Are you familiar with Markus Gabriel's ideas? — Janus

No, but I will have a look.

From a quick scan on Wikipedia Markus Gabriel, I definately agree with:

"In an April 2020 interview he called European measures against COVID-19 unjustified and a step towards cyber dictatorship, saying the use of health apps was a Chinese or North Korean strategy."

"In a 2018 interview, Gabriel complained that "most contemporary metaphysicians are [sloppy] when it comes to characterizing their subject matter," using words like "the world" and "reality" "often...interchangeably and without further clarifications. In my view, those totality of words do not refer to anything which is capable of having the property of existence"

To be consistent, the indirect realist cannot say “rock”. The only meaning this term could mean by this theory is “some object” or “something”. — Richard B

As an Indirect Realist, I can say "I see a rock", because the rock I see exists as a concept in my mind. External to my mind is something, but it is not a rock.

In my mind, the rock exists in part as a direct perception and in part as part of language, neither of which are independent of any mind.

It's the same world viewed by different people with eyes in different places. — plaque flag

Relatively speaking.

There is the ontology of the nature of reality, in that, is the Neutral Monist correct when they argue that reality is elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time. There is the epistemological problem of how we know the nature of reality, given the problem that between our mind and the external world are our senses, and the senses alter any information arriving at our minds from the external world. But we can only discuss these things using language.

But language is a symbolic system, where words symbolise what they represent. Therefore, any understanding we get using language must be founded on a symbolic understanding, where, for example, the word "world" symbolises something else, in this case, the world.

This leads into the philosophical problem of where does language get its meaning. What does the word "world" actually mean. Is there an absolute meaning to "world", or is its meaning relative to its users.

If there is an absolute meaning to "world", then it cannot depend on the users of the language, as each user may use the word differently. Therefore it can only be found outside users of the language. But language wouldn't exist if there was no one to use it, leading to the inevitable conclusion that there can be no absolute meaning to the world "world".

Therefore, the meaning of "world" must be relative to the users of the language. But if meaning is relative to its users, the meaning of the word "world" depends on who is using it. Therefore, no one use is correct. My "world" may be different to your "world", meaning that there is no one meaning of "world" but many. In fact as many meanings as there are people using that language.

It is correct to say "she lives in her own world", where the world exists in the mind. It is correct to say "you are my world", where the world exist in a social community. It is correct to say "there is an unknown world out there", where the world exists external to any mind. It is also correct to say "there is only one world", where the world is the sum of all the above.

We may be worlds apart in our world view, but then again, the world is a strange and mysterious place.

So, all the indirect realist can say is “some object caused an idea of rock” and “some object caused an idea of cat.” Which then reduces to “some object caused an idea of some object.” We are left with some trivial generality that does not say much. — Richard B

The Indirect Realist would not say "some object caused an idea of some object", as that is presupposing objects like rocks exist in the external world. The Indirect Realist would say that "something caused the idea of a rock". From the position of Neutral Monism, that something is elementary particles and elementary forces in space-time.

One could reword as "something in the external world caused an idea of a rock in the mind"

But one could also say "something in the external world caused the idea of a pain in the mind".

I doubt that anyone would say that pains exist in the external world independently of any sentient being, so why suppose that rocks exist in the external world independently of any sentient being.

Why suppose that just because we perceive something it must exist in the external world.

We talk about the world we care about --- the world we all live in together. — plaque flag

I talk about my social world, which is something I care about. I talk about the external world, Planet Earth, etc, which is something I care about.

There are different worlds that I talk about.

Two people in the same room see the world through different pairs of eyes. But it's the same world. — plaque flag

Again, more than one world. The world from the person's perspective ,"see the world through different pairs of eyes" and the external world, "the same world".

The fact that I see a stick bent in water doesn't mean that in the external world the stick is bent in water.

Our talk has always been directed toward others and about the one and only world, so it's pretty strange to invent internal images of the world just to explain the fact that people can be mistaken sometimes. — plaque flag

If you see a stick bent in water, you are not mistaken in that you actually see a stick bent in water, but are mistaken in believing that the stick is actually bent in water

If what you saw is not an image, then you would be directly seeing the actual object in the external world.

Then how to explain the contradiction that on the one hand you are not seeing an image of a stick bent in water but directly seeing a stick bent in water and on the other hand are not seeing a stick bent in water.

How are you talking about it then ? It's a product of language, an empty negation. — plaque flag

The external world is not a product of language

I don't need language to be able to see things, there are many things I see that I don't know the name of.

There's nothing strictly wrong about indirect realism talk. It's just clumsy.............My view is that linguistic sociality is absolutely fundamental. — plaque flag

That we have language is not an argument against Indirect Realism

Indirect Realism is the view that you quoted in discussing Reid.

In perception, external objects such as rocks and cats causally affect our sense organs. The sense organs in turn affect the (probably, non-material) mind, and their effect is to produce a certain type of entity in the mind, an 'idea.' These ideas, and not external objects, are what we immediately perceive when we look out at the world. The ideas may or may not resemble the objects that caused them in us, but their causal relation to the objects makes it the case that we can immediately perceive the objects by perceiving the ideas.

As the passage shows, Indirect Realism isn't about the nature of language.

He opens by sketching indirect realism. Then he makes fun of it. He says fear of error becomes fear of truth. — plaque flag

Fear of error becomes fear of truth is not a reasoned argument.

The Indirect Realist could equally well have said the same.

His solution is to point out that we aren't on the other side of our sense to begin with ---that this was all just a silly unjustified assumption from the beginning. — plaque flag

To say that the Indirect Realist's position that we are separated from the external world by our senses is a silly unjustified assumption is not a very strong argument.

There must be a stronger argument against Indirect Realism that that.

For example, why does Hegel say that it a silly unjustified assumption.

There is just the one world that we all live in and see and talk about. — plaque flag

The world that we live in and the world that we talk about refer to different worlds. There is more than just one possible world.

When you say "one world that we all live in" this could apply to a world external to any mind. When you say "the world that we...........talk about", this could apply to the world of language within a social community.

In addition, there is the total world, comprising both minds and everything external to minds.

There is also the world as experienced by each individual. It must be the case that each individual perceives the world differently. I cannot believe that the world as experienced by a thirteen year old growing up in Soweto is the same world as experienced by a fifty year old merchant banker in Wall Street, as you seem to be suggesting.

The world that exists outside language is certainly very different to the world existing within language.

Yes we need our nervous systems to do this, but we are not trapped behind or in that nervous system — plaque flag

The Indirect Realist would agree that we are not trapped behind our senses, in that the Indirect Realist has no problem interacting with either other people or the external world.

The world is all that is the case because it is the articulated world we talk about, the shared world we articulate — plaque flag

It seems highly unlikely that for 13.7 billion years before humans first appeared, the Universe didn't exist because it wasn't talked about.

Yes, I need light to come from the apple to my retina. That's part of how I see the apple. But I don't see an image of the apple, and I don't see a private world in which the apple is given directly. I see the apple right there in our world, the world — plaque flag

A wavelength of 700nm enters the eye and an electric signal travels up the optic nerve to the brain.

How is it possible to directly know what is on the other side of our senses, when the information we receive in the brain has come to us indirectly ?

Say what now ? Is that a typo ? — plaque flag

No, certainly not a typo, as this is what I have been saying since page 2 of this thread.

The term "Indirect Realist" should be thought of as a name not a description, as some aspects of Indirect Realism are direct and some indirect.

I directly see a tree. There is no doubt about this. The question is, in what world is this tree. There are different worlds, i) the world in my mind ii) the world in the minds of a community iii) the world external to any mind iv) the world as a sum of all these. Problems arise in philosophical discussion when there is ambiguity in the meaning of "world". For example, Wittgenstein in Tractatus para 1 writes "the world is all that is the case.", and creates unnecessary debate by never explaining where this world is.

As Searle wrote:
The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

From Searle, the experience of seeing a tree does not have seeing a tree as an object because the experience of seeing a tree is identical with seeing a tree.

We talk about the object and not some private internal image of the object — plaque flag

Exactly, for both the Indirect and Direct Realist. The passage from the IEP is consistent with my statement that "As an Indirect Realist, I directly see a tree, I don't see the image of a tree."

From the IEP Objects of Perception section 2:
The indirect realist agrees that the coffee cup exists independently of me. However, through perception I do not directly engage with this cup; there is a perceptual intermediary that comes between it and me. Ordinarily I see myself via an image in a mirror, or a football match via an image on the TV screen. The indirect realist claim is that all perception is mediated in something like this way. When looking at an everyday object it is not that object that we directly see, but rather, a perceptual intermediary.

It comes down to the fact that there are different worlds that tend to coalesce into a vague and unspecified mystical unknown whenever Indirect and Direct Realism is discussed.

In the world in my mind I directly see a tree and in the world that exists independently of me I indirectly see a tree.

Here's Hegel. — plaque flag

In your support of Direct Realism you referred to Hegel. Hegel clearly sets out the problem with Direct Realism in the passage linked to above.

But what is Hegel's solution to the problem of how can we know what is truly the other side of our senses, when our senses alter what we know about what is the other side of our senses ?

Is it socially acceptable to hit a machine that is providing medical assistance to a human being? Probably not, and it would be nonsense to assume the machine has a concept of human pain. — Richard B

No, it wouldn't be, not because of the pain it would cause to the machine, but because of the pain it would cause to the human if they didn't receive medical assistance.

It is also not sociably acceptable to hit pets, not because of the pain it would cause to its owner, but because of the pain it would cause to the animal.

Your pet does not need a concept of digestion in order for it to digest food — Richard B

Neither do humans. But there cannot be any doubt that pets have the concept of hunger, as well as pain, even though they don't have a verbal language with the words hunger and pain.

They are living creatures, not machines, which is why it is not socially acceptable to hit pets as it is socially acceptable to hit machines.

Your use of we is a tacit acknowledge of that inferential norms are public — plaque flag

Exactly, the Indirect Realist believes that there is a world the other side of their senses, an inferential world. A conclusion reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning, not because we have direct knowledge of it.

Hegel was setting up that bowling pin to knock it down. — plaque flag

Hegel clearly sets up the problem - here - as to how we know what is the other side of our senses.

The Indirect Realist argues in Hegel's terms that there is knowledge on one side and an Absolute on the other side.

Within the quote forwarded, Hegel says that this is a presupposition, yet gives no reason or justification why this is a presupposition rather than a fact. He makes a statement.

How does Hegel explain how we can have direct knowledge of the Absolute the other side of our senses, yet such knowledge can only come through our senses, and our senses alter anything that passes though ?

Solipsism can be seen as parasitic upon common sense because it relies on common sense assumptions in order to even be formulated. — plaque flag

The Indirect Realist is not a Solipsist. Indirect Realism is the philosophical idea that other minds exist.

It is absurd to make the sense organs the product of the sense organs because it is a circular
argument. — plaque flag

Neither the Indirect nor Direct Realist would argue that their perceptions are of their sense organs rather than what has passed through their sense organs.

As an Indirect Realist, I directly see a tree, I don't see the image of a tree.

As I see it, the whole idea that the self is some gremlin in a control room, redeyed peeping at screens, only guessing at what lives outside its bunker, is a wacky viral meme. — plaque flag

There is the screen, which are the senses. The question is, how do we have knowledge of what is on the other side of the screen, the other side of the senses.

Hegel presented the problem in The Phenomenology of Mind where he wrote:
For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process, and has in view, a moulding and alteration of it.
Or, again, if knowledge is not an instrument which we actively employ, but a kind of passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium.

The problem is, how do we know what exists on the other side of our senses independently of our senses, when all the information about what is on the other side of our senses comes through our senses.

The "Realist" in Indirect Realist means that the Indirect Realist believes that there is a real world the other side of one's senses, and that we can certainly be eaten by alligators. The Direct Realist also believes we can be eaten by alligators. The Indirect Realist and Direct Realist agree that we can only know about alligators through our senses. The Indirect and Direct Realist disagree about in which world this alligator exists. There are different worlds, i) inside the mind, ii) inside the minds of a community, iii) external to any mind and iv) the sum of all these.

My question to the Direct Realist remains. How can we know what is truly the other side of our senses, when, as Hegel pointed out, our senses alter what we know about what is the other side of our senses ?

Animals of all sort have no conception of pain but do a good job of avoiding fire. — Richard B

If animals are able to avoid pain but without any conception of pain, then they are no more than automatons, machines. If animals are no more than machines, as it would not be morally reprehensible to hit a machine with a hammer, society would not be disapproving of animal cruelty.

Society is disapproving of animal cruelty because society accepts that animals do have the concept of pain, even if the animal has no verbal language to express it.

For example, see the article Animal cognition and the evolution of human language: why we cannot focus solely on communication

But it's not. I claim that you've simply adopted bad assumptions from a more primitive era of philosophy. — plaque flag

The self this side of the senses may be in part shaped by what is on the other side of the senses from information passing through the senses, but the self doesn't exist the other side of its senses.

That is, not unless one has the belief in telekinesis, psychic empathy and the paranormal.

So the person that sees (which is the person that talks about what is seen) is not stuffed in a brain, not trapped behind or as sensations. — plaque flag

That's the problem. The self is this side of our senses, and society is the other side of our senses.

How can we know what exists on the other side of our senses independently of our senses, when we can only know what is on the other side of our senses through our senses.

If a human doesn't learn a language, I don't know how much we can say about them in this context (they would be almost like wild animals?). — plaque flag

I hope you are not inferring that it is ok to kick dogs, in the event that dogs don't have the concept of pain because they have no language.

@plaque flag

A concept, a word becomes alive with meaning when a community has a use for it. — Richard B

I agree that a concept becomes alive when a community has a use for it, but a concept may still have a private meaning even if a community doesn't have a use for it

If Wittgenstein can use the analogy of a beetle, I will use the analogy of the desert island. Suppose there is someone who has lived their life alone on a desert island. If it is the case that "There are no private concepts.", he has never had the private concept of pain, and has been putting his hand into the fire badly burning it over the years. This is not something that has concerned him if he has no private concept of pain.

Unbeknownst to him, someone else had also been living in isolation on the far side of the island and one day by chance they meet up in the middle of the island.

Now that there are two people, there is a community, a society. Because there is a community, the concept pain takes on a public meaning within the community.

My question is, where exactly is this public concept of pain, if neither of the individuals has the private concept of pain ?

More than any other animal we live in a symbolic realm that we cocreate copreserve and codestroy. — plaque flag

The idea that more than any other animal we live in a symbolic realm is something a supporter of Indirect Realism would say, something that I would say.

There are no private concepts. — plaque flag

So I learnt my concepts of time and space, good and bad, red and green, easy and difficult, slow and fast, love and hate, freedom and subjugation, clarity and confusion, hot and cold, loud and quiet, justice and inequity, truth and falsity, etc. from society.

But where did society get its concepts from if not from the members of that society ?

That's where he shows those with eyes to see that meaning is public, concepts are norms. Beetles don't supply meaning. Back then, it made more sense to think Wittgenstein was crazy. — plaque flag

Without private meaning and private concepts there would be no public meaning and public concepts.

If no one ever had the private experience of pain, no one would have any concept of pain, and pain would not mean anything to anyone. In that event, pain would never be discussed in any public language.

Pain is only discussed in a public language because of the private experience of pain..

Wittgenstein's beetle in the box analogy explains in part how private experience is linked to public language.

A metaphysician 'introspects' and talks about 'Experience' and 'Representation,' which are understood to be private and immaterial and impossible to see from the outside. — plaque flag

Wittgenstein's para 293 of Philosophical Investigations and the beetle in the box analogy may be able to answer your question better than me.

Why this shift toward talk ? — plaque flag

Because your position throughout this thread has been that "what really matters are linguistic norms", where these linguistic norms are "within/by human communities", yet linguistic norms have nothing to do with the nature of Direct Realism.

See how you are holding me to linguistic norms, asking me to justify/defend my moves in social space ? — plaque flag

I agree with you that linguistic norms are part of the language game in social space. However, as your own resource sensibly laid out - here - linguistic norms are not part of what Direct Realism is about.

As we can talk about "The Big Bang" without suggesting that linguistic norms were part of what "The Big Bang" was about, we can talk about Direct Realism without suggesting that linguistic norms are part of what Direct Realism is about.

People should be held to linguistic norms when talking about something, but because we use linguistic norms when talking about something, this doesn't mean that what is being talked about has linguistic norms.

This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough).

Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world. In contrast to this direct awareness, indirect realism and representationalism claim that we are directly aware only of internal representations of the external world.
...
Direct realists might claim that indirect realists are confused about conventional idioms that may refer to perception. Perception exemplifies unmediated contact with the external world; examples of indirect perception might be seeing a photograph, or hearing a recorded voice. Against representationalists, direct realists often argue that the complex neurophysical processes by which we perceive objects do not entail indirect perception. These processes merely establish the complex route by which direct awareness of the world arrives. The inference from such a route to indirectness may be an instance of the genetic fallacy. — plaque flag

We both agree with your resource laying out Direct and Indirect Realism. But you must admit it makes no reference to language, linguistics or language games in distinguishing Indirect from Direct Realism.

The direct realist tries to do without this internal image, but not without sense organs. The direct realist is not so much focused on how the eyes see the tree and not the image of the tree, even if they will put the event this way. What really matters are linguistic norms. The 'I' that sees the tree exists within the space of reasons. The 'I' is like a character on a stage among others egos. Direct realists aren't worried about the internal structure of this 'I.' That's not the point. Language is fundamentally social, world-directed, and self-transcending. To see the tree is more usefully understand as to claim 'I see a tree.' We now think of this claim as a move in a social game. — plaque flag

So why keep introducing references to language, linguistics and language games.

Why say that what really matters are linguistic norms, when linguistic norms are not part of what distinguishes Indirect from Direct Realism, according to your resource.

It would make sense that the brain evolved to make us believe we are directly interacting with the world even if it is really a virtual world — lorenzo sleakes

:up:

I suggest dropping that terminology. External to what ? — plaque flag

This resource offers what I am talking about (or close enough). — plaque flag

The term "external" comes from the resource you recommended.

Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

No, I was switching between provisionally explaining the argument that perception is linguistic as if it were true, and expressing doubts about it. This should be obvious. — Jamal

Though you cannot doubt that perception is linguistic, as previously you wrote "It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are."

There's just the world, our world, the one we talk about. — plaque flag

Yes, this relates back to the Kant passage, but it doesn't address the question as to whether we have indirect or direct knowledge of this world.

The point is that concepts are public norms. The concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience. — plaque flag

If the concept pain doesn't get its meaning from private experience, I stub my toe and feel pain, where does it get its meaning from ?

The self is not 'behind' the senses or its data. The self is (I claim) a discursive performance of the body, a creative appropriation of community norms. — plaque flag

I don't think that "the self" is normally defined as part an individual and part the community in which they live.

Respectfully, I claim that you don't yet understand the position. 'Mind-independent world' is potentially nonsensical, almost definitely misleading. 'Private experiences' too. — plaque flag

You quote: Direct realism, also known as naïve realism or common sense realism, is a theory of perception that claims that the senses provide us with direct awareness of the external world.

Isn't an external world a mind-independent world ?

RussellA perceives direct realists only indirectly: the direct realist in his head does not resemble the direct realist as it is in the external world — Jamal

It seems you are redefining Direct Realism to include linguistics in a way not generally used in the literature, for example, SEP The Problem of Perception.

Closest I can come is to imagine how perception works when we're wrapped up in a physical activity, like running to catch a ball or playing an instrument (or hammering of course). These don't seem very linguistic to me, though I could well be wrong. I'm not committed to perception-as-essentially-linguistic — Jamal

It's a deeper point than that, to do with the fact that in situations of perceiving we are always already linguistic, because of what we are. — Jamal

You say that on the one hand you're not committed to perception as essentially linguistic but on the other hand you say that perception is linguistic.

Regardless, Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not about the nature of language.

We can talk about the world and just be wrong sometimes. — plaque flag

Which world are you referring to, the world as we perceive it, or the world as it is independent of our perception of it.

These 'private experiences' are tooth fairies. The 'mindindependent world' is Candyland. — plaque flag

Are you saying you have no private experiences, you stub your toe and feel no pain ?
Are you saying the Universe didn't exist for the 13.8 billion years before humans appeared on Earth, 315,000 years ago ?

I think Kant gets something right. — plaque flag

I agree with the Kant passage about cognition, in that the mind needs information from the other side of our senses, but this doesn't address the question as to whether this information is indirect or direct.

We perceive pain and we perceive a tree.

The Direct Realist says that our private perception of a tree is a direct presentation of something existing in a mind-independent world.

Wouldn't it follow, if Direct Realism is true, that our private perception of pain is also a direct presentation of something existing in a mind-independent world.

Presumably an indirect realist is not just mumbling about their internal illusion but trying to share news about the 'real' world (or whatever an indirect realist wants to call the one we live in together). — plaque flag

It is curious that language, a representational system, where words are symbols, is being used as an explanation of Direct Realism, an explicitly non-representational system.

Language is needed to talk about Direct Realism, but language should not be confused with Direct Realism. Language is antithetical to Direct Realism. Although language may be used to understand the planet Venus, this does not mean that the planet Venus is a feature of language. Similarly, as language may be used to understand Direct Realism, this does not mean that Direct Realism is a feature of language.

I can directly feel pain and I can directly see a tree independently of any private or public language . There are many things I see that I don't know the word for. Private experiences don't depend for their existence on language.

What is Direct Realism. It isn't about language. From the SEP article on The Problem of Perception para 3.4.1 Naive Realism in Outline one reads:

1) Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases where you genuinely perceive objects as they actually are. At Level 1, naive realists hold that such experiences are, at least in part, direct presentations of ordinary objects. At Level 2, the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.

2) For the naive realist, insofar as experience and experiential character is constituted by a direct perceptual relation to aspects of the world, it is not constituted by the representation of such aspects of the world. This is why many naive realists describe the relation at the heart of their view as a non-representational relation.

Direct Realism is the position that private experiences are direct presentations of objects existing in a mind-independent world, not that within social communities there are language games.

The social group is part of the world not external to it. — Richard B

It depends which "world" you are referring to. Sometimes philosophers talk about the "world" without specifying exactly where they think it is. For example, Wittgenstein in Tractatus writes in para 1 "The world is everything that is the case.", yet never explains where he thinks this world is.

There are different "worlds". There is the world within my mind, there is the world in the collective minds of a social group sharing a common language, there is the world external to any mind and there is the world that is the sum of all of these.

It's all around us. It's the world. It's the one philosophers talk about and make claims about.......................We have to be talking rationally in a shared language about a shared world. — plaque flag

Your posts are about the relationship between the individual and a social world of which they are a part, of which language is critical.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree about the importance of language.

The problem is, however, the relationship between the social group and the world external to the social group, and whether the social group have indirect or direct knowledge of this external world.

The Direct Realist would say that the tree exists in a mind-independent world exactly as we perceive the tree to be in our minds. The Indirect Realist would disagree.

This assumption of the instrument/medium is what's being mocked as a fear of truth that confuses itself for a fear of error.

With suchlike useless ideas and expressions about knowledge, as an instrument to take hold of the Absolute, or as a medium through which we have a glimpse of truth, and so on ..., we need not concern ourselves. — plaque flag

Considering that we only get our knowledge about the external world through our senses, it seems very cavalier for Hegel to write that we need not concern ourselves about the role our senses play in understanding the external world.

But what he presents is no discovery. — plaque flag

I agree. As an Indirect Realist I agree with Searle that the experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain.

Unfortunately, many who argue against Indirect Realism don't accept this. They believe that Indirect Realism requires that there must be something in the brain that is interpreting incoming data, something they often call a homunculus.

We talk about the world (directly) in our language according to our rational and semantic norms...A philosopher (in that role) can't deny it. He'd be talking about our world or just babbling. — plaque flag

I agree that we rationally and directly talk about the world.

The question is, where is this "world". Wittgenstein, for example, in Tractatus avoided this question.

The Indirect Realist would agree that this "world" exists in language. But this doesn't distinguish the Indirect Realist from the Direct Realist.

What else distinguishes the Direct Realist from the Indirect Realist ?

Here's Hegel.
For if knowledge is the instrument by which to get possession of absolute Reality, the suggestion immediately occurs that the application of an instrument to anything does not leave it as it is for itself, but rather entails in the process, and has in view, a moulding and alteration of it.
Or, again, if knowledge is not an instrument which we actively employ, but a kind of passive medium through which the light of the truth reaches us, then here, too, we do not receive it as it is in itself, but as it is through and in this medium. — plaque flag

Hegel sets out the Indirect Realist's problem with bridging the gap between our conscious mind on the one side and a mind-independent world on the other, between knowledge and the Absolute.

Whether knowledge is an instrument or passive medium to bridge the gap, it alters what passes from a mind-independent world to our conscious mind, meaning that our perceptions are indirect..

Perhaps you can find those that call themselves 'direct realists' that do this, but to me this is the wrong way to go and misses what's good in 'my' take on direct realism. — plaque flag

What's your take on Direct Realism ?

There is debate among modern interpreters over whether Kant is an indirect realist — Jamal

Philosophers have made good livings from arguing as to what Kant meant. Early twentieth-century philosophers of perception presented their direct realist views of perceptual experience in anti-Kantian terms. Today, some philosophers attempt to place Direct Realism within a Kantian framework by arguing that Kant can be read as a conceptualist rather than non-conceptualist.

Perhaps the debate comes down to the two varieties of Direct Realism, the early 20th C Phenomenological Direct Realism and the contemporary Semantic Direct Realism. Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR) may be described as a direct perception and direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world. Semantic Direct Realism (SDR) may be described as an indirect perception but direct cognition of the object "tree" as it really is in a mind-independent world.

He explicitly states that we perceive the external world "immediately," and what he calls representations constitute the perception and determination of objects, rather than standing in for them as images or constructions. We have awareness of objects not through anything like an inference from or construction of an internal image, but through an act of synthesis that puts the objects directly before us. — Jamal

Both the Indirect Realist and Direct Realist would agree that we perceive the world "immediately".

As Searle wrote: The relation of perception to the experience is one of identity. It is like the pain and the experience of pain. The experience of pain does not have pain as an object because the experience of pain is identical with the pain. Similarly, if the experience of perceiving is an object of perceiving, then it becomes identical with the perceiving. Just as the pain is identical with the experience of pain, so the visual experience is identical with the experience of seeing.

As an Indirect Realist, I feel pain, I don't feel the representation of pain. Similarly, when I see a tree, I directly see the tree, I don't see the representation of a tree.

The Indirect Realist differs to the Direct Realist. The Indirect Realist argues that the tree I see exists only this side of the senses, whereas the Direct Realist would argue that there is also an identical tree the other side of my senses.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist perceive the world "immediately", though they differ as to where exactly this world is.

And yes, he does use "realism" to refer to claims that we can know things in themselves — Jamal

I assume we both agree that Kant was not an Berkelean Idealist, where physical objects are constructions of the mind. Kant's transcendental idealism may be described as, on the one hand as a rejection of Berkelean idealism, and on the other hand that the things we perceive exist independently of us and about which we cannot directly cognize, yet grounds the way they appear to us.

In other words, for Kant, "Existence", in that there are things-in-themselves, "Humility", in that we know nothing of things-in-themselves and "Affectation", in that things -in-themselves causally affect us.

For Kant, the noumenal realm is not reality, since it is merely a product of reason. Rather, reality is that which we know about through experience and science. The clue to this is that reality for Kant is one of the categories of the understanding, thus it can only apply to phenomena. — Jamal

You are making the case for Indirect Realism.

For the Direct Realist, perceptual reality is the noumenal world, the other side of our senses, where there are things in a world outside our mind that are perceived immediately or directly rather than inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

For the Indirect Realist, perceptual reality is the phenomenal world, this side of our senses, where things outside our mind are perceived indirectly and inferred on the basis of perceptual evidence.

In summary, for both Kant and the Indirect Realist, perceptual reality is the phenomenal world this side of the senses whereas for the Direct Realist perceptual reality is the noumenal world , the other side of our senses.

I don't even know if minds exist. — Moliere

It would be difficult to have thoughts without a mind.

That one's easy -- pain is tied to the world — Moliere

The same question. If both pain and the colour red are tied to the world, how does the Direct Realist know that the object of one perception, eg pain, doesn't exist outside the mind, but the object of another perception, eg red, does exist outside the mind.

I would say "There is a real world" -- "out there" in particular is troublesome. Out where? — Moliere

According to Realism, there is a real world out there that exists independently of the mind's perception of it. According to Idealism, there isn't a real world out there that exists independently of the mind's perception of it.

If we directly perceive entities, but we do not directly perceive causal chains, then this is still a form of direct realism. — Moliere

Neither the Indirect nor Direct Realist when perceiving a red post-box, just from the perception itself, are able to perceive the causal chain going backwards in time. The Indirect Realist accepts this, the Direct Realist doesn't.

That's where I was going with my notion of the surface: so there is a case rather than the positions in abstract. — Moliere

In a sense, we can only see the surface, we can only see the red post-box, We cannot directly see the substratum beneath the surface, the thing outside our mind, the other side of our senses, the thing that caused us to see a red post-box.

Is it really so strange ? Philosophy can even be framed as a series of creative misreadings or violent appropriations of influences. — plaque flag

True, I used the writings of Searle, a Direct Realist, against Direct Realism.

So Hegel fixed Kant and offered a sophisticated kind of direct realism — plaque flag

Hegel's Absolute Idealism is not at odds with Indirect Realism.

Abandon all hope ye who enter here take private mental images seriously — plaque flag

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist believe in the private mental image, in that in the mind we have private experiences, such as pain, that are impossible to explain to others. The Indirect Realist is not someone who needs to believe in Wittgenstein's private language or solipsism, but does believe that they are part of a social world within which they are able to communicate using a public language.

What distinguishes the Indirect and Direct Realist is the location of this "world". Both the Indirect and Direct Realist agree that at the least this "world" exists in the mind. The disagreement is whether an identical "world" exists outside the mind.

There is no need to decide that color is unreal because it is correlated with wavelengths, etc. — plaque flag

The colour red is real in our mind and the wavelength is real outside our mind.

We agree that the colour red this side of our senses is correlated with a wavelength the other side of our senses.

The Indirect Realist believes that the colour red and the wavelength are different. How does the Direct Realist justify that two things which are commonly accepted as being different are in fact the same.