1. Something is an object of perception iff it is a constituent of experience — Michael
What is the difference between naive and non-naive direct realism? — Michael
I'm afraid I still only have one clear answer: for perception to be "direct", naïve realism should be true. The features of our perceptions must be present in reality, so that barns really look red, and violins sound as they do, independently of an observer. — hypericin
At the very least we can apply modus tollens and simply say that if phenomenal experience is not reliable then these direct realists are wrong, even without having to ask what they actually mean by "direct presentation". — Michael
“Directness” is intended to resolve the epistemological problem of perception such that if perception is direct then there is no problem, but if (2) is false then the common kind claim is true and disjunctivism is false, the epistemological problem of perception remains, and so perception isn’t direct. — Michael
It's not that when we perceive a tree we perceive a concept but that when we perceive a tree we are "perceiving treely", which is a mental state. — Michael
The Direct Realist also believes that we directly perceive a hand, but then ignores any philosophical questioning in favour of the language of the "ordinary man".
Even though the brain is part of the world, there is a distinct boundary between the brain and the world outside the brain. The brain only "knows" about the world outside the brain because of the information that passes through this boundary, ie, the five senses, and these five senses are the intermediary between the brain and the world outside the brain.
If outside the brain is a wavelength of 500nm, and inside the brain is the perception of green, even though the chain of events from outside to inside is direct, it does not of necessity follow that there is a direct relationship between what is on the outside and what is on the inside, and by linguistic convection, if the relationship is not direct then it must be indirect.
My belief is that to say that inferred knowledge is direct knowledge is ungrammatical.
The argument from illusion is indeed one of the arguments against direct realism — Michael
But you didn’t really answer my question(s). How does non-naive direct realism differ from naive direct realism? — Michael
Both hypericin and @Michael keep adverting to naive forms of direct realism, and if the point is only that, "Sometimes our perceptions are mistaken in knowing what is real, but reason can step in and correct course, thus providing us with 'indirect' knowledge of the real," then I don't really disagree. This would not be an insuperable universal relativizing, but only a superable local relativizing. Such a position opposes naive realism but not direct realism. — Leontiskos
I think it is a matter of accuracy or reliability. "Are we able to form true propositions which accurately and reliably get at what truly exists in the world?" The so-called direct realist says yes. The so-called indirect realist says, "No, we do not know whether our knowledge is about the world or merely about our representations of the world." — Leontiskos
...whereas indirect realists argued that phenomenal experience is, at best, a mental representation of external world objects and their properties, and so is possibly unreliable. — Michael
and indirect realism in its simplest form is simply a rejection of direct realism. — Michael
The common example is colour. I reject primitivism. — Michael
Well, I think that there is no “resemblance” between a thing’s appearance and a thing’s (objective) properties. — Michael
Do you view shape the same way you view color? — Leontiskos
When you say that shapes are primary qualities, is that shapes-as-seen or shapes-as-felt? — Michael
For Locke a primary quality belongs to the object — Leontiskos
and it seems obvious that one can interact with the same spatial property via both sight and touch. Some humans can interact with spatial properties via hearing, but there are other species which tend to be better at that. — Leontiskos
If primary qualities belong to an object then nothing in experience is a primary quality, because objects and their properties are not constituents of experience. — Michael
Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P. — Luke
Your position is this:
A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.
An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O. — Luke
The sensory information that an organism receives from its environment is a perception. You are basically saying that our perceptions are direct. — Luke
Given representations (R), perceptions (P) and objects (O), direct realists believe that R are part of the mechanics of P and are subsumed under P.
— Luke
Indirect realists also believe this. — hypericin
Your [indirect realist] position is this:
A direct perception is: P (excluding R) of an O.
An indirect perception is: P (including R) of an O.
— Luke
Perceptions are representations, and so there isn't really "P (excluding R) of an O" — hypericin
Experience of perceptions is direct. Experience of objects is indirect, this happens via perceptions. — hypericin
It seems odd to speak of simple organisms making inferences, conscious or otherwise, since the term usually applies to the deliverances of rational thought. — Janus
something that is inferred
especially : a conclusion or opinion that is formed because of known facts or evidence — Merriam Webster
My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation — Luke
Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct. — Luke
My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation
— Luke
Reading this, why wouldn't you conclude: perception is inherently indirect? — hypericin
Since it makes no sense to talk about experience of perceptions, then it makes no sense to say that experience of perceptions is direct.
— Luke
No problem. Lets say then, experience, including perceptual experience, is direct. — hypericin
How do you reply to this argument from hallucination? — hypericin
Nothing logically prevents us from hallucinating in a way that appears identical to the real thing. — hypericin
Any object O you perceive may either be real, or hallucination. — hypericin
Therefore, that we are in the everyday, veridical case, P of O, cannot be a part of the perception P itself. — hypericin
It must be an inference (We are wide awake and alert, O is consistent with memory and environment, others acknowledge O). Similarly, if we are hallucinating, we only know that by inference as well (We are delirious, O is incongruous, no one else acknowledges O). — hypericin
In short, that what we experience is real, is an inference, not a perception. We are indirectly aware, via inference, of the realism of the world, and only directly aware of perceptual content. — hypericin
That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object. My reply was that this isn't a perception at all, because it excludes any representation (and, more simply, because objects are not identical with perceptions). You can't have a perception without a representation, yet Michael calls this a direct perception. — Luke
What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? The dispute is not over our (direct or indirect) awareness of our perceptions. This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step; to create a gap between ourselves and our perceptions (much like your earlier talk of "experience of perceptions"). We do not perceive our perceptions; we perceive the world. — Luke
Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get. — Luke
The dispute is about whether our perceptions of the world are direct or indirect; it is not about how we know or whether we know that those perceptions are veridical or not. — Luke
The dispute is over whether we directly perceive objects or not; it is not over our knowledge of our perceptions. Our knowledge about (the veridicality of) our perceptions is not our perceptions. — Luke
What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness? — Luke
This talk of "awareness of perceptions" is just another of your attempts to push our perceptions back a step — Luke
Wittgenstein was a major influence on adverbial theories. — Count Timothy von Icarus
Since cause, matter, energy, and information appear to flow across this boundary in the same manner as any other, I am not sure how movement across the boundary is supposed to be more "indirect."...Is this logical necessity or causal? — Count Timothy von Icarus
Is there any knowledge that doesn't involve inference?...We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
That's my point. Michael was asserting that a direct perception must be when a perception is identical with its object...
— Luke
I don't quite understand what you're suggesting I'm saying here — Michael
Distal objects are not present in phenomenal experience and the features of phenomenal experience are not the properties of distal objects. That is indirect realism to me, as contrasted with the direct realist view that distal objects are present in phenomenal experience and that the features of phenomenal experience are the properties of those distal objects. — Michael
...but the representational theory of perception is indirect realism. — Michael
What I am disagreeing with are ideas such as that my seeing a tree is an inference. — Janus
We don't see various shapes and hues and then, through some concious inferential process decide that we have knowledge of a chair in front us. We just see chairs. — Count Timothy von Icarus
There's a difference between my position and indirect realism. As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. — Luke
The indirect realist argues that the "primary" qualities of veridical experience are of the same kind as the "secondary" qualities of veridical experience and the "primary" qualities of dreams and hallucinations, and that the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when I dream and hallucinate are the sorts of things that are the (direct) objects of perception when awake and not hallucinating.
This is the common kind claim. — Michael
If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael
Compared to what other sort of perception? It's as direct as you can get.
— Luke
"Direct" does not mean "as direct as you can get". "As direct as you can get" may still be indirect. What is it compared to? The directness of the perceptual experience itself. — hypericin
How can "perceptions of the world" be "direct", if the "of the world" must be inferred from the perceptions, and other context? — hypericin
What is the distinction between direct and indirect awareness?
— Luke
I think the distinction is clear. The feeling of heat on my skin, feelings of anger or contentment, the sound s and feeling of playing the drums, are all direct. My awareness of the exact temperature from my thermometer, my awareness of what Jodie said, via Bob's telling me this morning, and my awareness of your thinking on this subject, are all obviously indirect. — hypericin
You will have to provide a convincing argument that we are not aware of our perceptions. On the face of it, perceptions are exactly what we are (directly) aware of. — hypericin
It follows that your criterion for a direct perception is to have the distal object somehow be physically present in one's phenomenal experience. In other words, your criterion is that the object is identical with one's phenomenal experience. — Luke
Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.
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Direct Realist Character: the phenomenal character of experience is determined, at least partly, by the direct presentation of ordinary objects.
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On [the naive realist] conception of experience, when one is veridically perceiving the objects of perception are constituents of the experiential episode. The given event could not have occurred without these entities existing and being constituents of it; in turn, one could not have had such a kind of event without there being relevant candidate objects of perception to be apprehended. So, even if those objects are implicated in the causes of the experience, they also figure non-causally as essential constituents of it... Mere presence of a candidate object will not be sufficient for the perceiving of it, that is true, but its absence is sufficient for the non-occurrence of such an event. The connection here is [one] of a constitutive or essential condition of a kind of event.
How would that work? How is that kind of perception possible?
As I understand it, indirect realism asserts that we perceive representations (of objects). My position is not that we perceive representations (or some other intermediary), so my position is not indirect realism. My position is that perception involves representations. Representations are not the object of perception, as indirect realism asserts; instead, representations are formative in having perceptions. Or, as you put it earlier, representations are part of the "mechanics of perception". — Luke
If there’s such a thing as non-naive direct realism that can avoid the common kind claim without arguing that distal objects are actual constituents of experience then it needs further explanation. — Michael
3.3.1 Intentionalism in Outline
The intentionalist holds that we directly experience ordinary objects. The distinguishing feature of the view is a specific conception of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects: here the intentionalist appeals to intentionality conceived of as a form of mental representation (hence it is also sometimes called the representationalist theory of experience)...
Intentionalists endorse the Common Kind Claim. So, a veridical experience of churchyard covered in white snow, consists in direct representation of such a scene, but so do corresponding illusory and hallucinatory experiences: these experiences have the same nature...
3.3.5 Intentionalism and Perception of the World
In response to this, the intentionalist can suggest that although they reject Direct Realist Presentation, they do not reject Direct Realism. They can suggest that the former is not the only way to understand the latter. As we saw above, another way to understand Direct Realism is with a causal understanding of direct perception.
...The object-directedness of experience is at the heart of their approach. Even though intentionalism denies that experiences involve the direct presentation of ordinary objects, it (a) respects and is motivated by the phenomenological observation that experiences are directly of ordinary objects, and (b) offers an alternative account of the manner in which experiences are directly of ordinary objects. As we’ve seen, instead of presentation, the intentionalist appeals to representation.
Thus, the intentionalist can maintain that when you see a snow-covered churchyard for what it is you do directly perceive a snow-covered churchyard. This is not because your experience itself directly presents you with a snow-covered churchyard. It doesn’t. After all, your experience is of such a kind that it could occur in a hallucination, where it wouldn’t directly present any ordinary object. It is rather because your experience directly perceptually represents the presence of a snow-covered churchyard and is non-deviantly caused by the churchyard in question. This is what direct perception amounts to for the intentionalist — SEP article
The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.
And as I suggested here, naming these non-naive direct realisms as being "direct" realisms seems to be a misnomer. At the very least they seem to mean something different by "direct" than what is meant by naive and indirect realists. — Michael
Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects'
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