That the animal in front of you seems to have all of the properties of
a cat is evidence and not proof that it is a cat. — PL Olcott

Then how would we prove its a cat? How would we prove that its true that its a space monster, especially if its a perfectly disguised cat? Because it can't accidently be true right? That's the whole point of the Gettier argument.

↪Philosophim It is certainly not impossible to know with 100% complete certainty that a dog is an animal and my adaptation to JTB specifically excludes anything that is not known on the basis of complete proof. — PL Olcott

You ignored the key question about truth. How do you know its true? How do you know you have complete proof?

I have pondered this again and again for years.
"If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?"
Truth is a necessary yet insufficient condition for knowledge.

Knowledge requires:
Awareness that an expression is true on the basis of complete proof that the expression is true. — PL Olcott

The reason you've pondered it for years is that there is no answer. Logically, the only conclusion is its impossible. Therefore the only conclusion is that knowledge does not rely on truth as a necessary condition. That doesn't mean that knowledge isn't incredibly useful, or that we can suddenly start believing whatever we want. Check out my paper. There's a great summary of the ideas from another poster a few replies down from the paper.

"instance where there is something outside of our ability to know"
Does not count as knowledge under my adaptation of JTB. — PL Olcott

I'm putting forth some effort here, please do more than a few sentences if you're serious about engaging. Think about it. If truth is the necessary ingredient for knowledge, how do I know what I claim I know is true?

Somehow the replies got out of order. My point above is in regards to

↪Philosophim My adapted version of JTB does seems to perfectly divide knowledge from presumption and falsity and utterly eliminate the Gettier cases. — PL Olcott

As for the the cats DNA, you're missing the point of the thought experiment. The point is that we're in an instance where there is something outside of our ability to know, but from everything we observe and are capable of concluding, the only reasonable thing we can know is that its a cat. Thus we know something that isn't true.

When knowledge is defined as a justified true belief such that the justification necessitates the truth of the belief then the Gettier problem is no longer possible. — PL Olcott

And how do we know its true? I have a creature that's a space monster, and its absolutely beyond any human to find out its a space monster. We know it as a cat. Its not true that its a cat, but that's what we know it as. Under your point, no one could say they knew it as a cat. In which case, we can only say they believe it is a cat.

The problem is, you need some way to measure a belief against truth. How do you make it possible in this instance? How do we know that many things that we claim to know, are actually not knowledge if we discovered some new aspect of reality? We can't. This is why knowledge cannot be a claim of necessary truth.

↪Philosophim I always view these things in terms of pure logic. If a thing in the world can be empirically validated to have all of the properties of a cat including the DNA of a cat then this thing is necessarily a cat, all opinions to the contrary are counter-factual. The belief aspect of JTB is required because unless at least one person knows X then X is not knowledge even if X is true. — PL Olcott

To clarify, it is not that it is necessarily a cat. It is that you can logically conclude no other identity at the time of your identification. One could have the belief that its a space monster in disguise. In truth, it could be. But there's no way we could ever say, "I know its a space monster in disguise". Because knowledge is a tool of logic about what we can conclude with the information we have, not an assertation of truth itself.

I would say logic is the organization of thoughts and identities at an attempt to arrive at conclusions that are concurrent with reality. This is done using deduction. This is logic.

I solved the Gettier problem, as well as most classical epistemological problems such as the problem of induction here. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

The problem with Gettier is he uses justification as being "true". Truth has nothing to do with knowledge. Knowledge is about creating identities in our minds first. We have the image of a creature, and we call it a cat for example. Then when we encounter something in reality, to know its a cat in reality, we must match what we find essential about our identity of a cat, to the creature before us. If we can successfully do so without induction, then we know its a cat.

If it turns out its actually some weird dog breed, but only because society created the identity of that creature as a dog, and we did not know that attribute that would have made it a dog, that doesn't negate what we know at the time. At that time, we know it as a cat. Once society introduces this new identity, or definition to us, we can decide to accept it, or reject it. If we accept it, now we know longer can know that creature as a cat, but a dog. But if we reject societies identity, we still know it as a cat.

In sum, knowledge is about what identity you accept in your mind, then applying that identity in a deductive manner to ascertain whether it matches based on your context. Truth has nothing to do with it. So when its claimed "Smith has five coins in his pocket" its not a deduced application of identity, but an induction of identity as the claimant doesn't actually have evidence that at that specific moment, Smith has five coins in his pocket. Belief that happens to be the case is not knowledge if the reasons we came to that belief are not deduced correctly. That's just an accident.

Truth is reality. Reality is what exists regardless of what we believe.
— Philosophim

How do you know when you are looking at it ? — plaque flag

The fact that you are looking at something is truth. That exists despite what you believe.

Certainty is not a standard for knowledge. This is because you can doubt anything. Being able to doubt something lends no credence to whether a doubt is correct. Its what is irrefutable that matters. That you experience is irrefutable. To refute the idea that you experience, you must be able to experience. Therefore it is proof by contradiction.

Truth is reality. Reality is what exists regardless of what we believe. When we have beliefs that are not contradicted by reality, we seem concurrent with truth. When reality contradicts our beliefs, we know our beliefs aren't true.

I am entirely matter. Suppose everything about me can be explained in terms of matter, in terms of biological, chemical, and electrical processes. Then matter can become conscious, as demonstrated by the fact that I, who am entirely matter, am conscious. So, obviously, “dumb” matter has enormous potential. It can appear as dumb as a rock, but don’t let it fool you. You exist. You are conscious. If you are entirely material, then not so much the worse for you, but so much the better for materialism! Look what matter can do. Clearly, it’s extraordinary. Clearly, I don’t know all matter can do. Let’s call this view “enlightened materialism.” — Art48

Finally someone else gets it. Its sometimes frustrating that people get stuck in the idea that being conscious matter is somehow despairing. What's the amazing conclusion they're missing? Matter can be CONSCIOUS. Matter and energy is amazing magic, and we've only scratched the surface of what we can do with it.

To me, that is just ungrammatical and, thusly, does not reference anything (except for being “a word”). Is it “an apple”? If so, then you just have “1 apple” minus “1 apple”, which is nothing. Are you talking about the essence of an apple? The concept? — Bob Ross

You are correct on all accounts. I'm fairly certain I understand what you mean by quantitative, but I'm trying to see what's qualitative. I didn't want to say "an" apple because that seems to be a quantity of a quality. There is a difference between one apple, one pear, and one penny. The quantity is the same, but its the qualities that separate them right?

The identity of the concept of "apple" cannot be quantitative, because no two apples are quantitatively alike. If we were to add two apples and compare them, we would see one is slightly lumpier than the other. The redness would not be the same, nor the height and size. All of these seem to be qualities. But qualities can be processed as quantities. After all, remove the qualities from the quantity, and you are left with a qualityless abstract number.

One the flip side, some qualities do not make sense without some quantity. Saying "apple" doesn't roll off the tongue like "an apple does". That is because in this case, the quality and quantity are inextricably linked. And because of this, I'm not sure you can set qualitative and qualitative up as if they cannot include one another in any process.

It could be that “a pile” is just a useful indefinite, and thusly qualitative or perhaps just ambiguous, colloquial term to note a hazy bit of reality; just like how there’s no exact spot where a heap becomes a pile of sand. We could force the terms to start somewhere definite, or just let it be qualitative (indefinite) and let people decide what is the most useful in the context. — Bob Ross

But then what about adding two piles of sand together? Is this not a mix of quantitative and qualitative?

Perhaps I am confused as to what you are saying, but I think the words that we use to describe reality single out things, which will make it quantitative; but the words themselves do not reference something that is quantitative. For example, yes, one red apple plus one red apple is two red apples; but “redness” and the “actual apple” are qualitative. We use quantities to estimate the qualitative. — Bob Ross

Let us remove the quality again however, and what are we left with? Isn't "oneness" itself a quality then?

I will try to answer faster next time, I am busy as of late.

Also: if the two of you would just read the formal argument you would realize I stipulate in (1) that only the subset of those laws that are formed by reasoning about consequences are relevant. — ToothyMaw

When you have two people tell you the structure of your paper has problems, its not their problem, its your problem. Your OP's intro is poorly written. The main point of your paper is that rule-consequentialism becomes more like act-utilitarianism no? Your first statement should reflect that, and has nothing to do with whether people are assumed to think rationally while considering morality.

I didn't expect people to attack the assumption that people often try to justify the laws they want with some forms of reasoning. — ToothyMaw

With philosophy your argument starts with the very first premise you put forth. Your entire thesis statement starts with this assumption. The only thing which should be assumed is that most people are not going to let assumptions pass by without asking you to prove them. You may want to see if this assumption is unnecessary for the rest of your OP and remove it if possible. If not, I would re-evaluate your entire OP.

When I say rational, I mean that they make sense according to some sort of ethical reasoning, not that they are purely derived from reason, and are thus indisputable truths. — ToothyMaw

I'm going to second T Clark here. This is twisting the idea of rationality into something its not. People are often not inclined to be rational at all. They'll smoke, they'll drink, etc. People rationalize, but that's not being rational. Many people don't even go that far.

Reason also does not mean an indisputable truth. Reason simply means we have derived a conclusion from a set of premises that is certain or highly probable. It does not mean the premises used are true, and consequently, does not mean our conclusion results in an indisputable truth either.

Reading your work is always a delight! Unique thinkers are what we need and I enjoy mulling over your work. With your initial definitions, I'm going to present a couple of potential questions and potential issues I see, but feel free to amend your definitions as we go into detail.

P1: A quantitative process cannot produce a quality — Bob Ross

Lets say I have 1 apple. The oneness denotes a quantity, but if I remove the 1 and just say, "apple", is this a quality? If so, then we can combine the quantitative and qualitative. If not, then what is "apple" in a non-quantitative sense?

Next, lets disregard whether "apple" is a quality or quantity, and just say I have 1 apple. I quantitatively add another apple to a "pile". What is a "pile"? Is that quantitative or qualitative? I could also call them a "pair" of apples now. Is the word pair quantitative or qualitative now? It seems to have the quality of "grouping", but the quantity of two.

Lets add one more apple to make 3 apples. Now I have a "few" apples? "Few" generally means more than 1 but not too many, or not a "lot". Is "few" a quantity, or a quality?

Finally, let us now add in the quality of "red". I add two red apples together. In my quantitative process did I not also produce the quality of 2 "red"? This refers back to my first point, so I'll let you answer before I continue with other thoughts.

Hello Bob! As you are using specific vocabulary, it would help to make your point clearer by also defining exactly what each piece of the vocabulary means to you. What is a quantity by your view? What is quantitative vs qualitative to your view?

Logic only works when you have immutable properties that do not change or are open to interpretation. Definitions often times are immutable based on the internal definitions of the reader, as well as the context in which they can be placed accidently by the user.

Without very explicit terminology, I do not think the proposal can be evaluated.

"But they're job creators!"

At the end of the day I've found that its simply people being convinced that a billionaire's self interest is somehow their personal self-interest. There is a significant portion of the population that has been convinced that all taxation is a waste or theft. There's more that have been convinced that "They deserve it" because they've worked harder than everyone else. And then there are people who hope to take advantage of those cheats themselves one day.

In my experience, you're not going to change these people's minds unless great suffering occurs for them. Thus corruption will build until it finally damages people, then people will fight..

I've viewed reality as, "That which does not contradict your identity of the world." So, if I viewed an apple as healthy, ate it and got sick, that's the end reality. If I ate the apple and did not get sick, that's the end reality.

The Paradox is roughly this: information or knowledge of the initial conditions and laws of nature should allow a true prediction of the action of some person or subsystem with those initial conditions and that is governed by those laws of nature. Such a prediction must be true. However, if the person or subsystem in question acts in a way that falsifies the prediction, then the prediction is not true. In brief, the prediction must be true, however it is not true when the prediction is falsified by the action of the person or subsystem considered. — NotAristotle

Its a paradox because commits the mistake of, "We know everything, yet we do not do not know everything".

What you're doing is taking the observer outside the calculation of the system despite insisting that you have all of the information in the system. You're essentially saying, "We predict up to the moment where the observer learns, 'They will pick blue," then ignore everything after. The learning itself must be then taken into the calculation to see what the person will do next. Essentially every time the person learns what they will do next, that learning itself is a new set of parameters that need to be considered in the prediction.

This simply limits how far ahead one could know what they would do next. Its practically calculating in real time. Meaning that a viable prediction of what a person will do next may only be possible within a very small window. It is neither an argument for or against determinism, just against removing the observer's discovery as part of the "we know everything" calculation itself.

I answer this hear if you're interested in something serious and not surface level. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

We need balanced identity politics. Identities are useful in so long as they don't make us forget that we're all part of the same identity: the human race.

Well schopenhauer1, if that is your conclusion, then take that with you in your life. I will take mine. Good conversation.

The thought experiment works only if there is a rough symmetry between the situation of procreation and the already-existent, That is to say, in both cases the person would not be able to consent or know what the harms were. — schopenhauer1

Ok, that's fair. I don't want to divert from the intent of the thought experiment. If it is your parallel for procreation, then we also don't know what the benefits are either right? Further, we don't even know what we're gifting them. Its a mystery box to all involved. Since no one knows the outcome, is it even worth considering as part of your decision?

the ethics cuts much deeper than this kind of preference-fulfillment you are discussing regarding one's own life. It changes when you cause the life of another: — schopenhauer1

Its not like if we don't give them the gift they'll be fine. They won't exist. So we can really only judge by those who have received that gift. We can't ask those who did not get it. We look at ourselves, our friends, and our family. Even our enemies. Then we decide, "Is the gift overall worth gambling on?" That is up to each individual and their own experiences. No one can tell you "Yes." No one can tell you "No".

If you find that yourself, and people you agree with around you would rather not have lived then suffer through their life, then sure, don't have kids. That gift is a curse to you and those around you. But, you can't reasonably tell other people that they must follow your decision. The rational conclusion is it is a decision for each individual, not that there is a blanket answer that is the same for everyone.

I respect your nuanced position on this knotty subject. — Existential Hope

Much appreciated, it can be a difficult subject.

In other words, if you never cause happiness, you did nothing morally wrong. However, if you caused suffering, that does become morally significant. It is not symmetrical. Happiness causing and harm-creating are not commensurate. — schopenhauer1

Ok, I think I understand what you're saying here. You view positive and negative as "shift changes". So if someone were unhappy, it is not a moral imperative to shift them to neutral or happy. However, in your moral imperative its more important to not shift them down. So if they were happy, you shouldn't do anything that would put them to neutral or sad. So positive shifts are not moral imperatives, while avoiding negative shifts are.

Not to spoil your thought experiment, but I would think the only right thing to do would be to tell the friend what the gift entailed and let them decide. But this is probably how we can also save that thought experiment. Instead of a gift to others, why not shift the focus of the gift to oneself? It should keep the spirit of what you're trying to say.

I know that I would definitely take some of those detriments to obtain some of those positive goals in my life. It depends on what I value. I have sacrificed much in my life to obtain my personal goals and achievements. And I willingly knew it when I made those choices I did in my life. If I could save the lives of 100 good people by getting eaten by a lion, would I do it? Here in my comfortable home I would say, "Yes". Hopefully I would pass that test if it ever came to it in reality. ;)

My point is that in our own lives we must weight the costs for benefits in our lives. Nothing is free. Marriage is a loss of freedom. Children are a loss of financial independence for many people. It can add stress to your lives, poor health, etc. And yet if you asked many parents, they would do it all again in a heartbeat. So I would put that question to yourself. Are there things that are worth suffering through in life? Is avoiding suffering, the negative shift, the only goal, or is it simply the price we have to measure out for living?

Yet, I also fail to see much substantial value in making everything about risks, harms, and impositions. Opportunities, benefits, and benedictions are also of interest. — Existential Hope

However, having kids is also an event that brings about varying (and often great) harms and suffering for a future person. Thus, if one sees preventing harms as the moral sticking point and NOT benefits-giving (as this is supererogatory not obligatory like preventing known harms is), then indeed it would be wrong to bring about a future person who would suffer, and it would not be wrong to "prevent" a future person who would also have benefits. — schopenhauer1

So existential is considering both the positive and negative as the moral points, while shopenhauer1 is only considering the negative as the moral obligation points to consider. Does that sound about right?

It might just be a conceptualization difference. "Positive" and "Negative" are really relative terms. schopenhauer, couldn't the view point that you're noting is really about making life less negative overall? Which doesn't that translate into the relative idea that you're making life more positive overall? Someone being happy is a less negative experience then not feeling anything at all right? The point is I don't think its possible to compare negative without positive, as negative needs what is positive as a relative comparison. Vice versa naturally.

As for doing this comparison ourselves about having kids, that's extremely difficult. Should Steven Hawking never have been born if science had predicted he would have ALS in the womb and that's all we knew? Deciding to have or not have a kid based on known negatives of the kids life in the future runs parallel to abortion, and that debate is not likely to be settled anytime soon. That's why I think its more important that the person willing to have a child goes in with trying their best, while those who aren't interested should pass on having a kid.

I hope it wouldn't be too presumptuous of me to put my two cents here by mentioning that this is only a part of my argument against anti-natalism. — Existential Hope

Not at all. I took a look over the thread and decided that I did not have the full context of the conversation between you two. It did not seem right for me to weigh in on your particular comments.

I mean, if the issue is, "If we have control over outcomes in the future, do we have a moral obligation to ensure the most moral outcome happens within our capacity and resources?" Sure. Not sure who would disagree with this. All moral actions are about the future. They're about whether we do an action now to obtain or a avoid a certain consequence.

As for having a kid, you don't have full control over the outcomes. If you have a kid, you do your best to raise them right. But they still might suffer, die, etc. You can't consider things outside of your control as moral considerations. If you want to have a kid and will work to give them the best life and outcome you possibly can within your emotional and financial means, do so. If you can't be bothered, don't have a kid.

you don't prove something is a dog so much as say it is one. Matching IDs to objects is circular because it all comes down to saying it is that "because I said so". Which is fine, I mean that's what definitions are. — Darkneos

Did you read the paper or just a summary Darkneos?

Because it is and all you're really doing is just asserting that it isn't. And I don't know how much I can repeat that point for you to understand it. — Darkneos

I understand your opinion, you just haven't proved your opinion. Which is fine. If you're not interested, we'll call the conversation done and we'll chat over something else some other time.

I don't have to reread it, that's why I said what I said. — Darkneos

You do if you're going to critique the theory. I see you're not referencing the paper's ideas, just a general opinion. I'm not interested in general opinions, but someone who's willing to discuss the paper's ideas seriously.

Your theory is just your say so. This is a serious approach and you just keep reasserting your points like they've been shown to be the case. — Darkneos

I'm just repeating the point in hopes you'll understand it or see where you could critique it. Your note that I'm just saying so, is just saying so. You haven't been able to overcome the proof by contradiction, so I'm not going to take your opinion as anything more than that.

Looks like we're about done here Darkneos, thanks for the initial curiosity.

I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.
— Philosophim

My point is that animals will try to leave but don't see there is an exit, — Darkneos

Oh, I don't mean like a human. If that test isn't satisfactory to you, the test is just to see if an animal can separate X from Y. Food vs not food would probably have been a better example.

That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.
— Philosophim

That is circular though because you're pretty much saying a dog is a dog. — Darkneos

No, because if I find a cat and try to say its a dog, I'm wrong. If I claim something is a dog, I must prove its a dog. Matching identities to objects is not a circular argument.

Again no it doesn't mean that, this is just you trying to force your definition on reality. — Darkneos

You'll need to prove that, not just say it. I have given an argument in the paper that is far more than that, and your statement shows me you're not referencing the actual argument. If you want to argue against some generic idea of what you think I'm saying, that's fine, but its not going to be anything valid against the actual paper.

Not really, axioms can't be tested, they have to be taken as true in order to get off the ground. Trying to prove the axioms is akin to assuming the conclusion. — Darkneos

Right, you assume axioms to be true to start. In logic you might start off with A => B, then assume A. Of course, if later in your logic you show that A cannot be assumed, the argument fails. My point is that my initial assumptions are consistent within the later discoveries of the theory. Did you try? Go back to the original axioms now that you understand the theory and see if you can or cannot. Having an opinion is fine, but I'm asking you to do more at this point if I'm going to take the point into consideration.

"under the theory" which is pretty much just saying "according to me". They have solved the math problem correctly if according to them 2+2=5. We agree that 2+2=4 but if someone doesn't you can't really convince them otherwise. — Darkneos

If you're going to dismiss the theory without going over the points and showing why they're wrong, then of course there's nothing to talk about. I'm asking for serious approaches, not dismissals. No, according to the theory 2+2=5 would be wrong. If you're going to not try, then that's fine, I'll just let the conversation end. If you want the potential at actually exploring a theory of knowledge that could be useful in your own life, lets be more serious.

Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.
— Philosophim

Again, according to you. — Darkneos

No, according to the paper. I asked you to bring radical skepticism, not teenage angst. :)

Typing "i don't discretely experience" is evidence enough that I don't unless you're claiming to have knowledge of the inside of my mind and subjective experience to verify this, which you can't. — Darkneos

I don't have to see inside of your mind to verify this. If you want to take the conversation seriously, please re-read to understand what discrete experience is, and the proof for why it is also applicably known.

Try as you might your theory falls to strong skepticism. — Darkneos

No, this is just lazy analysis Darkneos. Which look, if you're not interested in addressing the actual argument, that's fine. I don't care about convincing you. I care about having a discussion over the paper. If you're just going to blanket state that everything I've done is an opinionated assertion without demonstrating that you understand the vocabulary of the argument or the reasoning, then this is just removing yourself from the discussion, not skepticism.

Nope. Still doesn’t mean I discretely experience. I could just be a bot after all, or just smacking the keys and yielding this. Can I know the letters, maybe, you don’t know that. My denial doesn’t lead to a contradiction, it’s more like you’re just really wanting to be what is a maybe to be a certainty. It’s not proof by contradiction, it’s wishful thinking at best — Darkneos

I've never encountered a bot with your level of sophistication. Its plausible, but that doesn't outweigh the possibility you're a person. Same with the random slapping of keys. Probability wise, I already know that's nigh impossible, so this argument doesn't work either. So its most rational for me to believe you're a human being. So no, your arguments aren't enough. The fact that you typed, "I don't discretely experience", means you do. Since the inductions failed, try to look at the argument as it is and see if you can refute it.

You’ve obviously never seen an animal trying to leave. — Darkneos

I have. That isn't really considering the points or a refutation.

They don’t have to prove anything. — Darkneos

They do if they are to claim they are being rational under this theory.

Being rational isn’t objective though, it’s subjective. — Darkneos

Is this an objectively rational conclusion? Claiming rationality is subjective contradicts itself. At that point I can claim from my subjective viewpoint that rationality is objective. And to hold onto your claim, you have to agree with me. Holding onto a claim which leads to a paradox or contradiction is of course, not objectively rational.

Maybe to you they aren’t rational because YOUR questions aren’t satisfied but that doesn’t mean anything besides you being upset about it. — Darkneos

No, they simply aren't rational under the theory. Its like someone saying 2+2=5. They can believe it all they want, it doesn't mean that they've objectively solved the math problem correctly.

No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.
— Philosophim

I’d argue yes since all ideas eventually have to start from axioms without exception. There is no branch of philosophy without axioms. — Darkneos

The M Trilemma issue has nothing to do with axioms. You also did not address my point where I noted the axioms I start with can be tested with the final theory and confirmed. I invite you to try to use the theory and find one of the three logical fallacies that is what the M Trilemma notes.

This is still circular as it’s just operating on the definition you say it is. You have a claim that can be contradicted by reality because all you’re doing is just saying that you do this, you haven’t shown that you do. — Darkneos

No, this is not circular. If you re-read the section I apply this notion of discrete experience to reality. Its my own reality. Again, if you are a human replying to me, you do the same. If you are able to read these words, you're able to see the black on the screen as something which you can ascribe an identity to. Your ability to make any sense of it requires you to discretely experience those words as something separate from the white nearby. You cannot deny that you do this. For to even attempt to deny that you do this, means you must have discretely experienced a concept that you're trying to deny.

Try as you might it’s still an assumption you are making rooted in the faith of your senses. — Darkneos

Its not an assumption, its an inescapable reality.

You cannot prove these assumptions must be without being circular, like using sensation to prove sensation. — Darkneos

That's not a circular argument. If I have the definition of a dog, find a dog and demonstrate that the thing is a dog, that's not a circular argument. Same with sensation.

I can have experience, supposedly, but that doesn't mean I am viewing it as parts and words and concepts. — Darkneos

Yes, because you answered my question. To answer my question you would have had to read. If you read, then you're able to part existence out. Can you differentiate between letters? Then you discretely experience. Your very denial that you discretely experience leads to a contradiction, therefore you discretely experience.

Now, its plausible that you as a discrete experiencer doesn't exist, and its all a figment in my head. Except I've never actually applicably known a situation where this has happened to me before. So for me, its not possible. I have applicably known other people who type things online, so it is possible you are another person that types things online. As what is possible is the more rational induction, I choose to stick with what I know is possible, and not plausible. I'm not stating that I applicably know you exist, that I cannot prove. What I can prove is that I did not type the letters in your reply, and that the only way something was able to, is if it discretely experienced.

Nope, we can't prove animals discretely experience, we can only infer that based on behavior. Also calling it theory of knowledge is a stretch, you're kinda anthropomorphizing here. — Darkneos

You may not realize how basic discrete experience is. Words are discrete experiences, but you have discrete experiences without words. Experience is the sum total of all the sights sounds, thoughts etc that stream into us. Discrete experience is the ability to focus on one or more combinations out of the noise. Something that did not discretely experience would be incapable of doing this, and just be a mess of input without any processing. We don't infer that animals discretely experience, we can test them by seeing if they have intention and attention, then attempting to divert that attention and intention.

Example: As a very basic test, put an animal in a room. Have an open exit. See if the animal ever tries to leave. A non-discrete experiencer would not be able to recognize there is an exit just like a camera cannot recognize anything about the picture it is taking.

Why is it most rational to take your position of probability? Depending on the person it might be more rational to believe god will do it. Something being rational doesn't mean right or true necessarily. This is just another assumption. — Darkneos

The hierarchy of induction is built up through the rational arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge. Do you agree the arguments for distinctive and applicable knowledge are sound? If not, we'll need to go there first as the hierarchy of inductions relies on this. Rationality is not a desire, its a consequence of how far removed from applicable knowledge an induction is.

Depending on a person's context, yes, it might be more rational to believe God will do it. But they must applicably prove so within their context. Do they have distinctive knowledge of a God that's non-synonymous with another identity? Have they ever applicably known this God? Have they applicably known God to change a lottery ticket before? If not, then its merely a plausibility. Compared to the known probability, its still more rational for them to choose the probability.

Also, we can evaluate other people as being rational, as being rational is objective. I can ask a person all of these questions, and if they give answers that do not align with actually applicably knowing these questions, then we can tell them they did not actually applicably know, and were not being rational. Their feelings or disagreement is moot.

Of course, if they have applicable knowledge of a God that fits their distinctive knowledge, its still at best a possibility. Meaning that the known odds still make it more rational to choose the odds then believe God will change the ticket.

Well no, you can have different theories of knowledge like science does where different ones apply to different levels of reality. That's why quantum physics was such an upset. — Darkneos

Instead of reality, I note it as context. Reality is just what it is. I cut this portion out of the rewrite, but it appears most of your questions actually apply to this section here. https://docs.google.com/document/d/14_KGMPbO2e_z8icrjuTmxVwGLxxUA0B_CqNT-lF6SXo/edit?pli=1

Its only a few double spaced pages, but it addresses the questions you've been asking. I may post this in the reserved post I made as optional reading.

You haven't really shown it has defeated radical skepticism, I keep saying you're making a bunch of assumptions. Even the fact I experience isn't certain, I could be wrong in some wacky and EXTREMELY paradoxical or whatever way. — Darkneos

If you can disprove that people discretely experience, then yes, I will just have an assumption. Until then, its both distinctively and applicably known. If you discretely experience, then of course you experience. Being able to doubt or invent a plausibility such as, "What if I don't actually experience?" is fine. But if you've experienced at least once, which you would need to even ask the question, then its possible that you experience. So once again possibility is more cogent than plausibility, and the plausible question can be dismissed as a less rational induction to believe and explore.

Also, while there may have been assumptions made to think through the theory, I can go back to each assumption and apply the theory to it. Many theories of knowledge fail when this is done. Mine doesn't. If you think it does, please demonstrate where it does.

Well no, we don't understand the concept of discretely experience, again this is just a you thing. Get out of your own head. It is very much circular. — Darkneos

I meant if you understand the arguments that lead to proving that you discretely experience. From my point, if you don't understand the argument, it still makes you a discrete experiencer.

Here's the point which needs to be countered:

Discrete experience is the ability to part and parcel the full set of experience you have. Discrete experience allows us to observe parts of experience. Go back to the camera which merely splashes light on a piece of paper versus that which can interpret sections such as a sun, a field, and a sheep on the paper. As a very simple point, can you see a difference between letters and words? Can you ignore the letter and simply focus on a black piece on your screen? That's discrete experience.

Can you understand concepts apart from the totality of what you experience? That's discrete experience. Because I can form this concept in my head, and I find that simply challenging the idea, "I don't discretely experience" necessitates that I discretely experience, I have a claim that cannot be contradicted by reality. Thus, my first set of distinctive knowledge. This is not an assumption or circular. The very negation of it proves that it must be.

And example of a circular argument is, "The bible tells me God is real. God tells me the bible is truth. Therefore God is real." This cannot be proven by contradiction. If I state, "The bible isn't true" we have a situation in which God doesn't have to be real. The negation does not create a contradiction. I do not see this with discrete experience.

Lastly it's not really induction that all will, it's just a fact. — Darkneos

No, that is an induction. Has every single idea been proven to devolve into the M Trilemma? Of course not. Feel free to prove it if so. An induction is a conclusion that does not necessarily occur from the premises. If you have not proven that all ideas devolve into the M Trilemma, then it is an induction.

Everything is built on language that only makes sense in a social setting and that we made up to be self referential in order to talk to each other. So off the bat you're on shaky ground. — Darkneos

I agree within a social context. The paper starts with a single context for a good reason. We must first have an understanding of knowledge as individuals, then it evolves into knowledge between more than one person. We can address this more once you read the section I posted.

For your theory to even get off the ground it has to take things as a given, just like everything else. Chiefly the axioms listed in the video I posted, faith in your observations and that you can know things. — Darkneos

No, I do not assume faith in my observations or even that I can know things. I build that up from assumptions, yes. But then I try to disprove those assumptions afterward. The thing about the theory is once you understand it, you can apply it to every single one of the prior assumptions. Starting with assumptions is not illogical as long as you can go back and prove those assumptions must be. The M Trilemma in specific is about claiming that all ideas devolve into one of three fallacies, circular, dogmatic, or regressive. You've made a claim that the argument is circular, but you have not proven so. If you can prove that the theory devolves into one of those 3, then you would be correct. Can you do so?

Good comments Darkneos!

This also assumes you know the state of the minds of others and just assume people do this. — Darkneos

Its not an assumption, its a proof if anyone can grasp the concept. If you can't discretely experience, then you can't differentiate between the letters, words, and sentences you read. In communicating with each other, we've already proven we discretely experience. To even doubt the idea that you discretely experience means that you have experience, and that you can view it as parts like words and concepts. Its proof by contradiction.

On could also un knowingly be able to experience discretely and yet not be able to comprehend the idea of it, I would cite animals as this case (at least I assume from their behaviors). So this act of creation is more an assumption than a fact of living things, or in this case humans. — Darkneos

We can also prove that animals discretely experience. As long as they consistently model behavior beyond random chance that shows they can identify something, they do. Does this mean they can every comprehend what they're doing in a meta analysis like we can? Not necessarily. But, this theory of knowledge can easily be applied to any discretely experiencing thing, not merely humans.

I guess that probability is more a likelihood within a known quantity like a deck. Possible is if it can happen. Plausible is more like a maybe it COULD be. I'm still not sure how one is more useful than the other though. — Darkneos

Here's an example.

Probability: The chance of winning a lottery ticket is 1 out of 10,000,000.
Possibility: People have won the lottery before, so its possible I could win.
Plausible: God will intervene and make the next ticket I purchase a winning ticket.

If I was discussing with someone else, or even analyzing these myself, I might be very tempted to want one of these inductions over the other. But, if I understand what's most rational, whatever I or anyone else may feel, its most rational to make my decision using the probability. The most rational conclusion is not to buy a ticket, and put the money to some better use.

I guess I have a more loose version of truth. For me truth is what IS and what comports with reality and evidence. Because one can "know" something and it be false (flat earth, autism and vaccines). It's why I said that knowledge sometimes yields truth. — Darkneos

I agree. I was just clarifying from the paper's viewpoint for some very specific critiques someone could have, but what you are saying seems fine to me.

Science I wouldn't really use as an example as it's designed to be a constantly evolving process, and even then it's complex. Like classical and quantum physics. It's not that classical is "Wrong" per se, just useful at our level of complexity (and that it is if you see what we've done with it). But in terms of reality as it is then the quantum world is where it's at, maybe. — Darkneos

If this is a theory of knowledge, it should work everywhere including science. Context is of course important as well. To continue with the example earlier, Newton's laws were still sound when we used them for small bodies. Once relativity was found out, we also could reduce it down to Newton's laws at small bodies. This allowed us to use a simpler equation and set of identities at one level, and the more complex set of equations and identities at another.

I guess I never really give much thought as to how I know what I know because in the past I tend to spiral into some radical skepticism where I know nothing and end up catatonic. — Darkneos

Agreed, but this theory defeats radical skepticism. There is a base of distinctive knowledge, and everything builds up from that. Further, you can take the vocabulary within the theory, apply it to itself from the beginning, and it still holds strong. If you would like, put forward some radical skepticism ideas and I will post how the theory solves the issue.

While "how do we know what we know" is a nice question to ask, at some point we have to realize that everything ends in some irrational position, according to the Munchausen Trilemma. — Darkneos

As I've noted, my theory starts with a proof by contradiction. To be able to If we couldn't discretely experience, then we could not understand the concept of discrete experience. Because we do understand the concept, we discretely experience. Since this is neither circular, dogmatic, or regressive, I've refuted the Manchausen Trilemma.

Lets go one farther using the hierarchy of induction. The M Trilemma states that all ideas will end in an irrational position.

We don't applicably know this as we have not applied the M Trilemma to all ideas. Therefore this is an induction.

We don't have a probability as we don't have enough applicable knowledge to establish one.
We do know that some ideas have ended by resting on a circular, dogmatic, or regressive idea, we do know its possible for this to happen to ideas.
Its plausible that all ideas fall to the M Trilemma.

Since we know it is possible that some fall to the M Trilemma, but the claim that it applies to all is a plausibility, it is more rational to hold onto the possibility and dismiss the plausibility if we decide to settle on a belief. So the more rational induction to hold is that it is possible that ideas can end up falling to the M Trillemma. The induction that all will, is less cogent, and therefore can be dismissed in any rational discussion.

It sounds like you would like to terminate the discussion, so, out of respect, I am going to refrain from responding to your points and let you have the last word.

As always, I hope you have a wonderful day and cannot wait to hear what else you have to say on this forum! — Bob Ross

Thanks Bob! I appreciate it, I just felt like both of us were getting nowhere with each other at that point. Have a great day as well, I look forward as well to the next ideas you bring to the forums!

This kinda breaks down as you don’t really demonstrate we have discrete experiences but just assert we do. — Darkneos

Let me repost this section.

A discrete experience is not a claim about the truth of what is being experienced. It is the act of creating an identity within the sea of one’s experience. A camera can take a picture, but cannot attempt to put any identity to any of the colors it absorbs. I can take a picture, look at portions of it, and make “something” within the “everything else”. It is the ability to part and parcel within the totality of one’s experience as one chooses.

Is this something I know? Knowledge is a deduction that is not contradicted by reality. I must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of “discrete experience.” But I also must be able to experience discretely to comprehend the idea of the idea being contradicted by reality. For if I could not create identities, I could not create the idea of identities. For reality to contradict that I discretely experience, and to know this, I must be able to discretely experience. Therefore, I do not simply believe that I discretely experience, I deduce that I discretely experience. Therefore, I know that I discretely experience. — Philosophim

That's the claim. If you believe its incorrect, why?

Also the differences between the forms of induction are just splitting hairs than any actual distinction between them, apart from irrationality. — Darkneos

This is fair as I paired this down a bit. The difference between each type of induction is how many steps it is from what is applicably known.

When you know the entire composition of a deck of cards and that it will be shuffled without intent, the next immediate induction you can make is that a Jack has a 4/52 chance of being drawn. There's nothing in between right?

Now look at possibilities. I've seen a jack drawn before. I believe its possible that it will be drawn on the next pull. But its less rational of an induction then utilizing the applied knowledge of the card counts, the suits, and the face. Something being possible only indicates that it was applicably known once. It has no bearing on whether it will happen again.

This allows me a set way to compare two inductions and determine which one is more rational to hold. I'ld say that's pretty useful right?

I found your “split” between knowledge and truth iffy at best. Knowledge does capture the truth at times but not always. — Darkneos

Could you specify what was iffy? Let me sum what the difference was.

Truth: What exist in reality.
Knowledge: A set of identities which when applied as matching with reality, are not contradicted by reality.

The point here is that knowledge can never "know" that what it holds is truth. All it can know is that what it currently holds has not been contradicted by reality.

As an example to this abstract, distinctively and applicably known physics from the 1700's is not the same as physics from today. There were certain identities in physics that when applied with the tools available, were not contradicted by reality. However, eventually certain contradictions were found such as with orbiting large bodies. What was applicably know for small bodies could no longer be applied to planets. Eventually relativity came along. Today, we distinctively and applicably know things in science that in 100 years, may no longer stand.

What was the problem you were thinking this missed?

And my usual final question, what’s the point here? — Darkneos

A fantastic question, perhaps the best one. I find epistemology to be one of the core unsolved questions of philosophy, and the most important one. "How do we know what we know," is incredibly important before any serious discussion can occur. Being able to identity what another person distinctively and applicably knows is immensely valuable in debating another person. If you see that the conflict is merely over the distinctive differences in identities, you can refocus energy and efforts on that instead of the applicable.

As well, to my knowledge there is no theory in epistemology at this point in history which allows us a reasoned way to compare inductions and ascertain that one is more cogent than another in a particular situation. Intuitively we feel this, but no one has ever actively given an objective means to do so. Sometimes this is called "The problem of induction". The theory here gives a solution to this problem.

Absolutely no worries my friend! I think, with all due respect, that we are completely speaking past each other on this dispute about “rationality”. — Bob Ross

Yes, we may be at an impasse at this point simply due to differences in definitions. If we can't agree on those, there's really nothing we can debate over. As I've noted, what we choose as distinctive knowledge is up to us as individuals. We can attempt to persuade one another, but at the end of the day, the choice is in our own hands. Whatever you choose Bob, the discussion has been good until now.

Within that interpretation of our dispute, I think you are noting that “truth” is not relative (which I agree with) but are semantically associating it with “rationality”. I am associating “rationality” with an act which is in accordance with one’s primitive epistemic standards, which inevitably are norms (and norms are either categorical or hypothetical). — Bob Ross

To clarify, it is the processing and thoughts which do not lead to a contradiction from reality that I consider rational. Something rational may not be true, as someone simply hasn't encountered that which in reality would contradict their reasoning yet. At that point, holding onto the original statement would be considered irrational, while a rational individual would amend or eliminate their identities and thoughts which now lead to a contradiction.

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

Wanting to be in good health and being obligated to be in good health are both norms; — Bob Ross

The above statements do not consider whether you should want to be, or are obligated to be in good health. This is not a subjective argument. It is objectively the case that if you want to be in good health, you should not smoke.

if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not

Your “resolution” section is the exact same thing I said but you substituted “should” for “want”, and , since they are both normative statements, it doesn’t matter: normative statements are subjective. — Bob Ross

This is why I do not use broad generic philosophy terms as absolutes in detailed argumentation. The debate then shifts from the actual idea to the debate of about a generic term. We'll debate whether this or that statement is actually normative, and whether there will be exceptions to normative, and does context change whether its normative and we don't actually debate the point. Show me why the statements are subjective after I've demonstrated they are objective. "They're normative" is not a good enough answer. If you don't want to do that, its fine. But if you don't want to, I don't want to go down that rabbit hole of time and effort.

I am sorry, but this is just a blatant straw man. Firstly, assertions which contain obligations (such as “should”) are assertions. I can assert that “I should eat food in 5 minutes”--you can’t say that isn’t an assertion. — Bob Ross

Correct, a wrong term on my part. What I meant to say was that this was not an unambiguous assertion. My problem is "should" in this instance is ambiguous. If you say,

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.

My first question is, "Why?" Does "should" mean, "But they could also not be?" Its a poor word for a specific argument. A well constructed set of statements avoids all ambiguity where possible. One who is incoherent in their beliefs "is" or "is not" or even "is or is not" irrational is a clear and unambiguous statement. I'm not going to consider an ambiguous statement as anything valid. Please try to remove the ambiguity and create an example that demonstrates why rationality is always subjective and therefore never objective.

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.

NO. I am saying that in truth there is nothing it is to be irrational or rational apart from one’s (or our) epistemic standards (which are normative statements) and so to claim that there is an objective standard of rationality is to, from my point of view, hold a false belief; BUT, I cannot say they are objectively irrational for holding it. — Bob Ross

Let me translate that first sentence. "I am saying in truth (objectively) that what is rational does not exist apart from our subjective standards. Therefore if you hold there is a truth (something objective), you hold a false belief.

This is just word play and spinning in circles Bob. If rationality is subjective, I can tell you, by my subjective rationality, that its objective. And according to you, I'm being rational. Meaning I can come up with a rational conclusion that contradicts your conclusion, and somehow we're both right. I'm done with this. I feel like you're arguing for the sake of argument at this point and its fully distracted from the debate at hand. I don't care what you hold at this point, because according to you, we're both right. You can't even objectively say I'm irrational for saying so. Therefor the debate is over. Believe what you want, its lets me believe what I want too. :)

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card.

No! The 4/52 chance of pulling a jack is not an induction: that is a deduction. — Bob Ross

If we're debating what an induction is, then I'm satisfied that my theory has held up. No one in any normal setting is going to debate this. This is so far from a debate about the theory at this point, its just a rabbit hole. If you have to go this far Bob, you don't have a good point.

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Fac
…
Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and num

Please outline exactly what the essential properties are that you keep referring to in this example. By my lights, it is not what is essential to the formulation of the inductions; so I am confused what you mean by “essential properties” of the inductions. — Bob Ross

Bob, I'm tired of re-explaining this. At this point I just feel like you're arguing to argue. Re-read it. I've posted this countless times and if you can't understand it, I don't care anymore. I'm putting in a lot of work here to make careful examples, and I'm not feeling like you're putting the same effort back. Please consult the example and try to work through it. Show me where the example lacks as you try to reason through it, just don't ask me a generic question without an example.

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create.

What I am saying is that we create distinctive property sets, but there are, in reality, relevant factors to the situation. Period. It isn’t distinctive knowledge itself. — Bob Ross

I've asked you to stop using this term. If you can't respect that, there's nothing more to discuss.

you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I already have. — Bob Ross

Beyond confirmation bias? You haven't. Almost every time you've claimed I haven't given an example, I've taken the time and effort to repeat it to you or reference it in some way. You are not doing me this favor back. As such, I'm going to keep believing that you haven't given me a rational argument to explain why H2 should be picked over H1.

Looking back over this, I think we're about done Bob. The original argument was whether you could compare between hierarchy sets. I've said no and presented reasons why. Giving my best to understand your points, I do not find them enough to counter what I've noted. Further, we're getting into redefining basic terms and introducing all odd manner of arguments that its not even the original subject anymore. If you disagree, that's fine by me at this point. I beginning to feel like if I said the moon was in space you would argue it wasn't somehow, and when I've gotten to point in discussion like that with good people, I know its time to end it. Feel free to redefine your last terms, but if its just more of the same or goes too off base, I'm just going to let you have the last word.

Intuition is a summary of a book, while knowledge is the book itself. I can give you an overall idea of what the book is about, but unless you carefully examine the specifics, you won't know the full picture. Sometimes summaries are accurate, and sometimes they aren't. What they are is efficient, and can be a guide to motivate you to read and understand the book itself.

If you have a genuine interest in this question, check my post here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1

This basically answers the question. Quick summary, we create language, then test it against reality. If reality does not contradict that language, then it is rational to hold it for as long as it does so.

it just sounds like you aren’t cross-comparing inductions that are not in the same hierarchies; however, in a more broad sense, you are comparing the inductions by comparing the hierarchies because those “bases” you speak of are what decide the properties of the inductions themselves—so you are comparing the properties of the inductions via those structures. — Bob Ross

Inductions derive from the distinctive property sets we create. The set of inductions I can form when considering only A and B are potentially different when considering the full property sets of A, B, X, and Y. I've pointed out that comparing a derivation is not the goal, its comparing the base that we start with that is the goal. This is not the same thing as comparing the inductions between the sets, and if anyone were to use the theory in such a way I would inform them this was incorrect. The theory give no rational argument to do so, so therefore it is not part of the theory as the proper way to organize and compare inductions in a rational manner.

The end goal is not to pick an induction. The end goal is to pick a distinctive knowledge set that when applied, will give you a rational assessment of reality.

To me, your second sentence here is a just a more complicated way of saying that the end goal is to pick an induction. — Bob Ross

Yes, as long as you realize its the induction of picking a distinctive knowledge set. What is important is not to compare the inductions that you can form with the distinctive knowledge set, as inductions themselves are unknowns. Perhaps this is what you need to finally see why we're not comparing the derived inductions, but must compare the distinctive knowledge sets first. If you're looking to the derived inductions to establish an induction upon which that derived induction would form, this is trying to rationalize an induction by an induction and very low on cogency. Its much more rational to establish a justification for the base induction before deriving from it. Do you understand now why we it is less cogent to use the derived inductions as a reason to pick our initial induction of our distinctive knowledge set?

Because illogical means irrational. The antonym of rationality doesn't explain what rationality is.

What is illogical is one way you can be irrational. That does not explain or define what rationality is. That was my only intended point. I also noted that I was fine with your general identification of rationality. The main point stands that despite the definitions, you have not given anything rational that explains why H2 should be picked over H1.

I was saying essentially this:

1. The probability of … is Z% is not an induction. — Bob Ross

A probability is an induction Bob. When I say I have a 4/52 chance of pulling a jack, that's because we don't know the outcome of the card. We've deduced the induction, but deducing an induction does not make the induction not an induction. If you mean its not an induction until we decide to believe it or not, that doesn't work either. That's choosing an induction to believe in.

One thing I will clear up in case this is causing confusion is that "pattern" as an induction is not the same as a pattern itself as a noun. The capture of the pattern as a noun is the applicable knowledge one has when repeating the same steps and counting the number of times an outcome occurs. The number of outcomes alone is not an induction, this is applicable knowledge of results. This applicable knowledge allows us to make an induction I've been calling a pattern, that repeated results that favor a particular outcome means we believe that particular outcome will occur again. To avoid this confusion going forward (and until I can think of a better term :) ) lets call the induction of a pattern "patterning".

If by it you mean:

We are talking about the essential distinctive properties that are needed to make that induction.

Then, as shown above, no induction which is not completely identical to another can be compared, which is clearly not what you are trying to argue for. — Bob Ross

No, I've attempted to note this over several posts. Lets go back to cards instead of boxes because you might be misunderstanding this.

Distinctive knowledge set 1: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. I do not include the particular type of suit.

Applicable knowledge: I have applicable knowledge that there is deck of 52 cards with this setup. I've pulled three cards, and its been a jack 3 times in a row. I have no applicable knowledge as to what the next card is in the deck after its shuffled.

Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack out is 4/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack again.

Distinctive knowledge set 2: Face and number cards in a deck of 52 cards. Each face and number card has four suits. The four suits are hearts, diamonds, spades, and clovers. (The new properties for the inductions)

Inductions:
a. Probability of pulling a jack of hearts out is 1/52
b. Patterning that I will pull a jack of hearts out again.

As you can see, the difference between both sets is the distinctive knowledge set used with the applicable knowledge using that set, to set up different types of inductions. We were able to use the same distinctive knowledge set to create different inductions within it based on our applicable knowledge. Please use this example specifically to point out issues. I think your problem is you're missing the fact that that applicable knowledge, or lack thereof, is what allows us to make different inductions within the distinctive knowledge set. But the distinctive properties used to make the inductions do not change themselves.

Philosophim, I am not interested in comparing our (or others’) egos or credentials; but, since you brought it up, I have studied metaethics in depth, so I know for a fact that moral anti-realism is not an irrational position nor has moral realism thoroughly debunked it. The fact of the matter is that there are rational and good arguments on both sides. There have been many great philosophers that have been one, and many the other. — Bob Ross

Agreed, I am not interested in comparing either. I hesitated to even post it as I was unsure of your level of development and education in philosophy. The intent was to persuade you to re-examine the idea carefully, but I see that was not the way to do so. I made a bad judgement call, so my apologies and I will never use an appeal to authority again in our discussions.

I have no problem with your adamant support for moral realism here (which, as I was saying before, is the crux of our dispute about rationality); but to say that your prominent opponents (even in the literature itself) are all irrational and that anyone who is serious can debunk them in a heart beat is a straw man, inaccurate, borderline dogmatic, and unproductive to think. — Bob Ross

I did not say I supported moral realism, nor was I debunking anyone who opposes moral realism. That's the straw man here Bob. I was noting that your position was what was easily debunked. Perhaps you intended some implicit references that I did not see within your points read as is. As is, the point you are making is easily refuted.

For example, if I should be healthy, then I should not smoke. This is true regardless of whether I want it to be or not; however, whether I should be healthy or not is not grounded in objectivity—it is subjective. — Bob Ross

This is incorrect. Lets say not debate the statements validity, lets assume that it is true. Lets also make it so that it fits with what you are intending to convey. Because technically I could decide not to smoke, but get sick for example.

True: Smoking leads to poor health.
Resolution: If I want to be in good health, I should not smoke.

This is an objective statement that has nothing to do with your subjective opinion on the matter. If you stated, "I think I'll retain good health while smoking, this is simply untrue."

Deciding to smoke or not smoke is a decision. Rationally you should choose not to smoke if you want to retain good health. But you don't have to be rational. You could be emotional. You have a subjective choice, but that subjective choice may or may not be rational.

P1: One who is incoherent in their beliefs should be considered irrational.
P2: To smoke and think that one should be healthy is to hold incoherent beliefs.
C: Therefore, to smoke and think one should be healthy is to be irrational. — Bob Ross

P1 is not an assertion because of "should". That's just an ambiguous sentence. A proper claim for logic is "One who is incoherent in their beliefs IS considered irrational, or even IS NO considered irrational. "Should" leaves the point incomplete. Why should it? Why should it not? What does should even mean? Does that mean the outcome is still uncertain?

P2, should should be "will". P2 is an affirmation of a future action. Should doesn't really communicate this clearly.

The refutation is not the argument, but the nature of the words and premises. They aren't clear. Unclear premises are allowed to be rejected in any logical discussion because they are open to interpretation by each subject and are the root of many logical fallacies.

But not to detract from your point as I saw it:

We decide what rationality means and it is contingent on what we think we ought to be doing epistmically which, in turn, doesn’t exist in reality apart from our wills/minds. — Bob Ross

This translates directly to this:

Each person subjectively decides what rationality means. Because of this, there is no objective rationality, or something which is rational apart from our subjective experience.

Maybe you didn't intend that, but from the reading of that sentence alone, what I've noted is equivalent. Thus my conclusion:

Since the above is the case, I can subjectively conclude that there is an objective rationality apart from our subjective experiences. Since your proposal necessarily lets me hold a contradiction (a negation of your point that you cannot refute) your proposal is not true.