Many millennia of being embedded in the world have granted sapiens in particular, and biological sight in general, the ability to receive information from their surroundings, including color. It is because organisms have been in the world and directly interacted with it this whole time that has allowed them to do so. I wager that had perception been at any time indirect, the evolution of perception would not have occurred at all and we’d still possess the perceptual abilities of some Cambrian worm. — NOS4A2

I agree that humans have evolved in synergy with the world over millions of years, and have evolved to survive within this world.

Successful evolution requires that there is a direct causal chain between an event in the world and the human's perception of it, and that this direct causal chain is consistent, in that every time an object in the world emits a wavelength of 500nm the human perceives the colour green. Evolution would fail if when an object emitted a wavelength of 500nm, one time the human perceived the colour green, the next time the colour purple and the next time nothing at all.

However, for the Indirect Realist, what is indirect is the relation between the object that exists in the world and the observer's perception of it.

As I see it, the Direct Realist is proposing that we know the world as it really is, in that if we perceive an object to be green then we know that the object is green.

I don't think that this is a case of semantics for the Direct Realist, in that if we perceive an object to be green then by definition the object is green. I think that the Direct Realist is saying that the object "is" ontologically in fact green.

The Indirect Realist is proposing that we don't know the world as it really is, but only know a representation of it, in that our perception of the colour green is only a representation of the object..

The question for the Direct Realist is, how can they know that the object is really green if their only knowledge of the object has come second-hand through the process of a chain of events, albeit a direct chain of events.

One of the central flaws in Kant’s theory of knowledge is that he has blown up the bridge of action by which real beings manifest their natures to our cognitive receiving sets. He admits that things in themselves act on us, on our senses; but he insists that such action reveals nothing intelligible about these beings, nothing about their natures in themselves, only an unordered, unstructured sense manifold that we have to order and structure from within ourselves. But action that is completely indeterminate, that reveals nothing meaningful about the agent from which it comes, is incoherent, not really action at all. (W. Norris Clarke) — Count Timothy von Icarus

I go into the garden and am stung. I have no idea what the cause was. It could have been a bee, wasp, hornet, mosquito, flea, spider, cactus, algarve, yucca, pampas grass, holly, thorn bush, pyracantha, rose, gorse, etc.

And yet the implications could be serious. A swelling, going to the medicine cabinet, taking antibiotics, using antiseptic cream, even having to go to A&E and a possible night in hospital.

For Norris Clarke to argue that Kant's theory of knowledge is flawed because "action that is completely indeterminate, that reveals nothing meaningful about the agent from which it comes, is incoherent" is not persuasive.

The cause of the sting may well be completely indeterminate, the thing in itself may remain forever unknown and I may never know anything meaningful about the agent, but this is irrelevant to the real world consequences of being stung.

As Kant writes, what concerns us is what we perceive, not an unknown cause of what we perceive.

Are the trees lining the banks not bald cypress? — creativesoul

Because you have the concept of a bald cypress before looking at the river bank, you perceive a bald cypress.

As I don't have the concept of a bald cypress, all I perceive is a mass of green with some yellow bits.

Did the bald cypress exist before anyone looked at it? You know that a mass of green with some yellow bits is a bald cypress, but I don't know that

So how can a bald cypress exist in the world independently of any mind to observe it, if the bald cypress only exists as a concept in the mind?

Are the trees lining the banks not bald cypress?... Are those things in our mind? I would not think a direct realist would arrive at that. — creativesoul

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist must agree that the thought of "trees lining the banks" must be in the mind, otherwise how would the mind know about trees lining the bank in the first place.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that there is something in the world causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank", as both believe in Realism.

The Indirect and Direct Realist differ in what the something is in the world that is causing us to perceive "trees lining the bank".

For the Direct Realist, in the world are trees lining the bank regardless of there being anyone to observe them, in that, if you look at the world you will perceive exactly the same thing as me. This means that if we are both looking at the same trees lining the bank, we will both be perceiving the same thing. This means that I will know what's in your mind at that moment in time.

For the Indirect Realist, in the world is something regardless of there being anyone to observe it. As what I perceive is a subjective representation of the something in the world, we may not be perceiving the same thing. This means that I cannot know what is in your mind when looking at the same thing.

As I have never believed it possible to know what someone else is thinking, I am an Indirect rather than Direct Realist.

I think the implication is that if you can take a thought and ferry it through the air to cause a thought in the other person, this constitutes telepathy. — AmadeusD

Whence the need for omniscience? — creativesoul

I didn't say this is telepathy, only that it "could be described as a form of telepathy".

The Merriam Webster Dictionary defines telepathy as " communication from one mind to another by extrasensory means"

I am only referring to looking at the world, not inner feelings like pain.

The implication of Direct Realism is that if person A looks at the world they will be seeing the world as it really is, and if person B looks at the same world they would also be seeing the world as it really is. As there is only one world, each person would know what was in the other person's mind.

There is a causal chain from the world to the mind of person A through their senses, and there is a different causal chain from the same world to the mind of person B through their senses.

On the one hand there is no causal chain from the mind of person A to the mind of person B, yet the Direct Realist's position is that person A must know what is in person B's mind.

Call it a form of telepathy, communication by extrasensory means or transcendental knowledge, either way, it's a problem the Indirect Realist doesn't have.

I’m not sure how something can in fact be orange but appears blue, so I cannot suppose it. — NOS4A2

One possibility would be colour blindness. I'm sure you can think of others.

Colour vision deficiency (colour blindness) is where you see colours differently to most people, and have difficulty telling colours apart. There's no treatment for colour vision deficiency that runs in families, but people usually adapt to living with it. (www.nhs.uk/)

How do you know that it is in fact orange if you never see the orange? — jkop

Obviously you cannot. That's why I wrote: "suppose the thing in the world is in fact orange, yet I always perceive it to be blue."

A recurring theme is that one can never experience a thing as it is due to this distance and the things in between one and the other...To say we do not perceive light, for instance, which is of the world, cannot be maintained, especially given how intimate this relationship is — NOS4A2

On the one hand, the Indirect Realist proposes that we can never experience a thing in the world as it is, meaning that the relationship between perceiver and thing in the world as it is is indirect. But on the other hand, the Indirect Realist also proposes that we do experience a thing in the world as we perceive it to be, meaning that the relationship between perceiver and thing in the world as the perceiver perceives it to be is direct.

The intimate relation between the perceiver and perceived is maintained.

IE, suppose the thing in the world is in fact orange, yet I always perceive it to be blue. It is true that I can never experience the thing in the world as it is, but this is irrelevant to my relationship with the world, as I always perceive the thing in the world to be as I perceive it to be, in this case, blue.

Wittgenstein makes the same point in Philosophical Investigations 293 with the beetle in the box analogy.

That'll be the article which ends: The question, now, is not so much whether to be a direct realist, but how to be one. — Banno

The quote above from the SEP article The Problem of Perception refers to the debate within Direct Realism, not to the debate between Direct and Indirect Realism.

The paragraph in full is:

Whilst the debate between sense-datum theorists and adverbialists (and between these and other theories) is not as prominent as it once was, the debate between intentionalists and naive realist disjunctivists is a significant ongoing debate in the philosophy of perception: a legacy of the Problem of Perception that is arguably “the greatest chasm” in the philosophy of perception (Crane (2006)). The question, now, is not so much whether to be a direct realist, but how to be one.

According to the SEP article The Problem of Perception

Direct Realist Presentation: perceptual experiences are direct perceptual presentations of ordinary objects.

If person A directly saw an object as it really is, and person B looking at the same object also saw the object as it really is, then person A would know what was in person's B mind. This would be a consequence of Direct Realism and could be described as a form of telepathy.

Why in the world do you think direct realists think that? — flannel jesus

They are using their own particular language game, sui generis, where "direct" in the language game of the Direct Realist means "indirect" in the language game of the Indirect Realist.

How are we to know which parts of our experience provide us with “raw” information about the external world? — Michael

As the Indirect Realist would say, "exactly".

Everyone seems to agree that there is a chain of events. For example, light from the sun hits an object, part of the light is absorbed by the object and part reflected, a wavelength of 480nm then travels though space to the eye of an observer, this causes an electrical signal to travel along the optic nerve from the eye to the brain where it is somehow processed, thereby enabling the mind to perceive the colour blue.

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that there has been a "direct" causal chain from the prior cause to the subsequent effect.

It then comes down to a semantic problem. What is it the correct use of language.

It cannot be that the observer has "direct" knowledge of the cause of their perception, as the cause is of a very different kind to the effect, and there is no information within the subsequent effect as to its exact prior cause. Whilst one prior cause determines one subsequent effect, one subsequent effect could have had numerous possible prior causes. There is a temporal direction of information flow. Consider the impossibility of looking at a billiard ball at rest on a billiard table and being able to determine its prior position just from knowledge of its rest position. The same with perceiving the colour blue.

It must be more grammatical to say that the subsequent effect, perceiving the colour blue, only gives us "indirect" knowledge of any prior cause.

a billiard ball's path contains information about the cue ball that struck it — Count Timothy von Icarus

Information flow is directional.

I hit a billiard ball on a billiard table and can calculate more or less where it will come to rest.

I see a billiard ball at rest on a billiard table, yet cannot determine its prior start position, which are innumerable.

The Direct Realist argues that just from knowing an effect it is possible to know its cause. Whether seeing a billiard ball at rest on a billiard table and directly knowing its prior state, or experiencing the colour yellow and directly knowing an object in the outside world that caused it.

I agree that from knowing a prior state it may be possible to unequivocally determine its later state, but the Direct Realist is in effect arguing that just from knowing a later state it is possible to unequivocally know its prior state.

I take Luke to be saying that indirect realists think perception would have to be “untainted by representation” for it to be direct. — Jamal

That's also my understanding. As the SEP article on The Problem of Perception notes:

This is why many naive realists describe the relation at the heart of their view as a non-representational relation.

How is representation a core part of what is defined as "Direct Realism"?

A factual statement about the contents of your sense organs and thoughts, not the facts of the objectivity of the world. — Corvus

That's the problem. How can a human know objective facts about a world that exists outside their subjective experiences. Kant said it isn't possible.
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Here you must realise that photons of light is also an abstraction — Corvus

I agree. All language is more figurative than literal.
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The cat cannot see the mouse without its eyes. — Corvus

Though perhaps the cat can also see the mouse in its imagination.
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I knew you were engaging in some sort of language games. — Corvus

Isn't everyone.

I really don't care to argue what someone means, or should mean, by "I see x". — flannel jesus

But it is impossible to look into someone else's mind. We can only know their beliefs from their words, and if they have defined words differently to us, it makes conversation problematic.
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I'm concerned primarily with the experience of it all - if a direct realist says "I see things as they really are", I don't see that as some opportunity for a semantic argument, to me it looks like an unambiguous statement about their visual experience — flannel jesus

However, I do agree that there does seem to be a substantive difference between Direct Realism and Indirect Realism.

An apple is illuminated by white light, and reflects the wavelengths from about 495nm to 570nm (which we call green) as it has absorbed the other wavelengths.

For example, as an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see a green apple", using the word "green" in a figurative rather than literal sense.

However, the Direct Realist seems to believe that the apple is literally green.

The Direct Realist wouldn't say that a mirror is literally a person because the mirror has reflected the image of a person, so why would the Direct Realist say that the apple is literally green, even though the apple has only reflected green light.

Am I right in thinking that the Direct Realist believes that the apple is literally green, and if they do, how do they justify such a belief?

Your distinction seems to me to be one without a difference because photons are of the external world, and if so, one is immediately and directly perceiving the external world — NOS4A2

This is more a question for the Direct Realist. Would they agree that perceiving photons of light entering the eye is what they mean by perceiving the external world?

This sounds like you are being pedantically sceptic here. — Corvus

Perhaps, but still making a factual statement.
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This point proves that the categorisation of indirect and direct realist is a myth. — Corvus

I perhaps agree, in that the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist are playing different language games. The Indirect Realist is correct within their language game, and the Direct Realist is correct within their language game.

No-one could "see" anything if photons of light didn't travel through space from an "apple" in the external world to the eye, followed by an electrical signal travelling from the eye to the brain, which is then somehow processed by the brain, and which then somehow enables the mind to "see" an "apple".

The Indirect Realist within their language game says "I see a representation of an apple", and the Direct Realist within their language game says "I see the apple"

However, it could well be the case that both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist mean exactly the same thing, but are using words defined in different ways.

For example, the Indirect Realist in their language game would say "I indirectly see my hand" and the Direct Realist in their language game would say "I directly see my hand", even though the underlying meaning is the same. IE, the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist are defining the words they use differently.

A conversation between the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist becomes difficult if each is defining the words they use differently.

It would be unreasonable to conclude that Mars doesn't exist just because it takes time for the photons of light to arrive at one's eyes. — Corvus

True, the photons of light that enter my eye were caused by something that existed in the past, and just because something existed in the past doesn't mean it still doesn't exist in my present.

Whilst the Indirect Realist is more of the position that I see the photons entering my eye which I can then reason to have been caused by something in the past, the Direct Realist is more of the position that they are immediately and directly seeing the external world as it really is.

Yet how can the Direct Realist be immediately and directly seeing the external world as it really is when there is no guarantee that what they are seeing still exists?

This is something that no one can verify, unless he could have a discussion with the cat about it. — Corvus

When you look into the night sky and see Mars, what you see no longer exists, as it takes time for the photons of light to travel through space.

And yet when you say "I see Mars", how can you be seeing the external world as it really is, when in fact what you are seeing no longer exists.

But you are definitely seeing something, and if you are not seeing the external world as it really is, all you can be seeing are the photons of light entering your eye, which you can then reason to have been caused by the Planet Mars.
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If there was no reasoning applied to the shapes and colour, you would have no idea what it is — Corvus

Yes, I must perceive shapes and colours before being able to reason that they were caused by the planet Mars.

IE, I cannot reason that .I am seeing Mars before photons of light have entered my eye.

There is still the body of the dead mouse in the external world where it died. — Corvus

Yes, but the cat is not seeing the external world "as it really is". What the cat is seeing is a representation of how the mouse used to.
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In perception, the most critical factor is the subjectivity, then objectivity. — Corvus

The cat is subjectively seeing a bright, lively mouse, but objectively the mouse is long dead and lifeless.
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You say "I see Mars", because you applied (with or without knowing) your reasoning onto the shapes and colours hitting your eyes. — Corvus

Yes, first photons of light enter my eye, I see shapes and colours and then reason that I am seeing Mars.

I am saying that the cat sees the mouse, not the photons of light. — Corvus

Try a thought experiment

There is a mouse and photons of light travel from it to a cat. It takes time for light to travel a distance.

By the time the cat sees the mouse, the mouse has unfortunately died, and yet the cat still sees the mouse.

How can the cat be seeing the external world as it really is, if in the external world there is no mouse?
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For the cat, photons of light is a fantasy invention by RussellA — Corvus

The fact that the cat doesn't know about photons of light doesn't mean the cat could see things in the absence of photons of light.
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You see a bright dot, and first you don't know what it is. — Corvus

Yes, first "I see shapes and colours" and subsequently, after using my powers of reasoning, "I see Mars".

IE, I can only say "I see Mars" after saying "I see shapes and colours"

How does cat know photons of light is the mouse? — Corvus

When someone looks into the night sky and sees a bright dot, how do they know that the bright dot has been caused by Mars rather than Venus say. They can only know by applying their powers of reasoning to the bright dot.

When a cat sees colours and shapes, how does the cat know that these colours and shapes have been caused by a mouse rather than a bird say. The cat can only know by applying its powers of reasoning to the colours and shapes.
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The cat sees the mouse. The cat doesn't care about the photons of light, does he? — Corvus

Are you saying the cat could see the mouse if no photons of light had travelled from the mouse to the cat?

“Sense data”, or “sense datum” in the singular, is a technical term in philosophy that means “what is given to sense” (SEP – Sense Data)

Are you saying that the cat could see the mouse in the absence of any sense data?

Are dogs and cats indirect realists or direct realists? — Corvus

According to the SEP article on Sense Data:

“Sense data”, or “sense datum” in the singular, is a technical term in philosophy that means “what is given to sense”. Sense data constitute what we, as perceiving subjects, are directly aware of in perceptual experience, prior to cognitive acts such as inferring, judging, or affirming that such-and-such objects or properties are present. In vision, sense data are typically described as patches exhibiting colours and shapes.

Presumably, when a cat sees a mouse, photons of light have travelled from the mouse to the cat, and the cat sees photons of light.

The photons of light are sense data, in that "what is given to sense".

How can the cat see the mouse in the absence of these sense data. How can the cat see the mouse in the absence of any photons of light travelling from the mouse to the cat?

I don't need anybody to jump through hoops to know what I'm saying when I say "I can see my house from here". — flannel jesus

The Indirect Realist is in part pointing out that language is more figurative than literal.

If one was being literal, the speaker would have said: "I can see the front wall of a house that I know for several reasons is mine, such as there is a pine tree in the front garden, not in the sense that I own the freehold of the house but rather rent out a room from the landlord, and when I say I see my house I don't mean that I can see the back of the house, or any of the rooms inside the house, but only that part of the front wall not obscured by the pine tree."

This would obviously make language unworkable, so the speaker reduces the literal sentence to the figurative sentence "I can see my house".

The average person knows what this means, because the average person knows about the figurative use of language.

The direct realist would say "I see what appears to be a bent stick, but I know it's really pretty straight, because I took it out of the water". — Janus

I would have thought that an Indirect Realist would also have said "I see what appears to be a bent stick".

The Merriam Webster Dictionary lists 23 different meanings of the word "see", including "to perceive by the eye" and "to imagine as a possibility". The expression "I see what appears to be" is quite complex. On the one hand it shows the poetic beauty of language but on the other hand it can be open to misinterpretation.

It depends on the meaning of "Direct Realism". Is there an authoritative definition of Direct Realism?

As a start, there is the SEP article The Problem of Perception

In 3.2.6, the article distinguishes between a causal form of direct realism and a phenomenological form of direct realism (PDR), something the Intentionalists are sympathetic to.

There is also Semantic Direct Realism (SDR).

Is there in fact any substantive difference between PDR and Indirect Realism?

At least on the forum, productive discussions of direct vs indirect realism tend to require pinning down where the disagreement is between disputants. — fdrake

Suppose in the world is the object "apple" and I perceive an "apple". In my mind, I am conscious of an "apple", and there is an intentionality within my mind about an "apple".

But I cannot perceive an object separate to its properties, in that I cannot perceive an "apple" separate to its properties, such as the colour green and a circular shape. If the object had no properties, then I wouldn't be able to perceive it in the first place.

This means that in fact I am not perceiving an object but rather a set of properties.

The Indirect Realist says that the object emitted a wavelength of 550nm which we perceive as the colour green.

In order for the Direct Realist to see the world as it really is, if they perceive a green object then the actual object must be green.

The question is, does the object emit a wavelength that the Indirect Realist perceives as green, or is the object green?

It depends on definition.

As the Direct Realists define an object that emits a wavelength of 550nm as a green object, by their own definition they are correct

As the Indirect Realists don't define an object that emits a wavelength of 550nm as a green object, by their own definition they are correct.

Even though they are playing different language games to each other, within their own language games they are both correct.

We have been dealing with the visual sense of the word, and I don't think it is going to help to bring in other senses of 'see'. — Janus

Perhaps this is the distinction between the Indirect Realist and the Direct Realist.

The Indirect Realist says that in the sentence "I see a straight stick that appears bent", the word "see" is being used as a figure of speech and not literally, as in "I can clearly see your future".

The Direct Realist says that there is no difference between a word being used as a figure of speech or literally.

Something like "the rock transfers more energy to the ground than a grain of sand upon collision" doesn't involve an agent. — fdrake

A rock falls and hits the ground, which increases in temperature of the ground by x deg. A grain of sand falls and hits the ground, which increases the temperature of the ground by y deg.

It is true that x and y don't require a human agent. The sticking point is "more than", in that "x is more than y".

How is the human concept "more than" expressed in a world absent of any human agent?

How objects present themselves is a hobby horse of mine.................Like I discover how heavy my dumbbell is by lifting it. — fdrake

We know that a rose is heavier than a mosquito and lighter than a pebble, because a human can discover this by lifting them.

Heavier and lighter can only exist as relations between objects.

If there were never humans, would a rose be heavier than a mosquito and lighter than a pebble? If yes, what would be the ontological nature of relations?

I note the recursion. If “I see mars” is a figure of speech “I am seeing mars” can’t be what it symbolises without an endless circle of self-referential justification. — AmadeusD

In the Present Simple tense I can say "I see Mars every evening in the night sky". In the Present Continuous tense I can then ask the question "how do I know that I am seeing Mars rather than Venus?"

I don't think that this is where the infinite regress is.

The homunculus problem arises because of a confusion about the relationship between "I" and "the image".

An object in the world such as an apple is not a Platonic Form floating around separate to its properties, such as is green, is circular and is sweet. If there were no properties then there would be no object.

Similarly, "I" is not a Platonic Form floating around the world separate to its properties, of which "image" would be one.

Internal to "I" must be "the image", otherwise "I" couldn't be conscious of it. If "the image" was external to "I", then "I" couldn't know about it in the first place.

"The image" is not separate to "I", and as circular is a property of the object apple, the image is a property of "I". The "image" is part of what makes "I".

IE, if "I see a red dot", where a red dot is an image, part of what gives "I" an identity is the image, in this case the image of a red dot.

There is no infinite regression.

Direct or indirect realism isn't epistemology, recall, they're philosophies of perception. — jkop

Disagree. Indirect and Direct Realism are part of epistemology.

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge. It is concerned with the mind’s relation to reality. What is it for this relation to be one of knowledge? Do we know things? And if we do, how and when do we know things?

(www.sheffield.ac.uk/)

While not without critics, direct realism forms a substantial part of epistemological theories, and it is important to understand both the arguments for and against this perspective.

(https: //studyrocket.co.uk)
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As long as the assumption is that you never see things directly, then skepticism follows. Not so for the direct realist. — jkop

I think everyone should be sceptical, whether the Indirect or Direct Realist. Who wants to unquestionably believe everything they are told.

As the Merriam Webster Dictionary writes:
Scepticism = 1) an attitude of doubt or a disposition to incredulity either in general or toward a particular object 2a) the doctrine that true knowledge or knowledge in a particular area is uncertain 2b) the method of suspended judgment, systematic doubt, or criticism characteristic of skeptics 3) doubt concerning basic religious principles (such as immortality, providence, and revelation).

Philosophers in particular should practice scepticism, including the Direct Realists.

Saying "I see Mars" is in effect saying that the photons which cause me to recognize that I am seeing Mars were reflected by Mars. — wonderer1

Yes, "I see Mars" is a figure of speech meaning "the photons which cause me to recognize that I am seeing Mars were reflected by Mars, travelling an average distance of 225 million km through space and taking between 3 and 22 minutes dependent upon the positions of the planets, meaning that I am not directly seeing photons from Mars as it is now but as it was in the past"

A figure of speech may be thought of as "is in effect saying".

I don't agree that they are equivalent. Naive realism is pre-scientific realism, — Janus

I agree the terms aren't equivalent, though they do have strong similarities. As the article Recent Work on Naive Realism by James Genone points out:

Naïve Realism is sometimes thought to be synonymous with ‘direct realism’ or ‘common sense realism’.................Nevertheless, this terminological ambiguity can be a source of
confusion.

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As organism we are part of the world, each organism sees the world directly via its perceptual apparatus—there is no question of distortion, no need to invoke indirectness — Janus

Suppose that there is a straight stick in a glass of water. We may perceive a bent stick sitting in a glass of water, yet can reason in our minds that the stick is in fact straight.

You say "each organism sees the world directly" It depends what you mean by "see". The word "see" can have several meanings. It could be literal as in "I see in my visual field a bright light", or it could be a figure of speech as in "I see your future, and it looks promising"

In a literal sense, "I see in my visual field a bent stick". As a figure of speech "I see in my mind a straight stick".

On the one hand "I see a bent stick" and on the other hand "I see a straight stick".

Both sentences are truth apt, but whether true or false depends on the meaning of the words used.

Stars, planets, moons etc. Indirect realists sees dots that represent stars, planets. The direct realist sees the stars and planets that may appear as dots, discs, or spheres etc depending on distance, available light etc. — jkop

When the Direct Realist looks up at the night sky, how can they say "I am looking at a star" if they don't know whether the dot they are looking at has been caused by a star or planet?

It cannot be the case that every Direct Realist knows what each and every dot in the night sky has been caused by.

It could be that a Direct Realist could say "I am looking at Mars", because they are knowledgeable about astronomy.

But what "I am looking at Mars" actually means is "I am looking at a dot in the night sky that I know has been caused by the planet Mars because of my prior knowledge about astronomy".

If the Direct Realist suggests that the dot "is" Mars, this reintroduces the problem of identity, in that how can a 1mm diameter dot in a person's visual field "be" a 6,794km diameter planet?

The direct realist doesn't see a dot in the visual field. — jkop

When looking up at the night sky, if the Direct Realist doesn't literally see dots in their visual field, what do they see?

I think it is less confusing to say that the little light you are seeing is Mars presenting itself, appearing, to you. Language may be representative, but seeing is not, and the analogy you present above is inapt. — Janus

Direct Realism is aka Naïve Realism. Indirect Realism is aka Representational Realism,.
(Wikipedia Direct and Indirect Realism)



The red dot represents Mars in the same way that a symbol of a house represents a house and the word "tree" represents a tree.
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I agree it is more parsimonious to simply say we see Mars — Janus

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist can look into the night sky and say "I see Mars"

The Indirect Realist means "I directly see a bright dot in the night sky through my eyes which I know to be the planet Mars". But who is going to say all that. It is far easier and perfectly acceptable just to say "I see Mars".

The Direct Realist means "I directly see a bright dot in the night sky through my eyes which is the planet Mars". In the same way, no-one is going to say all that. It is far easier and perfectly acceptable just to say "I see Mars".

Therefore, although both the Indirect and Direct Realist can say "I see Mars", what they mean by it is different.

The word "see" can be used in different ways in language. Metaphorically such as "I see your pain", meaning within the mind, and literally such as "I see a bright dot", meaning through the eyes.

Similarly, the word "is" can be used in different ways in language, including metaphorically "cheese is heavenly", as a definition "a unicorn is a mythical animal", ironically "spinach is delicious", as a description "the Eiffel Tower is a wrought-iron structure", etc.

When the Indirect Realist says "I see a bright dot", they are using "see" literally, but when they say "I see Mars" they are using the word "see" as a figure of speech, in that the bright dot is a representation of the planet Mars.

When the Direct Realist says "I see a bright dot", they are using "see" literally, and when they say "I see Mars" they are also using the word "see" literally, in that they they argue that they are seeing the external world as it really is.

The problem with Direct Realism is that it assumes an identity between what is seen and the cause of what is seen. It assumes an identity between the bright dot and the planet Mars, such that the bright dot "is" Mars, otherwise the Direct Realist could not see the external world as it really is.

And if this is the case, in that the bright dot "is" the planet Mars, how can a bright dot in the visual field have a mass of ${6.4 * 10^{23}kg}$?

I guess we just mean different things when we say 'looking at'. That's ok by me. — flannel jesus

:grin:

I suppose my confusion lies in whether the “representation” is a product of the perceiver or the percieved. — NOS4A2

Someone sees a dot in the sky and doesn't know what it is.

Later, from various observations over a period of time using the eye and scientific instruments the human reasons that the dot they see in the sky is in fact the Planet Mars.

The next time they see the dot in the sky, they know that the dot has been caused by the planet Mars. The dot isn't the planet Mars, but the dot in their visual field has been caused by the planet Mars. In a sense, the dot represents the planet Mars.

I don't see why it needs to be metaphorical. What else would "looking at" mean if not what I said? What I said was not metaphorical at all. — flannel jesus

Suppose there is a stick in a glass of water. If I said "I'm looking at a bent stick", there are two possible meanings to this statement. It could mean "I am perceiving a bent stick although the stick is in fact straight", or it could mean "I am perceiving a bent stick and in fact the stick is bent".

Similarly, if I said "I'm looking at Mars", to the Indirect Realist this means "I'm looking at a dot that I reason to be Mars" and to the Direct Realist this means "I'm looking at a dot that is Mars".

The Indirect Realist could ask of the Direct Realist, how can a dot be the planet Mars?