It's because the I-language is not spoken that I doubt concepts are at work. We talk about concepts fairly frequently, and successfully. Freedom, Love, Democracy..............I think I'd just include concepts, as well as logic, within E-language. — Moliere

There is the I-language in the mind, and the E-language in the world.

There is the word "love" in the E-language which refers to the concept of love. The concept being referred to doesn't exist in the either the E-language or the world independent of any mind.

Where else can the concept of love exist if not in the I-language of the mind.

This sets out how to use analyticity. It's a convention -- if we interpreted "is" in a certain way, and we interpret the terms in a certain way, then it follows that A is D, analytically. It reads more like a stipulation than a feature of knowledge. — Moliere

Following on from the OP, the analytic and synthetic are aspects of language. The necessary and contingent are aspects of logic, and the a priori and a posteriori are aspects of knowledge.

Yes, analytic statements are not necessarily statements of knowledge.

I was thinking an I-language would be anything but a concept........I'd say an I-language is public, in principle.................but the I-language would be formed from our social environment. — Moliere

If I touch a hot stove and see my hand blisters, in my I-language, I am conscious of pain and quickly remove my hand. But if my I-language was formed by my social environment rather than my innate instinct, in a different social environment on touching a hot stove and seeing my hand blister I could well be conscious of pleasure and leave my hand where it was.

But this is not something that is empirically discovered. In all societies, if someone touches a hot stove, they don't leave their hand there but quickly remove it. This suggests that their I- languages are the same, meaning that I-languages are not determined by the social environment but have been determined by innate instinct.

As Chomsky proposed, the I-language is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence.

We can classify statements such as the case of bachelors and unmarried men and dub them analytic. And we can also say "War is war" and know that the meaning is not analytic -- it's the "is" of predicating rather than the "is" of identity — Moliere

True, "war is war" is analytic if "is" refers to identity, and "war is war" is synthetic if "is" refers to predicating.

But also, using "is" as identity, if the set of words "A","B","C" and "D" is named "war", then the statement "war is B" is analytic, regardless of the meaning of "A", "B", "C" and "D".

Similarly, if the set of words "A" and "B" is named "bachelor", then the statement "a bachelor is B" is analytic, regardless of the meanings of "A" and "B".

So what about Hume or Quine's extreme empiricism (the denial of innate mechanisms at all)? Where does that fit in, and what is your analysis? — schopenhauer1

For me, the mechanism linking concepts in the mind and language in the world can be explained by Hume's principle of the constant conjunction of events, illustrated here, in Kant's terms, a posteriori. But the mind's ability to perceive patterns in the world, to perceive the constant conjunction of events is innate, a product of 3.7 billion years of life' e evolution within the world, in Kant's terms, a priori.

I'm not sure that Hume would have denied the innate. He writes in Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding:

By the term impression, then, I mean all our more lively perceptions, when we hear, or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will. And impressions are distinguished from ideas, which are the less lively perceptions, of which we are conscious, when we reflect on any of those sensations or movements above mentioned.

It is an operation of the soul, when we are so situated, as unavoidable as to feel the passion of love, when we receive benefits; or hatred, when we meet with injuries. All these operations are a species of natural instincts, which no reasoning or process of the thought and understanding is able either to produce or to prevent.

I would assume Hume takes certain abilities as innate natural instincts, such as hearing, seeing, feeling, loving, hating, desiring and willing. It would follow that rather than learning the instinct of loving and hating from the world, we project our instincts of loving and hating onto the world.

The sort of studies done by Tomasello and such, no? But he strongly disagrees with Chomsky. He is very much of the social cognition camp — schopenhauer1

It comes down to the debate between Chomsky, who argued that language is founded on innate concepts biologically pre-set and the Behaviourists, such as Skinner, who argued that that all language is learnt during one's interaction with the environment.

There seems to be a link between Tomasello and Hume in that humans have an ability to recognize patterns.

Tomasello argued:
The essence of language is its symbolic dimension which rests on the uniquely human ability to comprehend intention. Grammar emerges as the speakers of a language create linguistic constructions out of recurring sequences of symbols. Children pick up these patterns in the buzz of words they hear around them.

Hume in An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding wrote:
When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only, that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion, which is somewhat extraordinary; but which seems founded on sufficient evidence.

Yes I was actually going to point that out regarding the difference between "A triangle is 180 degree, three sided polygon" and "Bachelors are unmarried males". Kant may have said that the triangle is in some sense "a priori" whereas the bachelor is always a posteriori true. However, I think this distinction is muddled as there doesn't seem to be any clear distinction. — schopenhauer1

There is the E-language, whereby there are statements such as "A triangle has 80 degrees, and is a three sided polygon". The set "180 degrees, three sided and polygon" has been named "a triangle", such that the statement "a triangle is three sided" is analytic.

There is the I-language, whereby there are concepts such as a triangle has 180 degrees, is three sided and is a polygon.

I can have the concept of a triangle without knowing the word "triangle", and I can know the word "triangle" without knowing what it means, without having the concept triangle.

Though interacting with the world, my private concept of triangle is linked with the public word "triangle". By interacting with the world, my private I-language is linked with the public E-language

The Nominalist view is that abstracts don't exist in the world, only in the mind, meaning that as triangles and bachelors are concepts they only exist in the mind as abstractions.

In the sense that concepts exist in the mind as an I-language and definitions exist in the world as an E-language, I agree with Fodor that concepts cannot be definitions

I also agree with Fodor that concepts don't have an internal structure, and are, in Kant's terms, unities of apperceptions

Both the words "triangle" and "bachelor" exist in the E-language which exists in the world, whereas triangles and bachelors exist as concepts in the I-language which exists in the mind.

The next question is, how are concepts in the I-language linked with words in the E-language.

You want to talk about vague and muddled notions, both:
a) Chomsky's view on analyticity as described in your OP article is just that.
b) The article itself is kind of meandering and muddled touching a little of here and there — schopenhauer1

Chomsky sensibly believes that a basic range of concepts are innately represented in the human mind, because, after all, life has been evolving on Earth for about 3.7 billion years.

I would agree about some primitive concepts are innate, such as the colour red.
(1) The first one is to say that most of our concepts are definitions which are defined in terms of primitive concepts. The primitive concepts are either defined as sensory primitives such as RED, SQUARE etc., or as abstract concepts such as CAUSATION, AGENCY, and EVENT etc.

But Chomsky goes too far in arguing that some complex concepts are also innate, such as carburettor
(1) It is of course possible that Chomsky is correct that children are born with innate concepts such as: CARBURETTOR, TREE, BUREAUCRAT, RIVER, etc.; however an incredible amount of evidence is needed to support such an incredible claim.

I will take the opportunity to argue again that the statement "bachelors are unmarried men " is analytic.

Philosophers often use definitions to explain analyticity
(2) Quine suggests that one might, as is often done, appeal to definitions to explain the notion of synonymy. For instance, we might say that “bachelor” is the definition of an “unmarried man,” and thus, synonymy turns on definitions.

Quine in Two Dogmas of Empiricism attacks the analytic/synthetic distinction in large part because of the problem of substituting synonyms for synonyms
(2) However, Quine attests, in order to define “bachelor” as unmarried, the definer must possess some notion of synonymy to begin with. In fact, Quine writes, the only kind of definition that does not presuppose the notion of synonymy, is the act of ascribing an abbreviation purely conventionally. For instance, let’s say that I create a new word, ‘Archon.’ I can arbitrarily say that its abbreviation is “Ba2.” In the course of doing so, I did not have to presuppose that these two notions are “synonymous;” I merely abbreviated ‘Archon’ by convention, by stipulation. However, when I normally attempt to define a notion, for example, “bachelor,” I must think to myself something like, “Well, what does it mean to be a bachelor, particularly, what words have the same meaning as the word ‘bachelor?’” that is, what meanings are synonymous with the meaning of the word ‘bachelor?’ And thus, Quine complains: “would that all species of synonymy were as intelligible [as those created purely by convention]. For the rest, definition rests on synonymy rather than explaining it” (Quine, 1980: 26).

Quine fails to understand the function of a definition.

It is not the case that in attempting to define the notion of "bachelor", I must think to myself what does it mean to be a bachelor, and conclude that bachelor means a man that is unmarried. Rather, a definition is a set of other words, and the meaning of the words in the set plays no part in the definition. The function of the dictionary is not to explain the meaning of each word, its function is to group sets of words together and then name this set, as illustrated by @Banno here.

For example, within a language are a set words "dirisha", "mlango" and "chumba", none of which I know the meaning of, but for convenience the set may be named "nyumba". As "nyumba" names the set of words "dirisha, mlango, chumba", regardless of knowing the meaning of each word, it is necessarily known that "nyumba = chumba", ie, which is analytic.

The meaning of each word may only be discovered out with of the dictionary, external to the dictionary, for example using Hume's principle of constant conjunction of events, as illustrated here, or Wittgenstein's picture theory in the Tractatus.

As a definition is the name of a set of words, regardless of the meaning of those words, all definitions are analytic, including the definition of a "bachelor" as an "unmarried man".

1) = CHOMSKY AND QUINE ON ANALYTICITY PART 1
2) = IEP - Willard Van Orman Quine: The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

Seems to me bringing vague, muddled notions of objective and subjective into the discussion can only lead to it becoming vague and muddled. — Banno

The Wikipedia article Objectivity (philosophy) notes:
In philosophy, objectivity is the concept of truth independent from individual subjectivity (bias caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination). A proposition is considered to have objective truth when its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being.

The SEP article Analyticity and Chomskyan Linguistics notes
He sharpens this distinction in his (1986, pp. 20–2) by distinguishing what he regards as essentially the ordinary, folk notion of external, what he calls “E-languages,” such as English, Mandarin, Swahili, ASL and other languages that are commonly taken to be spoken or signed by various social groups, vs. what he regards as the theoretically more interesting notion of an internal “I-language.” This is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain (or a stable final-state of that system) that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence

How can one know that within an I-language the thought that the sky is blue has an objective truth ( its truth conditions are met without bias caused by the mind of a sentient being) or a subjective truth (caused by one's perception, emotions, or imagination) without introducing the concepts of objectivity and subjectivity.

Again, it seems to me you have not grasped the gist of Quine's argument — Banno

I'll keep reading.

Indeed, why take the triangle as being important? What rule was followed? And even if triangles are taken as primal, why not AME or AJK? What counts as prime depends on the task in hand. — Banno

True, language is use. Wittgenstein PI para 23 "Here the term "language-game" is meant to bring into prominence the fact that the speaking of language is part of an activity, or of a form of life."

Elaborating, I look at parts in the world, and these parts can combine into numerous mereological wholes.

In a sense, each mereological whole exists in the world, and each may be discovered in the world, although it would take an inordinate amount of time

It is therefore true that in the world there is something with three sides which can be named "triangle", but it is also true that every possible mereological whole could also be named, again taking an inordinate amount of time

As Wittgenstein said, language is part of an activity, a form of life

As it would take too much time to discover each possible shape in the world and then decide which I had a use for, in practice, I start with a task, and then discover in the world that shape that would be suitable for the task in hand.

My judgement that a particular shape is suitable to my task at hand is based on a predetermined requirement as to the suitability of any shape, and is therefore an a priori judgement

My judgement that there is something in the world that has three sides is synthetic, as I can only know that there is something with three sides by discovery.

IE, my judgement that there exists something in the world that has three sides and has the name "triangle" has been synthetic a priori.

The sky is blue is synthetic a posteriori because it is discovered but true only by way of the content we pick out and not by way of how our faculties must operate. An X is NOT not X is analytic a priori as not only is it true by our faculties but the very terms don’t need to be discovered but are true immediately based on how logic operates a priori. — schopenhauer1

Using the convention of "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, perhaps one could say:

"the sky is blue" is synthetic, the sky is blue is a posteriori, "an X is NOT not X" is analytic and an X is NOT not X is a priori.

"The sky is blue" being synthetic brings in the debate between Indirect and Direct Realism

As you wrote:
Direct realism seems to me, to posit that we "objectively" see the thing "as it is in itself". What is something "in itself" though? A tree is the tree you see as a perceiver when there is no perceiver? Mind you, I'm not saying the tree doesn't exist without a perceiver. If you answer, "Well, no the tree isn't what an average human 'sees' when observing a tree", you have your answer- and it doesn't indicate direct realism. Sense data, goes through other layers of the brain, and creates something we have called a tree. Even if you (oddly) posited just "sense data" and no other layers involved (whatever that might mean), then there is still something there as a barrier to what is the tree in itself. It is its own "indirect".

For the Direct Realist, the sky is objectively blue, in which case the statement "the sky is blue" is synthetic and refers to a world that is external to the mind.

However, for the Indirect Realist, as the sky is not objectively blue, but only subjectively blue, the statement "the sky is blue" is still synthetic but refers to a world that exists in the mind and not external to the mind.

Right, but the key idea here is they discovered something about the concept first. — schopenhauer1

Many parts are observed in the world

But from any set of parts, numerous mereological wholes can be discovered

For example, from the 15 parts shown - thousands of possible wholes may be discovered - for example -
ACHN - BFGM - AB - ABG - etc

It is true, the observer discovers a triangle, CKO


But why discover one particular shape, rather than any of the other thousand possibilities.

Presumably, because the observer knows a priori that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.

1) Therefore, a priori, the observer knows that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
2) It is a necessary truth that the triangle is a shape important in their interaction with the world.
3) The statement "triangles are important in their interaction with the world" is analytic, because it is known a priori that triangles are important in their interaction with the world.

That is to say, a triangle necessitates it being three sides in all possible worlds. However, the discovery of this truth is in some way synthetic when first discovered. The passing on of this discovery as a convention that we learn very early on, makes it "analytic", but this is only the way we discover the information. — schopenhauer1

In the beginning, someone discovered something that had three sides and it had no name. They didn't discover a "triangle", they discovered something that had three sides. The statement "triangles have three sides" would have been meaningless, as the word "triangle" didn't exist.

They named this something with three sides "a triangle", though they could equally well have named it "a circle".

Once named, as the statement "triangles have three sides" is true by virtue of the meanings of the words alone, it is therefore an analytic statement.

IE, when the statement "triangles have three sides" first occurred, it was already an analytic statement.

Now you will not find "rown" in Merriam Webster, but we knew what she meant, as does everyone reading this. — unenlightened

Would you know what a child meant if they said something more complicated, such as
"habari za asubuhi, habari gani" without having to look in a dictionary.

Suggestions welcome. — Banno

Chomsky likes Locke.

From IEP - Locke:Epistemology
Locke defines knowledge as the perception of an agreement (or disagreement) between ideas (4.1.2). This definition of knowledge fits naturally, if not exclusively, within an account of a priori knowledge. Such knowledge relies solely on a reflection of our ideas; we can know it is true just by thinking about it. Some a priori knowledge is (what Kant would later call) analytic.

Would it be possible to get Chomsky to talk about the analytic in reference to Locke, someone he likes.
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An odd word, now becoming surprisingly common. What could it mean to have properties supervene onto individuals... green supervene on grass... that the green "occurs as an interruption" to the grass? Hu? And what does it relate to what I have said? — Banno

In my mind is a box that includes both the knowledge of my private experience of grass, something not available to anyone else, and the knowledge of the word "grass", which is publicly available to everyone else, as described by Wittgenstein in PI para 293.

As some philosophers, including Searle, believe in supervenience, the concept should be taken into account.

If there is no superveninece, then the word "grass" is simply the set of words "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop".

As the SEP - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction notes
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

In this case the meaning of "grass" is fully known by knowing the meaning of the words "a typically short plant, etc". In this event, as the SEP notes, analytic.

However, if there is supervenience, then the word "grass" is more than the set of words " a typically short plant, etc". In this event, the meaning of grass cannot fully be known just by knowing the meaning of the words "a typically short plant, etc". IE, the expression cannot be analytic.

IE, whether an expression is analytic or not partly depends on one's attitude to supervenience.
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Why? A child knows its mother, despite not being able to provide a definition. And so on for the vast majority of words. I think you are here just wrong. — Banno

We are communicating using written language. I have no other clues to your meaning other than the words on my screen, such as tone of voice, facial expression or bodily movements.

You have written the word "mother". You may not believe me, but I don't know what this word means. Within the context of the paragraph it could mean, "a child knows its neighbourhood", "a child knows its school", "a child knows its pet", etc.

In order for me to fully understand what you are saying, what does "mother" mean ?
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The following argument is stolen from Austin: Look up the definition of a word in the dictionary. Then look up the definition of each of the words in that definition.Iterate. — Banno

There are two types of concepts, simple and complex (there may be better terminology).

As I wrote before
The gavagai problem may be solved by taking into account the fact that there are simple and complex concepts, and these must be treated differently. In language, first there is the naming of simple concepts, and only then can complex concepts be named, such as the complex concept "gavagai".
Simple concepts include things such as the colour red, a bitter taste, a straight line, etc, and complex concepts include things such as mountains, despair, houses, governments, etc.

Dictionaries allow us to learn complex concepts, where a complex concept is a set of simple concepts. But we cannot learn simple concepts from the dictionary

In Bertrand Russell's terms, the dictionary allows us knowledge by description but not knowledge by acquaintance.

For simple concepts, we need knowledge by acquaintance, achievable using Hume's constant conjunction of events.
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Is this your opinion, or your view of Chomsky, or both? — Banno

True, I should have made it clearer when I wrote " As I see it".

@Dawnstorm asked "So, if deep-structure thought (I-language thought?) can proceed without words, what stands in for words in such a situation?"

It seems inconceivable that we use words such as "road", "traffic light", "pedestrian", "blue sky" in an I-language.

As I wrote:
When driving through a busy city street, if I had to put a word to every thought or concept, I would have crashed in the first five minutes.

I see no alternative to the idea that in an I-language thoughts and concepts stand in for words.
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Analyticity without language? What could that be? — Banno

Starting with E-language, if "grass" has been defined as "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop", then the statement "grass has long narrow leaves" is analytic.

There is a direct analogy between analyticity in E-language and analyticity in I-language.

Within the I-language, there are no words such as "vegetation, consisting, etc", but rather thoughts about concepts.

It follows that within the I-language, if I know that grass is vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop, then I must also know that grass has long narrow leaves, which is also analytic knowledge.

When one shouts "Fire!" in, say, a theatre, one does not mean merely to refer to "the rapid oxidation of a material (the fuel) in the exothermic chemical process of combustion, releasing heat, light, and various reaction products.".......Rather, it is a call to action in a matter of life and death. — unenlightened

True, the same word may be defined in many different ways. The Merriam Webster dictionary for "fire" lists almost 42 different uses.

Though the same principle applies, in that is is more convenient and quicker to say "fire" than "I am making a call to action in a matter of life and death."

Suggestions welcome. — Banno

Chomsky says that concepts cannot exist without language. See Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4).

7min "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property"

Perhaps Chomsky would say that as concepts cannot exist without language, if there is analyticity in language then there must also be analyticity in concepts.

So, if deep-structure thought (I-language thought?) can proceed without words, what stands in for words in such a situation? — Dawnstorm

Thoughts and concepts stand in for words

From SEP - Analayticity and Comskyan Linguistics
He sharpens this distinction in his (1986, pp. 20–2) by distinguishing what he regards as essentially the ordinary, folk notion of external, what he calls “E-languages,” such as English, Mandarin, Swahili, ASL and other languages that are commonly taken to be spoken or signed by various social groups, vs. what he regards as the theoretically more interesting notion of an internal “I-language.” This is not a “language” that is spoken at all, but is an internal, largely innate computational system in the brain (or a stable final-state of that system) that is responsible for a speaker’s linguistic competence

As I see it, in the mind there are two aspects. There are conscious thoughts about concepts, in that I can have the conscious thought that the tree is to the left of the river, and there is an underlying subconscious structure that enables me to have these conscious thoughts about concepts.

I can have conscious thoughts about concepts without the need of words. When driving through a busy city street, if I had to put a word to every thought or concept, I would have crashed in the first five minutes.

Once I can have conscious thoughts about concepts, an E-language can be developed. My conscious thought that the tree is to the left of the river may be expressed as "the tree is to the left of the river".

In a sense, our conscious thoughts about concepts is a language, but this is secondary to the underlying subconscious structure that enables thoughts about concepts. It is this underlying structure that is common to different peoples.

In an E-language, if "grass" is defined as "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves", the statement "grass has narrow leaves" is analytic.

In the mind, if I have the thought that there is something that is typically a short plant with long, narrow leaves, then I know that this something that is typically a short plant with long, narrow leaves has narrow leaves, and again, this is analytic.

IE, in the mind, we can have conscious thoughts about concepts, but underlying this is a deeper subconscious structure that is common to different peoples that enables us to have these thoughts about concepts in the first place.

This is to suppose that there is a thing, which is someone's understanding of grass; as if to understand "grass" were to have a certain box in one's mind; so that your box can be different to my box. — Banno

I believe that i) grass doesn't supervene on its properties, a typically short plant, etc. and ii) "grass" doesn't supervene on its properties, "a typically short plant, etc."

To start, there is a diference between what exists in language and what exist in the world. In language, "grass" is defined by the properties "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop". In the world, grass includes the properties a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop.

I see something in the world that has the properties typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop. It would be unwieldy in conversation to say "yesterday I mowed a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop". It is far easier to define "grass" as "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop" in order then to more simply say "I mowed the grass"

Once "grass" has been defined as the set of properties "a typically short plant with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and used as a fodder crop". the statement "grass has narrow leaves" is true by definition and is therefore an analytic statement.

Grass in the world may have numerous properties, only some of which are included in the definition of "grass". In part for the reason that some properties may only be discovered in the future, and in part that some properties may not be useful in daily conversation. It is also true that the definition may change with time.

Definitions aren't perfect, but they are better than the alternative of not having definitions. Without definitions communication would break down. Especially if you said "I mowed the grass yesterday", and my concept of "grass" was "a thickset, usually extremely large, nearly hairless, herbivorous mammal of the family Elephantidae having a snout elongated into a muscular trunk and two incisors in the upper jaw"

As regards boxes in my mind, I agree that my concept of grass is private and inaccessible to anyone else, but my concept of "grass" is accessible to others as it is has been publicly defined.

Communication using language would break down without definitions. One consequence of definitions are analytic statements.

Analyticity is the acknowledgment that the whole doesn't supervene on its parts.

Seeing as how the man himself is to honour us, it may be time I came to grips with this issue. — Banno

:100: Definately a worthwhile and invaluable thread.

Sure. But the point remains that not all analytic statements are acts of naming. — Banno

As the question in the OP was "If I were to ask Chomsky a question, it would be "Are there analytic statements?", does this mean that on our side we agree that there are.

But further, when do you, or I, participate in such a formal act of naming? Apart from baptisms and boat launchings, it's not something we commonly do. — Banno

True, I have never launched a boat or baptised a child, as these are things done by others having more authority than me.

But the question remains, who has determined that "triangles have three sides", and why should we accept what they say.

Presumably, it can only be because an Institution or group of people have determined that this is the case, and it would be foolhardy for me as an individual to go against forces over which I have little power.

I may never have baptised the meaning of a word, but it is only sensible to accept the meaning of a word as baptised by those more powerful than me who have come before.

Again, the desire to have all of language work like the very limited process of naming objects—to imagine all words referring to an object, even “meaning” or something “real”—is because we want logical necessity and predictability. — Antony Nickles

Both aspects are necessary in language.

On the one hand, we need predictability, otherwise, if you said to me "the grass is greener on the other side of the hill", and I take "grass" to mean "a large, long-necked ungulate mammal of arid country", our conversation will quickly break down. In order to establish a minimum level of agreement, reference to a dictionary will be necessary. We can then both agree that "grass" is "vegetation consisting of typically short plants with long, narrow leaves, growing wild or cultivated on lawns and pasture, and as a fodder crop"

On the other hand, no two people's understanding of "grass" will be the same, as no two people will have had the same life experiences. For example, the concept of grass to a South African taxi driver will be very different to that of an Icelandic doctor.

Communication using language, in order to work, must be founded on basic and agreed definitions of concepts, but consideration must also be taken into account that no two people's concepts of the same word will be exactly the same.

I think this is the most interesting theory he holds, and at least prima facie, seem true. Much of language is basically self-talk. It is our thoughts to ourselves: our own reasons, moods, ideas, strategies, everything that is "discursive" in nature. — schopenhauer1

Chomsky also makes the proviso that both the visual system and language need to be stimulated from things in the external world in order to operate successfully.

See Noam Chomsky on Linguistic Theories and the Evolution of Language (Part 3) | Closer To Truth Chats.

8 min "Stimulation is necessary.............if you don't present pattern stimulation in the early days of life the visual system won't function , it has to be set off by different kinds of stimulation and if you modify the kinds of stimulation say horizontal lines instead of vertical lines it will affect the way the visual system develops. That's pretty much like language"

Right but that article still seemed to not mention other terms (not proper names or natural kinds) as being an outcome of that theory. It seems to always be mentioned in conjunction with proper names et al. I am not sure if it has been explicitly broadened to all terms. — schopenhauer1

The article, linked here, discusses the causal theory of names as regards abstract objects.

"For example, the numeral ‘17’ is a name of the number 17. But how can there be a causal relation between a number and subsequent uses of a numeral? In short, how can abstract objects stand in causal relations? It would seem that it is always something concrete that is a cause. In this kind of case, it makes more sense to trace the causal chain back to the dubbing, rather than to the object. For although 17 is an abstract object, the act of dubbing it (first performed by some mathematician, no doubt) was a concrete event that can stand in causal relations to subsequent events."

Whether the process is a Performative Act or baptism, the question remains, what authority has determined that "a triangle is a plane figure with three straight sides and three angles", and why do we accept this.

One thing I am pretty sure he is saying is that concept formation is a separate issue than his generative grammar.................A natural reaction might also be to question why he so easily separates these two — schopenhauer1

Chomsky refers to concepts, thoughts and language in Noam Chomsky on the Big Questions (Part 4) Closer To Truth Chats

He says that the relation between thought and language is one of identity

2min - "Language and thought are intimately related . Language has historically be called audible thought , its the mechanism for constructing thoughts over an infinite range which we can then access and use in our various activities"

He says that concepts cannot exist without language

7min - "Even the simplest concepts tree desk person dog, what ever you want , even these are extremely complex in their internal structure . If such concepts had developed in proto human history when there was no language they would have been useless. They would have been an accident if developed and quickly lost as you cannot do anything with them. So the chances are very strong that the concepts developed within human history at a point where we had computational systems which satisfy the basic property"

He says that communication is a secondary use of language, the primary use of language is thought

16min - "Sometimes language is used for communication, but that is a very peripheral use . Almost all our use of language goes on all our waking hours , most of our language is just thinking, we can't just stop , it almost impossible to stop . it takes an incredible act of will to stop thinking"

IE, Chomsky is saying that concepts wouldn't exist without language, and the main function of language is to have thoughts.

Am I mistaken or was Kripke only accounting for meaning in regards to proper names and scientific kinds (like water is H20) which unlike other terms, are always true in all possible worlds? — schopenhauer1

True, I agree that Kripke limited his causal theory of reference to proper names. Putnam extended the theory to other sorts of terms, such as water, whereas in general the theory may be used for many referring terms.

From Wikipedia Causal Theory of Reference:

A causal theory of reference or historical chain theory of reference is a theory of how terms acquire specific referents based on evidence. Such theories have been used to describe many referring terms, particularly logical terms, proper names, and natural kind terms.

In lectures later published as Naming and Necessity, Kripke provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names.......... Although he refused to explicitly endorse such a theory.

The same motivations apply to causal theories in regard to other sorts of terms. Putnam, for instance, attempted to establish that 'water' refers rigidly to the stuff that we do in fact call 'water', to the exclusion of any possible identical water-like substance for which we have no causal connection.

The relevant equivalence is not between "triangle" and "three-sided shape", since we might have given some other name to three-sided shapes. The relevant equivalence is between polygons with three sides and polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180º. This could not have been otherwise. It is not a result of a performative. — Banno

1) In Euclidian space, there is equivalence between (a polygon with three sides)
and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180 deg), and this could not be otherwise.
2) In Riemannian space, there is no necessary equivalence between (a polygon with three sides) and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 180 deg), and this could not be otherwise.
3) In RussellianA space, there is equivalence between (a polygon with three sides)
and (polygons, the internal angles of which sum to 75 deg), and this could not be otherwise.

Each space is the result of a Performative Act, first by Euclid, then by Riemann and then by RussellA.

The issue is if a statement can be true in virtue of the meaning of the words alone. But we do not have a consensus on what the meaning of the words means. — Banno

True, there is never an absolute consensus as to what words mean, and words change their meaning with time. But if there was no consensus at all as to the meaning of words, this thread would not be possible, as no one would be able to understand what anyone else was saying.

Words may change, but Kripke's Causal Theory of Reference illustrates the importance of the Performative Act Of Naming in Language in ensuring the stability of language, whereby the reference of a linguistic expression, what it designates in the world, is fixed by an act of “initial baptism”.

Drawing on Gottlob Frege’s distinction between word meaning and word reference, Kripke and Putnam developed a causal theory of reference to explain how words can change while still designating the same thing in reality.

The act of baptism designates a very real physical object associated with something observable. But words may evolve with time, and what establishes the “reality” of an expression is the existence of a continuous causal chain, linked back to the initial baptism.

Language thus maintains a stable relationship with the external environment, ensuring that even though words may change, the expression as a whole remains truthful.

The initial baptism establishes the analytic nature of an expression.

Chomsky doesn’t seem to know if there is a conceptual apparatus so apparently that aspect isn’t part of his LAD? — schopenhauer1

Being able to see the colour red and being able to see a link based on constant conjunction,
as inherent functions of the structure of the brain, and products of genetic coding, are possible without the need of conscious a priori concepts of red or constant conjunction. Concepts are subsequent to the event.

Your idea is that all analytic statements are the direct result of performative acts................My suspicion is that your account is based on considering only one type of analytic statement.. — Banno

Your example may be reworded as: "a triangle is a plane figure, a polygon, where the sum of the internal angles is 180 deg", thereby defining "a triangle".

This is a complex concept, so can be carried out in a straightforward Performative Act of Naming, where one word is defined as a set of other words. This is a purely linguistic process, not requiring any link from word to world, and not requiring any link from linguistic to extralinguistic.

Where do "Gavagai", the inscrutability of reference and the indeterminacy of translation fit in this account? — Banno

The gavagai problem may be solved by taking into account the fact that there are simple and complex concepts, and these must be treated differently. In language, first there is the naming of simple concepts, and only then can complex concepts be named, such as the complex concept "gavagai".

Simple concepts include things such as the colour red, a bitter taste, a straight line, etc, and complex concepts include things such as mountains, despair, houses, governments, etc.

For complex concepts, the "gavagai" may be named in a Performative Act of Naming, such that "a gavagai is a gregarious burrowing plant-eating mammal, with long ears, long hind legs, and a short tail". One word is linked to other words, the linguistic is linked with the linguistic, not the world. Misunderstanding and doubt are minimised in a relatively simple process. As "a gavagai" is defined as having long ears, the statement "a gavagai has long ears" is analytic.

For simple concepts, the process is more complicated. The problem is that of linking a word to something in the world, linking the linguistic with the extra-linguistic. For example the colour "orange" is something that is orange, where one word is linked with one thing in the world

In order to explain the naming of simple concepts, I return to my diagram illustrating naming using Hume's constant conjunction of events, whereby learning a name is more an iterative process that is unlikely to be achieved at the first attempt. One needs to note that from the viewpoint of the observer, both the words and pictures are objects, things existing in the world, where the word is no less an object than the picture.



The words "nyekundu", "kijani" and "samawati" have been determined during Performative Acts of Naming either by an Institution or users of the language or a combination of both.

You asked before why the observer should necessarily link two objects that happen to be alongside each other. As the tortoise said to Achilles when playing chess, where is the rule that I have to follow the rules. Why should the observer take note of a constant conjunction of events? Because, as life has been evolving for about 3.7 billion years on Earth, taking note of a constant conjunction of events has been built into the structure of the brain as a mechanism necessary for survival, something innate and a priori.

Chomsky proposed that a person's ability to use language is innate. Taken from the https://englopedia.com article Innateness theory of language:

Linguistic nativism is a theory that people are born with the knowledge of a language: they acquire language not only through learning. Human language is complex and considered one of the most difficult areas of human cognition. However, despite the complexity of the language, children can accurately learn the language in a short period of time. Moreover, research has shown that language acquisition by children (including the blind and deaf) occurs at ordered developmental stages. This highlights the possibility that humans have an innate ability to acquire language. According to Noam Chomsky, “the speed and accuracy of vocabulary acquisition do not leave any real alternative to the conclusion that the child somehow possesses the concepts available before the language experience, and basically memorizes the labels for the concepts that are already part of him or her. conceptual apparatus “

In summary, first, complex concepts may be learnt as a set of simpler concepts in a Performative act of Naming, linking the linguistic to the linguistic. Second, simple concepts may be learnt by linking two objects in the world using Hume's constant conjunction of events, an innate ability having evolved over 3.7 billion years. The first object a name established during a Performative Act and the second object a picture, thereby linking the linguistic with the extralinguistic.

Can you explain Quine's objection to analyticity? — Banno

Quine wanted to give a non-circular account of the distinction between analytic and synthetic sentences.

Circular in that the notion of analyticity is being used as an explanation for necessity and a prioricity, yet necessity and a prioiricity is being used as an explanation of analyticity.

It is often said that analytic truths are true by definition, but Quine pointed out that an analytic truth can only be turned into a logical truth by replacing synonym with synonym, which again leads into the problem of circularity. Synonymity between two expressions leads to analyticity, but synonymity between two expressions requires analyticity.

As Quine wrote:
“There are those who find it soothing to say that the analytic statements of the second class reduce to those of the first class, the logical truths, by definition: ‘bachelor’, for example, is defined as ‘unmarried man.’ . . . Who defined it thus, and when? Are we to appeal to the nearest dictionary ...? Clearly, this would be to put the cart before the horse. The lexicographer is an empirical scientist, whose business is the recording to antecedent facts; and if he glosses ‘bachelor’ as ‘unmarried man’ it is because of his belief that there is a relation of synonymy between those forms . . . prior to his own work.”

Quine asks "who defined it thus", and the answer is, in a Performative Act, carried out either by a public Institution, by the general users of a language or a combination of the two.

J. L. Austin in the 1950's gave the name performative utterances to situations where saying something was doing something, rather than simply reporting on or describing reality. The paradigmatic case here is speaking the words "I do".

Kripke in Naming and Necessity provided a rough outline of his causal theory of reference for names, promoting it as having more potential that Russell's Descriptive Theory of Names, whereby names are in fact disguised definite descriptions. Kripke argues that your use of a name is caused by the naming of a thing, for example, the parents of a newborn baby name it, pointing to the child and saying "we'll call her 'Jane'." Henceforth everyone calls her 'Jane'. This is referred to as Jane's dubbing, naming, or initial baptism.

From the SEP - The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction:
“Analytic” sentences, such as “Paediatricians are doctors,” have historically been characterized as ones that are true by virtue of the meanings of their words alone and/or can be known to be so solely by knowing those meanings.

We can consider two stages in linguistic meaning:
Stage one: words are given their meaning in performative acts
Stage two: once words have their meanings, some statements are known to be true just by knowing the meaning of their words, ie, as the SEP notes, analytic statements.

The Performative Act breaks Quine's problem of circularity.

Isn't this generally tautological? All unmarried men are bachelors is saying unmarried men are unmarried men. — Tom Storm

In the statement "bachelors are unmarried men", "bachelors" should be thought of as a definition rather than a description.

As a description "bachelors are unmarried men" is tautological, where "unmarried men" is a synonym for "bachelors".

But rather, "bachelor" should be thought of as a definition, where "bachelor" is the definition of "unmarried men".

For example, rather than say "I see a large building, typically of the medieval period, fortified against attack with thick walls, battlements, towers, and in many cases a moat", it is far more convenient just to say "I see a castle", where "castle" is the definition of a large building, typically of the medieval period, fortified against attack with thick walls, battlements, towers, and in many cases a moat.

Similarly, rather than say "I see an unmarried man", it is more convenient just to say "I see a bachelor".

If language only consisted of words that referred to simpler concepts: red, loud, circle, line, sweet, thick, etc, the number of words required to express complex concepts would be inconveniently excessive. Therefore, for convenience, definitions are used to group sets of words together. Without definitions, language would be unwieldy.

As "castle" is a definition, the statement "The castle has thick walls" is analytic. As "bachelor" is a definition, the statement "The bachelor is a man" is analytic.

I think Chomsky (or at least some nativists) might argue that the very ability of the performative act is some sort of innate language acquisition capability. — schopenhauer1

I agree. Whilst on the one hand there cannot be a priori knowledge of "the triangle" until it has been baptised in a performative act, on the other hand, there must be some innate, a priori knowledge of the importance of the concept of triangle, otherwise the language speaker wouldn't have considered it worthwhile naming.

As with "snow is white" is true IFF snow is white, the expression in inverted commas exists in language whilst the expression not in inverted commas exists in the world, there is a difference between "the triangle" which exists in language and the triangle which exists in the world.

It can be argued exactly where this world exists, in the mind or external to any mind. Wittgenstein in Tractatus avoided the question altogether.

Life has been evolving for about 3.7 billion years on Earth, and must be responsible for the physical structure of the human brain as it is today, ie, the hardware. What the brain is capable of doing, ie it software, can only be a function of its hardware, ie, the physical structure of the brain. It is clear that a kettle can only boil water, it cannot play music, ie, what a physical structure is able to do must be determined by its physical structure, What the brain is able to achieve, its thoughts, concepts and language cannot be outwith the physical structure that enables such thoughts, concepts and language.

The linguist Noam Chomsky and the evolutionary biologist Stephen Jay Gould proposed the theory that language evolved as a result of other evolutionary processes, essentially making it a by-product of evolution and not a specific adaptation. The idea that language was a spandrel, a term coined by Gould, flew in the face of natural selection. In fact, Gould and Chomsky pose the theory that many human behaviours are spandrels. These various spandrels came about because of a process Darwin called "pre-adaptation," which is now known as exaptation. This is the idea that a species uses an adaptation for a purpose other than what it was initially meant for. One example is the theory that bird feathers were an adaptation for keeping the bird warm, and were only later used for flying. Chomsky and Gould hypothesize that language may have evolved simply because the physical structure of the brain evolved, or because cognitive structures that were used for things like tool making or rule learning were also good for complex communication. This falls in line with the theory that as our brains became larger, our cognitive functions increased.

As regards the immediate topic "Are there analytic statements?", as "the triangle" has been baptised in a performative act as meaning "a shape having three sides", the statement "the triangle has three sides" can only be analytic. Therefore, there are analytic statements.

Obviously there's a use-mention distinction, but is that distinction relevant here? — Michael

The problem is temporal.

Before the performative act, the combination of letters "the triangle" has no meaning.
As "the triangle" doesn't refer to anything, it has no use.
As "the triangle " doesn't exist in the common language, there cannot be any mention of it.
As "the triangle" doesn't exist in the common language, it cannot play a role in any analytic or synthetic statement.

During the performative act, the combination of letters "the triangle" is christened as a word, or as Kripke said, baptised, to have the meaning of a shape with three sides.

After the performative act, within the social community sharing a common language, the word "the triangle" means "a shape with three sides", and the statement "the triangle has three sides" is true.
As "the triangle" does now refer to something, ie, a shape with three sides, it has a use.
As the word "triangle" is now part of the common language, it can be mentioned as being a word within the common language.
As the word "the triangle" does now exist in the common language, it can play a role in analytic and synthetic statements. The statement "triangles have three sides " is analytic, as this is part of the definition of triangles. The statement "the triangle is orange" is synthetic, as this is not part of the definition of triangles.

There is no a priori knowledge of "the triangle" until it has been baptised in a performative act. There is only a posteriori knowledge of the word "the triangle" after it has been baptised in a performative act.

"Are there analytic statements?"

In a performative act, I define X as x, y and z.
I tell at least one other person.
There is now a social community sharing the same language that knows that X means x,y and z.
The statement "X is z" is now an analytic statement and it is true that "X is z".

Provided that within a social community sharing the same language, at least one person has made a definition in a performative act, and told at least one other person, yes, analytic statements exist.

Concepts don't exist in the head. They exist in the movements of the body, including the movements of mouth and hand and all the [ other kinds of ] action that claims are used to justify, explain, predict. — plaque flag

Where in my body is my concept of open government.

This is one of the problems with indirect realism. It's dualist ! You are trapped in your head — plaque flag

If trapped in my head, how have I managed to survive X years in a harsh, brutal and unforgiving world.

Personally I wouldn't put beliefs 'in the mind. — plaque flag

If my belief that it will rain tomorrow isn't in my mind, how can I know that this is my belief.

Do you see claims through your sense organs ? I think not. — plaque flag

The first claim being that simple ideas come into the mind in the form of nonpropositional awarenesses
The second claim being that these ideas once in the mind somehow get converted into something that can stand in inferential relations to propositions in the mind

As regards claim one, true. I can see many things without knowing its name.
As regards claim two, partly true. Some things I see I do know its name.

Concepts are public. Concepts are norms. — plaque flag

Either the public body is a set of individuals, meaning that concepts only exist in the minds of the individuals making up the public body, or, the public body supervenes on a set of individuals - a non-reductive physicalism - meaning that concepts exist in the public body and not in the minds of the individuals.

As I personally find non-reductive physicalism hard to believe, my belief is that concepts can only exist in the minds of the individuals.

I touch on that in my new thread — plaque flag

:up:

How have (or could) you establish “my private experience of apple is different to yours”? — Richard B

True, its an assumption, but a reasonably strong assumption.

But if I was a South African cab driver and you were an Icelandic doctor, the chances that our private experiences of apples are exactly the same is highly remote.

From https://scitechdaily.com:
It’s a question that arises with virtually every major new finding in science or medicine: What makes a result reliable enough to be taken seriously? The answer has to do with statistical significance — but also with judgments about what standards make sense in a given situation. The unit of measurement usually given when talking about statistical significance is the standard deviation, expressed with the lowercase Greek letter sigma (σ). The term refers to the amount of variability in a given set of data: whether the data points are all clustered together, or very spread out.

I probably have a six sigma level of confidence.

Here are some good points against indirect realism, IMO. — plaque flag

What Sellars’s “Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind” helped Rorty to show was that a belief can be shown to be justified (or unjustified) only on the basis of another belief or set of beliefs.

The Direct Realist argues that they perceive immediately or directly things in the world.

If a belief can be justified only on the basis of another belief, and beliefs only exist in the mind, then there can be no connection of any kind between the mind and the world. This is more an argument for Idealism than Realism.

A belief cannot be shown to be justified (or not) on the basis of what Sellars mocked in his essay as “the unmoved movers of empirical knowledge” (Sellars 1956, 77).

There is a causal chain from the external world through my senses to my mind

When I see the colour red, I don't believe that I see the colour red, I know without doubt that I see the colour red. I don't need to justify my belief as it is not a belief in the first place.

IE, the Indirect Realist doesn't need to justify what they perceive through their senses.

They both see the apple directly, but differently. — plaque flag

I directly see the apple, and you directly see the apple, but the apple I see is different to the apple you see. My private experience of the apple is different to yours.

I directly see the colour red, and you directly see the colour red, but the colour red I see is different to the colour red you see. My private experience of the colour red is different to yours.

Then how can there be a public language about apples and the colour red if our private experiences of apples and the colour red are different.

People can disagree about the world and be wrong about the world, but they are seeing and talking about the world and not their images of it. — plaque flag

If all Direct Realists are immediately and directly seeing the same world, on what grounds can they disagree about what they see.

I can understand Indirect Realists disagreeing about the world, as they are not seeing it immediately and directly, but are dependent on personal interpretation.

Is there no distinction to be drawn and maintained between a direct realist and a naive one? — creativesoul

I'm sure there is, but it is probably very subtle.

According to Wikipedia Naive Realism:
In philosophy of perception and philosophy of mind, naïve realism (also known as direct realism, perceptual realism, or common sense realism) is the idea that the senses provide us with direct awareness of objects as they really are.

Could you rephrase this question by dropping "facts" and "external world" out of it? — creativesoul

I was trying to incorporate Wittgensteins 1.1 "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" in the Tractatus

By external world I mean whatever exists external to any mind. The IEP uses the term in their article Locke: Knowledge of the External World

The world is whatever we as philosophers are talking about..........The philosopher's intention to articulate the truth is intrinsically social and worldly in a strategically indeterminate sense...Wittgenstein is trying to dig deeper, say something about 'eternal' logical-linguistic structure.. — plaque flag

I don't think that in reality you are a Direct Realist, but someone who has the position that the world exists fundamentally in language. Perhaps a Wittgensteinian approach. This is what all the evidence points to. You say i) The master-idea of semantic inferentialism is to look instead to inference, rather than representation, as the basic concept of semantics ii) that what really matters are linguistic norms and iii) "to see the tree is more usefully understood as a claim to "I see the tree".

For the Direct Realist, the world we see around us is the real world itself. Things in the world are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

As you say "A tree is 'made of' leaves and branches, but the tree is no less real because we can consider it as a unity", something the Indirect Realist would agree with, in that we have the tree as a concept in the mind. But the Direct Realist is also saying that this tree exists in the world exactly as we perceive it in our minds.

Using Wittgenstein as a starting position, from the Tractatus
1. The world is all that is the case.
1.1 The world is the totality of facts, not of things

Things in the external world are not static but change with time. For example, the life cycle of a tree has six main stages: seed, sprout, seedling, sapling, adult tree, and decline into coarse woody debris.

The world is all that is the case, and the world is the totality of facts. Facts are states of affairs that obtain in the world and about which we can make true propositions.

The sapling becomes a tree, but the process isn't instantaneous. It requires time for one fact to change into a different fact.

At an earlier moment in time, there is the fact that the sapling is short and we can say "the sapling is short" is true. At a later moment in time there is the fact the tree is tall and we can say "the tree is tall" is true. But there is an intermediary period when neither fact obtains, the fact that the sapling is short doesn't obtain, and the fact that the tree is tall doesn't obtain.

If Direct Realism was true, and we directly perceive things in the world as they are, then every observer will agree about the moment when the sapling changes into a tree, when one fact in the world changes into a different fact.

But we know that different observers will make different judgements as to the moment the sapling changes into a tree, when one fact changes into another fact over an extended period of time.

My question to the Direct Realist is, if all observers are directly observing the same facts in the external world, then why do different observers make different judgements about the moment when one fact changes into a different fact.

Philosophy is often a serious kind of poetry. Yes, we like inferences. But metaphors do much of the lifting. — plaque flag

It is true that "The world is all that is the case", but is this the world of Indirect or Direct Realism.

In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein studiously avoids addressing this question.

I think Gabriel is missing the point. The world as that which is the case is methodically minimally specified. If Gabriel says that that kind of metaphysics is vague, he is describing what is the case, talking about the world --- as whatever is the case. — plaque flag

Wittgenstein's "The world is all that is the case" is poetry.

Robert Frost also talked about the world

Some say the world will end in fire,
Some say in ice.
From what I’ve tasted of desire
I hold with those who favor fire.
But if it had to perish twice,
I think I know enough of hate
To say that for destruction ice
Is also great
And would suffice.

Poetry is fine, but open to numerous interpretations, which is its nature.

If the writer knows his words will be open to numerous interpretations and doesn't find that a problem, then either they are a poet or they are, as Markus Gabriel said, being sloppy about their subject.

The language, its users, and the world are primordially unified — plaque flag

Not primordial, as language only began about 50,000 to 150,000 years ago.

Users of the same language agree to a basic meaning of a word, even though they can have very different concepts as to its particular meaning. For example, an Australian living in Alice Springs will have a very different concept of the word "grass" to an American living in Spokane.

The world is all that is the case. There is genius in that simple statement. — plaque flag

My approach to "the world is all that is the case" is similar to that of Markus Gabriel:

"In a 2018 interview, Gabriel complained that "most contemporary metaphysicians are [sloppy] when it comes to characterizing their subject matter," using words like "the world" and "reality" "often...interchangeably and without further clarifications. In my view, those totality of words do not refer to anything which is capable of having the property of existence"