1. Is redundant with the term ‘reality’
2. Does not completely capture its colloquial usage (e.g., saying “bob’s claim is true” makes less sense if ‘truth’ is ‘reality’, as it is implying that it is true in virtue of the fact that bob’s claim corresponds with reality—but ‘true’ no longer relates to correspondence under your definition). — Bob Ross

I don't think you made a strong enough case for me to agree with these. I can definitely see some agreeing with you, but not the majority. But this is a minor quibble.

3. Every deployed use of ‘true’ is contingent on a thinking being: there is no example where someone would say something is true without that something being related to thought. E.g., ‘that is true’ refers to a claim someone made and is useless as a proclamation if there was no claim made. — Bob Ross

If you said "some" instead of every, I would be in full agreement. As it stands truth is often referred to things objectively outside of our thoughts. I can say, "Its true that the universe would exist without me." and, "Its true that there are things existent outside of our thoughts". Am I right? That's a question of knowledge. The truth is what exists despite my statements.

Very simply Bob, I'll divide truth into two concepts. Subjective truth, and objective truth. Subjective truth is the experience of a subject. Objective truth does not care about a subjects experience or thoughts. A subject or subjects subjective truth are also objectively true, as it does not matter if another subject is aware of those subjective experiences. This is a normative notion of truth that will be accepted by the majority of the people.

Under my view, I am not saying that truth is relative (e.g., that there is my truth and your truth, and they can be contradictory but equally true); I am not saying that if I died right now, that truth would no longer exist, for there are other subjects which still exist. So long is there is at least one thinking being, I would say truth exists; but if all subjects died, then there is no truth (and, within the hypothetical where there are no subjects, there is certainly no use for describing things within it as ‘true’ or ‘false’: everything just is). — Bob Ross

Perhaps its your approach that's the problem. Lets look at the notion of noting that the descriptor of true and false would not need to exist if there were no beings that. Why is that special for truth? That's the case for all words. Reality, belief, knowledge, and dog. Without any subjects, there is no use in describing anything, everything just is. And what "just is" is truth. Just as the descriptor of "what is and is man's best friend" is a dog. Your notion is just describing that we create identities, and without people to create identities, identities wouldn't exist. That's not a reason to change the identify of truth as "what is".

I said its true because what you are thinking is "what is". What you think, is "what is". The fact that you are having a thought is true

Yes, but whether it is true that you are thinking is not, for you, dependent on your thought (that you are thinking) corresponding to reality, such that you really are thinking. For you, it just has to be the case that you are thinking. Now, of course, if there are no thinking beings, then the claim, under your view, would be false—but not because the claim that “you are thinking” does not correspond to reality but, rather, because it simply is not the case. Even saying ‘it is not the case’, to me, implies that something did not correspond to reality, which, under view, is irrelevant to whether it is true or not. — Bob Ross

You've noted that simplicity and coherency are a virtue of knowledge. I can say truth is what exists. There is subjective truth, my experience, and objective truth, that which is outside of my experience. Its simple, coherent, and everyone understands it. Bob, I'm not sure what you were trying to say in the above paragraph. Did you say anything above that couldn't just be resolved to the normative notion I put forward?

I am not saying that thinking is not a part of reality, my correspondence theory applies to everything in reality; so I am thinking iff my thought that I am thinking corresponds to reality such that I am actually thinking. This process applies subjective acts just as much as anything else. — Bob Ross

As I noted early, this is a simple observation that without subjects, identities created by subjects don't exist. It doesn't mean the things we were identifying don't exist outside of us. And its surely not any justification for why we should suddenly stop calling the identity of "things that exist outside of us" objective truth. It doesn't give a reason to stop saying, "My subjective truth is my experience". Even the notion of subjective truth is objectively true. What I am thinking is what I am thinking, even if I believe I am not thinking it.

n your analogy, I found nothing wrong with it (other than that I do not think that a tree literally falls, a physical sense, when no one is conscious of it: but I doubt we want to get into that right now). — Bob Ross

We may have to, as I think this is the crux. Identities are our representations of what is real so we can understand them. What is real does not cease to exist just because our identities do. A tree is a combination of matter and energy. A tree falling is a state change of that matter and energy. Whether we're there to observe and identity it or not, that matter and energy exists, and has a state change.

I can say this using normative language, and its clear for everyone to understand. You note that reality exists apart from subjects. Aren't we essentially saying the same thing, but I'm able to do so more efficiently?

I think we are missing the forest through the trees here and I'm going to back out a bit to focus on the key points that I think are relevant to the discussion.

So, for you, truth persists when there are no subjects, because it is just what is. — Bob Ross

Lets keep it extremely simple. I view this as the normative view of truth. If you disagree with me, that's fine. But from my part, this is what I hold. Why should I not hold this? What does your view of truth introduce that solves problems of knowledge, or clarifies confusion in epistemology?

(Philosophim)Truth exists within the subject and despite the subject.

Truth still exists despite a subject, under my view, but not despite of all subjects. — Bob Ross

I don't understand this statement. Can you clarify the latter part?

(Philosophim)If you have a thought that corresponds with reality, that thought is true

The thought, under you view, isn’t true by corresponding: it is known; what is true is whatever is claimed is—but the thought is irrelevant to whether it is true or not. You have removed the subject from truth. — Bob Ross

First, let me add the follow up to that quoted statement. I said its true because what you are thinking is "what is". What you think, is "what is". The fact that you are having a thought is true. This is when truth involves the subject. But you seem to be entirely negating the idea of truth that exists apart from the subject. It is normative to hold that if a tree falls in a forest and no one hears it, it makes an air vibration. The vibration of the air is sound to an observer. Do we need the subject to interpret the vibration of the air into something else? Yes. That is the truth of the observers experience of that sound.

But the lack of the observer does not negate the air's vibration when the tree falls. That is also true. How does your view of truth that needs a subject handle this?

You think because we can note that our subjective experience is true, that the truth of that subjective experience suddenly means all truth is tied to our subjective experience

Not at all. Simply because we obtain something as true, it does not follow that it is subjective; nor that it is contingent on the subject whatsoever. Just because I obtain that there is a ball in my room, the balls existence is not thereby contingent on me. I am saying that truth itself is an emergent property of subjects uncovering the world (in a more aristotilian definition) because of the previous reasons I already outlined. — Bob Ross

Bob, this is a contradiction. You can't say that truth is not contingent on the subject, then say that it is an emergent property of the subject. And if it does necessitate the subjects claim about the world, this fits in with the normative notion of knowledge, not truth. This seems confusing and removes cohesion.

I'll also address this part about illusions.

Under your term, illusions are a part of truth; but it is odd: isn’t it? What aspect of illusions makes them true (in the sense that that a part of reality is illusion) and them false (in the sense of what they are)? Within your definition, there is no way to account for this other than saying that an illusion, as an illusion, is real (and in the truth), but that to say whatever the illusion pretends to be is real is false because it isn’t. — Bob Ross

The truth is your experience of the illusion as is. What isn't true is when you assume physical characteristics as being real after only experiencing the visual illusion. Its not that the illusion is pretending to be something false. Its that our minds are jumping to improper conclusions that aren't real. That claim is false despite our justification, and despite our knowledge.

But I don't want to get off track here, as I think the crux comes down to your idea that truth must have a subject. The major note here is the contradiction I pointed out. Either you're holding something that cannot be true, or it just needs to be explained more clearly.

I will grant that many people do think of truth as just what is, but many also think of it as an agreement between thought and what is.
This is easily reflected by looking up the word ‘truth’ in the webster dictionary, where #1 reflects your definition (i.e., ‘ the body of real things, events, and facts’) and #2 mine (i.e., ‘the property (as of a statement) of being in accord with fact or reality’). — Bob Ross

The property of being in accord with fact or reality is another way of saying truth is reality. For example, if I stated, "That apple is red, is that true?" I'm asking the truth assessment of the property, or whether this is in accordance with reality. In no way does this definition imply thought. The idea of tying thoughts themselves with truth is philosophy, and a different take on truth. I'm not saying you can't change the norm of truth, but the norm of truth is what is real, not the marriage of our thoughts and what is real.

1. Using ‘truth’ as interchangeable with ‘reality’ is redundant vocabulary. There’s no reason to have two words for the same thing, and ‘reality’ is a much better word (when compared to ‘truth’) for what one is describing. It is generally accepted that semantics should avoid redundant terms, and this is a text book example of two words which serve verbatim the same meaning (and aren’t even synonyms: they are literally equivalent under this sort of view). — Bob Ross

I do not see them as redundant. Reality is a general descriptor of experience. It is the "what is" that everyone understands at a primitive level. Reality is much like the term, "tree". Truth is a higher order descriptor. It is more carefully thought out, and describes a particular notion of reality. After all, an illusion is a real experience. But truth carefully describes how it is real in an objective manner. A visual illusion is a real experience of our senses, but we make unconfirmed assumptions about the physical aspects of the experience that aren't true. Truth is more refined in its description of that particular tree because it takes both the subjective and objective existence of the tree into question. Yes, they can overlap at times, but truth is a useful and different enough identity to matter in conversation. It is more about the context of the terms. Reality is generic, truth is more stringent.

2. Using ‘truth’ as interchangeable with ‘reality’ doesn’t completely capture what is meant by ‘truth’ in society. If someone is on trial and they make claim X and I say “they are right about X” (or “X is true” or “they are in the truth”), then it wouldn’t complete for those to merely express that “there exists X (in reality)” but, rather, the whole meaning is that that person’s thoughts corresponded to X (in reality). — Bob Ross

If a person is on trial and someone said their thoughts were corresponding to reality, a good lawyer would counter with, "But how do you know?" Such statements require proof, which is the realm of knowledge. It can be true that our thoughts correspond with reality, but knowledge is the process that demonstrates how this is possible. Truth does not require justification. Truth simply is. It is when we claim that something is true that we require justification. This is again, at the heart of the Gettier argument. I can have a thought that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket. Its true that he does. But the justification which lead me to believe that Jones has 5 coins in his pocket is false. So again, truth requires no justification, truth is simply "what is". As such, I see no need to tie it solely to one's subjective experience.

This is even more self-evident if I were to re-write my claim (in this example) a bit odder: “there exists X in reality, and what that person said (which was X) matches X so what they said is true”--the claim that it was ‘true’ is derived from the correspondence of their assertion with reality and not merely from it being in reality. — Bob Ross

This agrees with what I've noted. Truth is "what is". A person can claim something which matches with reality, so what they said is true. Its just an observation, not a justification. In this case a correspondence and it being real is the same thing. For if it was not real, we could not correspond.

3. There’s no use for the term ‘truth’ if there were no subjects. We already have a term for what a world is without ‘subjects’ (or with them as well): reality; and there is absolutely no such thing as any claim being ‘true’ without subjects, so ‘true’, as a term, is now obsolete. — Bob Ross

In this case, yes, they are synonyms. "It is reality that I believe the visual illusion means something physical is there, but my belief is not true." "It is true that I believe the visual illusion means something physical is there, but my belief is not real." Even in this synonym case, it is useful to have a separate term to hammer home the intention. Keeping it all the same word just makes the statement more confusing.

I think they can and are separate: my thought (or held belief) is not truth, for truth is the correspondence of that thought (or held belief) with reality. — Bob Ross

But is it not practically the same to say, "For truth is what is real?" Because if my thoughts did not correspond with reality, I wouldn't have the truth. For the truth is what is real regardless of whether my thoughts correspond to it or not. What you're trying to do is make truth dependent on the subject. Which violates the normative definition of truth which includes both the subjective and objective. Truth exists within the subject and despite the subject.

I think they can and are separate: my thought (or held belief) is not truth, for truth is the correspondence of that thought (or held belief) with reality. Truth is emergent from thoughts and reality (from subject and object). — Bob Ross

The first sentence is correct. If you have a thought that corresponds with reality, that thought is true. That's because its "what is". If you had a thought that did not correspond with reality, this would also be true, in the fact that is the thought you are having. These are subjective truths. Truth is not an emergent property. There is the "what is" of the subject, but also the "what is" that is apart from the subject. If you tie truth to only the subjective viewpoint, you ignore the "what is" apart from the subject, which has traditionally been called "truth" as well. I think that is your mistake here Bob. You think because we can note that our subjective experience is true, that the truth of that subjective experience suddenly means all truth is tied to our subjective experience. This is not the case. There are things that exist apart from our subjective experience, and normatively, these things would be considered true existences, despite our lack of subjectively observing them.

A lot of peoples’ notion of truth is correspondence, so I don’t think it would be as foreign to them as you are supposing. As a matter of fact, I’ve explained this to laymen before, and, although they weren’t sure of all the technical details, they usually say that “that seems about right” because they intuit truth as a correspondence. However, I will grant that if I also brought up “truth is what is”, they are very likely to say that same thing. — Bob Ross

This mirrors my experience as well. But note that they have two different notions of true. You also did not contrast true with the definition of knowledge. Part of our job as philosophers is to sort definitions and words in a clear way that both ascribes to the cohesion of common language, while clarifying generalities into non-contradictory specifics. People have a notion of what is "good". But ask them to specifically define it and most will have a difficult time. That's our job. Same with "truth". Yes, the general person is going to lump in truth with knowledge. But as we drill down into it, we realize that truth and knowledge are simply not the same thing.

We take a general understanding of truth and knowledge, refine them, but still keep them within the cohesive framework of how people generally think where possible. Thus I can tell that same layman, "Truth is what is. Knowledge is a process that attempts to figure out what is true with the information we have. What we know can sometimes match the truth, but sometimes our knowledge is not true.", and while they will ask for clarification, they generally agree at the end of the day that knowledge and truth are separate entities.

The fact of the matter is that people usually have notions and not concepts of terms; and I am interested in having the best concept of truth I can (whatever that may be). So appealing to peoples’ notions doesn’t really help me, except in attempting to keep it as similar as possible thereto (which I think I have done). — Bob Ross

However, I'm talking about the normative definition of truth within philosophy. I cited the JTB breakdown. We can know what is true. But what is true exists despite our subjective attempt to know it. Perhaps a better breakdown of truth for you might help. Essentially there is "subjective truth" and "objective truth". Your tying the word "truth" to only the subjective aspect of truth ignores the objective aspect. That is not the norm, and I do not as of yet see any advantage in changing from the norm besides personal preference.

Under my theory of truth, the ‘real’ (in the sense of simply what exists) is never ‘true’ but, rather, is a part (an aspect: a component) of what is ‘true’. — Bob Ross

This leaves a bit of a mystery as to what the real is then. I think I see what you're doing, which is taking vocabulary and turning it around to solve an issue. The problem I see is you're not really solving the issue, you're just moving words around and avoiding the problem that is now only more difficult to see.

There's a fine line we all tread in philosophy where we have to redefine words. Sometimes we find that certain properties of a word are simply impossible, or a misunderstanding. But while we change what the words properties can mean, we shouldn't change its essence. And by that, I mean some universally recognized aspect of that word.

I'm not going to counter your redefinition of truth, instead I'm going to ask you some questions. Since we're on the Gettier argument, we can use that. JTB, or justified true belief, clearly separates a belief, justification, and then truth. Truth can be different from one's justification, and different from one's belief. But in your definition, truth can no longer be separate from one's justification or your belief.

So the question is, what value are we getting out of changing the meaning of truth so drastically? How could I look to a normal person, describe truth as you are, and they want to accept that from the norm?

I think this is how it should be, for when we speak of ‘truth’ what we mean, I think at least, is that the person at hand has a thought (or thoughts) which do correspond to reality. ‘Truth’ is the act of uncovering reality, so it can’t be reality itself. — Bob Ross

Here again, I think this is normally what people would refer to as knowledge. Truth is normatively seen as reality, while knowledge would be the understanding of reality, or truth. We can change it, but why? What benefit do we get out of it that cannot be gleaned as normal?

The problem becomes “how does one know that what they think corresponds to reality actually does?”. My answer is that we cannot know with certainty that the correspondence holds but, rather, can only construct epistemic verification methods to determine whether we accept it as corresponding or not. — Bob Ross

Right, but this problem is already stated with the interplay between normative knowledge and normative truth. So here we've changed the normative meaning of the words, but we're right back to the same problem between knowledge and truth, its just called truth and reality now. Isn't that just introducing a lack of cohesion for the same result? We really haven't solved anything.

In other words, Truth is the correspondence of thought and reality; but that correspondence is never certain between any particular instance of thought and reality, such that our aim is to correspond, but never to claim that we have definitively (absolutely) gotten there. — Bob Ross

I could just as easily say, "Knowledge is the correspondence of thought and truth; but that correspondence if never certain between any particular instance of knowledge and truth. Our aim is to correspond, but never to claim that we have definitively gotten there."

The second statement keeps the cohesion of the general understanding of knowledge and truth, so why not just keep that?

I agree. The one reason I am not quite sold on your semantics is what is "real" cannot be considered true at that point.

Sure, even if I affirm it as ‘true’, that doesn’t mean I am certain of it—but, by my lights, I am taking it up as ‘true’ by saying I know or, otherwise, I am saying that ‘I don’t believe this corresponds to reality, but I somehow know it anyways’. — Bob Ross

Right. Basically instead of "How do I know what I claim is true is true," for you it would be, "How do I know what I claim is real is real?" I think we're simply using different signs (words) for the same concepts. Whether you call truth real or real the truth, the end question still comes about.

I mainly agree, but I would add there is more to it than being merely logically consistent and providing clarity (determinacy). Logical consistency, in itself, does not promise any sort of correspondence to reality (which I think you agree with me on that). — Bob Ross

Yes, agreed!

I mainly agree, — Bob Ross

I would say, epistemologically, that the desire to “know the world” (i.e., ‘know reality) is the prerequisite to epistemology and stemming from that desire is to want to not contradict reality. The desire itself to want to not contradict reality can be taken on without wanting to know reality; however, I don’t think one needs to the desire, as a prerequisite, to desire to know reality. — Bob Ross

I agree here as well. I did not mean that the desire to want to know, meant an articulation or breakdown that the best way to know is to find something that does not contradict reality.

But I think your solution is plagued just the same by this issue, as I could ask “what justification do you have for intuitions being the best way of assessing reality within our limitations?”...is that not an intuition you have based off of your experience which strikes you as the case that your intuitions, which have not been invalidated as unreliable by counter-evidence, are the best way of assessing reality? — Bob Ross

My intention is not to go back into my view of epistemology, but just provide a point that whether I succeeded or failed, I did attempt to justify this notion. I feel I succeeded, and would agree with you that intuitions defined as such are a norm of epistemology. The difference is I feel it is actually justified more than in a circular fashion. If you believe that it is impossible that intuitions cannot be justified in any other way other than circular reference, then that is of course your choice. I will not rehash my original paper, as that is not the focus of your thread; I just felt that you could make your point stronger.

Next up, is your alluding of ‘true’ being improper within epistemology, as, if I remember correctly, you believe that epistemology is devoid of consideration of truth and, rather, is about cogency. You express this here (I think):
A minor quibble with the word "true". I would replace "true" with "known". — Bob Ross

Cogency is a descriptor of reasonable inductive beliefs. Knowledge is a sound and valid deductive belief. But my definition of knowledge is unimportant to your thread. Truth as defined is what "is" despite what one knows. I view, and many others, that one can know things which aren't true, and one can encounter truth without knowing it. Truth is what we seek in knowledge, but that does not mean we obtain it. So in general, the words truth and knowledge have remained separate.

If however you feel that what is known is true, then there is one question which must be answered: "How do I know that what I know is true?" If I have a coin in the palm of my hand, and everything I can observe and identity leads me to say, "I know this is a coin", how do I actually know its a coin? Because it turns out that its not a coin, its a transponder disguised as a coin that I was unable to detect. I had never even known that such a thing could exist. Is it not possible that many of the things we think we know, actually have something about them that we are unaware of or are unable to detect?

To me, whatever the proposition may be, it has prepackaged within it a context (i.e., a scope), and to claim to know it (about the world) is to take it up as true within that context. We may not be able to know the absolute truth of things, but we are, by my lights, still getting at truth in this contextual manner. — Bob Ross

If we are stating something is contextually true, is it contextually true, or contextually known? The idea of truth tends to be what "is" regardless of context as well. At least this can better answer the question of "How do I know that what I know is true?" However, a second question now forms. "How do I know which context is the true context?" Meaning, if we have two contexts where one person concludes A is true, an in the other context one concludes A is false, which one is correct? Our idea of contextual truth turns out not to be true.

Although it has indeed been awhile since I read your papers (so correct me if I am misremembering here), I remember your use of ‘belief’ as something like an initial attitude towards a proposition (i.e., a conjecture/hypothesis about reality which hasn’t been verified yet). To me, it seems as though ‘beliefs’ are knowledge (i.e., the verified claim) and the conjectures (i.e., the preliminary attitudes towards something), and the difference is only whether the claim has passed the rules of verification (within the epistemological theory). — Bob Ross

For my purposes here, there is again no need to go into my paper. We can use the normative idea of beliefs. You are proposing a normative set of epistemic normative facts, and by the norm, a belief is something we use in gaining knowledge, but is not knowledge itself. If I believe the sun will explode tomorrow, normatively, no one would claim I knew that. A belief is a claim about reality that has in some combination neither been confirmed nor denied. A conjecture is normally defined as a knowingly incomplete belief. It is a belief that knows it does not have all of the information to make a claim to knowledge, but commits to the claim regardless. A belief can be knowingly incomplete, or believed to be so tight that it is claimed it is knowledge itself. Epistemology's attempt is to find a consistent method to examine beliefs and claim without inconsistency or indeterminacy whether someone's belief is knowledge.

I agree that the epistemological theory should itself, be coherent; but I also add that within the theory a consideration of coherence of current knowledge with the candidate knowledge is important. For we assimilate the world around us via what we already claim to know about it, and we attempt not to incessantly force the candidate knowledge to bend and appropriate to our current knowledge but, rather, to assess the hierarchy ‘web’ of our knowledge with the inclusion of the candidate knowledge to see how well it fits in contrast to our higher-prioritized knowledge (within that hierarchy web). For example, I reject that I can fly by flapping my arms in the air because it is, among other things, incoherent with my current knowledge (beliefs, as I would call them) of the world. There is absolutely no logical contradiction in such a claim, but nevertheless it is incoherent with all the knowledge I have that I prioritize higher than that claim (as potential knowledge). — Bob Ross

I believe we are fully in agreement here! My quibble was mostly with the term "belief" instead of knowledge.

At a basic level, wouldn't it make more sense that rationality is what the epistemic norms are grounded in, and not the other way around?

I would say no, for then “rationality” would be defined outside of epistemology — Bob Ross

Since I separate truth and knowledge, then yes, it would necessarily follow that rationality is a precursor to epistemology. First comes the desire to make claims that are not contradicted by reality, then comes the establishment of norms and theories that help us refine and become successful at this. Since you do not separate knowledge and truth, then of course you would reasonably disagree with me here. So until that is resolved or an agreement of disagreement is reached, I believe we each have a valid reason to believe our own conclusions on this part here.

Again, I largely agree with your approach here besides a few conceptual and semantic differences!

Hello again Bob! I have wanted to dive into your posts but I have not had the time to give them the thought they deserve. I am impressed by this particular post. I wanted to go over why.

Although moral facts may not exist and—even if they did—are useless, epistemic normative facts exists; for epistemology has a hypothetical imperative as its precondition: that one ought to gain knowledge. Thusly, one is already committing themselves to “knowing the world” when they engage in epistemology, and there are objectively better ways of “knowing”: there are epistemic normative fact-of-the-matters which are better for “knowing”. — Bob Ross

This was a good way of focusing the discussion. I will have to take a look at your ethics post, but I can agree with this approach. You're not trying to justify why one ought to gain knowledge, you are simply noting it is something which exists. This is irrefutable and removes the whole discussion of ethics from knowledge.

Is it a precondition? Again, you cleverly note that it is not a precondition to have knowledge, it is a precondition to actively understand and pursue epistemology.

1. Intuitions (i.e., intellectual seemings): one ought to take as true what intellectual strikes them as being the case unless sufficient evidence has been prevented that demonstrates the invalidity of it. — Bob Ross

A minor quibble with the word "true". I would replace "true" with "known".

2. Parsimony (i.e., Occam’s Razor): entities ought not be multiplied without necessity. — Bob Ross

Correct. It is not that we attempt to make things simple. It is that if we have two equal theories that serve the same outcomes, but one takes fewer steps and words to communicate, we take the simpler theory.

3. Coherence: the belief (in question) should cohere adequately with one’s higher-prioritized beliefs about the world. — Bob Ross

I don't think this quite works. Your focus is epistomology, which is the study of knowledge. Beliefs are of course part of the discussion of knowledge, but beliefs are steps towards knowledge, not knowledge itself. Good epistemology does not seek coherence by forcing our rational outcomes into a belief system, but an already established knowledge system. To clarify further, it is not that we change or alter knowledge to keep coherence, it is that a system of knowledge should be coherent naturally. A lack of coherence is evidence of contradictions or poor methodology. A lack of coherence is a hint that what you hold is not knowledge, but a poorly constructed belief.

4. (Logical) Consistency: there ought not be logical contradictions in the belief nor in contrast to higher-prioritized beliefs. — Bob Ross

Again, I would replace the word "belief" with "knowledge". Beliefs are like the clay that the pottery of knowledge is built out of. While the pottery is not yet set, the clay will go through many shapes and contradictions to its initial path. Often times while trying to construct perfect pottery, we must experiment with the clay. Going against the norms, or doing things which seem contradictory can at the end of the day result in new ways of creating that pot.

The first epistemic norm (i.e,. #1 above) is, I would say, inevitably circularly justified—like reason in general — Bob Ross

This is not circularly justified. In fact, you made no justification for it at all. All you did was make a statement as a given. Someone could of course question or ask for justification. If you recall, that's what I did in my paper. It is justified by the fact that logically, it is our best way of assessing reality within our limitations. You are listing norms, but you have not given any justification for them at this point.

I think that, in light of this, “rationality”, in the sense of “acting in a manner that agrees with reality”, can be objectively grounded insofar as the hypothetical imperative (of knowing the world) is a presupposition of epistemology and thusly not within it; and so “rationality”, which in the sense defined (above) is deeply rooted in epistemic principles, is grounded in the objective epistemic norms. — Bob Ross

I'm going to sum up what I believe you are stating here. Rationality = acting in a manner that agrees with reality. This is grounded by the epistemic norms you listed above.

I don't think anything you stated leads up to this conclusion however. You list norms that exist, but you do not give any justification for them. Listing norms as a discussion topic is good, but I don't think you made the steps to take this topic beyond a list of norms and into a justification of them. At a basic level, wouldn't it make more sense that rationality is what the epistemic norms are grounded in, and not the other way around?

Well of course. Concluding something in one area does not mean you will conclude something in another area. Being an atheist doesn't make you any more intelligent or capable in reasoning, math, physics, language, etc. It just means you don't believe in a God.

The Tarski Undefinability Theorem "proves" that True(L, x) can never be computed on the basis that Tarski did not understand that the Liar Paradox must simply be rejected as not a truth bearer. https://liarparadox.org/Tarski_275_276.pdf — PL Olcott

No one cares about the Tarski Undefinability Theorem for practical purposes. If you're going to go that in depth, then you're going to have to be in depth in your analysis. Ok, that's likely the last response now. Good luck in your work!

Although the problem of induction seems to prove that the very next time you drop your coffee cup it might just hang there in the air levitating, I dismiss this as unreasonably implausible. — PL Olcott

Sure, but in philosophy, you need a reason. If you can't say why its unreasonably implausible, then you haven't solved anything.

Again, this does not answer the question of, "How do I know that what I know is true?"
— Philosophim

It answers it well enough for all practical purposes. Since we cannot even know that five seconds ago actually existed we can't even know that we have ever met our own mother, even if she just left the room. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Omphalos_hypothesis#Five-minute_hypothesis I dismiss this as unreasonably implausible. — PL Olcott

If you're just concerned about knowledge for practical purposes, nothing needs to be written or done. People use knowledge in practical ways every day. If you want to get to the heart of it, to find the specifics and create a system that can be applied universally, you can't just dismiss this issue outright.

Again, I'm just letting you know that if you want to make any serious impact in epistemology, what you have is not enough. I highly suggest reading more epistemology to really understand what's been proposed already, and what the remaining issues are.

As there can be a lot to read, here's a video giving a summary of epistemologies evolution over the years. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=94rK0_-x8bI

Its been a good conversation, and I think we've reached the end. Good luck in your journey!

I am taking all of the things known through induction, (ignoring the problem of induction) — PL Olcott

This is another major problem. By the way, my paper has an answer to the problem of induction. Its the last section. Induction cannot be used to ascertain truth.

and converting them into axioms in the verbal model of the actual world. These are all construed as knowledge that is known to be true. This same model also includes all analytical truth. — PL Olcott

Feel free to try. But so far this is a claim, not a proof or example.

This system allows people and machines to correctly compute True(L, x) as pure deductions within this model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Again, this does not answer the question of, "How do I know that what I know is true?" What is true is "What is". We can't change the definition of what is true. "What is" is existent despite our having knowledge of it or not. You can put a T in a function, but that doesn't mean its an actual representative of truth.

I'm just trying to save you from going down an average path. The ideas that you are proposing are not new and have clear problems. Most epistemologists believe that knowledge has to do with mapping our words to reality. The question is "How". How do we do it and demonstrate that a knowledge claim is more reasonable than a not quite certain belief? How do you deal with cross cultural definitions, and physical contexts? How does someone who is blind know the world differently from someone who has sight?

Keep at it, but really apply these flaws I'm pointing out. If you don't have solutions to them, there is nothing your theory adds that already hasn't been implemented before.

When analytical knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

I've mentioned this before, and its important that you understand this. If using Kant's definitions, the Gettier problem does not apply to analytic knowledge. It applies to synthetic. JTB applies to synthetic, not analytic. Let me show you why.

Analytic knowledge is broadly defined as "True by definition". To simplify this in the most straight forward terms possible, we invent definitions. Why is a dog composed of X, Y, Z properties? Because we invented it to be that way. Definitions are essentially signs that represent some experience. For example, I can create analytic knowledge of a unicorn. I simply combine the experience of a hrose with a horn and viola, analytic knowledge.

Does that mean we can synthetically know a unicorn? Can we find one in the wild? That's the real question of JTB. Even then, analytic knowledge has its problems as well. What if I create a definition of a unicorn that also includes it being magical, while you do not? We both analytically know the definition of unicorn as something different. How do we reconcile that? Some people like Quine believe the analytic/synthetic distinction isn't really a distinction at all when you examine it closely.

But enough exploration of the analytic for now. The thing you have to understand is that JTB is not analytic, it is synthetic.

Empirical knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification makes every possible attempt to correctly match a set of physical sensations to their corresponding elements in a correct verbal model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Except this isn't truth. Truth is, "What is". "What is" does not care about your deductions or conclusions. What you are describing is a "Justified Belief". And you are noting that a justified belief makes every possible attempt to correctly match a set of physical sensations to their corresponding elements in a correct verbal model of the actual world. I agree with this model, as I've noted repeatedly that truth is not a necessary pre-condition for knowledge. Your statement agrees with this.

Since the cost of making a mistake could make humanity extinct (or worse) it might be better to err on the safe side and say that empirical knowledge is impossible. This view tends to keep reinforcing humility. — PL Olcott

As I've noted before, this is simply giving up. Let me tell you the utter disaster this would entail. We would have no way of justifying why science is more valid than my personal beliefs. THAT would drive humanity extinct, or at least invoke some serious Darwinism. If we say empirical knowledge is impossible, then someone who believes the sun is a giant ball of gas has as much rational validity as someone who thinks its a light bulb invented from an ancient alien civilization.

We should not get caught up so much in words, technicalities, and a desire to hold ideology that we ignore reality. In reality, we ascertain that some statements are more reasonable and rational than another. In reality, people claim they have knowledge of things. Our goal in philosophy is to figure out why, and bring explicit the implicit process. Dismissing what people naturally do would be viewed as insanity by the rest of the world, and quite rightly.

Because of this it might be best to refer to {empirical knowledge} as a {reasonable guess} and never call it any kind of knowledge at all. — PL Olcott

Or we simply figure out the most reasonable way of objectively ascertaining the validity of empirical claims, and continue to use the word knowledge. Your insistence that knowledge MUST have truth is again, against the way the world works. People will not stop using the word. Your job is not to eliminate the word, but to refine it to be better used explicitly. That way when someone says, "I know this happened," we have an objective set of steps that can confirm whether that person does actually know.

Giving up is easy. It is the temptation of the intellect to do so. Do not give in.

My goal is to define truthmaker theory and epistemology is such a way that ordinary people learn correct reasoning in common terms that they already understand. When they are jurors in court cases they really need to know all of the details of how interpreting sensory perceptions can diverge from truth. We must also overcome the egoistic bias of overconfidence in one's own subjective opinions. In this case we can have some very bad outcomes if we allow knowledge to be false. — PL Olcott

This is a fine desire, but your current trajectory will destroy this. Also, your desire may not be real. That is something we also have to accept as philosophers. "I want to define knowledge that includes truth," cannot logically be done. Or, if it can, you must ignore everything else and answer the one question, "How do I know that what I claim I know is true?" in the synthetic sense. Ambitions are fine, but without this core pillar established, the whole roof will collapse around you.

Almost everyone here has proven to be very knowledgeable and sincerely wants an honest dialogue. That is much better than any other Philosophy forum. For example StackExchange severely penalizes every new idea just because it is a new idea. — PL Olcott

Agreed! I looked for years and was highly dissatisfied with them all until this one.

I do encourage you strongly to read my theory of knowledge paper that I linked towards the top of these forums.
— Philosophim
I have no idea how to find this. — PL Olcott

Here's the link again:
https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

I suggest you do a cntrl-F and search for Caerulea-Lawrence as they've posted an outstanding summary of what I've written. Then if you want more details, try reading the paper itself.

The forced choice here is either to accept that a space alien perfectly disguised as a duck necessarily must be mistaken for an actual duck or empirical knowledge must be determined to be impossible. There don't seem to be even any other categories of possibility. It seems absurd that expressions of language that are false yet taken to be true could possibly be correctly construed as knowledge. — PL Olcott

I would read my paper first to understand where I'm coming from, but consider instead that knowledge is simply a tool humanity uses in an attempt to get as close to the truth as logically possible. What would be wrong with that? If we have concluded one thing is impossible, then the next step is to determine what is possible within our goals.

Consider the act of induction. I have a deck of playing cards that is normal and complete. Someone starts shuffling the deck without either of knowing the order of the cards and asks me, "What's going to be drawn first after I shuffle the deck? A card with hearts, or a card with diamonds, spades, or clovers?"

Now its impossible for me to know the answer. But, I can take what is not impossible for me to know, that there is a ratio of 3/4 that it will be a diamond, spade, or clover, and guess that it will be one of those. Its using logic in an impossible to know outcome, to still make a guess that is more likely to match the possible outcome than not.

Indeed! But I will quibble with you. In what sense do you suppose I do not understand the theorem, against what I do claim to understand about it? — tim wood

Oh, my point was not that you do or do not understand the theory. You may very well have full mastery of it. I don't pretend to. I'm just noting that if you want to be assured of such I'm sure a scientist is going to be able to give you affirmation and/or enhance your understanding more than us philosophers. :)

If you really want to understand Bell's theorem, you should visit a science forum Tim Wood. The terminology like "spin" is often misconstrued as an English equivalent. Often times words that sound like English are used as placeholders for deep mathematical and scientific concepts. At this level, everything is math with an often poor attempt to convert it into language. Only someone with a very clear scientific background would be qualified to speak with on this. Layman's understanding of quantum theories are often woefully inadequate and misunderstood.

My goal here is to end up with a universal criterion measure for truth such that True(L, x) becomes computable. I am on this forum for the purpose or researching truthmaker theory so that I can write an academic paper breaking new ground in this field. — PL Olcott

First, I want to praise this with every fiber of my being. I hope that my challenges to your writing have not come across as antagonistic. I am not trying to tear you down, I genuinely want to see if you can produce answers to the questions that have plagued epistemology for years. Knowledge was an absolute passion of mine for many years until I moved onto other things. So if I can help in any way, I will.

I do encourage you strongly to read my theory of knowledge paper that I linked towards the top of these forums. You don't have to agree with it, but if you're keen on really thinking about epistemology, you're going to want to read it and understand it as it addresses many of the problems I'm pointing out to you.

I am back to something close to my original position confusing a space alien perfectly disguised as a duck for an actual duck is the only possible mistakes allowed with my very reasonably plausible approximation of knowledge. — PL Olcott

Is it the only possible mistake though? And if a theory allows a mistake, does that mean its a complete and good theory? Lots of theories that we don't use could be used by just allowing one mistake. An epistemology that solves all of our problems can have no mistakes. You're talking about a problem that countless people have examined over thousands of years. It can have no flaws for it to be taken seriously.

Beyond the abstract, the allowance of this mistake in particular will kill your theory. Because at the end of the day you have allowed that one can know something even when its not true. You have to specifically address why that is, and it must be consistent across your entire theory. If you allow one instance in which someone can know something when it is not true, then you cannot claim that truth is a necessary component of knowledge.

If you believe that your friend has at least five coins in his pocket and you did not see at least five coins then you do not have sufficient justification for your belief. If you see these coins and they turn out to be perfect counterfeits of actual coins you are still justified in your belief. If they are obvious plastic counterfeits then your belief was never justified. — PL Olcott

These are statements, but why? Philosophy might seem easy at first, because our intuitions point out that the Gettier argument is dumb. It is being able to articulate a consistent and clearly why its dumb, and a defined solution that is where the difficulty occurs.

So a few questions with the above quote:

1. Why do you not have sufficient justification if you did not se at least five coins?
2. Why do you have sufficient justification when they still turn out to be perfect counterfeit coins?

It needs to be consistent, and applied to any other statement of knowledge.

JTB one must have justification such that the truth of the belief is a necessary consequence of its justification to the best possible extent that counterfeits of things in the world (relevant to the justification of the belief) are detected and rejected when possible. — PL Olcott

Lets look again at the statement, "to the best possible extent". What specifically is someone's best possible extent? How do we measure this or note this in any other claim? Does this only apply to counterfeits? Here's a nice summary of a classic epistemological problem, with an attempt to solve it by Dretske: http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/epist2001/dretske.html#:~:text=Dretske%20says%20that%20depends%20on,duck%20but%20isn't.)

Keep at it.

Hello PL Olcott, my apologies but the last few days have been busy. I can continue our conversation now.

You can "know" empirical things to a reasonably plausible degree that is less than logically justified complete certainty.

The key empirical thing is mapping a set of physical sensations to their corresponding element in the verbal model of the actual world.

The model of the world is construed as an axiomatic system. We know that {cats} are {animals} by looking this up in the knowledge tree model of the world. — PL Olcott

First, I do not disagree with your overall viewpoint here. The problem is, without certain details, you fall into the Gettier argument. Lets address your main point, "You can "know" empirical things to a reasonably plausible degree that is less than logically justified complete certainty."

Recall that Jones knows Smith has five coins in his pocket with less than logically justified complete certainty. And its truth that Smith has five coins in his pocket. So according to the above statement without any clarification, Jones knows that Smith has five coins in his pocket even though almost everyone would say he didn't have enough justification to say so.

The first problem we tackled was "Truth". I noted that truth is not a necessary condition for knowledge. But that leaves another part of knowledge to tackle. "Justification". In my opinion, that's the real crux of the Gettier argument. What does it mean to be justified? How do I separate something that I believe, from something I know?

Let me set up some terminology. "Justification" is really short for "Knowledge justification". Even beliefs have reasons why we hold them. But reasons for why we hold beliefs are not "Justification". Justification is really the magical word which means, "Holding reasons which lead us to conclude the person has knowledge."

Jones has reasons for his beliefs, but I think all of us feel he has no justification. Jones hasn't seen Smith for an hour. There are a whole host of things that could have happened to those coins. Smith could have dropped one, had a hole in his pocket, or bought something from a vending machine. Its absurd for Jones to say he "knows". Jones simply believes, with his reason being that Smith had the coins an hour ago.

This gives us a hint to what justification can be then. Justification must not be inductive. A deductive argument has premises that necessarily lead to a conclusion. Inductive arguments are premises that do not necessarily lead to a conclusion. Jones argument about Smith is inductive. Inductive arguments are not knowledge. Therefore Jones does not know Smith has five coins.

The truth of the matter is irrelevant. Lets say Smith shows Jones five coins in his hand. Jones is allowed to examine the coins in depth with all the tools he has available to him. After exhaustive study, every bit of evidence conclusively points to these five objects being coins, and that they are in Smith's hand. Deductively the only conclusion Jones can make is that there are five coins in Smith's hand. Therefore this is what Jones knows.

Of course, Smith then reveals that these "coins" are experimental spy coins that hide the fact that they are transponders. It turns out the metal shape and alloy is not currently detectible by public means, and Jones was fooled! Does that mean that Jones did not know that these were five coins in Smith's hands moments ago? Of course not. Jones absolutely knew that there were five coins in Smiths hand. It wasn't a belief, because it was the only thing which could be deduced.

So then the question for you is, "Is deduction without truth knowledge justification?"

Great analysis.

I think we're missing a lot of context here. Taken at face value, this is objectively stupid. What's the point? I'll just ask him back, "But wait. You haven't been doing quaddition. It was addition. When you said quss, you meant pluss, and: x + y = x quss y for sums less than 5, but over that, the answer is always 57. So you haven't been consistent. If you were consistent, you would have said "57.""

Then I would put it on THEM to prove to me instead of doing it myself. If they refused, I would ignore them from then on for wasting my time. :D

Without the qualified mapping that I propose Buddhist enlightenment is impossible — PL Olcott

Buddhism is just another philosophy. If its invalidated by the points I make, then it is. Buddhism affords no special treatment, and must answer the problems and solutions presented here on its own. But lets keep Buddhism out of the discussion. The question is whether knowledge needs, or does not need truth as a necessary requirement. Lets stick to that.

because societal conditioning is construed as actual truth rather than possible truth. — PL Olcott

I've given several examples in which societal conditioning is based on the context of possible truth, not actual truth. You haven't adequately shown that these examples do not happen.

This closes the mind so that when evidence is presented of the actual truth it is never noticed. — PL Olcott

Once again, you're jumping past the question, "How do we know we have actual truth?"

Within the model of the actual world we can know the stipulated relations between elements because the model of the actual world is an axiomatic system. — PL Olcott

Is it really an unquestionable system? Not at all. What is the model of a "tree". I envision a tree, and you envision a tree. Are they likely the same? No. If it were self-evident, then could I say all swans are white as an identity, then know that all swans are white?

When we attempt to map things in the world based on what appear to be sense data from the sense organs we cannot possibly tell the difference between a duck and a space alien perfectly disguised as a duck. — PL Olcott

Only if the underlying requirement is that the mapping is true. And yes, we both agree on that. This not only applies to this example, but all examples. This means again, that we can't know whether something is a duck and a space alien. So every time you go out into the world and see a duck, you'll have to say, "I don't know if that's a space alien in disguise."

That's a rather odd viewpoint of the world. When we step out of our armchair, we find this viewpoint to have major problems. We are left with a system that lets an insane person have just as much validity in saying, "I believe that duck could be a space alien in disguise," as someone who is more rational than someone who says, "I know that's a duck," even if that person has all the evidence in the world that shows that its a duck. Are we to then tell the mentally ill person, "Yes, you have the right of it. It definitely could be an alien in disguise instead of a duck."

The problem is you're so focused on fixing one problem, that you're not thinking about the numerous problems your fix results in. If you have truth as the necessary pre-requisite of knowledge, you are going to run into many, many more problems. Its like there is a crack in the wall, and instead of fixing the crack, you're breaking down the wall so the crack isn't there anymore. That's not a solution. That's just another problem.

This seems to indicate that we cannot possibly know that any mapping from what appears to be physical sensations to their element in the model of the actual world is a correct mapping. — PL Olcott

True, if we require that our mapping must be true. Why not instead of mapping based on reason, we say mapping is based on rational application with the limited information a person or group has at the time? Thus I can know that duck is a duck. I have no information that implies its a space alien, so I can't know it as a space alien, I can only know it as a duck. Then if later it reveals itself to be a space alien I can say, "I once knew that as a duck. I no longer know that as a duck. Now I know it as a space alien." And to be silly, the space alien could actually be a human disguised as a duck disguised as a space alien, ad infinitum, and we would still have stages in which we knew what it was based on a rational application of the limited information we had at the time.

If they assume that all apples are red without seeing all apples
then they are wrong even if their assumption is correct. — PL Olcott

This is just a repetition of a previous statement, and doesn't solve the issue. You're not explaining to me how we resolve the fact that properties as part of the definition, are later found to be wrong. That means you can never know anything. What if we discover 100 years ago after scientific DNA advances in DNA, that oranges are actually apples? Its not just the color, its any property of anything we know. Its a vivid example of, "How do we know that what we know is true?"

I will count on gravity as long as it continues to function. I will not
assume that it is an immutable law of nature. — PL Olcott

Its not the question of whether you count on gravity, its whether you know what gravity is. Do you know gravity as the force that pulls all matter together? If we did find something different about gravity in the future, wouldn't we say it was because of the context of what people had available at the time, just like the sun example?

Don't just respond that these are assumptions next time please. Really think about it. Address the broad idea, not the specific instance.

To conclude that all swans are white on the basis of some swans are
white is flat out incorrect and there cannot possibly be two ways about this. — PL Olcott

Lets take another example. You live in a place where all apples are red. Everyone calls them apples, everyone knows that they are red. Ask a person what color an apple is, and they'll say, "Red". We know green apples exist. But for them, they've never encountered or heard of a green apple. An apple being red is part of the definition of being an apple. That is what is known. Green apples won't be introduced for 200 years. Are you saying in that time that no one ever knew what an apple was?

And again:

Do we say, "All the gravity we have encountered so far causes bodies to accelerate towards each other, or do we say gravity causes all bodies to accelerate towards one another? — Philosophim

We say gravity causes bodies to accelerate towards each other. Its in the definition. We don't adendum knowledge claims with all possible exceptions. We assert. Do you know that gravity is a force that pulls objects together regardless of distance, or not?

I'm noting that swans by definition were known as white at the time. The house by definition is not white, it has the attribute of white. The swan by definition was white. It was part of its identity.

If the rest of the points are also not addressed, then the point stands. And its really not my point, its just a point that's been concluded by many people in epistemology. If you want to counter them, my arguments are things you'll need to have answers to. Keep at it!

From their frame-of-reference they could see the Sun cross the sky
thus saying they they see the Sun cross the sky is accurate. — PL Olcott

Then you agree with me. The truth is that the sun does not revolve around the Earth, it is that the Earth revolves around the sun. You allow frame of reference to be more important than truth for knowledge, which I agree with. Thus knowledge does not have truth as a necessary pre-requisite.

The correct thing to do at the time is to say all the swans that I know about are white.
To say that all swans are white is incorrect reasoning. — PL Olcott

No. At the time it was just understood that swans were white. You would ask a person, "What color are swans?" and they would say, "White." Do we say, "All the gravity we have encountered so far causes bodies to accelerate towards each other, or do we say gravity causes all bodies to accelerate towards one another?

Finally, I did not see a proof in your reply. I will assume that you don't have a proof that lets us know that what we know is true. So the point stands. Truth is not a pre-requisite for knowledge.

The meaning of the word "knowledge" requires that it be true. — PL Olcott

It does not. Prove that it requires it. To prove that it requires it, you must demonstrate that one can have synthetic knowledge of it, and also prove that it is true. And to clarify, the thing that we are proving is true, must not be known to be true prior to that proof.

Try and find any false statement that counts as knowledge that is
not merely knowledge of its falsity. — PL Olcott

I mentioned an example earlier. Over 2000 years ago people used to know that the Sun circled in the sky around the Earth. Later, we found out its actually the Earth that circles around the Sun. My point is that though people did not have the truth of the relative movement of the Earth and the Sun, this was all they could know. All logic lead to the conclusion that the Sun rotated around the in the sky, not that the Earth rotated around the Sun.

Lets go one further. At one time swans were known to be white. Later, someone discovered that swans were black on another continent. Prior to this discovery, didn't people know swans as white? If someone said, "Actually, swans are black" without any justification, they would be ridiculed. Are we to say then that they didn't know what a swan was? What if we later find out swans can be orange? Did we not know what a swan was?

Finally, imagine a man who lives in a forest goes about identifying different plants for his own amusement. He points at a short tree and says, "That's a bush". He's always able to identify it as a bush with complete accuracy. One day a botanist visits him and says, "Actually, that's a tree." The man looks at him and says, "Well that's a bush to me, I don't do botany." So what does the man know the bush as? Does he know? Has he ever known what the plant was?

Knowledge is personal, societal, and cultural. It does not depend on truth as a necessary precondition.

You are disputing this.
Most everyone knows that ALL knowledge must be true or instead of
knowledge we have false presumptions. — PL Olcott

Lets say, even though you have no proof, that most people think that truth is a requirement for knowledge. Philosophy is not a contest of opinions. Can you prove that truth is a necessary requirement for knowledge?

Realizing that synthetic knowledge is impossible yet also understanding
that a close approximation of synthetic knowledge has proven to be very
reliable how do these things fit within the Gettier cases?

Gettier cases prove that a reasonable approximation of knowledge
sometimes diverges from actual knowledge. — PL Olcott

I never said synthetic knowledge was impossible. I simply noted that truth cannot be a necessary requirement for synthetic knowledge. Gettier cases are happy accidents that technically happen due to the JTB as written down. Most of them can be fixed by spelling out one's justification.

"A bear is nearby" How did you get that? "Well I saw a bear up ahead just a minute ago." What bear is nearby? "A different bear behind me. I had justification for my belief, and my belief was true therefore I knew there was a bear nearby."

This is of course, stupid. Gettier was pointing out that JTB as written neglected one very important part of justification. That it should lead to why the conclusion is true, not that the conclusion is true and you had some justification for your belief. Something like this is an acceptable solution.

The problem is when you say, "It has to actually be true" you have to answer the question of, "How do you know it is true?" You cannot. If you can, feel free to do so. But if you cannot, then you cannot state that knowledge has truth as a necessary pre-requisite. Otherwise you say we know nothing, which is again, the abandonment of epistemology.

My apologies, but I have places to go this evening. I'll carry on our conversation tomorrow.

I went back through what you said and your position seems to be
that because there are cases where we cannot possibly confirm
that a belief is definitely true we should construe these cases as
knowledge even when they might be false. — PL Olcott

Close. Its more to the fact that there is no answer to the question, "How do we know if what we know is true?" Its impossible in regards to the synthetic, backed by many arguments. And yet we still use knowledge. We still need some way to say, "It is more reasonable to believe this, than that."

So then the only conclusion is that truth must not be a necessary component for knowledge. This makes sense the more we think about it. Prior to telescopes, ancient man knew that the sun crossed the sky from the East to the West. Today, we have greater knowledge and know that the Earth rotates around the Sun, not the other way around. Did that mean ancient man did not know that the Sun circled the sky? Of course not. That was the only thing they could deduce from the information they had.

To say they didn't know it is to make all beliefs have the same rational weight. That means someone who said the sun magically altered our senses and actually always traveled West to East would have an equally valid conclusion. To us, this is absurd. We innately understand that one statement is more rational than the other.

Back then, they knew that the Sun crossed the sky. Today, we know that its actually the Earth rotating away from and back to facing the sun. Perhaps we will know something different in the future. The point is that what we know is what is able to be most rationally concluded with the information and reasoning we have. Its a tool, not truth itself.

The trick then is how do we construct this system of reasoning to be more rational and the best chance to be as close to truth as possible? How do we separate "knowledge" from mere belief? I could go into it, but I wrote a whole paper on it already, and gave a very light summary earlier. Feel free to visit the page and scroll down a few replies. You can cntrl-F and type in Caerulea-Lawrence. They gave a better summary than I ever could have. Feel free to ask me further questions there or feel free to read the original post if it strikes your interest.

"Truth cannot be a necessary component of knowledge."
How so? — PL Olcott

Please re-read my previous comments. That's been the entire point of the conversation.

The the Gettier issues would seem to only involve making sure that
our physical sensations actually do correctly map to the correct elements
in the model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

Which again leaves us with, "How do we know that we're correctly matching the correct elements in the model of the actual (true) world?" Its the same question again. Truth cannot be a necessary component of knowledge.

You did not bother to notice that an argument can be valid
even if its premsies are false. — PL Olcott

I don't need to. My point had nothing to do with validity, and you know that because I explicitly noted your premises were not true. That's not honest discussion at that point.

I believe there's nothing more to discuss here either. You've already noted you cannot answer the major question of "How do we know what is true?" Without that, nothing has been solved. Not that I wouldn't try to continue tackling the question, but until that question is answered, your solution is a dead end.

A deductive argument is sound if and only if it is both valid, and all of its premises are actually true. — PL Olcott

You posted this up above. To be a sound deductive argument, the premises need to be true. This is getting into silly territory now. Do not be afraid to concede a point, or at least leave. Stubbornly trying to make a point without merit is not seeking truth, its seeking ego.

You haven't proven your premises as true, therefore you're argument is not deductive.

If we are living in a perfect simulation of reality like the brain-in-a-vat
thought experiment then all of our knowledge of physical realty is false
because physical reality does not exist. — PL Olcott

No, its only false if truth is a necessary pre-requisite for knowledge. You've made the claim that it is, but there are practical problems in doing so. I have claimed it is not by pointing out that means we cannot know anything besides our own analytic constructions. This is useless to us, as we deal with more than our analytic constructions in the world.

The synthetic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction simply assumes
that physical reality exists. Because it is possible that this is false then
there cannot be 100% certain knowledge of physical reality. — PL Olcott

No, the synthetic side does not assume "physical reality" exists. The synthetic side addresses the point that there is more to reality than simply our thoughts. Whether this is "physical" or "something else" is a different question entirely. Unless you champion solipsism, you must address the synthetic side of reality. Do you believe there is something that exists beyond your thoughts? Then you believe in situations that require synthetic judgements, and thus questions of synthetic knowledge.

With valid reasoning the premises are assumed to be true even if they
are false. — PL Olcott

This doesn't make any sense. Either the premises are true or false.

(1) It definitely true that synthetic knowledge actually does not exist. — PL Olcott

You have not proved this anywhere. In fact, this statement is a contradiction. When you speak of "exist" you mean, "exists apart from an analytic identity". That means you are trying to synthetically claim that synthetic knowledge does not exist.

You could try to analytically claim that synthetic knowledge does not exist, but then I could claim the opposite. Now we're left with the mess of everything being true, even contradictions. Again, why synthetic knowledge is, at least in the confines of this argument, a very real thing that needs addressing, not mere dismissal.

If synthetic knowledge does not actually exist and I have correctly
shown that it does not, then this corrects mere presumptions to the
contrary, thus objectively is progress. — PL Olcott

No, that's not progress at all. You haven't shown that there is no synthetic knowledge, you've simply set the definition of knowledge as something impossible to obtain. That's not useful, nor does it help us solve problems like science, facts, and knowing where I put my keys. Your solution to the Gettier argument is to burn everything down. That's not a solution.

We know that every element of the set of semantic tautologies is true.
AKA self-evident truth. — PL Olcott

Yes, analytic knowledge is true by definition. Few debate that. We're talking about synthetic, which is the entire target of the Gettier argument.

Everything else is at best a reasonably plausible estimate of knowledge.
Or we could say that it functions as if it was true. — PL Olcott

Which means that we have no synthetic knowledge of the world according to your Gettier fix. That's a failure, not a success.

How do we distinguish the difference between reality and a perfect
simulation of reality that has no distinguishable difference?

We Don't !!! — PL Olcott

Then we know nothing. That's why your fix to the Gettier problem fails. Knowledge is obviously something we use. It differentiates itself from mere belief. The specifics of how and why are the entire question of epistemology. Your viewpoint leads to the "nihilism" conclusion, which is rejected by most thinkers in the field.

If you tie truth as a necessary condition for knowledge, then the nihilism solution, "We know nothing, there is no knowledge" is the only solution. And quite frankly, that's silly. That's an indicator we're doing something wrong. And what's wrong? Making truth as a necessary pre-condition for knowledge. Check my paper out if you want an alternative.

Reviewing some of the Gettier cases it seems that they involve
an incorrect mapping from a set of physical sensations to their
corresponding elements in the model of the actual world. — PL Olcott

And again, the same question. How do we know we have the correct mapping, or know that what we know is true?

When we require that the justification for the belief necessitates
that the belief is true, then the incorrect mapping is excluded
from justification. — PL Olcott

Sure, if it was as simple as that the argument would have instantly died. But how do we know that the belief is true? You can't. Therefore you cannot have truth as a necessary pre-requisite for (synthetic) knowledge. No matter how much you try to avoid this, it will always be there.

Only the analytic side of the analytic / synthetic distinction has proof.
The synthetic side (that I call the empirical side) only has evidence. — PL Olcott

My adaptation of JTB requires proof that the belief is true, with less
than proof we only have presumption and thus not knowledge. — PL Olcott

Then according to your JTB, no one can ever know anything synthetically. Meaning I can't know if I'm really in my house or if I'm a brain in a vat. The Gettier argument is not a criticism of analytic, but synthetic arguments.

Until you answer the question, "How do I know what I know is true?" you've solved nothing. If we don't have a method to know that what we know is true, then we never have synthetic knowledge about anything. Its all beliefs. Is that where you want to go?