I'm surprised that no-one has been interested enough in this thread to add a comment in more than 11 weeks.

North Sea Oil — ssu

The SNP's mistaken dependence on North Sea oil and gas prior to the 2014 independence referendum should be both a lesson and an important moral about their dependence on the EU prior to any future independence referendum.

The SNP manifesto 2011 stated that "In 1970 North Sea Oil was discovered, with 90% of it lying in Scottish waters. This led to one of the our most successful campaigns – It’s Scotland’s Oil". The SNP manifesto 2021 stated "The people of Scotland voted decisively to remain within the European Union and we firmly believe that EU membership is the best option for Scotland".

Alex Salmond, as Scottish First Minister, and the SNP, as majority government, when leading up to the 2014 referendum put the oil industry at the heart of their campaign. They predicted oil prices could rise above $150 a barrel by 2020 - the remaining reserves were worth £300,000 per Scot - they estimated there were 24 billion barrels of oil and gas remaining, with a wholesale value of £1.5 trillion - all of which would significantly underwrite Scotland's economy.

However, these predictions did not come to pass. MSP Andrew Wilson, chairman of the SNP's growth commission, said in 2017 said that making North Sea revenues central to the economic arguments for independence had been a mistake, and SNP's future economic case "should not include oil". Since then the North Sea oil price has plummeted with UK oil and gas production generating negative receipts in 2015/16 of -£24m compared with +£2.15bn the year before. Today a barrel of oil is $70.

While the oil and gas sector currently does not generate much in the way of public tax revenue, it does contribute to the economy in other ways, such as in employment. For example, about 70,000 Scots are either directly or indirectly employed in the oil and gas industry, primarily in the Aberdeen area.

However, there are inevitable pressures against further economic benefits of fossil fuels. In the 6 May 2021 Scottish elections, the pro-independence SNP failed to win an overall majority and must rely on the the Green Party, who favour a substantial reduction in oil and gas production, for a pro-independence Holyrood majority.

In summary, as the SNP made the mistake in 2014 (according to the chairman of the SNP's own growth commission) of planning to base Scotland's economy on North Sea revenues, the SNP will need a stronger and more reasoned argument in 2021 to show that they are not making another mistake in planning to base Scotland's economy on joining the EU.

Just recently Jacob Rees Mogg said in the house that devolution is a failed project and that it is now time for its abolition — Punshhh

What Rees-Mogg actually said was: "It is the SNP that has been the failure and it is not devolution that has been the failure."

At Commons Business Questions 19 Nov 2020, Rees-Mogg said that devolution would work "perfectly well" if the Conservatives were in charge in Scotland. He accused the SNP of having a "shameful" record at Holyrood. He also said "The failure of the SNP is not something I would have thought [Mr Sheppard] would wish to boast about. "The SNP in government has failed on Scottish education, it has failed on Scottish health, it has failed on Scottish law and order. "It is a shameful record in Scotland of the SNP. They have let the people of Scotland down." He added: "Devolution could work perfectly well if only the Conservatives were in charge in Scotland, which would make a triumphant success of it.

Both the Conservative and Unionist Party and the Scottish Conservatives have had a long history of supporting and strengthening Scottish devolution.

The Conservative and Unionist Party manifesto 2019 stated: "Strengthening the Union: Conservatives have a proud history of upholding and strengthening the devolution settlements in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. We also want to ensure that the UK Government and its institutions are working effectively to realise the benefits of four nations working together as one United Kingdom."

The Scottish Conservative manifesto of 2021 stated: "For devolving power and funding to communities, so that we can put an end to the era of SNP centralisation and better support local services, like schools and roads".

The Scotland Act 2016 devolved further powers to Scotland, and recognised the Scottish Parliament and a Scottish Government as permanent among UK's constitutional arrangements, with a referendum required before either can be abolished.

In addition, Ruth Davidson at a speech to the Scottish Conservatives on the 26 March 2013 said: "we have heard their ambition for a devolved parliament within the UK with greater powers than it currently holds. We have listened, we have heard and we will act. We will respond positively to that ambition, and in doing so, we reaffirm our unshakeable conviction that continued membership of the UK is the cornerstone of a safer, fairer and more prosperous Scotland"

In summary, it is not Conservative policy to abolish devolution.

But in reality the EU is largely trying to regularise standards, regulations, tariffs and enjoy a customs Union between members. — Punshhh

The home page of the EU does not say that the role of the EU is largely in trying to regularise standards, etc, but rather that "The European Union is a unique economic and political union between 27 EU countries".

The single market is important as the economic engine of the EU, but is no longer the raison d'être of the EU.

It is true that the predecessor of the EU was the European Economic Community (EEC), created in 1958, and initially increasing economic cooperation between six countries: Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands.

What began as a purely economic union has evolved into an organization spanning policy areas, from climate, environment and health to external relations and security, justice and migration. A name change from the European Economic Community (EEC) to the European Union (EU) in 1993 reflected this.

The problem with the current EU is that it is no longer largely an economic union, but is progressively becoming more and more political.

This would not necessarily be a problem in itself, in that the EU's stated aim is in making its governing institutions more transparent and democratic. However, this is an example of Orwellian doublespeak, because the EU is becoming in reality, more opaque, bureaucratic and undemocratic.

As Rees-Mogg said to the Oxford Union on the 24 October 2013, in speaking about the EU's "contempt for public opinion" as shown by the Commission repeatedly demanding referenda on EU treaties until they are approved and its role in the removal of elected leaders of countries such as Greece and Italy, thus giving a voice to extremist parties such as Greece's New Dawn and France's Le Front National. Their successes, amplified in EU elections, have become a destabilising influence on member states' democracies.

If the EU had remained an economic union and had not morphed into an undemocratic bureaucracy, I doubt Brexit would have happened.

subjugation of Scotland — Punshhh

I can understand some Scots wanting independence, even at a financial cost of about £15 billion a year. For example, this compares to the £14 billion that the Scottish government spends on its NHS each year.

According to the 2018/2019 Government Expenditure and Revenue in Scotland (GERS) report, tax revenue north of the border amounted to around £66 billion - that figure includes North Sea oil revenues. Scotland received about £81 billion in public spending. That means the UK Government spent an additional £15 billion in Scotland as a whole, more than it collected from the country via taxes. This is under the Barnett Formula.

However, this is not what the SNP wants. The SNP wants to rejoin the EU. But independence is not compatible with EU membership. The SNP manifesto 2021 states "we are seeking the permission of the Scottish people in this election for an independence referendum to take place after the crisis (covid)" and "we firmly believe that EU membership is the best option for Scotland".

The SNP say that they want to be independent because of their feelings of "subjugation" within the UK Parliament, having only 9% of the MPs, yet propose joining the EU, where they will have possibly have only 1.8% of the total MEPs. If the SNP feel "subjugated" within the UK Parliament, their feelings of "subjugation" will only be magnified once part of the EU. Scotland can be either independent and not part of the EU or part of the EU and not independent, but they cannot be both independent and part of the EU, as the SNP misleadingly say they can.

The SNP's claim that Scotland can be both independent and a member of the EU is untrue.

Referendums are won by % votes, not seats. — Tim3003

As Tim3003 pointed out, referendums are won by % votes, not seats.

In a democratic society, the will of the people is generally taken to mean a decision by simple majority, or half-plus-one wins the vote.

Nicola Sturgeon on the 8 May 2021 said a second independence referendum "is the will of the country" and the prime minister would be "picking a fight with the democratic wishes of the Scottish people" if he tries to block it.

To take a sporting analogy, in the World Championships in Berlin 2009 100 metres Men Final, Usain Bolt finished in 9.58 seconds and Tyson Gay finished in 9.71 seconds - a difference of only 0.13 seconds. If the sports commentator had said that Tyson Gay had won because he had the slower speed then that commentator would never be taken seriously again.

Similarly, it makes no sense for Nicola Sturgeon to say that a second independence referendum is the "is the will of the country", when the pro-second independence referendum parties (SNP and Greens) gained fewer votes than those parties opposed (Conservatives, Labour and Liberal Democrats).

But not only that, as Scotland has a population of about 5,517,000 and there are about 4,281,000 registered voters, the pro-second independence referendum parties only gained 24% of the population in general and only 31% of the registered voters, making her claim that it "is the will of the country" even more spurious.

Once they ran an empire; now they don't seem to be able to run a fish and chips shop. Or maybe the French should take over again. It improved things quite a bit the last time. — Bitter Crank

I beg to differ. As noted in The Telegraph of 10 May in an article about the UK's 50 best fish and chip shops, there are now 10,500 fish and chip shops in the UK and they are experiencing a booming trade since the start of the lockdown, where orders have shot up by 208%.

So much so that even the French are after our fish, as noted in the BBC headline on the 7 May "Jersey officials hold talks with French fishermen over rights dispute".

I think the French have more on their plate than looking to take over another country. As the BBC News headline of 11 May noted: "French soldiers warn of civil war in new letter".

The Scottish have been dominated by Westminster for about a thousand years — Punshhh

The Scottish are not separate to Westminster. The Scottish are part of the Westminster Parliament, together with Northern Ireland, Wales and England.

At the moment, Scots make up about 8% of the population of the UK and have about 9% of the MPs in the UK Parliament. However, since 1900, Scottish Prime Ministers have been in power for about 20% of the total period.

The official position of the SNP is to be a full member of the EU. Of the 705 MEPs, Scotland could expect to have a similar to number to Slovakia, who have a similar population, meaning about 13 MEPs. Scots would make up about 1.2% of the population of the EU and would have about 1.8% of the MEPs

If the SNP are worried about being dominated by the Westminster Parliament, then their problem will only be magnified if they become part of the EU.

Hume and Locke — frank

It is interesting that we only observe in the world a set of intermittent particular events, yet are able to conceptualise in our minds something that has a continuous existence. What was discussed by Locke, Hume and Kant in the 17th and 18th C. is still being discussed today.

reasonably coherent — Mww

Success at last. Time to celebrate and open a good bottle of McGuigan Shiraz.

How can an intuition be calculably curved by a mass? — Banno

The question is, if our knowledge of space is innate a priori pure intuition, how is it possible for us to alter our conception of the nature of space. For example, curved spacetime within General Relativity.

We can imagine different types of space, but we cannot imagine no space
For Kant, space and time are pure intuitions that we know prior to experience and we know to be true independent of experience. As the concept of space and time is innate within the brain, part of the physical structure of the brain, we can imagine different types of space and time - empty, curved, etc - but we cannot imagine there being no space or time.

The mind only perceives a fraction of what exists in the world
When we perceive the world, we perceive parts and the relationships between those parts.
For example, we only see some colours in the world, from 380nm to 700nm, not the ultraviolet that some birds see. Of the unlimited number of possible mereological relationships between the parts existent in the world, we are only aware of a few of them - a table top and its legs - a tree and its leaves - a roof and its walls. There are also many more mereologically possible relationships that we are not aware of - my pen and the Eiffel Tower - a tree and a fish - the horn of the narwhal and the body of a horse (aka a unicorn). As the mind perceives only a small proportion of the parts and relationships existing within the world, what the mind perceives as the world is a very limited and simplistic model that only scratches the surface of what in fact exists.

What the mind is able to perceive has been determined by evolution
In the 3.7 billion years of life on earth, complex life forms have evolved to have certain innate intuitions necessary for continued survival. It is not the case that we have certain intuitions and they happen to correspond with the world, rather, our intuitions were created by the world and therefore of necessity correspond with the world. Through the process of evolution the mind gradually models the world around it. If the model had not been correct, then the mind and body would not have survived. Therefore, the sensible intuitions innate within the mind have been created by the world in which the brain has survived.
Therefore, it is not that the mind has an intuition of space that may or may not correspond to the space that exists around it in the world, but that the intuitions of space within the mind of necessity correspond to the space that exists around it, as the mind's intuitions of space have evolved in synergy with the world.

Kant and evolution
It is true that Kant did not propose an evolutionary mechanism for a priori pure intuitions, but his principle of "synthetic a priori judgements" remains valid. Kant (1724 to 1804) was not able to benefit from Darwin's theory of evolution. Kant's approach was as set out in his Critique of the power of judgement 1790, primarily a teleological one, where some features of organism could be understood mechanistically, but some aspects had to be understood as purposive structures.

Equations model the world
For example, the equation of motion for a freely falling object - v = u +gt - was this equation discovered in the world or was the equation first invented and then discovered to correspond with phenomena in the world. When we observe the world, such as an object falling, we only observe intermittent events, ie, Hume's problem of induction, where we observe a series of conjoined events. However, our equations don't give an intermittent answer but a continuous one. Equations are therefore idealisations of something that can never be empirically known. Equations are predictions based on sensible intuitions. Kant in wrestling with Hume's problem of induction proposed that we don't learn the concept of causation, but that we are born with the innate concept of causation. Even though we only observe a series of intermittent events, we perceive them as a continuous sequence. Even though we have empirical sense impressions of discrete events, a light to the right, a shape to the left, we have the innate a priori concept of one space in which these observations take place

Summary
As mathematical equations in giving a continuous output are different in kind to empirical observations which by their nature must be intermittent, mathematical equations cannot have been discovered but are rather inventions of the mind. Our intuition of space and time is part of the structure of the brain, having evolved in synergy with the world over probably billions of years. Consequently, it would not be possible to imagine there not being space and time, although one can imagine different kinds of space and time, such as curved spacetime.

present discussion between Luke and @Metaphysician Undercover? — Banno

I would say that both Luke and metaphysician agree that rules are necessary when using both language and games. Whereas metaphysician is pointing out one aspect that rules need to be invented, Luke is pointing out another aspect that, when invented, such rules need to be coherent.

But then again, paraphrasing the 20th C. English philosopher Barbossa, what one calls rules are more like guidelines.

One cannot imagine eleven-dimensional space, but one can do the maths. — Banno

I agree that there are two aspects to imagining either an eleven-dimensional space or there being no space, dependent on whether mathematics was a discovery or an invention. My belief is that mathematics was invented.

If mathematics was discovered, then points of "no dimension" exist in the world independent of the existence of any observer. I would then agree that in geometry, where the dimension of any space is defined as the minimum number of coordinates needed to specify any point, and a point has no dimensions, then I don't need to imagine what "no dimensions" means. I only need to understand how it is used, as Wittgenstein might have said.

If mathematics was invented, then a point of "no dimension" is a mental construct, and therefore mathematics cannot be used to determine existence independently of the existence of the mind.

It depends on whether one is in Plato's or Aristotle's camp.

and the mind itself is prior to spatial existence — Metaphysician Undercover

As I believe in reductive physicalism, in that I believe that the mind and body are ontologically indiscernible, for me, the mind cannot be prior to spatial existence

Kantian epistemology — Mww

Kant — Banno

The impossibility of imagining something that cannot be imagined
Kant's proposal of a priori pure intuitions is at the core of my philosophical beliefs. Although Kant in Critique of Pure Reason only specifically mentioned space, time and objects, in my opinion, other concepts can be included a priori. For example, the colour red, a bitter taste, an acrid smell, a velvety touch and a grating noise.
A26, A33 - "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings"
A239 - "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves".
IE, such a priori pure intuitions, concepts, explains to me how the mind relates to that which is outside the mind.

I can imagine zero dimension, but not no dimensions
I can imagine a cube of 1cm sides. I can imagine a cube of 1mm sides. I can imagine a cube having sides of zero dimension. But I can only imagine this cube of zero dimensions within my ordinary everyday space of tables, chairs, etc. For the mind to be able to imagine no space would be as if the mind could imagine not existing, as the concept of space is a fundamental building block from which the mind is constructed.

Colour as a tractable example
As regards colour, my position is that of eliminativist projectivist, where we project a colour, which is purely a mental phenomena, onto objects in our environment. A post-box isn't red, but emits light at a wavelength of 700nm which the mind interprets as the colour red. Stephen Palmer wrote in 1999 "colour is a psychological property of our visual experiences when we look at objects and lights, not a physical property of those objects and lights". In a similar fashion, the concept of space is a mental phenomena which the mind projects onto what it perceives as an outside world.

Galileo, for example, thought that physical science had shown that objects are not really coloured, but inside the mind.

For the mind to be able to imagine no space, would be as if a person born colour blind
could experience the colour red by being described it by others, even allowing for the possibility of an "inverted spectrum".

Kant postulated that the mind intuits sensory experience which it processes in the faculty of understanding in order to produce an ordered predictable world, Consequently, we must already have knowledge of what space and time are in order to recognize the intuition of time and space. Similarly, we must already have knowledge of the colour red in order to recognize the intuition of the colour red.

As with the question, do objects in the world have the property of colour that the mind perceives them to have or is the property only a mental phenomenon. Is what the mind perceives as "space" a property of what is external to the the mind or a property only of an internal mental phenomenon.

As in order to be conscious of the colour red we must have an a priori innate ability to
be conscious of the colour red, in order to be conscious of space and time we must have an a priori innate ability to be conscious of space and time.

Synergism of the brain with the world through evolution
The mind today, ie, the brain, is the product of 3.7 billion years of evolution within the world. The Synergism Hypothesis of 1983 addressed the evolution of cooperative phenomena in nature and increased complexity in living systems. I am not saying that space and time don't exist, but that the mind is not directly aware of space and time. What the mind perceives as space and time is a projection by the mind of innate concepts that have evolved over billions of years onto sense impressions it receives through sight, sound, etc. As the concepts of space and time are an innate part of the mind, it is beyond the ability of the mind to imagine their non-existence.

The mind is not separate to a priori pure intuitions, the mind "is" a priori pure intuitions
As the concept of space and time is an innate physical part of the structure of the brain, it would as impossible for the brain to imagine the non-existence of space and time as it would be for the brain to imagine the non-existence of pain when touching a hot stove.

As it would be impossible for the mind to think about what it would be like to not think, it would be impossible for the brain to contemplate the non-existence of space and time, as the concept of space and time is innate within the brain, and a part of the physical structure of the brain.

The brain is not separate to its innate a priori concepts - space, time,etc - rather, the brain "is" its innate a priori concepts, and therefore cannot contemplate the non-existence of something that makes up its very nature.

the question of existence of a "whole" — Metaphysician Undercover

We are faced with the insolvable problem of how the mind can know things that exist independently of the existence of the mind.

Paraphrasing Kant as regards a priori pure intuitions, we can imagine the concept of empty space, but we cannot imagine the concept of there being no space.

As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, "Space and time are merely the forms of our sensible intuition of objects. They are not beings that exist independently of our intuition (things in themselves), nor are they properties of, nor relations among, such beings". (A26, A33)

solar system — Metaphysician Undercover

Taking the (solar system) as a thing, do things have an ontological existence ? There are two parts to this question, Whether it has an ontological existence in the mind and whether it has an ontological existence in the world independent of any mind.

The "solar system" in the mind
I agree that in the mind, the "solar system" is a concept, and because a concept "then it is fundamentally a unity". I also agree with "but I do not see how a concept is divisible". I think of the concept "solar system" as a "simples", a whole that cannot be divided into parts, although can be linked with other concepts, such as eight - planets - moons - orbit - around - the sun.

The solar system in the world
However, if there was no mind to observe the world, would the solar system ontologically exist in the world ? As Berkeley wrote: "to be is to be perceived" and "The objects of sense exist only when they are perceived; the trees therefore are in the garden... no longer than while there is somebody by to perceive them." There is a basic conundrum in asking whether a solar system can exist independently of a mind when the concept "solar system" is dependent on the existence of the mind. The definition in the Cambridge Dictionary for "to exist" ends up being circular, but links to the following words - real - imagination - fact - proof - information - true. I continue with my pen and Eiffel Tower analogy that things don't ontologically exist in the world outside the mind because there is no information within any of the parts that links it to a whole.

The word "whole"
There is a world of matter, energy, space and time, in which there are parts and wholes. However, it is possible to refer to a whole as a set of parts without giving the word "whole" an ontological status. The status of the set is open to debate. On the one hand, Aristotle in Metaphysics wrote: “In the case of all things which have several parts and in which the totality is not, as it were, a mere heap, but the whole is something besides the parts, there is a cause; for even in bodies contact is the cause of unity in some cases, and in others viscosity or some other such quality. On the other hand, Eubulides used mathematical induction to show that a heap of sand cannot exist, in that i) A single grain of sand is not a heap. ii) If n grains do not make a heap, adding one grain doesn’t create a heap.
IE, the word "whole" does not of necessity have an ontological status.

Summary
IE, I agree that the "solar system" as a concept in the mind is a whole, a unity, and not divisible, but as regards the solar system in a world independent of any mind, the solar system is a whole (in the sense of a set or collection) that has parts that are spatially seperated.

wholes and parts — Metaphysician Undercover

metaphysician - names
I agree. When we observe, for example, a post-box, we can know two different things at the same time. We know that we are observing a particular red (700nm), and we also know that we are observing an abstract "redness" (620nm to 750nm).

metaphysician - use of "simple"
I am trying to use the word "simple" as used in mereology, where a "simple" is any thing that has no proper parts.

metaphysician - all things have an ontological status - the true identity is within the thing itself - what is referred to by "relation" does not have an ontological existence

If in the world there is a thing that has an ontological status, then the whole thing has parts that are spatially separated.

If a thing such as a "table" can be composed of parts such as a flat top and legs, then a "peffel" can be composed of the parts my pen and the Eiffel Tower and a "pegal" can be composed of my pen and the galaxy Andromeda.

If "table" has an ontological existence in the world, then there is no logical reason why not also the "peffel" and "pegal".

However, there is no information within my pen that it is linked in some way with the Eiffel Tower. There is no information within the Eiffel Tower that it is linked to my pen. There is no information within the physical space between them that there is a pen at one end and an Eiffel Tower at the other.

As I am not aware of any mechanism in the world that links my pen to the Eiffel Tower, apart from an all-knowing god, my belief is that things such as "tables", "peffels" and "pegals" don't ontologically exist in the world, but only in the mind as concepts

IE , for these reasons, although I believe that in the world are atoms and physical space, my belief is that neither things such as "tables" nor "relations" have an ontological existence in the world outside my mind.

"language games" — Banno

language games — Metaphysician Undercover

I am going out on a limb here, but hopefully sensibly reasoned.

I cannot know the meaning of a word through its use in language
Wittgenstein wrote in para 43 of Philosophical Investigations "the meaning of a word is in its use in language" and para 220 "Let the use of words teach you their meaning". If this were true, we would have known the meaning of the Ancient Egyptian in the Rosetta Stone by solely reading the text. It seems clear that we can understand a simple concrete word, such as "dog", by observation of the world, where we associate the observed picture of a dog with the public name "dog". It is also clear that it would be difficult to learn the meaning of a complex abstract word, such as Zeitgeist, through direct observation of pictures in the world.
IE, we can only learn the meaning of a new word as long as the words we use, needed in order to learn the new word, must sooner or later be simple concrete words whose meaning is clear to us by observation of pictures in the world.

Banno - we can set out parts of our use of language without having to set out the whole
As Wittgenstein wrote in para 21, language games is not just language - "Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different." There is a difference in meaning between a part of a proposition and a simple. For example, if I say "the sun is warm" in a particular tone of voice, then there are three simples - "the sun" + a particular tone of voice + "is warm".
IE, even the simple (a particular tone of voice) has no meaning unless it is related to another simples.

Banno - "beliefs range over propositions"
There is the whole and the parts, and in mereology the parts are "simples". Consider the statement "I believe that the sun is warm", where "the sun is warm" is a proposition. I cannot have a belief in a simple, such as "the sun". Only a combination of simples has meaning. I can only have belief in a combination of simples, such as "the sun is warm", where one simple has a relation with another simple. For example, pre-langauge, a sentient being when looking at a yellow circle in the sky, the circle, being a simple held no meaning. There was only meaning to the sentient being in the combination of simples, in the combination of the simples "circle" and "warmth". With-language, there is the additional meaning, in that the simples "circle" is combined with the linguistic simples, the word "sun".
IE, within a proposition there cannot be belief in a simple but in the set of simples within the proposition

It is true that simples can be split into further simples
As a simple, "the sun" has no meaning. But the sun can be split into the further simples - the star - around which - the earth - orbits. Each of these can be split into further simples, until, in my opinion, we arrive at Kant's a priori pure intuitions.
IE, it remains true that a "simple" has no meaning.

Banno - words are connected using more than logical operators
Pre-language, there is the relation between the simples circle and warmth, where the connection is not that of a logical operator but that of empirical observation. With-language, where the circle is named "the sun", the connection between the empirical observation of a circle and the word "the sun" is not that of a logical operator, but as the word is learnt in a social environment, is also that of empirical observation.
IE, words are connected by correspondence with empirical observations.

metaphysician - relations between parts must exist independently of the observer
If this as the case, then the relation between any two things in the world has an ontological existence. For example, this would mean that the relation between the pen in my pocket and the Eiffel tower has an ontological existence, meaning that they form a unique object, which could be called a "peffel". This would mean that in the world are an almost infinite number of objects in the world of which we are aware of only a minute proportion.
IE, it would also follow that in Wittgenstein's duck-rabbit picture, it is not that different observers have different interpretations, but that both the duck picture and rabbit picture actually exist in the world independent of the observer.

Summary
1) The meaning of a proposition such as "the sun is warm" is not in any of its simples - "the sun", "warm", but the combination of its simples.
2) These simples are themselves sets of other simples, in that the simple "sun" is the set of the simples "the star", "around which", "the earth" and "orbits".
3) Eventually we arrive at foundational simples, which I describe as Kant's a priori pure intuitions, such as time, space, causation, etc.
4) As Kant wrote in Critique of Pure Reason, A239: "We can only cognize objects that we can, in principle, intuit. Consequently, we can only cognize objects in space and time, appearances. We cannot cognize things in themselves".
5) IE, those things we observe in the world are only combinations of things for which we have prior knowledge.
6) IE, the meaning of a word is not in its use in language, but in that set of a priori pure intuitions from which it is composed.

If language games were real — Metaphysician Undercover

As Wittgensein's language game is a model for ordinary language rather than a literal reproduction of it, the term "hinge proposition" has a different meaning within the language game and ordinary language. Therefore, the term "hinge proposition" as used in the language game cannot be shown to be incorrect by reference to ordinary language.

I agree with what you say as regards rules and hinge propositions within ordinary language - but Wittgenstein's "language game" is a different thing altogether.

Wittgenstein's "language game"

Whereas Bertrand Russell dismissed ordinary language as being of little philosophical significance and too confused to be able to solve metaphysical and epistemological problems, Wittgenstein proposed that philosophy was in trouble because it tried to use words in too abstract a manner. IE, outside the common usage of ordinary language within a community of language users.

The truth or falsity of the whole and its parts

If I make the statement "the apple is on the table", and there isn't an apple on the table, then the statement is false. But because the whole statement is false, it does not follow that the individual parts of the statement are false. IE, because "the apple is on the table" is false it does not logically follow that "the apple" is false

If the statement "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth" does not correspond with the world, then the statement is false. However, even if the statement is false, it does not logically follow that the "hinge proposition" "the sun revolves around the earth" is false.

If a statement is false, such as "The sun is 150 million km distance from the earth and the sun revolves around the earth", it is the relationship between the parts of the statement that is false, not the individual parts.

Do relationships of parts ontologically exist in the world or the mind

Example one. When considering the duck-rabbit in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigation page 194, even though each person is looking at the same picture, the same physical object in the picture, they may arrive at different interpretations. One person may unambiguously see a duck and another may unambiguously see a rabbit. They have perceived different relationships between the same parts.
Example two. Even when looking at four objects, there are 32 possible relationships between them.

Given a statement, the meaning of the whole is a function of how the parts are combined. The parts may be combined in different ways. This means that dependent on how the parts of a statement are combined, the meaning of the whole changes. This raises the question - do these possible combinations exist independent of the observer, or only in the mind of the observer. The Platonist would say that they exist as universals in a transcendent world of pure forms. The mereological nihilist would say that relations between part and whole don't exist in the world. The conceptualist would say that these relations only exist in the mind, either as mental representations or as abstract objects.

Do different language games originate in the world or in the mind

If the relationships between the parts exist independently of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a rabbit, then there are several possible language games, of which the observer is only aware of one. If the relationship between the parts only exist within the mind of the observer, and the observer unambiguously sees a duck, then there is only one possible language game.

The question as to whether language games exist in the world independently of the observer or only exist within the mind of the observer depends on whether relations between parts ontologically exist in the world or only in the mind of the observer.

Summary

IE, as the language game is only a model of ordinary language, and not a literal representation, the concept of a hinge proposition exempt from doubt remains of value in the insights it gives about ordinary language.

Where? — Banno

Your post gets to the core of my continuing problem with Wittgenstein's language game, illustrated by the fact that whilst we both understand the phrase "where?" and how it is used within its context, I understood the phrase as a statement, whereas I believe you understood the phrase as a question.

If the same phrase fulfils several language games, which language game should be used

Unfortunately, Wittgenstein argues that I should know even without clues external to the text, such as tone of voice or expression of face (para 21 of Philosophical Investigations)

It is not as if I can guess, as Wittgenstein makes clear that whilst a beginner may guess (para 156), or someone coming into a strange country (para 32), one cannot guess how a word functions, one has to look at its use and learn from that (para 340)

Wittgenstein discusses ambiguity of perception as regards the duck-rabbit (page 194). He writes that when shown a picture he reports his perception that he unambiguously sees a rabbit. Yet on another occasion he may well have unambiguously seen a duck. I cannot find in PI any mechanism whereby if the same perception can be explained by more than one language game, then which language game should be used.

I find Wittgenstein's transcendental argument unpersuasive, in that as the meaning of a word is its use in the language (para 43, para 220), in order to discover the meaning of a word I must first use it in language, but I cannot use it unless I know its meaning.

Wittgenstein also offers no explanation of the process whereby one finds the right word not by judgement but through inspiration: "At last a word comes: That's it!" (page 218)

IE, similar to Grayling's problem in Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty, where the foundationalism of Wittgenstein's language game is undermined by the relativism between alternate language games.

Where? — Banno

It looks as if I made an assumption that has turned out incorrect.

I took the passage from www.newworldencyclopedia.org: "Thus, Wittgenstein argued that the meaning of the term or concept is highly contextualized; two different contexts, be it a theory or a culture, can be incommensurable although they may present a loose similarity." New World Encyclopedia is an offshoot of Wikipedia for teachers and students.

The first statement
I think that the first part of what I wrote is correct: "Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised.............."

Context is defined as the circumstances that form the setting for an event, statement, or idea, and in terms of which it can be fully understood.

In para 21, Wittgenstein wrote "Imagine a language-game in which A asks and B reports the number of slabs or blocks in a pile, or the colours and shapes of the building-stones that are stacked in such-and-such a place.—Such a report might run: "Five slabs". Now what is the difference between the report or statement "Five slabs" and the order "Five slabs!"?—Well, it is the part which uttering these words plays in the language game. No doubt the tone of voice and the look with which they are uttered, and much else besides, will also be different. But we could also imagine the tone's being the same—for an order and a report can be spoken in a variety of tones of voice and with various expressions of face—the difference being only in the application."

In para 43, "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language."

IE, meaning is in use, and use is in a context.

The second statement
However - I am having difficulty justifying the word "incommensurable" within the quote.

The definition of incommensurable is - i) not able to be judged by the same standards - ii) having no common standard of measurement. For example, the beliefs of the atheist and the theist are incommensurable.

Starting with para 21, the term "five-slabs" could be being used either as a report or a statement.
Even if there are no clues in the speaker's tone of voice, the difference is only within the application. As in para 43: "the meaning of a word is its use in language". For example, if used on site, five-slabs would be a statement, whereas if used in the office it would be a report.

As regards the word incommensurability, this means that there are different standards for judging the meaning of five-slabs - one on site and one in the office. However, for Wittgenstein, there is only one standard for knowing the meaning of five-slabs, and therefore the word incommensurable is not appropriate. Perhaps a better word than "incommensurability" would have been "different".

Then how does Wittgenstein explain how one knows the correct meaning of five-slabs ?
In para 68 - "For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still counts as a
game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No."
In para 138 - "But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp
it in a flash, and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'use' which is extended in time!"
In para 220 - "Let the use of words teach you their meaning. (Similarly one can often say in mathematics: let the proof teach you what was being proved.)"
In para 692 - "But now the problem is: how are we to judge whether someone meant such-and-such?—The fact that he has, for example, mastered a particular technique in arithmetic and algebra, and that he taught someone"
On page 218 - he writes - "How do I find the 'right' word? How do I choose among words?........But I do not always have to make judgments, give explanations; often I might only say: "It simply isn't right yet". I am dissatisfied, I go on looking. At last a word comes: "That's it!"

Wittgenstein seems to be using the transcendental argument, in that we don't judge the meaning of a word, the use of the word teaches us the meaning. But this seems chicken and egg - in that how can I use a word if I don't know its meaning.

Conclusion
In summary, the term "incommensurabity" seems wrong, whereas "different" may have been better.

language is not a game consisting of rules. — Metaphysician Undercover

In linguistics, syntax is the set of rules, principles, and processes that govern the structure of sentences (sentence structure) in a given language, usually including word order.

incommensurability of language games — Banno

I believe that incommensurability is in large part a mereological problem of relationships
Wittgenstein wrote that as the meaning of a term or concept is highly contextualised, two different contexts - whether a theory or culture - can be incommensurable even though they present a loose similarity.

Person A observes the world and has a strong belief that there is a god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is a god", which becomes part of their language game. Person B observes the same world, and has a strong belief that there is no god. Having a strong belief they invent the hinge proposition "there is no god", which becomes part of their language game.

Persons A and B in observing the same world may have observed the same objects, but for a finite number of objects there are almost an infinite number of relationships between them. This is the mereological fact that even for 4 objects there are 32 possible relationships. Person A's belief is founded on the objects they see and a particular set of relationships between those objects. Person B's belief is founded on the same objects but a different set of relationships between those objects, as it is statistically highly unlikely that the relationships Person A chooses will be the same relationships Person B chooses.

Once Persons A and B have invented their different personal hinge propositions, these hinge propositions become part of the logical form of their private language games.

Banno wrote - (hinge propositions) "And being part of the logical form of the system (the language game) they are not subject to falsification by observation alone". Therefore , even if Person A points out to Person B those particular relationships they have based their own beliefs on, as Person B's beliefs have become part of the logical form of their private language game, it is unlikely that Person B can be persuaded by observation alone.

IE, once a person's beliefs have become part of the logical structure of their language game,
they become highly immovable to persuasion by observation alone.

literal description rather than a metaphor. — Metaphysician Undercover

Language game is a metaphor for having rules, and rules are needed in order to cope with the raging white-water confusion of the world. People literally need some kind of bedrock, some set of working assumptions, axioms, rules, hinge propositions, etc.

some hinges are not only doubted, they are rejected as false — Fooloso4

As I see it, hinge propositions are inventions and therefore knowable without reference to the world. They are true by definition and therefore exempt from doubt.

Suppose language game A including the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" was replaced at a later time by language game B including the hinge proposition ""the earth did not exist before I was born". As hinge propositions are true by definition, true without reference to the world and exempt from doubt, the previous hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" remains true.

Propositions are only contradictory with reference to the world, and as hinge propositions are true without reference to the world, hinge propositions cannot be contradictory

IE, even if language games change, the hinge propositions within them remain true in an analytic rather than synthetic sense and therefore cannot be rejected as false.

we cannot say that the hinge propositions of any particular language game are beyond doubt. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree - as Grayling wrote in section III "As OC stands, it stands defeated"

The proposed hinge propositions are subject matter, content, and therefore need to be doubted — Metaphysician Undercover

To my understanding, within a particular Wittgensteinian language game are beliefs, foundational beliefs and the logic that ties them together. Wittgensteinian foundational beliefs are now referred to as "hinge propositions".

When Wittgenstein writes in OC341 - "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn.", I read this as a performative statement about the nature of hinge propositions rather than an empirical discovery about the world. He is creating some propositions to be exempt from doubt, rather than in looking at the world he has discovered some propositions that are exempt from doubt.

That is, the hinge proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is not open to doubt, as it is part of the logical framework of the language game, and is a logical statement, whereas the proposition "the earth existed before I was born" is open to doubt, as it is a belief.

A hinge proposition is analytic, in the same sense as "all bachelors are unmarried" is analytic.

For Wittgenstein, a language game is internally logically coherent, and therefore is a foundationalist refutation to scepticism.

However, the problem remains that there can be any number of internally logically coherent language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask for justification why a particular language game corresponds to an external reality.

IE, "hinge propositions" are part of the logical form of the system and not part of the content.

The sceptic here takes the ideas of 'direct knowledge' and 'justification' for granted. — j0e

Grayling points out the two types of scepticism: scepticism within the foundationalism of OC1 and scepticism within the relativism of OC2

One important aspect of the difference between Quine’s and Wittgenstein’s conceptions of philosophy, is their opposite attitudes towards linguistic diversity — link

When an author uses a critical word that they know can be interpreted in more than one way, then, as a general principle, they should somehow make it clear to the reader in what sense they are using it - unless they are a poet.

what is missing from their knowledge that justifies doubting it? — Fooloso4

If someone says "I see a post-box, and it exists in a world external to me", the sceptic is justified in asking the speaker, first, how they know there is an external world, and second, how they know there is a post-box in this external world. What is missing from the speaker's knowledge is evidence for their belief.

One's belief may be false, not so one's knowledge. — Banno

Introduction
The truth of the statement "One's belief may be false, not so one's knowledge" depends on the meaning of "knowledge". The nature of knowledge has been discussed since at least Plato, so I don't think I will be able to resolve the matter in this post.

Knowing and believing
I am trying to keep my use of the words "knowledge" and "belief" within a framework, whereby a sentient being pre-language knows internal consciousness , knows external observations and believes external possibilities. A sentient being with language knows internal consciousness, believes external observations and believes external possibilities.

One advantage of a sentient being with language only believing in external observations rather than knowing them is possibly an answer to Russell's problem of how to think about non-existent things - a problem approached by Wittgenstein in his Tractatus regarding possible worlds.

Different theories of knowledge
Whether knowledge can be false depends on the definition of knowledge, as there are different defintions as to what knowledge is.

For example, there is internal knowledge. There is knowledge of a skill or ability, such as "I know how to play football". There is knowledge of one's own consciousness, such as "I know pain"

There is external knowledge. There is knowledge by acquaintance, such as "I know there is a tree in the garden". There is knowledge by proposition, such as "I know the Eiffel Tower is in Paris".

I cannot doubt internal knowledge, but I can doubt external knowledge.

It is possible to have different types of knowledge at the same time. For example, when looking at a post-box, I know the proposition "red light has a wavelength of between 620nm and 750nm", I know that I am looking at a post-box and I know my conscious experience of a particular colour

Wittgenstein and knowing
Wittgenstein in On Certainty was concerned with excluding doubt in his refutation of scepticism - OC 341. "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

However, in order to exclue doubt, one must also exclude knowing - OC354 "Doubting and non-doubting behaviour. There is the first only if there is the second"

As Grayling wrote - i) "The well-known, and persuasive, central tenet of OC is its view that claims to knowledge only make sense where the possibility of doubt exists." - ii) "His contribution is to insist on the internal connection between the concepts of knowing and doubting. "

For this reason, Wittgenstein argued against Moore when Moore said "Here is one hand", "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!"

For Wittgenstein, the word "know" is only an assurance - OC21. Moore's view really comes down to this: the concept 'know' is analogous to the concepts 'believe', 'surmise', 'doubt', 'be convinced' in that the statement "I know..." can't be a mistake.

For Wittgenstein, Moore should have argued from "here is one hand" rather than "I know that here is one hand"

IE, For Wittgenstein, it is not the case that knowledge cannot be doubted, but that knowledge is only an assurance, and as such can be doubted.

Justified true belief
Since Plato, knowledge has been defined as justified true belief. If the three conditions of justification, truth and belief are met for a given claim, then we have knowledge of that claim.

However, in 1963 Gettier argued that, by giving counter-examples, whilst an individual can have a JTB, the individual may still fail to know it because the reasons for the belief, whilst justified, turn out to be false.

There are different solutions to the Gettier problem. Some look for a fourth condition, others look to replace "justification" with something else. As yet, no definitive solution has been agreed upon.

Summary
As some kinds of knowledge may be doubted, there remains an overlap between knowledge and belief, in that the statement "I know that the post-box is red" overlaps with the statement "I believe that the post-box is red"

eventually you will positively be able to answer whether or not someone’s conscious experience of 750 nm is the same as anyone else’s. — khaled

The enclosed article may do a better job of what I am trying to say.
https://www.uh.edu/engines/epi3161.htm

So which is it? — Fooloso4

The problem with the English language is that many of its' words have several meanings, such as the word "know". Context does not always make it clear which meaning is intended. Life would a lot easier if each meaning of the word "know" had its own individual sub-word. Though that would meaning a lot more words.

Are you claiming to be unable to distinguish a hand waved by Shrek from one waived by Moore? — Banno

Whilst watching TV, I see a figure waving a hand. As the figure has a green face, I know it is more likely to be Shrek than Moore.

However, the sceptic would be justified in pointing out that my TV is old and tends to give a green tinge to everything, and ask my reasons why I think it is Shrek rather than Moore.

IE, I can distinguish between Shrek and Moore, but I may be wrong.

So, the person sees green yet knows that the post-box is red despite his sense impression not because of it. — Fooloso4

A person can know several different things at the same time.

The person can know that the publicly accepted word for the colour of the post-box is "red" - though it could have been "rouge" or "rot".

The person can also know their own conscious experience of a particular colour.

There is no way of knowing whether one person's conscious experience of the wavelength 750nm is the same as anyone else's. It could be that two people have the same conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it red. It could be that that one person's conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it red - is different to someone else's conscious experience of 750nm - let us call it green.

IE, a person could know two things. First, that the external public name of the colour of the post-box is "red" and second, that their internal private conscious experience of 750nm is green.

Does this mean that if I them to paint the box red one will do so correctly and the other will paint it green? — Fooloso4

No - they will both paint it red.

What serves as direct knowledge that a post-box is red? — Fooloso4

Light having a wavelength of 750nm travels the 10m from the post-box to our brain through our eyes.

There is no information within light having a wavelength of 750nm that is able to determine that the observer will have the sense impression of red, rather than green, say. For example, one person may see red and another person may see green.

Therefore, the colour an observer sees is a function of the observer and not of the light travelling from the object.

Therefore, it is not that the actual post-box is red, but rather we observe the post-box as being red.

When someone looks at a post-box and says "I know the post-box is red", what they really mean is that when looking at the post-box they have the sense impression red.

If they had said "I know when looking at the post-box my sense impression is red because the post-box is emitting light at a wavelength of 750nm", it is true that they don't need a reason to justify that they know their own sense impression.

If they had said "I know that the actual post-box is red, not just my sense-impression", the sceptic is justified to ask them for what reason they think they know that the actual post-box is red. If they cannot give a suitable reason, then the sceptic had justification to ask.

When someone says that they know something about which they have no direct knowledge,
the sceptic is justified in asking for a reason.

What more empirical a demonstration could there be than Moore waving his hand at you? — Banno

Whilst reading Part II of Philosophical Investigations, I see a "picture-face" on the pages, and as Wittgenstein wrote: "In some respects I stand towards it as I do towards a human face. I can study its expression, can react to it as to the expression of the human face"

Whilst watching Shrek on TV, I perceive a hand waving at me. If I had concluded that this was a empirical demonstration of an external world of dragons and talking donkeys, I would have been mistaken.

IE, perceiving a hand waving at me is not necessarily an empirical demonstration of the existence of an external world.

Davidson would certainly not agree that language isn't necessary for knowing and believing — Banno

I assume that when Davidson refers to language he is referring to human language, and not the primitive language of cats for example, who hiss and spit.

As regards knowing and believing, personally, I am certain that a cat knows it has paws and knows it sees a mouse, though I cannot prove this.

As you wrote a while ago " Lilly apparently believed that there was something objectionable out the window, and that her hissing and spitting were imperative in order to drive whatever it was away.", it seems that we are both certain that cats know and believe.

Wittgenstein is said to believe that thought is tied to language. As language is inherently social there is no inner space in which thoughts can occur. Mental states are intimately connected to a subject's environment, especially their linguistic environment.

However, Wittgenstein did also write at the start of Part II of PI - "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful? And why not? A dog believes his master is at the door. But can he also believe his master will come the day after to-morrow?—And what can he not do here?—How do I do it?—How am I supposed to answer this? Can only those hope who can talk?"

IE, it seems that Wittgenstein's position that thought is tied to language was not absolute.

I agree, as Davidson wrote, that language can only have meaning if empirically true.

However, the cat Lilly, an example of a sentient being not having language, knows there are local strays outside the house and believes there will be an imminent invasion.

IE, language isn't necessary for knowing and believing.

The truth of Moore's "here is one hand" must be considered both as part of language and outside of language (pre-language).

Davidson's T-sentence "here is one hand" is true IFF here is one hand points out there is the linguistic aspect "here is one hand" and the non-linguistic aspect, ie, the empirical truth of here is one hand. For Davidson's T-sentence, the meaning of a sentence is equivalent to stating its truth conditions, where a theory of meaning for a natural language must be an empirical theory in that it must be empirically verifiable

Scientists have estimated that the first animals are likely to have emerged around 750 million years ago. Anatomically modern humans begin to appear in the fossil record in Ethiopia some 200,000 years ago - and if were using red ochre pigments for ritual and symbolic purposes, they probably had symbolic language as well. Therefore, language is very recent in the development of sentient animals.

Language isn't necessary for knowing and believing. As Wittgenstein wrote at the start of Part II of Philosophical Investigations "One can imagine an animal angry, frightened, unhappy, happy, startled. But hopeful ? And why not ?"

Moore wrote he knew "the existence of external things" because he knew "Here is one hand" - saying "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!" However, for me, when I raise my hand, although I know "Here is one hand", I only believe in the "existence of external things". Moore's argument is therefore insufficient justification for me.

I am certain that a cat knows "here is one paw" and "the existence of external things". As Moore having language and the cat not having language know these same things, I would suggest that such knowledge doesn't require language, in that is pre-linguistic. I would also suggest that my doubt about the existence of an external world is a consequence of my having language.

Without language, I would not know that Moore knew "here is one hand" and the "existence of external things". It is only through language that I know that Moore knew "here is one hand" and the "existence of external things". Language opens up my knowledge from the first to the second and third persons.

No sceptic could doubt Moore when he says he knows "here is one hand". No sceptic could doubt that Moore knows "here" is in his mind. But the sceptic can doubt that Moore knows "here" is in the external world.

I look at a picture and, having had experience of real rabbits, I see a rabbit. Knowing language I may say "here is a rabbit", which will only be true IFF here is a rabbit. Another person may look at the same picture and see a duck, and may say "here is a duck", which will only be true IFF here is a duck. IE, in order to establish the truth, language alone is insufficient.