip or skim down the hill.

A judgement must have been made as to the manner of the object moving down the hill.

What if, however unlikely it might seem, dogs turned out, on further investigation, not to be mammals? — Janus

If something that was not a mammal had been named "a dog", then the statement "a dog is not a mammal" would be analytic.

So then, what if the meanings of the words are ambiguous? Would that make the truth of such an expression undecidable and hence no longer analytic? — Janus

The statement "this is cool" is ambiguous, in that cool can mean "low temperature" or "fashionably attractive".

If "low temperature" has been named "cool", then "cool is a temperature" is analytic. If "fashionably attractive" has been named "cool", then "cool is fashionable" is analytic.

Even if the meaning of a word was ambiguous, for each meaning an analytic statement can be found.

What does i-langage do that is not captured by "cognition"? — Banno

Cognition is the mental action or process of acquiring knowledge and understanding through thought, experience, and the senses. The I-language exists in the physical structure of the brain.

Cognition requires thoughts in the brain, but doesn't distinguish between Chomsky's Innatism, where some thoughts result from structures biologically preset in the human brain, from Skinner's Behaviourism, where all thoughts are products of learning from interactions with the environment.

Wouldn’t degrees of roundness suffice? — schopenhauer1

Who judges the degree of roundness? There is nothing in a mind-independent world that can make judgements about the degree of roundness. Judgements can only be made in the mind.

I find it difficult to think of the brain as operating like a grammatic machine — Moliere

The SEP article The Computational Theory of Mind asks "Could the mind itself be a thinking machine?". This brings in the problem of consciousness, in that it doesn't seem that a thinking machine would need to be conscious in order to calculate. Does the fact that we are conscious mean that we are more than thinking machines, or is it the case that consciousness is a by-product of very complex thinking machines.

- that what we choose as an I-language, even if we delimit our domain to the brain, will be over-determined by the E-language we already know — Moliere

According to Chomsky, E-language (language) is something abstract externalized from the actual apparatus of our mind and I-language (grammar) is the physical mechanism of our brain. If the E-language is generated by the I-language, then, the E-language won't be over-determining the I-language, in the same way that naming the colour red as "red" isn't an instance of over-determination.

Grammar and language are as real as beans and brains, in my view. (it's the theories about grammar and language that end up in the land of abstractions) — Moliere

In a sense, everything is both abstract and concrete. For example, a university is both an abstract idea yet is concretely instantiated in buildings and staff.

The I-language, at least my understanding of it, is built upon my understanding of the E-language and my ability to use it — Moliere

E-language is what is written and spoken in our daily lives, and the I-language is the physical mechanism of the brain. E-language is the externalized language and I-language is the internalized grammar.

I agree that we have been using the E-language for quite some time, but no E-language can exist without the brain that has created it, even though the brain can exist without an E-language.

The E-language didn't evolve independently of any brain. Its form, character and nature can only be a function of the physical mechanism of the brain.

It cannot be the case that first there was an E-language existing in the world independent of any user, rather, first was the brain and subsequently there was the E-language.

Chomsky argued that it has been generally assumed that language is thought to be something existent whilst grammar is considered something abstract. So grammar, unlike language, does not exist in the same way as language.

However, Chomsky proposed instead that it is language that is abstract and grammar that is existent. He argued that language is something externalized from our brain whilst grammar is the physical mechanism of our brain. He named language “externalized language (E-language)” and grammar “internalized language (I-language)”.

I find it easier to believe that E-language has been founded on the physical mechanisms of the brain, an I-language, than there is an E-language operating in the world independently of any mind controlling it that is capable of making sense of the I-language.

How about like this -- if the only way we can express our I-language is through E-language, as we are doing in this thread, then what does "I-language" add? — Moliere

If the only way the Empire States Building can remain vertical is because of its foundations, one could also ask, then what do its foundations add ?

If we accept that analytic statements are analytic on the basis of convention then we accept that they are, at the same time, not going to have anything philosophically interesting about them. — Moliere

As the meaning of every word in language derives from convention, in what other way can a statement be analytic if not by convention.

Let's just grant the I-language of simple concepts and what-have-you. Somehow this allows us to use an E-language. The examples of analytic statements aren't in terms of simple concepts, though -- they're in E-language. And it seems you agree there's an element of convention in the E-language. Isn't analyticity on the side of E-language, rather than I-language? — Moliere

When driving through a busy city, I don't have time to put all my thoughts into words taken from my E-language. Yet, I couldn't successfully navigate the streets and other traffic without being aware of complex concepts existing within my I-language,

Chomsky in New Horizons in the Study of Language and Mind seemed to argue that not only are there complex concepts in the I-language but that they are also innate. I can understand primitive concepts being innate and complex concepts learnt but would agree that both are within our I-language.

If analyticity requires complex concepts, and complex concepts exist within the I-language, then analyticity can also exist within the I-language.

Are the metaphors supposed to reduce to very primitive ones? — schopenhauer1

Perhaps the advantage of a metaphor is that it doesn't need to be reduced to more primitive ones, but allows understanding by relating a complex abstract concept to more familiar concrete ones.

For example, I may be perplexed by the concept of gravity, but I feel I have some understanding by observing one snooker ball rotating around a football on a sheet of rubber stretching under their weight.

How can properties be said to be instantiated in the object and not the mind? ..........................That is to say, humans really do "see" a small portion of the essence of an object, but that the object is always withdrawn or "hidden" besides the vicarious properties of objects it interacts with. — schopenhauer1

As I see it, I observe something having the properties round, green and sweet and name it "apple".

When I observe the object apple, I am observing a set of properties, in that if each property was removed one by one, once all the properties had been removed, there would be nothing left.

It is not the case that the properties round, green and sweet are instantiated in the object apple, rather, the object apple is an instantiation of the properties round, green and sweet

It is not the case that an object has an essence hidden behind the properties of the object , rather, the essence of an object is its set of properties, in that if all the properties were removed, neither an essence nor an object would remain .

Bradley questioning the nature of properties. He started with the example of a lump of sugar. He noted that there appears to be such a thing as a lump of sugar and this thing appears to have qualities such as whiteness, sweetness, and hardness. But, asked Bradley, what is this “thing” that bears properties? On the one hand, he thinks it is odd to assume that there is something to the lump of sugar beside its several qualities, thus implying that postulating a property-less bearer of properties is incoherent. On the other hand, he notes that the lump cannot merely be its qualities either, since the latter must somehow be united. For Bradley, the unity properties presupposes relations, which is why he went on to question our concept of relations.

The alternative is that the apple supervenes on its properties, in that the apple has an essence which is more than the sum of its properties. But how this is possible needs to be justified.

If the property of roundness was instantiated in the object in the world rather than existed in the mind as a concept, as nothing in the world can be exactly round, how can roundness be instantiated in the world if no instantiation of roundness is possible in the world.