Grayling in section I wrote that OC1 states that scepticism gets no purchase because our beliefs inhere in a system which rests upon foundational beliefs.

Grayling also wrote in section I that Wittgenstein's foundational beliefs are justified by a transcendental argument - OC248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions. And one might almost say that these foundation-walls are carried by the whole house".

The transcendental argument - i) X occurs only if Y - ii) X occurs; hence Y.

Applying Wittgenstein's transcendental argument to Moore.

Moore says that because he knows "here is one hand" (X) he therefore knows "the existence of external things" (Y ).

The argument is that the sceptic cannot doubt that "here is one hand" (X) occurs only if there is "the existence of external things" (Y ).

Moore argues that because his knowledge "here is one hand" (X) has occurred - hence his knowledge "the existence of external things" (Y ).

However, whilst true that no-one can doubt Moore knowing "here is one hand", the sceptic may rightly doubt the meaning of the word "here", in that does "here" refer to the external world or Moore's mind. If "here" refers to the external world, then the transcendental argument follows. However if "here" refers to Moore's mind, then the transcendental argument fails.

IE the argument within OC1 for foundational beliefs does not negate the sceptic.

personal subjective knowledge — magritte

I am sure that it was the same for Moore, in that Moore knew with certainty that he had one hand, which was personal subjective knowledge that he could not doubt.

As we can communicate with others the concept of blueness of objects around us, even though
we can only ever observe particular blues, it seems to me that we can communicate with others using a conceptualised public language even though each of us uses a particular private language.

Private language
As regards our private language, there is no fixed meaning to the words we use. The particular meaning of a word depends both on context and the life experiences of the person using that word.
For me, a house is a two-story brick building, for someone else a house may be a single-story timber building. What "house" means to me also changes with time. What I mean by "house" now is different to an hour ago since discovering a loose tile.

At this moment in time, if I use "house" in conversation, the word "house" can only have one single meaning to me. This particular meaning is unique to me. This is not to say that in an hours time, if I use the word "house" again, its particular meaning to me may be different again.

What does "mean" mean ? My understanding of the meaning of the concept "house" is just that set of the simpler concepts it is composed of, eventually leading to what Kant called a priori pure intuitions, such as space, time, causation, green, etc.

Even though the concept "house" is built from a set of simpler concepts, roof, door, window, etc, there is for me still a single meaning of the word "house". The fact that at one moment in time the word "house" only has as single meaning to me, and as meaning is a thought, and thoughts cannot doubt themselves, the meaning of "house" to me is beyond doubt, and therefore beyond the sceptic.

As Wittgenstein wrote in OC341 "That is to say, the questions that we raise and our doubts depend on the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn."

Public language
As regards our public language, even though the person with whom I am in discussion with will have their own particular language game, different to mine, in general we can successfully communicate because of the "family resemblances" between the words we use.

For example, even though for me I think of a house as two stories, whilst others may think of a house as single story, we both agree that a house is "a building for human habitation, especially one that consists of a ground floor and one or more upper storeys." As this is a definition it is also beyond the sceptic.

As Wittgenstein wrote OC256 "On the other hand a language game does change with time" and OC65: When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change", establishing that there may be more than one language game.

AC Grayling
In considering the foundationalism of OC1 and the relativism of OC2, as Wittgenstein wrote in OC99: "And the bank of that river consists partly of hard rock, subject to no alteration or only to an imperceptible one, partly of sand, which now in one place now in another gets washed away, or deposited", I would suggest that successful communication using language needs both a bedrock of a private language game and a public flow of family resemblances between different private language games.

Rather than agreeing with Grayling that "the exercise in OC is at best partial, at worst self-defeating, with the self-defeat stemming from acceptance of OC2", I would suggest that both themes within OC, foundationalism and relativism, are complementary in successful communication.

no comment for this thread? — Banno

Have been busy starting to replace the 80 year-old electric junction boxes in my attic,
and having to learn about lighting wiring circuits, but now underway and getting a bit more time.

Moore wrote that when he says "Here is one hand", it follows that "How absurd it would be to suggest that I did not know it, but only believed it, and that perhaps it was not the case!"

Does this mean that ontologically there is a world in which there is the object "one hand" and the object "Moore" ?

How does the object "Moore" know that in the world is another object "one hand" ? The only possible way that Moore could know there is another object in the world is through his sense impressions. Sense impressions such as the colour red, a sweet taste, a grating noise, an acrid smell or a silky touch.

But there is no information within these sense impressions as to what caused them, in that there is no information within the sense impression of the colour red as to what caused the emission of 700nm. Therefore, Moore can never know the cause of his sense impressions, although he may have a belief about what caused them, and beliefs can be doubted

But Moore said he did know that "here is one hand", which raises the question - how is it possible for Moore to know that "here is one hand".

We can say for certain that Moore knows his sense impressions, even though he cannot know what is causing them. As Moore is only getting his information about any external world through his sense impressions, and as sense impressions carry no information as to what caused them, it follows that Moore's thought that "here is one hand" cannot be knowledge of a world outside of Moore's mind, but can only be knowledge of a state of affairs within Moore's mind.

IE, when Moore says I know that "here is one hand", the true meaning of this is not that Moore knows what is in the outside world (even though he may believe what is in the outside world), but knows that within his mind is the concept ""there is a world outside me in which there is one hand".

Wittgenstein isn't saying that "here is one hand" is a fact in the world. Do you see somewhere where he says that? — Sam26

In Tractatus 1.1 Wittgenstein wrote - "The world is the totality of facts, not of things"

An explanation of what Wittgenstein meant may be found in Russell, who had similar views

Russell wrote in The Philosophy of Logical Atomism - “I want you to realize that when I speak of a fact I do not mean a particular existing thing, such as Socrates or the rain or the sun. Socrates himself does not render any statement true or false. What I call a fact is the sort of thing that is expressed by a whole sentence, not by a single name like ‘Socrates.’ . . .We express a fact, for example, when we say that a certain thing has a certain property, or that it has a certain relation to another thing; but the thing which has the property or the relation is not what I call a ‘fact.”

It seems to me that "here is one hand" fulfills what Wittgenstein meant by a fact in the world.

Wittgenstein is challenging the first premise in the above argument; more specifically, he is challenging Moore's claim that he has knowledge of his hands. — Sam26

I am trying to understand Wittgenstein's objection to Moore's use of the word "know". My current understanding is as follows, and I would be interested in your comments.

Wittgenstein found Moore's common sense approach as a reply to the sceptic interesting, as it had similarities with his own nascent thoughts about hinge propositions. However he disagreed with Moore's use of the word "know".

Moore could have said "here is one hand", meaning that ontologically in the world there is an object "one hand". For Wittgenstein, "here is one hand" is a fact in the world, it is not an interpretation, it has no truth value right or wrong, is therefore not open to doubt, is therefore not open to the sceptic and therefore a hinge proposition.

Moore saying "I know here is one hand" has a different meaning, in that in the mind of the object "Moore" are sense impressions. Moore interprets these sense impressions as ontologically there exists an external world in which there exist an object "one hand" and an object "Moore". As "I know here is one hand" is an interpretation, it has a truth value right or wrong, and therefore is open to doubt, and therefore open to the sceptic and therefore not a hinge proposition.

IE - for Wittgenstein, Moore, in adding "I know", is therefore opening his statement "here is one hand" to the sceptic.

language game — Banno

I think that coherence and correspondence are useful concepts when discussing Wittgenstein's language games, in that it would be relatively easy to invent a language game based on bedrock hinge propositions that was internally logically coherent whilst ignoring the greater problem of ensuring that such a language game corresponded to external reality.

I am using terminology borrowed from AC Grayling's Wittgenstein on Scepticism and Certainty. That of foundationalism, OC 248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions" and relativism, OC 65 "When language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change". I used the link www.acgrayling.com/wittgenstein-on-scepticism-and-certainty

As Grayling concluded, "As OC stands, it stands defeated in just this way, for it only deals with scepticism at the lower, less threatening level, and fails to recognise that scepticism in its strongest form is, precisely, relativism"

Though it may be that Wittgenstein included passages on relativism in order to play devil's advocate whilst allowing him to work out his own foundationalist ideas.

On Certainty was intended to answer the sceptic. But did Wittgenstein succeed in his ambition ?

If Wittgenstein's position was that of a foundationalist - OC 88 "It may be for example that all enquiry on our part is set so as to exempt certain propositions from doubt, if they were ever formulated. They lie apart from the route travelled by enquiry" - the sceptic may validly ask why "certain propositions must be excluded from doubt"

If Wittgenstein's position was that of relativism - OC 256 "On the other hand a language-game does change with time" - the sceptic may also validly ask where is the justification that one language game corresponds more to external reality than another.

Although On Certainty is an incomplete work, could he have used more persuasive arguments ?

He could have proposed that "here is one hand" is a performative rather than constative statement, an idea Austin later developed more fully, partly based on Wittgenstein's writings.

He could have proposed that "here is one hand" is a Kantian synthetic a priori statement, where objects exist not in the world but in the mind of the observer. Wittgenstein was aware of Husserlian phenomenology, of which Kant's synthetic a priori was an important part. But as Wittgenstein seemingly was not a great reader of other philosophers, he tended to reinvent the wheel and seemingly did not take Kant's synthetic a priori as seriously as he should have.

Truth needs both coherence within a language and correspondence with the external world. On Certainty may be insightful about coherence, but could be more developed as regards correspondence.

Did he? — Banno

I agree that in On Certainty Wittgenstein did not use the words "the language game corresponds to a reality", but it seems to me that the inference within his writing is so strong that it would be difficult to argue that for Wittgenstein "the language game does not correspond to a reality"

Whilst Wittgenstein in his early philosophy did propose an isomorphism between language and reality, in his late philosophy, on the contrary, he was not explicit that language, being made up from language games, was isomorphic with reality.

I can only read On Certainty with the strong inference that Wittgenstein assumed a reality that language corresponded to.

Taking one example, passage 411, "If I say "we assume that the earth has existed for many years past" (or something similar), then of course it sounds strange that we should assume such a thing. But in the entire system of our language-games it belongs to the foundations. The assumption, one might say, forms the basis of action, and therefore, naturally, of thought."

On the one hand, the proposition "we assume that the earth has existed for many years"
belongs to the foundation of the speaker's language game. On the other hand, the speaker is assuming the reality of an earth existing for many years. It must logically follow that the speaker's language game must correspond with the speaker's reality.

In On Certainty, whilst Wittgenstein did not specifically say that "the language game corresponds to a reality", I would find it difficult to argue that Wittgenstein believed otherwise.

The radical skeptic (I'm referring to a specific kind of skepticism, not all skepticism) is not playing the game correctly. — Sam26

The radical sceptic makes a valid point in pointing out that whilst Wittgenstein argues that each language game has its own set of hinge propositions, he did not justify why one set of propositional hinges should be more exempt from doubt than others.

I agree that in a sense my choice of language game is objective, in that some language games are more useful to me than others, which I why I chose the language game of 21st century western society rather than the language game of the Japanese Imperial Court during the Heian period.

AC Grayling discusses Wittgenstein in his Wittgenstein On Scepticism and Certainty, and refers to two main themes within OC - which he names OC1 and OC2.
OC 1 is a foundationalist refutation of scepticism, where beliefs are inherent within a system
and beliefs rest on foundations, such as passage 248 "I have arrived at the rock bottom of my convictions".
OC 2 is relativistic, where truth and knowledge are not absolute but vary with viewpoint and time, such as passage 65 "when language-games change, then there is a change in concepts, and with the concepts the meanings of words change."

I agree with your reply, which I would classify as being within OC 1, where language games resist local scepticism by being founded on propositional hinges, but I would also agree with Grayling that the biggest philsophical problem with On Certainty is OC 2, in that the framework within which propositional hinges operate are themselves relative, and hard to resist against radical scepticism.

Wittgenstein's proposal of the hinge proposition may close down one route for the sceptic, but opens another.

Wittgenstein said that language has meaning within the context of its language game, meaning is determined by use, and the language game corresponds to a reality. A game such as chess has rules, but different games have different rules. A language game may be internally logically coherent and correspond to a reality, but each language game will correspond to a different reality. I look at the optical illusion "Rabbit and Duck" and see a rabbit, my reality is the rabbit. Another person looks and sees a duck, their reality is the duck. We may have the same perception but arrive at different interpretations. The sceptic may rightly ask for what reason should one interpretation have precedence over another.

Wittgenstein is correct that there is no room for a sceptic within a particular language game, but as the reality of each language game is relative, the sceptic may still ask for justification as to which language game is nearer to the absolute reality.

Yes, even a sceptic needs something, such as a set of rules, about which they can be sceptical.

Moore said that these rules are the rules of common sense, and has been criticised for not justifying to the sceptic why common sense should be the basis for the rules.

Wittgenstein said that once the proposition "here is one hand" is placed within the context of language, within a language game, as language is founded on logical propositions, and as logical propositions are beyond knowledge or doubt (being norms that are neither true nor false), scepticism is not able to function within language.

It is true that once the proposition "here is one hand" becomes part of a particular language game, both internally coherent and logical, then it becomes necessarily free from the sceptic.

However, the proposition "here is one hand" may be included within any number of internally coherent and logical language games, and the sceptic may rightly ask how Wittgenstein explained the basis on how to decide from the many possible language games the one that corresponds to reality.

In considering the proposition "here is one hand", Moore's common sense approach of Direct Realism does not stand a chance against the sceptics, in that even though I perceive a hand in front of me , I may be mistaken, because from my perception knowledge of the world does not necessarily follow.

For Wittgenstein in On Certainty the proposition "here is one hand" is more a performative speech act than constative, where "here is one hand" is a naming by the observer of what the observer perceives rather than a description of what the observer believes to be in the world.

Wittgenstein's unaltering bank of a river within which the river of language constantly flows are these performative acts immune to the sceptic, an idea as later developed by Austin. When a dignitary performatively names a new aircraft carrier "HMS Albion", the sceptic cannot question that this is the true name of the vessel, as evidence is held in newspaper articles.

Wittgenstein's approach to the proposition "here is one hand " as performative rather than constative becomes the first step in a theory of language where public communication becomes possible potentially free of sceptical doubt.

Subsequent steps in a theory of of language would be in expanding the meaning of "here is one hand " by placing it within a coherent linguistic context and then discovering correspondences between language and the world.

According to the Wikipedia article on Qualia, qualia are defined as individual instances of subjective conscious experiences, where an example of a qualia would be the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache.

According to the SEP article on qualia, philosophers often use the term ‘qualia’ to refer to the introspectively accessible, phenomenal aspects of our mental lives. In this broad sense of the term, it is difficult to deny that there are qualia.

According to the IEP article on qualia, qualia are the subjective or qualitative properties of experiences.

I could say that "I have sensation S", meaning that I have the sensation of an individual instance of subjective conscious experience, eg, the perceived sensation of the pain of a headache

I could also have said that "I have the sensation of a qualia".

In answering the OP, as I know that individual instances of subjective conscious experiences exist, then according to the Wikipedia, SEP and IEP definitions of qualia, qualia exist.

The color red as a relevant factor in making the distinction between memory and imagination is, hence, null and void. — TheMadFool

There are two different situations. First, having a complex thought such as "woman in red" and second, having a simple impression such as "colour red", where a complex thought is a set of simple impressions.

As regards the complex thought "woman in red", I agree that person X may not be able to directly distinguish between memory and imagination (though they may be able to distinguish using indirect means such as reason and logic)

However, as regards the simple impression "colour red", person X can distinguish memory from imagination as they know that their memory of the colour red must have come from a real experience, and therefore they cannot have imagined it. It is true that person X may not be able to accurately remember the circumstance in which they experienced the colour red, but this doesn't affect the fact that they know their memory of the experience of the colour red was not imagined.

IE, is it possible to give one example of a memory of a simple impression - a particular sight (eg, red) , sound (eg, loud) , smell (eg, acrid), taste (eg, bitter) or touch (eg, hot) - that has never been experienced through the senses but invented in the mind. If not, then, in this situation, memory can be distinguished from imagination as none of these memories can have been imagined.

memory is indistinguishable from imagination — TheMadFool

Can memory be distinguished from imagination ?

John Locke (1632-1704) and David Hume (1711-1776) have made the argument that the basic building blocks of all thought are simple ideas, or more precisely, in Hume’s terminology, simple impressions – single colours, single shapes, single smells and so on.

When we have a memory of an object or we imagine an object, we have to make the distinction as to whether the object we are thinking about is a complex thought or a simple impression, in that a complex whole is built from a set of simple parts.

Complex thoughts such as unicorns, government, justice, buildings, ie, the whole object. Simple impressions such as red, square, bitter, loud, ie, the parts of the object.

Therefore, we have two types of memories - memories of complex thoughts and memories of simple impressions.

It may be difficult to distinguish whether our memories of complex thoughts, such as unicorns and mountains, are real or fictive. However, our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be real. IE, all our memories of simple impressions must have been experienced through our senses, in that it is not possible for the mind to invent simple impressions. For example, someone who is colour blind and unable to experience through their senses the simple impression of the colour red will not be able to invent the experience of redness in their minds. Therefore, all our memories of simple impressions, such as the colour red, must be based on real experiences.

A memory of a complex thought may be real or fictive. However, when having a memory of a simple impression I know that I cannot have imagined it, and the remembered experience must have been real.

Therefore, it is possible to distinguish some memories from imagination.

Does this mean that our imaginations could actually be memories — TheMadFool

It may help to add in the distinction between the whole and its parts. The relationship between the whole and its parts has been discussed since at least Plato, and GE Moore wrote that “ a thing becomes intelligible first when it is analysed into its constituent concepts”.

IE, I would suggest that we can only imagine a whole object if we already have a memory of the parts of the object. This whole object may or not exist in the world. For example, I can only imagine the whole object "unicorn" because I have the memory of its parts - the tusk of a narwhal and the body of a horse. I cannot think of an example at the moment whereby I can imagine a whole object without having a memory of its real parts, in that I am not able to imagine a part for which I don't have a pre-existing memory.

As regards the question "is our imagination memories", I would say that our imagination of a whole object is our memory of its parts.

Science, if it's going to offer explanations, needs something to explain. — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that I may not have used the standard philosophical structure of thesis, antithesis, synthesis, and not made clear the difference between my understanding of Kant's transcendental idealism, and what I believe to be a sensible extrapolation of Kant's transcendental idealism.

I agree that Kant did not consider language, but rather space, time and objects. However, once Kant had established the principle of innate a priori concepts, the number of examples can be increased. I am sure it is commonly accepted that children don't need to be taught the difference between the touch of smooth and rough, the taste of sweet and sour, the sight of red and blue, the hearing of loud and quiet, the smell of acrid and sweet, in that these must be innate a priori concepts. Our understanding of the world can then be built up from these common-sense core concepts of body, person, space, time and causation.

The mechanism by which any innate a priori concept became part of the brain is a matter of belief. For an Evolutionist, they have evolved over millions of years through the continuous interaction between life and its surroundings. For a Creationist, they arrived through a supernatural act of divine creation.

The downside of innate a priori concepts is that any profound understanding of the truth of the world is inherently limited. We can understand three dimensional space because we have evolved within it , but this is not the case when we try to understand the expansion of the universe from the Big Bang. We may use the analogy of blowing up a balloon, but this is no more than glimpsing one of Plato's Forms, no more than a deaf person being able to experience the sound of a bell.

Whether language is innate a priori is debated. On the one side, Chomsky in Reflections on Language 1975 argued that the development of language is in large part predetermined by genetic factors, innate rather than being a blank slate upon which psychological and social forces act. But even those who argue against him, such as Philip Lieberman, proposed that our ancestors invented modes of communication that were already compatible with the brain’s natural abilities.

IE, Kant's transcendental idealism gives a solid foundation on which we can base our understanding of the world.

Doesn't the theory of evolution require undetermined mutations? — Metaphysician Undercover

From the viewpoint of the machine - internally it is determined - but external forces acting upon it that possibly cause internal change are undetermined.

who decides how the machine is to be programmed? — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, the question is whether a simple machine can self-evolve into a complex machine without the help from any external intelligence. A machine is defined as an apparatus using mechanical power and having several parts, each with a definite function and together performing a particular task. Such machines would be deterministic, without free-will and without consciousness.

One example of such a machine would be the bacteria, in that it can self-evolve free of any external intelligence, and without either free-will or consciousness (even accepting panpsychism).
IE, as there is at least one example of a machine that can self-evolve (the bacteria), this shows that in principle machines can self-evolve, meaning self-program.

The word "red" could only come to describe both of these objects if there is freedom of choice in usage. If there was no choice, "red" could only be used to refer to one or the other. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light anywhere between 640nm and 680nm is shone on a receptor of a machine, the machine can respond with the single output "red".
IE, a machine is able to give a single response covering a range of observations.

a non-free willing being probably wouldn't even know how to relate to words. — Metaphysician Undercover

Interactive voice response (IVR) is a technology that allows humans to interact with a computer-operated phone system through the use of voice.
IE, a machine can relate to words.

There couldn't even be any creating of new words because that would require choice. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light is shone on a receptor of a machine, and the frequency of the light is different to what has been observed by the machine before, the machine gives it a name - such as Frequency660
IE, a machine can create new words.

A non-free willing being would be so much different from a free willing being, that if one of them created words, the other would not even know how to relate to a word. — Metaphysician Undercover

In a deterministic world where all events are completely determined by previously existing causes, when light is shone on a receptor of machine A, and the frequency of the light is different to what has been observed by the machine before, the machine gives it a name - such as Frequency660, where the second part of the name is the frequency of the light in nm. When this name, Frequency660, is passed to machine B, machine B emits light of the same frequency contained within the second part of the name.
IE, if one machine creates a name, a different machine will be able to relate to that name.

Seth's work at Sussex on perception — Isaac

My post was based on Kant's concept of transcendental idealism as described in his Critique of Pure Reason 1781. Kant wrote, "Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori"

That is, when I look at an object emitting a wavelength of 700nm, because of my innate a priori knowledge of red, I project back onto the world my concept of the colour red. That is, when I look at an object, I perceive the colour red, not the wavelength 700nm.

Professor Seth in his 5 Oct 2018 Ted talk said - "So since Newton, it's been pretty clear that colours - red, yellow, green, et cetera - colours are not objective properties of objects in the world. They are attributes of reflected light. And the brain - the visual system will make inferences based on wavelengths of light about what colour something is. So something as basic as colour is not something that we just passively receive from the world. We actively attribute it to things out there in the world."

It initially seems that Professor Seth's approach to perception is similar to Kant's, although my only knowledge of Professor Seth's work is from his Ted talks

Could we have evolved otherwise, maybe with no concept of space? — Srap Tasmaner

I am with Kant when he wrote in The Critique of Reason "Since, then, the receptivity of the subject, its capacity to be affected by objects, must necessarily precede all intuitions of these objects, it can readily be understood how the form of all appearances can be given prior to all actual perceptions, and so exist in the mind a priori"

The problem is, if we didn't have a priori evolutionary knowledge of time, space, causation, etc, then how could we enable someone born without the ability to see the colour red to have the experience of seeing the colour red ?

"two aspects of language" — Srap Tasmaner

I believe that Kant's "synthetic a priori" judgements gives an insight into the apparent circular problem of the fact that I am only able to recognize a wrench if I already know the concept of wrenchhood, yet I can only learn the concept of wrenchhood if I am able to recognize wrenches.

In a "synthetic a priori" judgement, some important knowledge, such as causation, is neither given through the senses empirically nor known through rational reasoning, but rather is a priori. Therefore, it is only possible to have experience of an object if the object conforms to what can already be experienced. Objects of knowledge can only ever be things as they appear, not as they are in themselves.

Kant's insight is valid even if the terminology doesn't seem right. Synthetic is a linguistic term, yet a priori is an ontological term. Synthetic and a priori are of two different kinds, it is as if one asked "which is better, justice or cats". Perhaps it should be called an "a posteriori a priori" judgement.

We are born with certain basic innate a priori concepts such as time, space, causation, colour, sound, etc . During our lives, through regular observation and reasoning, we can combine these basic concepts into more complex concepts such as justice, buildings, tables, horses, etc.

Our innate a priori concepts are part of the physical structure of the brain. They have evolved over a period of 4.5 billion years in the development of complex modern organisms from ancient simple ancestors, being subject to the continual interaction between life and its surroundings.

Any physical system can only undertake that which it is physically capable of undertaking, ie, a blind person cannot see colour, a deaf person cannot hear sounds, a cat cannot judge the morality of its actions and a toaster cannot broadcast a television program. Similarly, the range of complex concepts about the world a person will be able to develop will ultimately be limited by their given, innate a priori concepts.

When looking at a set of shapes in the world, we are only able to recognize those parts of an object for which we already have innate a priori concepts. Through a regularity of observation and reasoning, we combine these parts to create an understanding of more complex objects, such as a wrench, and more complex concepts, such as wrenchhood.

Language must follow the same principle, in that we are born with a basic innate a priori linguistic knowledge. .Chomsky has argued that children are born in possession of an innate ability to comprehend language structures, where language acquisition occurs as a consequence of a child's capacity to recognize the underlying structure at the root of any language, as all human languages are built upon a common structural basis.

IE, as regards which takes priority, language as communication or language as representing the world. As the basic concepts of language as representing the world is already innate a priori within the brain (having evolved over over millions of years), this allows language as communication the ability to operate free of restrictions from the immediate external world whilst still being grounded in the enduring external world.

We can always manage somehow to be exactly as determinate as we need to. — Srap Tasmaner

What is language for ? There are two aspects to our need for language. The first aspect is about our survival within the world. The second aspect is about our understanding of the world, though the more we understand the world the better our chances will be of surviving within it.

As regards the first aspect, we need language to communicate our needs to others, and we need to communicate the difference between one thing and another. It seems that this requires both the Pragmatic Theory of Truth, in that truth is verified and conformed by the results of putting one's concepts into practice, as well as the Coherence Theory of Truth, where truth is primarily a property of whole systems of propositions, and can be ascribed to individual propositions only according to their coherence with the whole

As regards the second aspect, what is the truth of the world and how do we gain knowledge of the truth of the world. The main theory is the Correspondence Theory of Truth, stretching back to Plato and Aristotle, where the truth or falsity of a representation is determined entirely by how it relates to "things" and whether it accurately describes those "things".

Aspect one of having a pragmatic and coherent language allows me to determine the difference between a wrench and a hammer sufficient for my needs, and I agree that "So it does come down to our needs and words can be perfectly determinate for one need and not good enough for another". However, I can only distinguish between a wrench and a hammer if I first have the concepts of wrenchhood and hammerhood.

Considering aspect two of using language to understand the world through my rational reasoning of an empirical experience, I may observe a particular instance of a wrench, but I can only understand a particular instance through my understanding the concept of wrenchhood. There has to be a correspondence between language and "things" in the world, and such correspondence is ultimately semantically indeterminate.

IE, I agree that a coherent language can be perfectly determinate for one's needs in pragmatically distinguishing between wrenches and hammers. However, the recognition of a wrench requires the knowledge of wrenchhood, which requires having established a correspondence between language and things in the world, which is ultimately semantically indeterminate

what we mean when we say that two people have the same idea, — Srap Tasmaner

Perhaps this can be related back to the original question.

For those who believe in a Universal Mind, Alice and Bob are two parts of the same being.
When Alice/Bob looks at a particular wrench their idea has a single ontological spatial existence for both the particular wrench and the concept wrenchhood.

For those who believe in Platonic Forms, both Alive and Bob when looking at the same wrench have a glimpse of the same Platonic Form of Wrenchhood. Their ideas will be ontologically spatially separate. Their ideas of the particular wrench will be the same, and their concepts of wrenchhood will be the same.

For those who believe in Nominalism, for Alice and Bob when looking at the same wrench, their ideas will be ontologically spatially separate. Their idea of the particular wrench will be the same, but their concepts of wrenchhood will be different.

to show why any language produced by free willing beings will be indeterminate. — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree that a language using analytic propositions might be semantically determinate, though I would argue that any language using synthetic propositions based on how their meaning relates to the world will inherently be semantically indeterminate.

Argument one
I see an object emitting a wavelength of 640nm, and say "I see a red object". I see an object emitting a wavelength of 680nm, and say "I see a red object". Whether "I" have free will or not, my statement "I see a red object" is necessarily semantically indeterminate, in that I could be referring to any wavelength between 640 and 680nm. I could invent 40 new words to describe each wavelength in changes of 1nm wavelength, such as red650 meaning red of a wavelength of 650 nm. But I would still have the problem of describing each wavelength in changes of 0.1nm.
IE, the word "red" is inherently semantically indeterminate

Argument two
Any person, with or without free-will, would fail in any attempt to discover an absolute and fixed meaning of any word using the dictionary, for example , in searching for the meaning of "object" .

Object = a material thing that can be seen and touched.
Material = the matter from which a thing is or can be made.
Matter = physical substance in general, as distinct from mind and spirit; (in physics) that which occupies space and possesses rest mass, especially as distinct from energy.
Physical = relating to the body as opposed to the mind.
IE, the links are endless

Argument three
There are fewer words in the dictionary than mereologically possible objects in the world.
IE, language is inherently indeterminate.

Argument four
Consider a group of people with or without free-will trying to create a semantically determinate language. Suppose they create a new word "xyz". The question is how to give this new word a fixed meaning within the whole group. The word as description falls into the same problem as using a dictionary. The word as reference falls into a different problem. I could point to something and say, this is xyz, but there will always be uncertainty in the others as to what exactly I am pointing at.
IE, any group of people with or without free-will will fail at trying to create a determinate language.

Where does he claim the telos as the source of or navigator to truth — Gary M Washburn

As I understand it, for Plato, telos isn't the source of truth, "being" is the source of truth.

Plato in Phaedo argues that while materials that compose a body are necessary for its acting in a certain way, they cannot be sufficient. Telos is the inherent purpose of a person or thing, in that the telos of warfare is victory and the telos of business is the creation of wealth. What is sufficent is found within the Form itself, in that the Forms themselves are the source of the telos.

For Plato, truth is the way the world is. Truth depends on what "is" in the world, and is not defined in terms of any correspondence between statements and reality. Statements may be true in virtue of the world being a certain way, in that "Theaetetus is sitting is true if and only if the form sitting has being in the case of Theaetetus". These forms in the world are only shadows of the Forms, which we can recognize by using our mind and reason.

IE, by looking at forms in the world, which are the truths in the world, by using our mind and reason we can sense the Forms themselves. It is the Forms themselves that incorporate their own purpose, their own telos.

The abstract perfection of language — Gary M Washburn

George Orwell 1946 Politics and the English Language - "Political language... is designed to make lies sound truthful and murder respectable, and to give an appearance of solidity to pure wind. "

The reason why it is impossible to create a determinate language is that language is inherently something created by free willing beings. — Metaphysician Undercover

Premise 1 - language is created by humans
Premise 2 - humans have free will
Conclusion - humans cannot create a determinate language
IE, I agree with the conclusion - but it doesn't follow from its premises as given.

The problem though, is that many axioms are accepted on the basis of utility (pragmatism), not on the basis of being self-evident. This relates to Plato's "the good". This makes the belief itself the cause , as in teleology, but many do not believe that beliefs are causes. — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps this is along the lines of the different teleological approaches of Plato and Aristotle

For Plato, an extrinsic teleology, where the materials composing a body whilst necessary may not be sufficient for the body to act in a certain way. What is needed is an external Form of the Good in order to give the body purpose and reason (ie, the self-evident)

For Aristotle, an intrinsic teleology, rejecting an external intelligence or god, where nature itself is the principle cause of change (ie, the pragmatic)

It is written that the Correspondence Theory of Truth can be traced back to Plato and Aristotle, though what they believed is only a muted version of it.

The axiomatic theory of truth has the advantage over the correspondence theory in that it does not presuppose that truth can be defined. Tarski's theorem on the undefinability of the truth predicate shows that the definition of a truth predicate requires resources that go beyond those of the formal language for which truth is going to be defined, in these cases definitional approaches to truth have to fail.

IE, it is a question of whether one believes the cause originates as described by the Absolutism of Plato or the Relativism of Aristotle.

In theory, machines can be made at least as semantically intelligent as a standard dumb human. — magritte

I agree that today in theory this is so. Today the typical English speaker will have acquired a vocabulary of up to 48,000 words. Perhaps in the future will arrive a new Lieutenant Commander Data, having a positronic brain both able to achieve 60 trillion operations per second and store a larger vocabulary, enabling them to better cope with our boundlessly unpredictable real world.

The issue is that what causes language to be semantically indeterminate is that the creators of language have freewill — Metaphysician Undercover

Language (syntax and semantics) as a human creation is inherently indeterminate, in that it is not possible to create a determinate language, as illustrated by Gödel's incompleteness theorems in mathematics and Bertrand Russell's failed project of Logism which attempted to create an analytic framework for language.
IE, any language is indeterminate, regardless of whether its creators have free will or not.

If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

As some people might believe in axiom one, and other people might believe in axiom two, it is true that different people's beliefs will be contradictory.
IE, for someone who believes in axiom one (defined as a statement so evident or well-established that it is assumed to be true ), it follows that they accept that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, meaning that the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated does not affect their belief in a cause.

Isn't semantic indeterminism dependent on free will? — Metaphysician Undercover

A similar problem to the one experienced by Captain Kirk in the episode The Liar Paradox. Being trapped by machines on a planet, Captain Kirk tells the humanoid "everything that Harry Mudd tells you is a lie", at which point Harry Mudd says "I am lying", causing the humanoid to say "illogical" followed by a breakdown with smoke escaping from its head. The moral of the story is that deterministic machines without human free will cannot cope with semantic indeterminism.

However, the humanoids learn from their encounter. They add another line of software to their programs, such that if a calculation takes longer than a fixed time, the program stops and moves on to the next problem.

Years later, on being visited by the Battlestar Galactica, who are similarly trapped on the planet, Admiral Adama tells the humanoid "everything that Col. Tigh tells you is a lie", at which Col. Tigh says "I am lying".The humanoid, with its updated program, successfully avoids any logical problems, and the crew of the Battlestar Galactica remain imprisoned without chance of release.

IE, a metaphysically deterministic humanoid without free will can be programmed to avoid any logical problem of semantic indeterminism.

If it is impossible for a logical relationship to be demonstrated, doesn't this mean that there is no cause? — Metaphysician Undercover

Our system of knowledge is based on axioms. Axiom One could be that we live in a deterministic world where all events, including moral choices, are completely determined by previously existing causes. Axiom Two could be that we live in an indeterministic world where no event is certain and the entire outcome of anything is probabilistic. Being axioms, no relationship between an earlier event and a later event needs to be logically proved.

IE, the fact that it is impossible for a logical relationship to be proved, does not exclude axiom one, ie, that there are causes.

Aristotle actually defines "soul", as "the primary actuality of a body having life potentially in it" — Metaphysician Undercover

Perhaps Kant can be thought of as continuing Aristotle's philosophy in that one could draw a comparison between Aristotle's Forms and forms with with Kant's "a priori" and "synthetic", whilst, as a modern Enlightenment thinker, moving away from Aristotle's incorporeal and eternal soul to a more sceptical view about ever being able to know the true nature of the mind.

not if it allows Platonism — Srap Tasmaner

I agree that neither of us want to allow Platonic Forms back.

But the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea" also depends on one's definition of "person", which, at the end of the day is semantically indeterminate, even allowing that there is a consensus amongst most people as to its meaning. As I picture it, as there is no one fixed definition of "person", and no two people's definition of "person" will be the same, the meaning of "person" can be illustrated by the bell curve of normal distribution, a probability distribution symmetric about the mean.

There will be a consensus at the mean of the bell curve. However, at one extreme end of the bell curve will be those who define a person as their mind, in that being in an accident and losing one's leg doesn't take away a person's individuality. At the other extreme of the bell curve will be those who believe in telepathy, in Platonic Forms, in a collective consciousness (Emile Durkheim 1893 The Division of Labour in Society) or in a universal consciousness (Loken and Bendriss 2013 The Shift in Consciousness)

Therefore, the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea", will also depend on a person's particular definition of "person". Those at one extreme of the bell curve, those believing in telepathy, Platonic Forms, collective and universal consciousness, would argue that "the idea" is a token, whereas everyone else would argue that it is a type.

IE, neither opinion is right or wrong, as it depends on one's personal beliefs.

The more pertinent indeterminism — Gary M Washburn

There can be syntactic ambiguity, "He ate the cookies on the couch" and there can be semantic ambiguity, "We saw her duck"

When asking what does ""two people have the same idea" mean, I would say that this is an example of semantic ambiguity rather than syntactic ambiguity, in that "same" is ambiguous in meaning. IE, is "same" meant as a type (the same type of idea) or a token (the same instance of an idea).

Isn't at least part of the world indeterminate? — Metaphysician Undercover

I should have distinguished between the two types of indeterminism, semantic indeterminism (SI) and metaphysical indeterminism (MI).

The clause "two people have the same idea" is an example of SI, in that the phrase "same idea" has two different meanings. MI allows the possibility of free will. Many, including myself, believe that indeterminism is nothing but a semantic problem about the meanings of words. However, others believe, such as Professor David Taylor, that if indeterminism is semantic then one falls into an infinite regress, meaning that SI requires MI, in that there is something indeterminate about the world itself.

However, metaphysical determinism and semantic indeterminism are linked by the arrow of time, in that one can have both metaphysical determinism, a cause necessarily determines an effect, and semantic indeterminism, given an effect the cause cannot necessarily be determined.

Socrates and Plato were more like skeptics — Metaphysician Undercover

I agree. Plato and I are both septics as regards the Theory of Forms. However, the Theory of Forms, as with teleology, is a pragmatically useful concept, even if not true.

logic is not grounded in spatial-temporal existence — Metaphysician Undercover

From my reading, although Plato was interested in logic, and did discuss sentence analysis, truth and fallacies, logical puzzles in Euthydemus and the difference between valid and invalid arguments, logic as a fully systemized discipline only began with Aristotle. Plato approached the World of Forms not through logic but through intuition, where knowledge of the Forms cannot be gained through sensory experience but through the mind. Forms transcend time and space, timeless and unchanging. Plato was a Dualist, where the soul before being localised by the body was directly connected to the World of Forms. After the soul had been confined by the body, it retained a dim recollection of the Forms. IE, for Plato, the mind approaches the World of Forms not through logic but through a dim memory of them.

There is the question as to whether the mind can use logic to go outside of time and space.
Along the same lines, Mathematical Platonism suggests that mathematical entities have no spatio-temporal properties. As Plato would have said, I'm sceptical. My belief is that numbers are definitions, in the performative rather than than descriptive sense, and we find our defined numbers useful because we have discovered that they often correspond to the world around us. Things defined do exist, in a sense, through all time and all space, but only within it, not outside it.

Wouldn't any attempt to create a language with determinate meaning just produce another indeterminate language — Metaphysician Undercover

Exactly so. That is the problem as I see it. As Gödel proved for mathematics the impossibility of finding a complete and consistent set of axioms, perhaps we need another Gödel to prove whether or not language can be determinate.

So I assume that this ideal, deterministic world, which you believe yourself to be in, despite all the evidence otherwise, would support this ideal, deterministic language which you believe in — Metaphysician Undercover

In answer to the question, "can a deterministic world support a deterministic language ?", I don't believe so, as it seems that linguistic meaning is always indeterminate. The problem remains that language is part of the mind, and the mind is part of the world, not separate to it. Ultimately, bearing in mind Russell's paradox about sets being members of themselves, something can never know itself, meaning that language can never be determinate

In Plato's terms, language may be included with justice, truth, equality, beauty as being derived by reasoning from the Form of the Good, where the Good is a perfect, eternal and changeless Form, existing outside space and time and superior to every material instantiation of it. The perfect Form - a deterministic language - may be strived for, but never achieved. This raises a problem with Plato's Theory of Forms in that if the Form is outside of time and space and superior to every material instantiation of it, how can Plato argue for the existence of something that he has already argued is beyond his ability to discover.

— Metaphysician Undercover

As an aside, I intuitively believe that we live in a deterministic world, even allowing for apparent free-will, chaotic systems (still deterministic yet making predictions difficult) and quantum indeterminacy (not ruling out the possibility of a deeper determinism underneath quantum mechanics).

It seems that linguistic meaning is ultimately indeterminate for several reasons, including the problem of definition, the Russell paradox about sets not being members of themselves and Gödel's incompleteness theorems.

Perhaps, as it is therefore beyond the ability of current language to fully explain the reality of the world we live in, then another movement with the same goals as the Logical Positivists of the 1920's and 30's would be beneficial, ie, to create a new language whose meaning was determinate.

two people have the same idea — Srap Tasmaner

The meaning is ultimately indeterminate.

When Alice and Bob look at the same object, such as a square, they think about 1) a particular shape, 2) the universal concept of squareness and 3) their life experiences of squareness, such as the squareness of boxes, etc.

Do Alice and Bob have the "same idea" when looking at this object.

As regards terminology, a thought is fleeting, whilst an idea has a more permanence. Immediately upon seeing the object they will have a fleeting thought about the object's particular shape, whilst on reflection the fleeting thought becomes an idea. The term "same" has more than one meaning. If Alice picks an apple of a tree and gives it to Bob, it is the "same" ontological apple. If Alice and Bob have both taken their own apples off a tree, as the apples have the same description, linguistically, it is the "same" apple.

As regards item 1), there are two questions. Either Q1, is the idea in Alice's mind the same ontological idea that is in Bob's mind or Q2, is the idea in Alice's mind linguistically the same as the idea in Bob's mind, as both Alice's idea and Bob's idea describe the same object.

Whether or not Alice and Bob share the same (ontological) idea depends on the definition of Alice and Bob, which is a linguistic problem.

Definition one = If Alice was defined as a set of parts that included an ontological entity that expressed the idea of squareness - and Bob was defined as a set of parts that included the same ontological entity - then Alice and Bob would have the same (ontological) idea. IE, if a bowling club and a gardening club both had Claire as a member, then both the bowling club and gardening club would have the same (ontological) part, ie, Claire.

Definition two = if Alice and Bob were each defined as only that set of parts contained within a specific spatial volume - ie, commonly known as a person - then Alice and Bob wouldn't share the same (ontological) idea.

Both are valid definitions. But how is the truth or falsity of a definition determined ? The dictionary definition of "person" ends up circular. I could ask 100 people their definition - but then again I could have asked 100 people pre-Galileo whether the Earth was round or flat.

IE, the answer to the question "do two people have the same idea" reduces to a linguistic problem, ie, the definition of a person, and linguistic definition is ultimately indeterminate - becoming a problem of mereology

true belief — creativesoul

Truth within language
A bear hunts for salmon in the coastal waters of Alaska. The bear believes that there are fish in the water and as there are fish in the water the bear has, what we call, a "true belief".

Truth is the accordance between fact A, the bear's belief that there are fish in the water and fact B, there are fish in the water.

As truth is an accordance between two facts, and as neither fact A has any knowledge of being in accordance with fact B nor fact B has any knowledge of being in accordance with fact A, any truth must be external to facts A and B.

IE, truth is not an internal quality of a set of facts. Truth can only be a quality external to a set of facts, such as within language.

Truth outside language
As regards the bear, after successfully catching the fish

C - the bear believed there were fish in the water
D - the bear knows there are fish in the water

For the bear to know a truth, the bear has to know an accordance between C and D

IE, the bear has to know not only i) that it believed there were fish in the water but also
ii) that it knows there are fish in the water.

IE, for the bear to know a truth, the bear has to have thoughts about its thoughts, which becomes a problem of infinite regression.

truth claims seem to require sentences/clauses — Dawnstorm

As regards Davidson's semantic theory, Wikipedia's article on "Truth-Conditional Semantics" describes meaning as the same as, or reducible to, its truth condition. But truth is a concept that only exists within language, from which it follows that "a proposition has meaning IFF a proposition is true", agreeing with Scott Soames that this has become circular.

Also, most readers of Tolstoy's Anna Karenina, for example, will not know the truth condition of most of the propositions in the book, and many of the propositions will be untrue anyway, and thereby, in Davidson's terms, find the novel meaningless. But this is to define "meaning" in a way totally contrary to conventional use.

Malapropisms break the rules of conventional language use — creativesoul

It seems that, in his article "A Nice Derangement of Epitaphs"

1) Davidson doesn't define what he means by "conventions", but infers a particular definition of "conventions".
2) He concludes by inferring that because his particular definition of "conventions" is not illuminative - then no definition of "conventions" will be illuminative.