That is precisely incorrect. Consider the following: — Paine

PI 182. The criteria which we accept for 'fitting', 'being able to', 'understanding', are much more complicated than might appear at first sight. That is, the game with these words, their employment in the linguistic intercourse that is carried on by their means, is more involved—the role of these words in our language other—than we are tempted to think.

Does this cylinder C fit into this cylinder H ?

An engineer would say "Of course, I fitted it yesterday". A Professor of Linguistics would say "depends what you mean by "fit", it's a complicated question, the proper use of words, I am sure there's a definition, but we cannot depend on that, as definitions change"

PI 182 sounds more like the anti-realist linguist than the realist engineer.

To which Wittgenstein's first comment upon was: — Paine

PI 1 - Now think of the following use of language: I send someone shopping. I give him a slip marked "five red apples". He takes the slip to the shopkeeper.................But what is the meaning of the word "five"?—No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

The customer walks into the shop and presents a piece of paper with the word "apple" written on it to the shopkeeper.

The word is meaningless to both the customer and shopkeeper, unless both the customer and shopkeeper are aware of a priori agreed rule that if someone walks into a shop with a slip of paper with a word written on it, then the shopkeeper must then go to a particular drawer that has the same word stencilled on the front of it, open the drawer, and then give to the customer whatever object there is in the drawer.

By itself, a single word has a meaning but no use. For example, if I walked into a room and said "apple", I would be looked at as if I were mad. The listeners would know that "apple" meant a round, edible fruit produced by an apple tree, but they would see no use in my having said it.

Similarly the word "apple" written on the slip would have a meaning but no use. It would only have a use if a priori agreed rule was in place.

The use of the word "apple" on the slip of paper is to activate a prior agreed rule. The content of the rule is independent of the word. The rule could be to open a particular drawer, or it could equally be to make an apple pie.

The interlocutor asks of Wittgenstein, "what is the meaning of the word "apple"", and Wittgenstein replies that the word has no meaning, it only has a use.

But what is the word's use?

Its use is not for the customer to be given an apple. Its use is to initiate a prior agreed rule, regardless of the consequences of the rule.

When Wittgenstein writes that words don't have meaning but only a use, this can only be interpreted as saying that the use of words is to initiate prior agreed rules regardless of the consequences of such rules.

Sure, but what is considered "real" here? Objects only or abstracted entities (like "justice" or "compassion")? These don't exist "in the world" except as notion in people's internal cognitive understanding. — schopenhauer1

Simplifying, as I understand it, words have meaning in two ways. First, meaning by description, in the sense of Wittgenstein's use theory of meaning and second, meaning by acquaintance, in the sense of Augustine's correlation of word with object.

As regards meaning by description, it is true that there are some words in language that don't refer to the world but do refer to other words in the same language. For example the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but rather replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

If every word in language gained its meaning by description, language would be self-referential and unworkable. At lest some of the words in language need to gain their meaning from a correspondence or correlation with objects or events in the world, typified by the word table and the expression pain behaviour

What is real? The unicorn exists as a combination of words. As the words are real, does this mean that the unicorn is also real. Is a table real? The Indirect Realist would say that tables don't exist in the world, and the Direct Realist would say that tables do exist in the world. Both would agree that tables exist as concepts in the mind, but then again, are concepts real?

One can also make the case that ChatGPT is an extension of one's own intent. — schopenhauer1

I don't know how ChatGPT works exactly, but it seems to use statistical mapping. The parts may be copied from existing authored sources, and thereby have intentional content, but the parts may be combined statistically using historical data, which has no intentional content.

For example, Harry Guinness in the article How Does ChatGPT work?, gives his own example
Harry Guinness is a freelance writer and journalist based in Ireland. He has written for a variety of publications, including The New York Times, The Guardian, The Huffington Post, and Popular Mechanics. He covers topics ranging from technology and photography to travel and culture.
He notes that parts have been copied verbatim from his previous web sites, but the list of publications has been basically made up. As the New York Times and Guardian have been historically grouped together, ChatGPT had assumed because he had written for the New York Times, he had also written for the Guardian

As the statistical nature of ChatGPT breaks any intentionality on the part of ChatGPT, it can only be the reader who can bring intentionality to the text.

I think that the article I posited from Tomasello et al, can elucidate more on how "intentionality" and its evolution into a communal "intentionality" can help solve this — schopenhauer1

Michael Tomasello makes the point that human culture has developed from collaboration and shared intentionality rather than individual learning alone. As a believer in Enactivism, this seems highly plausible. For example, sand dunes take their form not from the wind alone, not from the sand alone, but from a dynamic interaction between the two.

The idea that Wittgenstein ignores how language-games have a use in the world seems way off the mark — Sam26

He does not ignore the fact that a language game has a use in the world. — Fooloso4

I agree 100% that Wittgenstein does not ignore the fact that the language game has a use in the world, such as teachers, pain, slabs, roses, shopkeepers, pupils, pillars, etc.

Perhaps a better wording would have been: "It seems that Wittgenstein's position is that i) words have a meaning because of their use in the language game, ii) the language game has a use in the world. He seems to ignore the fact that words also have meaning because of their use in the world".

From Wikipedia Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein is criticizing the view that the meaning of language derives from pointing out objects in the world, but rather the meaning of a word is its use in language.
Section 43 in Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations reads: "For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning," it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language." Wittgenstein begins Philosophical Investigations with a quote from Augustine's Confessions, which represents the view that language serves to point out objects in the world and the view that he will be criticizing. The individual words in a language name objects—sentences are combinations of such names. In this picture of language, we find the roots of the following idea: Every word has a meaning. This meaning is correlated with the word. It is the object for which the word stands.

From the IEP article on Ludwig Wittgenstein, Wittgenstein has been described as a Linguistic Idealist, where language is the ultimate reality and as an Anti-Realist, someone who cannot get outside their own language in order to compare what is in their language with what is in the world.

Given the two sentences "the house is on the hill" and "the hill is on the house", each having a different meaning, what determines the correct sequence of words?

I can understand Augustine's position that we can discover the correct sequence of words by observing the world, and finding a correspondence between the words and objects in the world. We observe that the house is on the hill, and therefore the proposition "the house is on the hill" is true and the proposition "the hill is on the house" is false.

But I cannot understand the position that the meaning of a word derives from its context within the language game. How can a sentence determine the correct sequence of words within itself ?

The same was and is said of Socrates. — Fooloso4

Perhaps one advantage of science is that it does try to answer the questions it has raised.

Wittgenstein's work shows the poverty of what is here being called "theorising". There's something oddly obtuse in denouncing him for not doing something that he has shown to be an error. — Banno

If Wittgenstein is against theorising, then why did he write that the meaning of a word can be either i) its use in language or ii) what it points to.

PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Or is PI 43 the interlocutor's opinion rather than Wittgenstein's?

It gets more complicated when the Wikipedia article on Philosophical Investigations writes that in the use theory of meaning, words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate. If that is the case, then PI 43 is contradictory!
Wittgenstein claims that the meaning of a word is based on how the word is understood within the language-game. A common summary of his argument is that meaning is used. According to the use theory of meaning, the words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate or by the mental representations one might associate with them, but by how they are used.

It seems strange that PI 43 would be famous, yet not something that Wittgenstein actually believed in.

In his debate with Jacques Derrida, Searle argued against Derrida's purported view that a statement can be disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, for example when no longer connected to the original author, while still being able to produce meaning. — schopenhauer1

Words have a use in the language game, and the language game has a use in the world.

Wittgenstein asks questions, but avoids trying to answer them
There are two parts to my understanding of language: i) words have a use in the language game and ii) the language game has a use in the world. Wittgenstein deals with the first part, but ignores the second. Wittgenstein is like a mountaineer who buys all the ropes, crampons, thermal weatherproof clothes and tents but then never goes to the mountain, justifying himself by saying that the actual climbing of the mountain is a meaningless pursuit. He asks endless questions without trying to draw these together into a comprehensive answer. In fact, he seems proud that he makes no attempt at theorising. Perhaps it is no surprise there is so much misunderstanding surrounding his works

As Stanley Cavell in his article The Later Wittgenstein concludes:
Both (Freud and Wittgenstein) thought of their negative soundings as revolutionary extensions of our knowledge, and both were obsessed by the idea, or fact, that they would be misunderstood -partly, doubtless, because they knew the taste of self-knowledge, that it is bitter. It will be time to blame them for taking misunderstanding by their disciples as personal betrayal when we know that the ignorance of oneself is a refusal to know.

Wittgenstein tackles the first part
As Mark Olssen describes in Wittgenstein and Foucault: The Limits and possibilities of constructivism, Wittgenstein does have a position of Relativism, an Anti-Realism, and even a Linguistic Idealism, where language is the ultimate reality. He explains events not in terms of the individual, but rather in the social constructivist terms of social, historical and cultural "forms of life".

Wittgenstein hints at the second part
Kristof Nyiri points out in Wittgenstein as a common sense Realist that Wittgenstein cannot, at the end of the day, rely on language as a justification for his actions, but rather, does what he does because of the reality of the world in which he exists. When obeying rules, as Wittgenstein writes, sometimes there can be no rational justification expressible in language, it is just what is done in the world. Such is a position of philosophical realism, where people learn about, handle and refer to physical objects within a physical world.
PI 217 If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do."

Single words have no use, only sentences
A single word such as "slab" has no use, in that If I walked into a room and said "slab" people would look at me with bemusement. Only sentences can have a use, such as "Bring me a slab" or "slab!". Sentences have a meaning when they have a use, and they have a use when they result in an action, such as someone bringing me a slab or people moving out of the way of a falling slab.

Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world
Language only has a use when it changes facts in the world, such as someone bringing me a slab. When it has a use, it means something. If I say "bring me a slab", for language to have any use at all, this means that I want a slab rather than an apple. Therefore, the word "slab" must be able to differentiate between a slab in the world and an apple in the world, meaning that the word "slab" must be able to refer to a slab rather than an apple. The meaning of of the word "slab" must be able to correlate with one particular object in the world. In other words, the word "slab" must name the object slab in the world, a position of Realism. This is Realism regardless of whether the realism of that of the Direct Realist, who perceives the slab in the world, or the Indirect Realist, who perceives a picture of the slab in the world

The meaning of a text and the intentionality of the author
Derrida proposes that a sentence such as "bring me a slab" can still have meaning even if disjoined from the original intentionality of its author, the author's intention when originating the sentence. But this raises the question, does the text of a ChatGPT have meaning if the ChatGPT zombie machine had no conscious intentionality when preparing the text. One could argue that that part of the text which has been directly copied from other authors, who did have a conscious intentionality, does have meaning. However, the act of combining these parts together using rule-based algorithms cannot of itself give meaning to the whole.

As it seems that readers do find meaning in ChatGPT texts, one can only conclude that it is possible for texts disjoined from the original author to have meaning, as Derrida proposed. The meaning has come not from the writer of the text but from the reader.

That words have a use in the language game is necessary but not sufficient
Wittgenstein's meaning is use suffers from the problem of circularity. From the SEP article Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is based on how the word is understood within the language game, ie, the use theory of meaning, in that words are not defined by reference to the objects they designate.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

He proposes that the meaning of a word does not come from the thing that it is naming, in that the meaning of the word "slab" does not come from a slab in the world. He suggests that we don't need a prior definition of a word in order to be able to successfully use it within the language game of the society within which we are living, but rather, the word is defined through use from "forms of life".

It seems that in the expression "meaning is use", the word "use" refers to use in the language game and not use in the world. It is here that the problem problem of circularity arises. If the meaning of a particular word is determined by its relationship with the other words within a holistic whole, yet the same is true of every other word, in that their meaning has also been determined by their relationship with the other words within a holistic whole. Within a language, if every part is relative to every other part, nothing is fixed, everything is arbitrary, and it becomes impossible to establish any meaning at all.

Conclusion
If meaning as use means use in language, then this is unworkable because of the circularity problem. If meaning as use means use in the world, then this is workable, as the only use of language is to change facts in the world. Language gets its meaning from being able to change facts in the world.

Your conclusion does not quite follow. "it would not be used as the name of a thing" – you conclude that the thing in the box doesn't have a name, when the conclusion ought be that there is no thing in the box to be named.Again, pain is not a thing! You repeatedly read the text as if it were. — Banno

Pain is not a thing
Perhaps I am missing what you are saying, but I don't understand when you say that the correct conclusion is that there is no thing in the box to be named, whether a beetle or a pain.

PI 293:Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

PI 304 "Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!"

Are you saying that Wittgenstein should be treated as a zombie having no conscious experiences, no inner sensations of pain, no beetles in his box?

The circularity of "meaning is use"
You didn't explain how to overcome the problem of circularity with "meaning is use", where the meaning of a particular word is determined by its relationship with the other words within a holistic whole. Yet the same is true of every other word, in that their meaning has also been determined by their relationship with the other words within a holistic whole.

If within a language, every part is relative to every other part, it becomes impossible to establish any meaning at all.

My belief is that the meaning of language is fixed by reference to the world, ie Realism. But if you disagree, then what does fix the meaning of language?

You might re-visit this. The remainder of the section is a rejection of that suggestion. — Banno

Words which have a use in the language game don't name the thing in the box.
PI 293 - But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language?—If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at all.

The meaning of a word is its use in the language game.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language

Wittgenstein writes that sentences such as "my pain is the same as his pain" make sense.
PI 253: "In so far as it makes sense to say that my pain is the same as his, it is also possible for us both to have the same pain.

There is the sentence "my X is the same as his X" and I want to find the meaning of X. I am told that the meaning of X is its use in language. If that is true, as I know how the word X has been used within the sentence, I should be able to find its meaning.

What does X mean?

You embrace a more conservative, realist-oriented reading — Joshs

Yes, Wittgenstein's proposition that the meaning of words in a language is in their use refers to their use in a world, not just their use in the language itself.

From the SEP article on Realism, there are two general aspects to Realism. First, that objects and their properties exist in the world, such as tables and squareness, Second, that such objects and properties are independent of any observer. For Realism, a world exists that is independent of any language used to describe it. For the Realist, there is a world external to the mind. However, within Realism there are different opinions as to how we perceive this world. For the Indirect Realist, we perceive a picture of a table. For the Direct Realist, we directly perceive the table.

As Hutchinson and Read write "For a word to be is for a word to be used. Language does not exist external to its use by us in the world", which is supporting the Realist position, in that they are saying that language can only exist as use in the world. If there was no world, there would be no use for language

As Joseph Rouse writes "Practices should instead be understood as comprising performances that are mutually interactive in partially shared circumstances", again supporting the Realist position, in that as the rules of language can only function in shared circumstances, which is by its nature external to the users of such a rule based language. External to the users of the language is a world .

PI 6 makes this point. Wittgenstein writes that a teacher points to an object and utters a word, such as "slab", thereby establishing an association between a word and a thing. In the mind of a child, the next time the child hears the word "slab", it may imagine a picture of a slab. But Wittgenstein is making the point that the purpose of language is not to evoke images, although this may be useful, the purpose of language is to cause someone to act in a certain way. He describes in PI 2 that in a primitive language, A calls out "slab" and B brings a slab.

What is not explained in PI 6, is how someone can learn a concept, such as the word "slab" from a single picture of a particular slab. However this does not negate the fact that Wittgenstein is specifically associating words in language with things in the world. He is not associating words in language with other words in language.

PI 6 is founded on the assumption that there is a world of objects and things, and builds on the idea that within this world, words in the language game get their meaning from how they are used in the world.

It is true that there are some words in language that don't refer to the world but do refer to other words in the same language. For example the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but rather replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

It is possible to imagine a coherent language game where none of its words referred to objects or things in a world, and was totally self-referential. Within such a language game, its propositions would be objective and its truth criteria unambiguous. In Donald Davidson's words, such truth would would be "relative to a scheme". However, what would guarantee the rationality of the scheme as a whole? There would be an uncountable number of such possible language games: the language game of the non-religious atheist, the language game of the non-believer atheist, the language game of the agnostic atheist, the language game of the catholic Christian , the language game of the protestant Christian, the language game of the Eastern Orthodox Christian, etc, etc. A language game with no link to objects and things in a world would be arbitrary and meaningless.

Only the existence of a world would give a meaning to a language game, where the meaning of a word is its use in language, and the meaning of a language is its use in a world.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language

The act of “expression” (rather than “observable behavior”) is necessary as it implies that it is of me (reveals me)you can know I am in pain by inference from the context) — Antony Nickles

I could say "ouch!" or I could wince, both serve the same function in indicating to others that I am in pain. They cannot know that I am in pain, they can only believe that I am in pain.
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And, again, expression is not a “name”. — Antony Nickles

From the Wikipedia article Name, a name identifies something, a referent. A proper name identifies a specific individual human. A common name identifies a person, place or thing.

Wincing is an instinctive behaviour. Saying the word "ouch!" is a cognitive act, and as a cognitive act refers to something. As a part of language that is identifying something, it is a name.
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the interlocutor has the impulsive desire for certainty........... Wittgenstein cannot tell you an answer — Antony Nickles

In PI 281 the interlocutor asks "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

Yes, this is a simplistic thing to say, in that: i) There can be pain and no pain behaviour, ii) there can be pain with pain behaviour, iii) there can be no pain and no pain behaviour and iv) there can be no pain and pain behaviour

However, Wittgenstein does make the specific statement in PI 304 "Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!". Even though pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, the pain can still exist within the individual.
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We want science to solve philosophy, but they are like two separate worlds, and what Wittgenstein is doing (his method) is not empiricism or statistics or an experiment. The result is not facts or theories, its to change you...(He is more often asking you to imagine something or being cryptic to force you to see something for yourself—he is not arguing for a conclusion.) — Antony Nickles

Wittgenstein is doing what any scientist would start by doing, he starts by asking questions:
PI 281 "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"
PI 282 - "But in a fairy tale the pot too can see and hear!" (Certainly; but it can also talk.)
PI 283 - What gives us so much as the idea that living beings, things, can feel?
PI 284 - Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations.—One says to oneself: How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing?

The scientist would also start by asking:
What is the universe made of?
How did life begin? ...
Are we alone in the universe? ...
What makes us human? ...

But what Wittgenstein doesn't do is the harder part, trying to discover a theory that gives a coherent answer to all these questions. He is not trying to discover that e = mc2.

Anyone can ask questions, what is more difficult is coming up with answers.
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Taking out the focus on my difference is to show that the owning is the important part about pain. Part of this process would be to ask yourself why you are fixated on our singularity? — Antony Nickles

As Wittgenstein writes in PI 253 "Another person can't have my pains."The word "pain" is a singular thing, having the four letters p, a, i and n. But the concept that it refers to is not a singular thing. My concept of pain is different to yours, my pain is different to yours, my pain yesterday is different to my pain today, and my concept of pain yesterday is different to my concept of pain today. Only as the word "pain" is it a singular thing.
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One realization of its failure is that our lives are essentially shared; that, yes, it is possible to have a personal even ineffable experience (alone with a sunset) — Antony Nickles

Yes, humans are individuals and generally live in a community of others. However, humans can equally live as individuals independent of any surrounding community, and can also live as part of the surrounding community. The one doesn't preclude the other.
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So yes, pain is not a “thing” (like color is not), but what he is saying is that it nevertheless is important (thus, not “nothing”); it just matters in different ways; we care (or not) about the pain being “had” by this person; it is that pain is expressed by a person, that it expresses them, that they matter. It is not a matter of knowledge, but interest. — Antony Nickles

My sensation, my beetle, can be different to your sensation, your beetle. My sensation is something, it is not a nothing. Your sensation is something, it is not a nothing.

PI 293 —Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a "beetle". No one can look into anyone else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle.—Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

As my something is different to your something, it is true to say that there is not one something but many. It is also true to say that our somethings are not a nothing either, which is why he writes

“PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!”
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It is not that they are “joking”; it only makes sense as a “joke” (you are to imagine the context in which it is a joke)—we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known (other than in the sense of knowing as being sure, as in “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”) — Antony Nickles

PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?
I translate this as "only as a joke would I say that I know I am in pain".

If this sentence is referring to my thoughts, then this is true, as the thought I know I am in pain means no more than I am in pain'. As you say"we would never otherwise say “I know I am in pain” because pain is not known"

If the sentence is referring to my words, then this is false, as the words "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain". As you say “I am certain I am in pain and that it’s not indigestion”.

Therefore, as the only way that this would be a joke is if I am referring to my thoughts, then PI 246 is referring to my thoughts, not my words.
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Wittgenstein is not “countering” solipsism, but getting at the desire for it, and the desire to “solve” it. — Antony Nickles

In forcing us to better understand the language we use, and misuse, although he may not have been deliberately intending it, Wittgenstein did come up with a new Theory of Language, the Language Game. In the sense that a theory is, according the Oxford Languages, "a supposition or a system of ideas intended to explain something, especially one based on general principles independent of the thing to be explained", in his desire to solve the problem of solipsism, he did come up with a theory countering solipsism.
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Language does not follow rules................Wittgenstein is not looking at rule-following to explain language — Antony Nickles

From the John Searle & Bryan Magee conversation 1987, language is rule governed. As for Wittgenstein, rules cannot be private, language must be public. Language is not bounded by rules, as rules can be interpreted in different ways. There are no rules for the rules. Forms of life determine meaning. Use determines meaning. We act in a primitive way, not from some great theory.

From Wikipedia Language Game (Philosophy), Wittgenstein argued that the meaning in language depends on rules.
A language-game (German: Sprachspiel) is a philosophical concept developed by Ludwig Wittgenstein, referring to simple examples of language use and the actions into which the language is woven. Wittgenstein argued that a word or even a sentence has meaning only as a result of the "rule" of the "game" being played. Depending on the context, for example, the utterance "Water!" could be an order, the answer to a question, or some other form of communication.

Oxford Languages defines a rule as "one of a set of explicit or understood regulations or principles governing conduct or procedure within a particular area of activity." To say that the language game is rule-governed is not to say that such rules are rigid, known and unchanging
PI 102 The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background—hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium)

Wittgenstein says that the rules of language are like the rules of chess, in that the rules of chess don't describe the physical properties of the chess pieces, but rather describe what the pieces do. Similarly, in language, the rules don't describe the words but do describe how the words are used.
PI 108 - But we talk about it as we do about the pieces in chess when we are stating the rules of the game, not describing their physical properties. The question "What is a word really?" is analogous to "What is a piece in chess?"

I agree in the main with what you are saying about Wittgenstein, and only on a few points could I quibble.

Again, Ouch! is not a name for a thing (an object—“something inside us”), it is an expression of my being in pain (an externalization). — Antony Nickles

Agree. "Ouch!" is a name for an observable behaviour. As pain is not observable, if there was no observable pain behaviour, then there could be no word "pain" in the language game.
PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

And to say pain is “caused by something inside us” is just a physiological fact..........................that is philosophically unimportant and confusing because it appears to bring up issues of causation and determinism, etc. — Antony Nickles

With this, I disagree. The issues of causation and determinism are important philosophical topics. In the present, there are certain facts in the world. In the past there were different facts in the world. It is a philosophical question to ask why are the facts in the world today are as they are rather than different to what they are. The concepts of causation, determination as well as the Principle of Sufficient Reason may be used to tackle this metaphysical problem.
PI 169: But why do you say that we felt a causal connexion? Causation is surely something established by experiments, by observing a regular concomitance of events for example. So how could I say that I felt something which is established by experiment?

It is the interlocutor (not Wittgenstein) that is asking a question based on their desire to separate pain and the expression of pain (see #245). They are trying to force Wittgenstein into admitting a behavioral conclusion that without expression there is no pain — Antony Nickles

It is clear in PI 281 that it is the interlocutor that is asking"But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?", but after all, the interlocutor is part of Wittgenstein's imagination, and is putting forward ideas that Wittgenstein considers important. Wittgenstein does conclude that there is a difference between pain and pain behaviour, where he describes that even though the private sensation of pain may drop out of consideration in the language game, pain does not drop out as a private sensation.
PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

But the way pain works is not in my knowing my pain, it is in my having my pain — Antony Nickles

There are two aspects, the private and the public. As regards the private aspect, the thought "know" in "I know I am in pain" is redundant, as this means no more than the thought "I am in pain". As regards the public aspect, the word "know" in "I know I am in pain" isn't redundant, as the expression "I know I am in pain" does have a different meaning to "I am in pain"
PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

His point is that the word (a description, etc.) are expressions, just like a cry is an expression, different entirely from a referent to an object (“reality”). — Antony Nickles

Yes, as in PI 293, the Beetle in the Box analogy, the object, the pain, drops out of consideration in the language game.
PI 293: That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of 'object and designation' the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant.

But as Wittgenstein points out, the way our lives work, we don’t know another’s pain...but the points Wittgenstein makes are that our language and ability to express ourselves have a shared depth and so possibility of reaching all the way into each other — Antony Nickles

Yes, we can talk about pain in the language game, even though no one else can know my pain and I cannot know theirs. Wittgenstein is trying to find a means of countering Cartesian solipsism, the separation of mind from world, through language. In part successful, in that the beetle does drop out of consideration in the language game, but in part unsuccessful, in that there still remains the problem that I can still not know another's beetle and they can still not know mine
PI 293 Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box.

All that to say that traditional philosophy wants to place “intention” before action, or tie “meaning” to speaking — Antony Nickles

Yes, you are on the road to answering my previous question. As the tortoise said to Achilles,
where is the rule that we must follow a rule. A child learns the rules of the language game, but how does the child know that there are rules to follow. In Wittgenstein's terms, the answer is in the "primitive", in Chomsky's terms, the answer is in the innate, and in Kant's terms, the answer is in the a priori. Wittgenstein bases his argument against a Private Language in part of the impossibility of developing private language rules, yet the same problem attaches to a language game based on rules. Where is the rule that there are rules.
PI 5: A child uses such primitive forms of language when it learns to talk. Here the teaching of language is not explanation, but training.

You are pissing upwind, my friend. — Banno

A sentence full of metaphorical meaning. Yet the problem is, how do I actually use such knowledge. I know what you mean, but making practical use of such advice is a lot more difficult. :grin:

It is the exclamation itself that is a noun, as an event, not as a name for (referent for) “the pain” (some object inside us) — Antony Nickles

I agree that the exclamation "ouch!" is not a name for the pain inside us, but rather, is the name for an observable pain-behaviour that has been caused by something inside us.

Wittgenstein refers to the difference between pain and pain-behaviour:
PI 281 - "But doesn't what you say come to this: that there is no pain, for example, without pain-behaviour?"

And the word is not a replacement for a “picture” (whatever we would imagine when we hear it I suppose you to mean); it is a replacement for the wordless expression, the wince, the cry, the clear attempt at repression, etc. — Antony Nickles

An Indirect Realist would say that the word is a replacement for a picture of the wince or cry. A Direct Realist would say that the word is a replacement for the wince or cry.

This way of looking at pain as word-object is created to avoid the real way pain matters between me and to you (how it works)—that it is I that is in pain (I am the one; I don’t know pain, I have it) and you either acknowledge me (say, come to my aid) or ignore me, reject me (say I’m faking). — Antony Nickles

Yes, how does an observer know whether when someone is exhibiting pain-behaviour, that they are actually in pain. An actor on the stage may exhibit pain-behaviour without actually experiencing pain.

PI 304 - "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it.

but isn't it the case that a single word may have a meaning but no use? — RussellA

"Ouch!"; "Hello"; "Fire!". No. — Banno

"Ouch!" and "fire!" are not single words. As exclamations, they are complete sentences. "Ouch" and "fire" are single words.

If I walked into a room and said "ouch" or "fire", people would look at me with bemusement. If I walked into a room and said" ouch!" or "fire!, people would act, either commiserate with me or start running.

"Ouch" and "fire" as single words have meaning but no use in the language game. "Ouch!" and "fire!" as complete sentences have both meaning and use in the language game.

If I walked into a room and said "no", people would again look at me with bemusement, as the word has meaning but no use.

When walking into a room, the word "hello" is being used as an exclamation, where the exclamation mark is assumed, and as an exclamation is not a single word.

What I disagree with is your assertion that "ouch" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour — Luke

I am sure that "ouch!" is a noun and/or the name of a behaviour. If somewhere along the line I wrote "ouch", without the exclamation mark, this was a mistyping.

You did not give an example of how the word "ouch" might be used in a sentence — Luke

I said that "Ouch!" is a sentence, not that "ouch" is a sentence.

The word "ouch!" is an exclamation, and according to the University of Sussex, an exclamation can be a sentence.

However it is clear that you have not seen how to replace thinking in terms of meaning with thinking in terms of use, and are still attempting to get at meaning by looking at use while treating these as distinct things — Banno

If I go into a corner shop, see people say "I want a cracker" and are given a cracker, then when I want a cracker I know to say "I want a cracker". As Wittgenstein said, meaning is use.
PI 43 For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language

But if I went into the corner shop and just said "I", nothing would happen, even though the shopkeeper would know what "I" means. They would see no use in my saying it. Similarly if I just said "want", or just said "a" or just said "cracker", the shopkeeper would know the meaning of each word, but would see no use in my saying these words. Only the complete sentence "I want a cracker" not only has meaning but also a use.

If a parrot walked into a corner shop and spoke "I want a cracker", the shopkeeper would do nothing as they know the parrot is not aware of the language game.

A child may see in a corner shop people saying "I want a cracker" and being given a cracker. On returning home, the child may say to its parents "I want a cracker". On not being given a cracker, then discovers that its parents are playing a different language game. Only by trial and error the child may discover that they will only be given a cracker when saying "Please I want a cracker", thereby successfully becoming part of its parents' language game.

I can understand that a sentence has both meaning and use, but isn't it the case that a single word may have a meaning but no use?

We enter into a community that already plays various language games — Banno

It could well be that as the child grows up, it may decide that the word "please" is a symbol of a military industrial complex that squashes the democratic rights of the proletariat, and decides that the the word "please" should therefore be banned from use. In changing the meaning of the word "please", it has instantly created a new language game, even if they are the only person who has such a belief. In effect, they have created a private language game.

Isn't a language game used by only one person a private language game?

“Ouch” is not a name, it is an expression — Antony Nickles

I agree that "ouch!" is an expression, as I wrote before "In that sense one can rightly say that "ouch!" is an expression of pain."

The word "ouch!" replaces a picture. As a noun is a word that refers to a thing, and as a picture also refers to a thing, a picture is a noun. As only a noun can replace a noun, "ouch!" is also a noun.

"Ouch!" is an exclamation, a short sound, word or phrase spoken suddenly to express an emotion. According to the Merriam Webster Dictionary, an exclamation is a noun: 1) a sharp or sudden utterance, 2) vehement expression of protest or complaint.

Use it in a sentence. — Luke

If someone can see me, they see a picture of me wincing. If someone cannot see me, and hear me say "ouch!", they can replace the word "ouch!" by a picture of me wincing, ie, the word "ouch!" names the picture of me wincing.

The word "ouch!" names a picture, and a picture is a noun. Therefore, in the sentence "Ouch!", the word "ouch!" is being used as a noun.

To say that "ouch" names a pain behaviour is to treat it as though it were a verb, such as "wincing" — Luke

"House" as a noun names a building for human habitation. "Ouch!" as a noun names a pain behaviour.

PI 26: To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing.

If I stub my toe I may say "ouch" even if no one else is around to hear me. Certainly this is not intended to communicate a private sensation to others or to myself. — Fooloso4

Then why did you say the word ?

Words are not all just the names of things. — Banno

I didn't properly answer your question.

It seems that the PI is making the case that god in the atheist's language game means something different to god in the Christian's language game. Neither meaning is either right or wrong, as long as each language game is coherent within itself. The word god doesn't represent a fact in the world, doesn't name something in the world, but has a meaning dependent on its context within a particular language game.

PI 43 - For a large class of cases—though not for all—in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

The meaning of god in the atheist's language game is how it is used in that language game. The meaning of god in the Christian's language game is how it is used in that language game. So it is true that the meaning of a particular word, such as god, depends on which language game it is being used within

However, within a particular language game, which comes first, i) knowing the meaning of a word and then understanding the sentence it is in, or ii) learning the meaning of a word from the sentence it is in in order to understand the sentence.

It cannot be ii), therefore it must be i). The nature of the language game can only be known after the meaning of a set of words has been fixed, rather than the meaning of the set of words within a language game have been fixed by the language game.

PI 26: To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?

Doesn't this mean that the nature of the language game has already been determined by an a priori choice of words that happen to be used in that language game rather than the meaning of a word is how it is used in the language game ?

I've been addressing your mistaken belief that...............the word "ouch!" names a set of particular observed behaviours in the world......................Therefore, I don't see how your response about learning language is relevant. — Luke

Saying "ouch!" is not an involuntary act such as wincing, but rather a cognitive act as part of a language game requiring conscious thought intended to communicate a private sensation to others.

If not naming the pain behaviour directly and the private sensation indirectly, then what purpose does the word "ouch!" have in the language game?

Words are not all just the names of things. — Banno

Which comes first, knowing the meaning of a word and then understanding the sentence it is in or learning the meaning of a word from the sentence it is in in order to understand the sentence. It cannot be the latter. First, we must know the meaning of a word before being able to use it. Wittgenstein says that the naming of words comes before using them.
PI 26: To repeat—naming is something like attaching a label to a thing. One can say that this is preparatory to the use of a word. But what is it a preparation for?

Wittgenstein writes that in language, words don't just refer to objects.
PI 27: Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions. Water! Away! Ow! Help! Fine! No! Are you inclined still to call these words "names of objects"?

Some words we can learn the meaning of as they are the names of objects, such as "stones".
PI 7 . In the practice of the use of language (2) one party calls out the words, the other acts on them. In instruction in the language the following process will occur: the learner names the objects; that is, he utters the word when the teacher points to the stone.—And there will be this still simpler exercise: the pupil repeats the words after the teacher——both of these being processes resembling language.

We can learn the meaning of words such as "ouch!", which are not the names of objects, by being taught that they can replace particular pain behaviour.
PI 244 A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour. "So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

If a word can replace something, then it names that something. For example, as the word "table" can replace the words " a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at", then "table is the name for a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at". As "ouch!" can replace a pain behaviour, then "ouch!" names that pain behaviour.

Do words name things? An object is a "thing". I suppose it depends on whether one can call a pain behaviour a "thing". A pain behaviour is something, but is it a "thing"?

Uttering those words becomes, for the child, a new form of pain-behavior; and for others it serves as a criterion for the child's being in pain." — Richard B

As you point out, a key para is 244 So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"— On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

As you say, it makes sense that the word "pain" is a pain behaviour, as crying is a pain behaviour. As Wittgenstein says, the word "pain" replaces crying rather than describe it.

The child is aware of its inner sensation of pain and outer instinctive behaviour of crying. The child learns that it can replace its crying by the word "pain". The child has learnt the rule that it can replace its particular behaviour by a particular word.

The problem is, as the tortoise said to Achilles, where is the rule that there are rules. How did the child learn the rule that its particular behaviour can be replaced by a particular word?

You say "Nor does the suggestion mean that the word 'pain' stands for or refers to crying-which would be a form of behaviourism."

If the child didn't discover the rule that there are rules through behaviourism, then how does the child know to follow the rules?

“Ouch” isn’t the name of anything; it’s what you say when you hurt yourself. — Luke

An English speaker would say "ouch!", an Indonesian speaker would say "aduh!", meaning that exclaiming "ouch!" is not an innate behaviour but is rather learnt as part of a language.

I would agree that the act of saying "ouch" names a behaviour, but I would not agree that the word "ouch" names a behaviour. — Luke

I agree that the word "ouch" has to be in context. It could be the Organisation for the Understanding of Cluster Headache, a BBC website reflecting the lives and experiences of disabled people, a term in the dictionary or a speech act from someone having a rock dropped on their foot. As Wittgenstein said "The question is: "In what sort of context does it occur?"

"Ouch" is not the name of a behaviour; it is an expression of pain — Luke

I agree with the second part, as I wrote before "In that sense one can rightly say that "ouch!" is an expression of pain."

However, I'm not sure about the first part.

If I want to communicate to someone who can see me that I am in pain, I can wince. If I want to communicate to someone who cannot see me that I am in pain, I can say "ouch!"

A word such as "ouch!" can replace a behaviour such as wincing.

PI 244 - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

If a word can replace something, then it names that something. For example, as the word "table" can replace the words " a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at", then "table is the name for a piece of furniture with a flat top and one or more legs, providing a level surface for eating, writing, or working at".

Similarly, as "ouch!" can replace a particular behaviour, then "ouch!" names that particular behaviour.

Wincing is the name of a behaviour, but "ouching" is not. — Luke

From Wittgenstein's Beetle in the Box analogy PI 293, the word "pain" in the language game cannot refer to any private sensation of pain, as any private sensation of pain drops out of consideration in the language game. This means that the word "pain" can only refer to the pain behaviour, either the act of wincing or saying "ouch!"

The act of wincing and saying "ouch!" are both pain behaviours.

Talk of pain has a superficial resemblance to talk of objects, "I have an iPhone in my hand" looks very much like "I have a pain in my hand". — Banno

As Wittgenstein said in PI 304 "Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object."

A name can only name something known, something that can be directly observed. A name cannot name something that is unknown, something that cannot be directly observed.

Richard Floyd in The Private Language Argument argues that it is not the case that Wittgenstein is saying that there are no private sensations, only that such sensations are unknown to outside observers.

PI 304 Not at all. It is not a something., but not a nothing either!

As a table is a public object, it can be named within the language game. As the sensation of pain is private, it cannot be named within the language game, but what can be named within the language game is pain behaviour, the effect rather than the cause, such as a face that winces.

But what about the unicorn. How can unicorns be named, when unicorns don't exist in the world. The Oxford Dictionary defines a unicorn as "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

As Wittgenstein establishes, the word "pain" describes neither the private sensation of pain not the pain behaviour but replaces the pain behaviour. Similarly, the word "unicorn" describes neither something existing in the world nor is described by its definition "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead", but replaces the words "a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

PI 244 - On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

"Unicorns" exist as a replacement to the set of words ""a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead".

Therefore:
1) The word "iPhone" replaces an object that can be directly observed
2) The word "pain" replaces a pain behaviour that can be directly observed.
3) The word "unicorn" replaces the set of words ""a mythical animal typically represented as a horse with a single straight horn projecting from its forehead" that can be directly observed.

“Ouch” is an expression of pain, not naming the behaviors that commonly associated with pain — Richard B

My arm is stabbed, I feel pain, and involuntarily my face winces. If I don't know the English language, I cannot say "ouch!". The only way an observer can know the possibility of my internal sensation is from my behaviour, my face wincing.

When learning the English language, I am taught that the word "Ouch!" is attached to the behaviour of a wincing face. Replacing the behaviour of a wincing face by the word "ouch!" then allows me to take part in the language game. As you say "I may just say "ouch!" without any of the pain behaviour."

PI 257 - "What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

Before learning the English language, I can express my pain through a wincing face. After learning the English language, I can express my pain not only through a wincing face but also by saying "ouch!". In that sense, one can rightly say that "ouch!" is an expression of pain.

"Ouch!" is a name in the language game. As a name, it names something. As shown by the beetle in the box analogy, it cannot name the sensation, but can only name the behaviour, as described in PI 257. "Ouch!" can only name the behaviour.

"Ouch!" is not a name for some group of behaviours. It is a behaviour. — Banno

"The word "ouch!" and behaviour
As Wittgenstein describes, the word "ouch!" replaces a person's particular behaviour. But isn't it the case that the word "ouch!" is not a behaviour, but replaces a behaviour ?
PI 244: How do words refer to sensations?....................."So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

The word "ouch!" and naming.
Wittgenstein says that there is a strange connection between a word and an object
PI 38 - Naming appears as a queer connexion of a word with an object

But some words are clearly not the names of objects, such as the word "ouch!"
PI 27 Think of exclamations alone.......Water!, Away!, !Ow.......Are you inclined still to call these words "names of objects"

So what is the thing that the label is attached to. It cannot be the object, because as Wittgenstein says, if humans showed no outward sign of their inner sensations, showed no behaviour, then the language game would be impossible.
PI 257 - What would it be like if human beings shewed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

As regards naming, Wittgenstein says that "naming" means "attaching a label to a thing ". As "naming" also means attaching a word to a thing, then words are labels.
PI 15 - It will often prove useful in philosophy to say to ourselves: naming something is like attaching a label to a thing.

For Wittgenstein:
1) The word "ouch!" replaces a behaviour.
2) Naming means attaching the word "ouch!" to a behaviour, ie, the word "ouch!" names a behaviour.
3) Therefore, "attaching" a word to a behaviour means "replacing" a behaviour by a word.

Why need there be a something that is being named? What does "Ouch!" name? Perhaps the game is not one of naming at all. — Banno

Wittgenstein and the Cartesian problem

Wittgenstein asks how words refer to sensations. His interlocutor asks if the word "ouch!" is describing the other's pain, Wittgenstein say no, the word "ouch!" is replacing the pain behaviour, and neither describing the pain behaviour nor the other's pain.
PI 244: How do words refer to sensations?....................."So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?"—On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

We can only know about someone else's private sensations from their outward behaviour. For example, knowing that they are in pain because of their pain behaviour, such as exclaiming "ouch!". However, even that may be misleading, as they may not be in pain whilst still exhibiting pain behaviour, or they may be in pain and not exhibit any pain behaviour or even that they may be having the private sensation of pleasure whilst exhibiting pain behaviour
PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

Accepting that the word "ouch!" replaces pain behaviour, we could generalise and say that words replace physical things in the world. The word "ouch!" replaces pain behaviour, the word "table" replaces tables. But it is more complicated than that. Neither an ouch! nor a table are platonic forms existing independently in the world. They only exist in the mind as concepts. As concepts, they have no single essence, they don't stand for objects, but rather refer to a set of different things that share some undefinable commonality, some family resemblance.

Concepts and words are similar as forms of language. From the SEP article on Concepts, concepts are psychological entities existing in the mind, enabling thought within an internal system of representation and having a language-like syntax and compositional semantics. Wittgenstein presented the argument that language must be rule-governed, and as rules cannot be private, they must be publicly grounded. Words, being part of the language game, must therefore depend on their meaning on a language-speaking community external to any individual. Wittgenstein makes the Private Language Argument from PI 243 onwards.

Wittgenstein and an argument against solipsism
1) Concepts don't exist in the world as platonic forms, but only in the mind.
2) As Wittgenstein presents an argument against a private language, the meaning of words must be grounded outside the mind in the public sphere.
3) Wittgenstein wrote in Tractatus para 4 that A thought is a proposition with a sense, meaning that thoughts are sentences in the head, thereby linking concepts in the mind with words in a world of language users.
4) If thoughts exist inside the mind and language exists outside the mind, then if thoughts are language, then this is presenting an argument against Cartesianism and against Descartes' solipsism of the separation of mind and body.

Why need there be a something that is being named?
Words cannot replace something that cannot be observed in the world. As described in the beetle in the box analogy in PI 293, words cannot replace unobservable things such as love, beauty, pain, unicorns, but can replace observable behaviour that has been caused by such unobservable behaviour. The private sensation of pain does have real world consequences, and it is these real world consequences that are named. As private sensations are unobservable, then if there was nothing in the world to observe, there would be nothing to name.

Can nothing be named? I could invent the word "ajuhgte", but if it wasn't replacing something in the world, the word would be meaningless.

What does "Ouch!" name?
The word "ouch!" replaces a set of particular observed behaviours in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other. If naming is defined as replacing, then the word "ouch!" names a set of particular observed behaviours in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other.

Perhaps the game is not one of naming at all.
In the language game are words, where a particular word replaces a set of different things in the world having certain undefinable resemblances to each other. If "naming" is defined as replacing, then the language game must be that of naming.

Feynman perhaps misses that there is a difference between the brown-throated thrush and the brown thrasher, for which it is often mistaken. To know the name of the bird is to be able to distinguish it from other birds. — Banno

Yes, to know the name of a bird allows one to be able to distinguish it from other birds, and to know the name of a chess piece allows one to distinguish the Queen from the King.

But as you say "Naming is not yet a move in a language-game". A piece is named, but what exactly is being named. Is it the form, that a piece has a rounded crown, or is it the content, that the piece can move any number of squares in any direction.

Similarly in the expression "he is in pain". What exactly is being named, the form, the pain behaviour, the crying, or the content, the private sensation of pain, the beetle in the box?

I agree when you say "And the upshot of that is that it is improper to talk of representing our own pains and pleasures. "I have a pain in my hand" is not like "I have an iPhone in my hand"; it is more like "Ouch!""

IE, in language, it seems that the form is being named, not the content of the form.

A. In what sense are my sensations private?
B. – Well, only I can know whether I am really in pain; another person can only surmise it.
A. – In one way this is false, and in another nonsense. If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain.
B. – Yes, but all the same, not with the certainty with which I know it myself!
A. – It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean
B. – except perhaps that I am in pain? — Banno

Only another 692 paragraphs in Part I to go through after we have agreed PI 246.

Wittgenstein is un-bolded, the interlocuter is bolded.

Regarding "It can’t be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I’m in pain. What is it supposed to mean"

I have had difficulty with this part of the paragraph.

Translating into my own words, I believe that this means that I would be joking if I said that I know I am in pain.

As you wrote "While @Fooloso4 and @Sam26 might disagree on the usefulness of the Cogito, they seem to agree that it doesn't make sense to say that I know I am conscious.", it must surely follow that if it doesn't make sense to say that I know I am conscious, then it also cannot make sense to say that I know I am in pain.

As we seem to agree that it wouldn't be sensible to say that I know I am in pain, this suggests that this is Wittgenstein's opinion.

Regarding "except perhaps that I am in pain?"

Translating into my own words, I believe that this means I would be joking if I said that I know I'm in pain because this means no more than I am in pain

As we seem to agree that it wouldn't be a sensible thing to say that I know I am in pain because this means no more than I am in pain, this suggests that this also is Wittgenstein's position.

As Feynman said in Names Don't Constitute Knowledge, knowing the name of something is useful if you want to talk about it with someone else, but it does not mean you know what that something is.


One Sunday all the kids were walking in little parties with their fathers in the woods. The next Monday we were playing in a field, and a kid said to me, "What's that bird? Do you know the name of that bird?" I said, "I haven't the slightest idea."He said, "Well, it is a brown throated thrush." He said, "Your father doesn't teach you anything." But my father had already taught me about the names of birds. Once we walked, and he said, "That is a brown-throated thrush. In German it is called the Pfleegel flügel. In Chinese it is called Keewontong. In Japanese a Towhatowharra, and so on. And when you know all the names of that bird in every language, you know nothing, but absolutely nothing, about the bird." And then we would go on and talk about the pecking and the feathers. So I had learned already that names don't constitute knowledge. Of course that has caused me a certain amount of trouble since because I refuse to learn the name of anything. So when someone comes in and says, "Have you got any explanation for the Fitch-Cronin experiment?" I say, "What's that?" And he says, "You know – that long-lived k meson that disintegrates into two pi's." "Oh, yes, now I know." I never know the names of things. What my father forgot to tell me was that knowing the names of things was useful if you want to talk to somebody else – so you can tell them what you are talking about. The basic principle of knowing about something rather than just knowing its name is something that you have stuck to, isn't it? Yes, of course. We have to learn that these are the kinds of disciplines in the field of science that you have to learn – to know when you know and when you don't know, and what it is you know and what it is you don't know. You've go to be very careful not to confuse yourself.

That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic..........This is why it can't be said of me at all that "I know I am in pain", and that all it could possibly mean is that I am in pain. — Luke

I agree, because as you say:"That one is in pain lies outside the scope of knowledge; it is non-epistemic"

As outside the scope of knowledge, such an expression can only be understood by the speaker, and as you also say:"A (private) language understood only by the speaker is the definition of a private language", which I also agree with.

However, the problem arises that we can only discuss a private language using a public language, a language game, as it is also true as you say that:""I am in pain" is an English phrase, and is not part of a private language, by definition"

So we are left with the quandary of how to talk about a private language, something that is outside the scope of knowledge, something non-epistemic, using language, a language game, that is by its nature inside the scope of knowledge, something epistemic.

If that one is pain is outside the scope of knowledge, something that cannot be talked about in the language game, does that mean that item 5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain? is a meaningless statement?

One knows from the other's behavior that they are in pain. — Fooloso4

One knows that are exhibiting pain behaviour, not that one knows they are in pain.

PI 304 "But you will surely admit that there is a difference between pain-behaviour accompanied by pain and pain-behaviour without any pain?"—Admit it?

When I use the word "pain" when referring to another person I am not replacing a particular behavior, but when they complain that they are in pain they are replacing some other form of behavior that expresses their pain, such as crying, with a verbal expression of pain. — Fooloso4

A person sees a child crying and says "she is crying". The phrase "in pain" replaces the crying behaviour. The person can then say "she is in pain".

A child is in pain and cries. The child learns that the phrase "in pain" replaces crying. The child can then say "I am in pain"

Note that the phrase "in pain" replaces the behaviour, not describe the sensation.

PI 244 How do words refer to sensations?........... On the contrary: the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it

It could have been in different circumstances that the phrase "happy" had replaced crying.

The person would then have said "she is happy" and the child would have said "I am happy"

The phrase "happy" would still have replaced the behaviour, not describe the sensation.

What does 5) have to do with a private language? — Luke

5) PI 246 It can't be said of me at all (except perhaps as a joke) that I know I am in pain. What is it supposed to mean—except perhaps that I am in pain?

I interpret 5) as meaning that it would be unreasonable for me to say that "I know I am in pain", as this means no more than "I am in pain".

I agree when you say: "I agree that one does not need to justify one's sensation of pain to oneself." and the word "know" has a definite function in the language game.

Knowledge is justified true belief.

Suppose my belief is that I am in Paris, and my justification is that I can see the Eiffel Tower. If it is true that I am in Paris, then I know I am in Paris.

But as regards my thought that I am in pain, this needs no justification as it is true. Thinking I am in pain is sufficient. Thinking that I know I am in pain would be redundant .

But this is the same idea as expressed in item 5), inferring that item 5) is referring to one's inner thoughts rather than any public language game. In other words, to one's private language.
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There is no distinction here. A private language understood only by the speaker is (the very existence of) a private language. — Luke

It is the difference between keeping a diary in PI 258 and the beetle in the box in PI 293.
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The point of 304 (and elsewhere) - at least, on my reading - is that the concept of "pain" is not based on the private feeling that nobody else can perceive, but on the expression of the sensation; on the behaviour (that others can perceive). — Luke

Agree.
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If a private language can be understood only by the speaker, then to whom is one saying "I am in pain" (in English)? — Luke

I have the thought "I am in pain". Following on from the Tractatus, para 4: A thought is proposition with a sense, for Wittgenstein, thoughts are "sentences in the head".

As no one else can know my inner thoughts, no one else can know my inner language. This inner language is a type of a private language. If I am saying "I am in pain" in my inner language, only I can hear it. If I am saying "I am in pain" in the language game, then others can hear it.
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I don't believe that it always, or even often, requires a justification. I think the only time it might require justification is if others didn't believe you were actually in pain or if you had to prove it for some reason. — Luke

In the language game, every word needs to be justified if the language has to have any coherent meaning.

For example, if I said "Yesterday, I visited the xxyx", without any justification for the inclusion of the phrase "xxyx", the sentence would be meaningless.

If I said "I am in dolor", again the sentence would be meaningless until I had justified the inclusion of the word "dolor" by explaining that it meant "experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress"

If speaking to an audience not knowing the meaning of "dolor", I would need to say "I am experiencing both localized and generalized unpleasant bodily sensations causing me severe physical discomfort and emotional distress"

If speaking to an audience who already know the meaning of "dolor", it would be sufficient to say "I am in dolor"

Either way, every word being used in a language game needs a justification for its use, whether or not the audience already know its meaning.

I read the following as a statement of fact.........PI 246 If we are using the word “know” as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?), then other people very often know if I’m in pain — Fooloso4

Yes, Wittgenstein does say that we can know something with more or less certainty.
PI 246 - Yes, but all the same not with the certainty with which I know it myself

Yes, I can know something with more or less certainty, but what exactly is it that one is knowing. Is one knowing the other person's sensations, or is one knowing the other person's behaviour.

Wittgenstein included PI 293 about the beetle in the box to point out that the word "pain" as it is normally used in language, in the language game, is not describing the other person's sensations, but is replacing a particular behaviour.

Yes, in the language game, we can say "I know they are in pain", but what does that mean exactly. According to the beetle in the box analogy, as the word "pain" is replacing a particular behaviour, the expression means "I know they are exhibiting a particular behaviour, and I know that this particular behaviour has been replaced by the word "pain"".

I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain — Fooloso4

The second statement was intended to be ironic. — Fooloso4

I am sure that Wittgenstein didn't intend Philosophical Investigations, of which a significant feature is about not being able to know another person's inner sensations from their outward behaviour, as irony.

On the one hand:

We can know that a baby is in pain even though she has no words to express her pain. — Fooloso4

On the other hand:

I am busy reading philosophy and have become convinced that I cannot know from the baby's behavior that she is in pain. — Fooloso4

How to resolve this quandary?