Hello Jabberwock! Welcome to the forums. Please, write your thoughts and feelings freely.

I would disagree with the OP claim that sex is objective. What is objective are biological features or properties. 'Sex' is a subjective term that is used to categorize beings based on those features, but it depends on the accepted definition, i.e. which features do we consider as essential for that category. — Jabberwock

For a first time post, this is a very good point to bring up. Yes, I am aware of genetic abnormalities that result in a lack of clear distinction between the sexes. But these are exceptions. Further, it doesn't change the definition of what a man or a woman is. In this case, these people fit neither fully into the category of man or woman.

In these cases, an abnormality or handicap asks us different questions. How does someone who is genetically not a man or a woman fit into sexually divided spaces? I think that should be considered based on the difference. But not we're not talking about gendered behavior, we're talking about placing someone with an objectively separate sex from a normal man and woman.

A subjective idea is an opinion. For example, lets say in one society men are not expected to wear dresses. In another society, they are. This is a societal expectation of how a sex should dress, but it is not an objective measure of how a sex should act. Objective measures of sex would be solid sex organ differences or clear genetic traits. It really doesn't matter what someone's opinion on the matter is, sex is a clearly defined term that has been studied and is known across all cultures and outlooks.

The subject is then focused on the norm, not the exceptions. While exceptions can be great to examine to make sure we aren't mistaken on the norm, I don't think that is the case here. No one is subjectively determining the sexual genetic normal for men and women. But I argue that gender, or the expectation of how men and women by sex should act, is a subjective stereotype, and does not override one's sex.

Great post again Jabberwock, and I hope you enjoy yourself here!

Are you talking about an origin of causality, all of the unknown steps that would lead to what we know today,
— Philosophim
Yes, my idea of an hypothesis that could be plausible is that we would be able to relate it to the current laws of nature and everything would fall in place like the pieces of a puzzle. — Skalidris

Lets go by your own definitions. You noted that what could be known is what can be observed. Can we observe that any one hypothesis is implausible? No, we can only test it to see if it matches reality. Lets examine what odds mean as well.

If I have a deck of 52 cards, the likelihood of a jack being pulled is 4/52, or 1/13. These odds only apply because we don't know which card will end up being pulled. Lets say we have a machine shuffle the deck and pull the top card. Since there is nothing in our knowledge which makes it more likely that any one card would be on top over another, we can safely claim those odds.

However, the shuffle is a real action. If we were to watch it, we would know with certainty which card was on top. Odds only work if you don't know certain aspects of reality and you want to make a reasonably inductive guess. Odds also only work if its reasonable to assume all situations have an equal chance of being.

In the case of hypothesis, you really don't have an underlying reason to state that any one hypothesis is plausible or less plausible than another. First of all, humanity can only know of a finite number of hypothesis, meaning the number of possible hypothesis is not infinite. Second, we need a method for demonstrating whether a hypothesis is true. Do we have any facts that demonstrate that any hypothesis we create has any greater chance of being true than another? No. Its not a chance that a hypothesis is true, its a chance that the hypothesis we pick can match correctly to reality.

In other words there are only a limited number of hypothesis which could be true. To simplify, lets say its one. So in a finite deck of cards, 1 out of that finite deck is true. Are we pulling hypothesis at random however? No. We can use reason and logic to rule out many potentials. When we do, do we know how many viable hypothesis are left? No, but its a finite number. So every hypothesis we test lowers the denominator by an unknown number as we discover more knowledge. Is the hypothesis we pick to explore next the right one? Now that's a clear 1/x chance. Meaning while the next hypothesis we pick to explore is most likely not going to be the one that matches reality, it definitely has a real chance to.

By this logic resulting from the premises you've put forth, we cannot conclude that any one hypothesis is more plausible or implausible than another merely looking at what has been left over after knowledge has eliminated the invalid ones. All we can do is pick the next hypothesis, explore it, and use that knowledge to further lower the denominator of possible hypotheses that humanity can create.

Was I close in the ball park of your flaw, or did you have another in mind?

This seems a bit harsh T Clark. I think he's just having a little fun. He's noted its flawed, no need to pull out AI! :)

Those subjective outlooks however question to what extent this biological fact is supposed to rule divide them in the first place. Notice how you haven't actually explained why sex (as chromosomes alone) is the only criterion used to make these distinctions. You've said it is, not why it is. — substantivalism

Sex is not a subjective outlook. We're starting to repeat, so I'm going to note this has already been stated.

Notice how you haven't actually explained why sex (as chromosomes alone) is the only criterion used to make these distinctions. You've said it is, not why it is. — substantivalism

I've said several times why it is. You even quoted me right here:

Dressing or acting in a particular way does not change that. Its not a party place. Its not a place to express fashion. Its to go to the bathroom. And since you have to undress or put yourself in a vulnerable position to expel certain bodily fluids, we keep the sexes separate. — Philosophim

Except when it comes to biologically transitioned individuals and intersex people who still, besides their possibly 'discordant' sex organs, can use either bathroom just as easily. — substantivalism

Absolutely. We're not talking about exceptions. I noted that a long time back. If you're neither a man nor a woman, then yes, you can use either bathroom. Its a non-issue in this conversation. We are talking about biological men and biological women.

So a person is a trans-female who passes. . . are they seen as a sexual predator or not? — substantivalism

I am starting to feel like you are not actually reading my replies. I have said several times that trans people are not sexual predators. Stop implying that they are. Stop implying that I've said they are. I'm getting tired of repeating myself.

If you're saying that acting like something you are not, or identifying as something you are not, makes you that something, that's false.
— Philosophim
Unless what that thing is, is nothing above the act itself. Being feminine/masculine (NOT TALKING ABOUT SEX) is heavily enforced by and cemented socially in a variety of acts that do not have to involve you taking your clothes off or revealing your chromosomes. — substantivalism

This is called gender. This is the entire focus on the conversation. Nothing new has been stated. Please re-read my definition of gender and sex again.

Society then has what right to tell us who we are internally? None. — substantivalism

I clearly said you can identify yourself however you want. But if I identify myself as the president, then start telling society I'm the president and try to get into the White House, they're going to kick me out because I'm not the president. You can identify however you want, but society is under no obligation to accept it. In the case of sex, biology is a world wide agreed upon standard which we follow. It has nothing to do with gender.

The sex differences between men and women are chromosomes or what primary/secondary sexual organs you possess. Sex is not the 'potential to rape' or 'probably going to rape'. That is something that ISN'T SEX. — substantivalism

I've said this several times. I feel like you're just rambling now. Go re-read our back and forth.

. . and it's there because. . . why? Why should it be there? — substantivalism

Again, re-read the last few replies. I'm not retyping the same thing I've already typed three times.

. . and these divisions by chromosomal status are there because. . .? Why should it be there? — substantivalism

Again, reread.

I was enjoying the conversation but you are at your end. Either you've lost what I've been saying in the conversation, or you know exactly what I'm saying, you can't counter what I'm saying, and you're grasping at straws. Please do better on your next response or I will know this discussion is finished.

Ha ha! I'm flattered! Thanks for the fun post. I'll give it a shot.

Points 1 and 2 seem good premises to start with.
Point 3: I agree. An infinite amount of theories is impossible for any limited species to make.
Point 4: So you're claiming knowledge requires observation, no problem there.
Point 5: Could life extend past the elements we currently know? Or because we have not observed it yet, we cannot know? I'll go with the later to keep consistent with point 4.

Ok, first set of questions.
Point 6: What does plausible mean in your OP? What do you mean by "explains all that we know now"? Are you talking about an origin of causality, all of the unknown steps that would lead to what we know today, or something else?
Point 7: We can create a large number of hypothesis, but they aren't infinite. Sounds good.
Points 8 and 9: I'll need the definition of plausible before I can judge these.

Great start!

Philosophim I'll pass. — RogueAI

Then so shall I. Lets have a better conversation another time.

↪Philosophim Would a functional mechanical equivalent of a working brain be conscious? Would a simulation of a working brain be conscious? If yes to either of those, how would you verify the consciousness of the simulation and/or the mechanical brain? — RogueAI

Answer my original reply and I'll address this question. I'm not interested in a one-sided discussion where you get to ignore my statements back to you.

I'm using the word women/men to regard the social/cultural categories and all assumed stereotypes or behaviors coincident with those terms colloquially. — substantivalism

I am not, nor was it presented as such in this discussion. Men and women are based on sex differences. Gender is a subjective belief in how a man or woman should act. Male human = man, Female human = woman.

You must first have a human male or female to then ascribe gender. Because gender is the expectation of an individual or culture in how a human male or female should dress or act in particular situations that do not involve the physical aspect of their sex. If you need to express it in terms that fit with the accepted definitions of the OP, you can use the term cis and transgendered.

No, that's incomplete. Do men dressed in clown suits get rejected from the men's restroom? No. Its not appearance, its based on sex.
— Philosophim
Except that isn't what you implied before. . . — substantivalism

I think you may have misunderstood me or I was not clear enough. This is exactly what I am implying. My examples of noting that someone can disguise themselves are irrelevant to the separation of bathrooms by sex. It doesn't matter if you go into a bathroom and no one realizes you're not of the same sex, its still not supposed to happen.

If I break into a person's home, steal nothing, then leave, did I still break the law? Yes. Doesn't matter if I didn't do any harm. Doesn't matter if most people who break in won't do harm. My home is a safe place that I let my friends into. If you disguised yourself as my friend and I didn't notice, its still wrong.

Can you attempt to disguise your sex? Yes. Does that change your sex? No. Does that mean that because we can disguise our sex that suddenly it makes it ok? No. Appearance is not your sex. Being able to "pass" does not change your sex.
— Philosophim
It does change the point or significance of using it or its utility in a true general sense. — substantivalism

No it doesn't. Bathrooms are for personal hygene and getting rid of waste bodily fluids. The sexes have different ways of getting rid of those. Dressing or acting in a particular way does not change that. Its not a party place. Its not a place to express fashion. Its to go to the bathroom. And since you have to undress or put yourself in a vulnerable position to expel certain bodily fluids, we keep the sexes separate.

Being seen as a likely perpetrator or as a statistical risk based off of your 'grouping' is also not based directly on your sex. — substantivalism

Yes it is. It has nothing to do with your gender expression. I want to make it VERY clear. Transgender people are not sexual predators. Sexual predators are sexual predators. We keep the sexes clear for sexual privacy, not gendered privacy.

You know, you are right. So let us agree for the moment with Butler that gender is to be seen as a performance. You aren't pretending to be a man dressed as women. You are you. Identity isn't XX chromosomes or XY chromosomes. . . it's who you 'are' or what you consider your 'self'. — substantivalism

The definition of a performance is an act. So yes, you are pretending to be a man dressed as a woman or vice versa. That's basic a basic set of definitions and a logical conclusion. If you're saying that acting like something you are not, or identifying as something you are not, makes you that something, that's false.

Now, if you want to internally identify yourself as whatever you want, feel free. Invent your own language as you see fit. But when you go into society which has accepted definitions and language, you do not get to tell society to accept yours. You can ask, but it is not obligated in any way to agree with you. If you identify as a woman in society, but you are not a woman by sex, you are simply wrong in your identity.

The question is why it should be a dividing line at all WITH a lawful set of consequences that negate some moral intuitions we have on it. — substantivalism

Your set of sentences after this were too abstract and didn't really answer the question I gave. Please clarify with examples.

Turns out, such stereotyping is seemingly motivating the decision to punish someone who's only action was using the restroom. The motivation being one's 'uncomfortability' which is garnered by societal expectations of how one who is MALE is to be judged on sight or even under a 'disguise'. — substantivalism

No, I've said several times that its based on the very real sex differences between men and women. Its not about the likelihood, its about the potential. This is not a gender issue.

Again, you seem to want to agree with me on gender and yet if a person doesn't conform to gendered expectations of their sex then they are still said to be 'doing it wrong'. — substantivalism

I've never said someone not conforming to their gender is "doing it wrong". I've been claiming this entire time that gender is subjective stereotyping. Your gender has nothing to do with your sex.

Female people don't own facial expressions and externalized forms of certain behavior nor do males as if some one doing something similar is 'stealing' it or some 'cheap copy'. As that assumes, contrary to our assumptions, that gender is in fact strapped to your chromosomal status. — substantivalism

Gender is the expectation of behavior for a sex, so of course it is tied to a sex. If you say you have the gender of a man, you're taking someone's belief of how a biological man should act or dress in culture. Now does that gender differ from someone else's? Sure. But if they say you have a male gender, the implication is you are acting the way a biological male is expected to act.

Why is the solution to pretend a stereotype means you now belong in a place of another sex, despite you not being that other sex?
— Philosophim
First, sex is not the reason they feel the need to be with the same sex. . . its SIMILARITY. Do I need to quote you again. . . — substantivalism

We're not talking about being around the same sex. Anyone can make friends or hang out with people of any sex or gender. But there are particular places and events that are divided based on sex. The way you act or dress does not suddenly make this sex divide go away.

Nothing. That's the entire point. Gender is a subjective stereotype of a group or individuals. If it doesn't have to do with physical characteristics, its not sex.
— Philosophim
However, the motivation and reason why this choice is made can be heavily influenced by gender. — substantivalism

People can make decisions based off of gender, which would be the stereotype of some individual or culture. But you have not made a case for why certain situations divided by sex: bathrooms, sports, and shelters for example, should suddenly be changed because of gender. A subjective outlook that can differ from individual to individual has no basis overriding biological fact that stands despite subjective outlooks.

First of all, gender is not necessarily about ought - As a woman, I have learned not to make decisions based on societal expectations of how I ought to behave. — Possibility

Gender is a stereotype of "ought". If you don't behave in accordance with certain stereotypes, does that change your sex? Of course not. My sister does not wear dresses and dissects dead bodies for a living. Does that mean she's not a woman by sex? Of course not.

I feel I should point out that, as women, there are many occasions in our lives where we have our pants around our ankles in the presence of strange men — Possibility

These are not strange men. These are medical professionals who have been vetted to ensure a particular level of trust. Men and women janitors can enter into cross bathrooms because we also know they're vetted. There is a level of professional trust. We're not pulling some guy off the street to give you an exam right?

So, let me be clear - the mere physical ability for a man to penetrate a woman is NOT the source of fear or discomfort felt by women. — Possibility

Some women, yes. But I am interested in groups, not individuals. Let me ask you this then, should there be a division of men and woman at all by bathrooms? Ignore the idea of trans entirely. Should we remove the men and woman bathroom division entirely? Would that cause any problems? If you say yes, then you are one person who does not believe men and women should be divided by sex in bathroom situations. If so, I have no disagreement, as you've erased a sex division, not a gender division.

If you do think there's a separation needed, then you need to explain to me why a separation based on sex suddenly gets overruled by a man wearing a dress. Why don't they still go over to their own bathroom? Why do they need or be allowed to come over to yours?

This was rather long, so I understand if you're unable to address or quote everything here. I might repeat myself a bit but I did not have time this morning to remove some possible repetition of points.

We don't generally let men or women in the other bathrooms.
— Philosophim
Based on appearance, yes. — substantivalism

No, that's incomplete. Do men dressed in clown suits get rejected from the men's restroom? No. Its not appearance, its based on sex. Appearance is how we readily judge another's sex. Can you attempt to disguise your sex? Yes. Does that change your sex? No. Does that mean that because we can disguise our sex that suddenly it makes it ok? No. Appearance is not your sex. Being able to "pass" does not change your sex.

Your dress and behavior do not negate your sex or make you special.
— Philosophim
Yes to the former. The latter however ignores societal classes, social roles, and stereotypes themselves. — substantivalism

Yes, it does ignore classes, roles and stereotypes. That's gender. The idea that a woman is inferior to a man is gender. The idea that only men can be fire fighters is gender. The idea that men cannot raise children is gender. All of those are subjective stereotypes and quite frankly, discrimination. Gender is not a good or positive thing substantivalism. Its a primitive emotional approach to judging members of the opposite sex on things that have nothing to do with one's actual physical sex.

Instead of digging into stereotypes by saying that trans people "belong to a certain social club" we should be changing our attitudes about gender stereotyping. Men should be able to wear tasteful dresses in public and we should all be able to treat that man with respect, equal rights, and not derision. A person shouldn't feel like they need to lie that they're the other sex to avoid stereotypes. A short man or tall man shouldn't be bullied.

To help me with our discussion, tell me why someone should cross sex divided places because of gender, over instead simply working on getting people to accept that men and women don't have to conform to gender stereotypes to be men and women? Specific examples please, not general abstracts.

cting like what some people think the opposite sex should act like does not make you the opposite sex.
— Philosophim
It could make you similar in every manner that is relevant to most people as to what it means to be culturally/socially a man/woman while not having the right chromosomes still. — substantivalism

Again, this is wrong. It is not culturally what it means to be a man or a woman, that's poor grammar. A man or a woman is by sex. Cultural expectations of how a man or a woman should behave, dress, and act apart from the physical sex differences is gender. Saying because I act like a certain expectation that one sex has makes me that sex, is discriminatory behavior.

The point I want to emphasize at this stage is how we've treated the bathroom situation. As a couple of the feminist articles i've seen on the issue have showcased and you admitted its about perceived safety among those of similar supposed standing. Its thinking, because we have the same external biology/behavior/chromosomes that we then feel comfortable around you in that vulnerable state. The question then is how much of the first two are needed until suddenly they, as you said before, 'don't feel uncomfortable'? Is there a 'male/female brain' or sense of biological essentialism that dooms any person who tries to avoid those masculine/feminine stereotypes? — substantivalism

It has nothing to do with a male or female brain. A man can enter a bathroom with painted nails, act flighty and emotional, and they're still a man. They are in a place they belong based on their sex. A muscular woman with a deeper voice who likes war games and monster trucks can enter a bathroom as well. The ultimate reason why we have bathroom division is based on sex. Not just the physical sex, but the act as well. Bathrooms are places of physical vulnerability, and generally attempt to have privacy from the rest of the world. Its not a place you go in and flex in the mirror or twirl your new dress around to strangers. You know this.

In places of physical vulnerability we try to minimize discomfort. We don't want to hear a man and a woman having sex in the stall next to us. When a woman has a period accident, she doesn't want to have men seeing her in that position as she takes a bloody tampon to a trashcan. Men don't want you looking over at their urinal. You get it.

Now, do we have exceptions like gay individuals? Of course. But its an extremely rare portion of the population. Further, the secondary sex characteristics do not have as much of a power difference, so any assault is less deadly and easier to fight off.

When you argue that trans people should be able to cross bathrooms, you make the mistake of ignoring sex. If you consider sex, what you should be saying is that all men and women should have no bathroom division at all. If its only a cultural idea, then we say the whole thing is a mistake.

So, argue that there should be no division of bathrooms based on sex if you want. Once you can show that, then we can say trans people can use the other restroom, as well as non-trans people. If you think there should be a division of bathrooms by sex, then trans people don't get to use the other bathroom, because gender is not the same as sex.

You can never be the opposite sex. Its impossible.
— Philosophim
If you are talking about chromosomes. . . then yes. If you are talking about societal classes to identify under or be a part of. . . well. . . we are on a philosophy forum. — substantivalism

Societal classes are subjective expectations of behavior, culture, and dress based on those chromosomes. An expected societal class has nothing to do with your sex, its about the expectations others have about your sex. That's gender. Gender and sex are different. So this does not counter my point that changing your sex is impossible. You can disguise yourself to change people perceptions about you and their expecations of you. That does not change your sex.

Why can't a trans person use the bathroom of their own sex?
— Philosophim
Uhhh. . . reasons. — substantivalism

Ok, then why don't we work on harsher punishment for violations like this, or work on the culture so that members of their own sex will not act negatively towards other based on stereotypes? Why is the solution to pretend a stereotype means you now belong in a place of another sex, despite you not being that other sex? Isn't the former much more logical and cause the least amount of issues in society?

Gender isn't sex. It's fluid and people who have a particular set of chromosomes might just behave contrary to expectations of this biological fact. So, they may desire to be accepted into that grouping irrespective of being held down by their mere chromosome status...This new desire being so great that it motivates them to completely change many aspects of themselves to achieve this goal. — substantivalism

And to that I say, "Tough luck". I'm short and I can't be a basketball player. It has nothing to do with my desire to be a basketball player. It has to do with my physical difference. Me putting on stilts and telling everyone I'm a tall person, or acting like the stereotypes of a tall person doesn't change this. My denial from the NBA isn't because of my behavior or societal discrimination. Its based on my failure to measure up physically for what is needed to be an effective member of a competitive sport.

I have no problem with a man dressing as a woman, or a woman dressing up like a man.
— Philosophim
If gender is separate from or to be mostly dissolved away from sex then it's just dress, stereotype, and. . . lots of varied behaviors. — substantivalism

Yes, that's exactly it.

The question here is. . . what makes a woman/man that isn't their chromosomes? What behaviors/mannerisms/mental states are 'owned' by women/men? — substantivalism

Nothing. That's the entire point. Gender is a subjective stereotype of a group or individuals. If it doesn't have to do with physical characteristics, its not sex.

My argument is very simple: brain consciousness leads to machine consciousness and machine consciousness is an absurdity — RogueAI

That's not an argument, that's a string of statements without any connective logic and an unproven conclusion.

Lets work backwards.

1. Brain consciousness is an absurdity.

Why?

2. Brain consciousness leads to machine consciousness

No, brain consciousness leads us to realize that matter and energy if organized correctly can be conscious. This appears across living species with different types of brains. We realize that brains are clumps of neurons which have a system of communication, reaction, and planning. Therefore it seems possible that if we duplicate matter in such a way that it can communicate, react, and plan, it would be conscious.

3.

What you think is neural causation is neural correlation. It's the old, correlation is not causation. — RogueAI

No, we have ample conclusion of causation. I'll start with a relatable example before getting deeper. Ever been drunk before? Been on anesthesia? We know that if we introduce these chemicals into the blood, they affect the brain. And when the brain is affected, your consciousness becomes inhibited or suppressed entirely. This is not happenstance correlation. This is repeatably testable, and falsifiable causation which has been upheld in both active life and science for decades. With modern day neuroscience, we can actually get live scans of the brain to show the physical impacts and when consciousness is lost.

Address these points, and we'll have a discussion.

But you're assuming here that brains produce consciousness. — RogueAI

No, this is not an assumption. This is a fact. Prove to me that brains do not produce consciousness and we'll talk.

I think the idea of machine consciousness should make us question the currently prevalent belief that brains cause consciousness. — RogueAI

No, it is not a belief that brains cause consciousness. It is the fact that brains cause consciousness which leads us to consider that machines could have consciousness as well.

Let me ask you: if you didn't know anything about brains, would you think that turning switches on and off in a certain way can lead to consciousness? — RogueAI

No. Because it is the knowledge that brains cause consciousness which lets us consider this idea.

I am on the side of decades of facts, neuroscience, and neuropharmacology. You have a lot to present if you're going to deny the fact that consciousness comes from the brain. Feel free to try, I will listen and evaluate all of your facts and arguments.

Meaning yes, its quite possible for us to program consciousness into a computer, though that consciousness may not expressly ever be human.
— Philosophim

So you're saying that if we take a collection of electronic switches and turn them on and off in some particular sequence, consciousness will emerge? That begs all sorts of interesting questions. — RogueAI

Yes, just like if we take a bunch of cells and have them constantly shift into different states they'll have consciousness as well. Your brain proves it quite easily. When matter and energy are organized in a particular way, they will exhibit a pattern we call consciousness. You are a living example of this. Your degree of consciousness is one of the most powerful of the living beings on this planet.

We can get perceptively less conscious the more primitive the brain from dogs, to fish, down to an ant. Once you remember you are an animal and matter and energy like everything else, you realize you're just an extra step complication and evolution. You are not a magical being outside of the laws of physics. You are a magical being within the laws of physics.

This does bring up actual viable questions to explore. At what state of matter can consciousness exist at its most basic level? Since we cannot experience the consciousness of a being, can we create a definition of consciousness that applies consistently across matter through observation of actions? Does consciousness need us to know the internal state, considering its impossible for us to have that? These are interesting questions for philosophers to think on. Not whether consciousness comes from matter. Because it clearly does.

Given that 'soul' is a translation from the Greek 'psyche', and that 'psyche' can also be translated as 'mind', do you think that people have minds? — Wayfarer

I'm not using the Greek definition of soul. We've also come a long way since we had Greek medicine and biology. Your mind is just a personal description of your consciousness. Or your mind can be a description other people give you that combines your personality and manner of thinking. All of which come from the physical interactions of your brain. Damage the brain, you damage the mind. Heal the brain, you heal the mind. Kill the mind, you end the mind. If you don't have any need or desire for a soul, its a simple fact backed by science and reality.

The idea that consciousness is somehow beyond the matter and energy of the brain is a matter of faith. This doesn't require a religion. The point of faith is to believe something that is contrary to fact. Its why its a pointless argument. If people could say, "The mind is not matter and energy, but it is this, and we can prove it," it would be different. Its also different if we speculate. "Wouldn't it be neat if there was something undiscovered that showed us consciousness wasn't simply formed from the interactions of the brain?"

But to say with any seriousness at all that consciousness just simply does not come from the brain, or that it does not make sense for it to with the facts we know today, is absurd. It defies decades of neuroscience, medicine, and psychotherapy. If a philosopher is not using these firm experiences of reality as a basis for their arguments, it is a sophomoric philosophy based on fantasy. Leibniz' monads were an interesting idea at one time, but is a hobbyist historical study today. Philosophy must evolve with the times, or it will be viewed as a strange place where people invent overly verbose vocabulary and ill defined arguments to rationalize their personal desires.

See my next reply on where we can go instead, into more modern and exciting ideas of "the mind". Forgive me if I seem short. I had to deal with dinosaur professors of philosophy who thought studying clearly dead philosophies lead to some valuable contribution to the world of thought. I vowed I would end that type of thinking wherever I go.

The only reason its controversial to think that physical combinations of matter and energy can have consciousness is because people think there is a soul. If there's no soul, its obvious that matter and energy can have consciousness. Meaning yes, its quite possible for us to program consciousness into a computer, though that consciousness may not expressly ever be human.

I've always viewed consciousness as the monitor that controls and regulates other functions. Under this definition, we already have primitive AI consciousnesses. Many animals have consciousness, and its been observed that apparently plants do in some aspects as well. Consciousness is really not all that rare or special relative to living creatures. What people are really asking is, "Are we as human's special relative to other beings? Am I something more than a combination of matter and energy? Will my consciousness end when I die?"

Remove questions like this and the whole silly debate dies.

Ok, I think we've narrowed down our misunderstanding.

We don't generally let men or women in the other bathrooms. Being trans has nothing to do with whether you are a man or woman by sex. Your dress and behavior do not negate your sex or make you special. We don't have exceptions for trans people, because trans people aren't biologically different, they're just different by gender.

You seem to think how a person acts should trump sex differences. They don't. Acting like what some people think the opposite sex should act like does not make you the opposite sex. This is a clear fact. So if you're a man in shorts, a tank top, sweater, or a dress, you don't belong in woman's sports, their bathroom, or any other place divided by sex.

We do not divide bathrooms based on how you're dressed. There's a reason why urinals are not in women's restrooms, and its not because men "shouldn't cry". So there is no exception based on gender. There are exceptions based on physical sex differences or having a child of the correct sex with you. Thus there is no exception for trans individuals, because trans people are people of a particular sex who act or dress differently then their sex's stereotype.

The social dynamics that may result within one particular group do not negate a group's division by sex, period.
— Philosophim
It does imply its existence, need, or IDENTITY. Groups are not made in a vacuum. They are made on personal, social, psychological, economic, historical, or on any other particular collection of reasons. — substantivalism

I'm a little lost here. I'm not saying you can't have a relationship or an identity within a group. But you cannot have the identity of another sex, when you are not the other sex. You cannot have an identity of being a pale red head if you are a brown skinned brunette. You can never be the opposite sex. Its impossible. Desiring to be, pretending to be, are all desires that cannot come to fruition in reality.

I'll put another question to you. Why can't a trans person use the bathroom of their own sex? Why can't a trans person compete with members of their own sex? Why can they not accept that they are a particular sex, but they like to act like the other sex? Isn't that reality? I have no problem with a man dressing as a woman, or a woman dressing up like a man. But when you think doing so makes you the other sex, and affords you the ability to cross over to the other sex when those divisions by law were made based on sex, you've crossed over from logic into wish fulfillment. Societies job is not to entertain other people's wish fulfillment.

Not at all. I didn't bring up passing and not passing, you did.
— Philosophim
Well. . . you did say. . .

If a person disguises themselves well enough to pass and no one notices, then no one will likely care. — substantivalism

And I believed I said that because you were implying passing at some point. Looking back I don't see where that was. If you did not imply that, my mistake. But that is why I brought it up.

So to your point then, you need to explain to me why acting like or impersonating the other sex gives you the right to enter areas that are separated by sex. If we don't let non-trans men into women's bathrooms, why should one who acts like a stereotype of one, should?

None of this is the fault of atheists.
— Darkneos

Of course not, why suggest it? — unenlightened

How atheist dogma created religious fundamentalism. — unenlightened

Indeed, why suggest it unenlightened?

This may be part of what I think Josh meant about the inextricable link between gender and sex. It is expectations of gendered behaviour plus male sex that leads to a perceived threat. — Possibility

No, this does not involve gender. Gender is a societal expectation of how a sex should behave in terms of body language, dress, and cultural expression. The ability for a man to penetrate a woman is a function of sex. It is not an expectation of how a man should act, it is the recognition of the physical potential action that a man can act on.

There are plenty of women who could physically overpower me if they wanted to - even sexually assault me, physically speaking. — Possibility

Very few women can physically overpower even an average man. Physical rape by a woman is much more difficult based on anatomy. But this may be irrelevant based on the point I made earlier. I note just as much that women are not allowed to enter the men's room. So if you fear that, all the more reason to separate the sexes.

If a male walked into the ladies’ bathroom wearing a dress, I would look for certain gendered behaviour as an indication of possible threat. — Possibility

You cannot necessarily judge the intent of someone by their behavior. Also gender does not apply to sexual assault or lewdness. Gender is very simply a subjective expected set of behaviors and cultural expressions that society and groups of individuals expect a sex to express. Men not crying is an example of a gendered expectation. This does not mean a man cannot cry. This does not mean that a man crying is a gendered expression. The gendered expression would be if a man decides not to cry purely because of the gendered expectations of himself or the group he is around.

Rape, assault, etc. are not gender expectations. Physical sex differences, and the general results they have, are not gender expectations.

I think we’re inconvenienced by this growing awareness of the complexity of reality. We like the idea of social shortcuts: men dress as men and go to men’s toilets, and women dress as women and go to women’s toilets - then we can continue to make assumptions based on minimal data. — Possibility

Speak for yourself. I am not inconvenienced by reality. I've thought about this topic for several months after doing lots of research scientifically, psychologically, and in online communities. I've already mentioned that I do not believe there should be any laws regulating gender expression. If men want to wear dresses, so be it. But in cases where real sex differences have potential outcomes, absolutely laws and limitations need to be made. Your gender is irrelevant to the law. Your gender is pointless except to the culture, social structure you are in, or your own personal guidelines. Sex differences and their potential outcomes regarding the physical nature and potential of those differences absolutely can be regulated by laws. The problem with your argument is labeling gender as something it is not, and inadvertently crossing into sex differences.

A safe place for themselves. Saying for their sex brings in group identity and goes outside the purview of non-gendered talk about sex. A group identity brings in social identity and cohesion which is related to but not the same as biological sex itself. It's something founded on stereotypes and generalizations especially when contrasting with the opposite sex 'group'. — substantivalism

No. You can have gendered stereotypes and identities formed within any group. You can make friends or enemies with anyone. The social dynamics that may result within one particular group do not negate a group's division by sex, period. We are talking about division due to physical safety and vulnerability. Anything that forms outside of that is secondary and has nothing to do with a person's sex, or the division of sex that formed this group to begin with.

Note that what you said is not actually specific to any correct bathroom usage. Technically, a person could find someone who is fairly masculine but has chromosomes that are XX as rather bothersome as well but we will. . . for some reason. . . curb their uncomfortability under the guise of 'anti-discrimination' if they are in the woman's rest room. — substantivalism

Find me the number of cases in which a woman was confused for a man. Its not many. Of course there are exceptions. There are always exceptions. General laws are not based on exceptions, but generalities. If you want to carve out subdivision a1 to the rule to ensure exceptions are treated fairly, all good. For example, if the other bathrooms are full, if you have a child under a certain age of that bathroom's sex, etc. There is no general reason to allow cross bathroom attendance.

Also, what are they going to report them for? If they were neither abusive nor indecent. Nor were they violent, aggressive, or verbally abusive. Are we going to tell them they used the rest rooms and then left? Are we punishing them for not 'passing' enough? — substantivalism

Some laws are not about a person doing something specifically wrong, its about prevention. There's a law that a person can't trespass on my lawn. I see some kids playing football out in the street and they end up occasionally running up on my lawn. Are they doing any harm? No. Are they staying long? No. Do I have the right to go out and tell them to get off my lawn, and call the cops? Yes. Would I be a jerk? Yes. Doesn't matter though. Territory and property rights need to sway towards those who own them, even if that person is a jerk.

The second you brought up 'passing' or not 'passing' you brought up gender. The second you brought up 'discomfort' and therefore indirectly some social acceptance of this behavior also involves. . . gender. — substantivalism

Not at all. I didn't bring up passing and not passing, you did. Doesn't matter if you're passing or not, the law is if you have a biological sex that does not belong in a particular place divided by sex, you don't belong there. Period. Acting or trying to hide one's sex does not give you a pass.

Second, the discomfort is not based on gender, but on sex differences. Can a man rape a woman? Can a man physically overpower a woman? In general, yes. It has nothing to do with whether that man is in a dress or khakis. This is not about the way society expects the way for a man or woman to act, this is about the physical interactions that can occur based purely off of sex differences.

Atheism created religious fundamentalism? One of the smells of a bad argument is blaming another side for the worst of people on your side. Stop that. People are good and bad everywhere. You have atheists who are saints and religious people who are sinners. Atheists did not cause you to have sinners.

There is already the possibility of another forcing themselves on another in that situation right now. — substantivalism

Of course. Its not about the likelihood, Its about the comfort of those feeling like they have a safe space for their sex. When you're in a vulnerable position with your pants down in a bathroom or needing to adjust clothing you don't want to worry about a man in the area. If a man wants to invade a bathroom and commit assault they can of course. But when there is a social pattern that's ingrained in a person its less likely to occur.

Are we taking legal action against them because we think they are probably an abuser? Are we biased in that respect? — substantivalism

Laws can be created, but enforcement of them is another matter. Its illegal for someone to trespass on my property. But if I had a kid cut through my yard one day as a short cut, do I need to call the police? No. Its an option. If a person disguises themselves well enough to pass and no one notices, then no one will likely care. But if someone DOES notice, and it bothers them, they then have the right to ask the person to leave or report them.

I've seen some interesting arguments on the internet that argue that all transexuals or homosexuals are mere sexual deviants on par with pedophiles as well as ploys to be sexually abusive. — substantivalism

That is not what is being discussed here at all. The argument of division by sex has nothing to do with gender. Meaning when I talk about the potential for sexual deviancy, it applies to the sex difference, not the gender difference. 99.X% of people do not commit sexual abuse in bathrooms. But the fear of that .x percentage that do is enough to have sex divisions by law.

The question should always be: Is gender or sex the deciding factor in some particular social/political/economic decision? Or to what degree is each characterization to be leveled? — substantivalism

My point is that gender should never be a factor. Gender is a subjective stereotype, an expectation of how a sex should act in a social setting. Dress codes that do not explicitly tie to physical sex (for example, shirts that cover up breasts correctly) should not be enforced. Thus requiring someone to wear a dress, or not wear a dress, should be abolished. Make up or lack of make up should be abolished. Basically society should not enforce behavior or fashion based on physical sex. THAT is old, outdated, and enforcement of stereotypes.

All areas that are necessarily tied to sex should never consider gender. Never. Anything that has to deal with nudity should always be separate due to the possibility of one sex being able to force themselves on another's vulnerable position. Women's sports, bathrooms, and shelter's should all be based on biological sex. Laws should enforce that if a man goes into a male bathroom dressed as a woman, they cannot be harassed or discriminated against. This seems fair and right towards all parties involved.

I am open of course to hearing whether society should change the meaning of certain words or laws and regulations.
— Philosophim

I'd try to avoid changing or adopting law based on what people think themselves to be, however strongly and genuinely, myself. But I'm old, and your world frightens and confuses me. — Ciceronianus

The argument I bring is that there is no logical reason why we should change the status quo of gender and sex being separate, and that one's gender has nothing to do with one's sex, or societies laws and divisions by sex. We should never be frightened and confused of asking questions or examining our presuppositions. I think fear and confusion comes when change is made without adequate reason and/or poorly explained.

Don't forget to kick a rock too. — RogueAI

Your post is a metaphorical rock kick at me. If you feel I am wrong, start a new thread demonstrating that what I have stated is refuted, is not. I'll discuss with you there.

If you ever think of anything would like to say, then please always feel free to message me! I always enjoy our conversations. — Bob Ross

Much appreciated Bob, the same extends your way. You are a credit to these forums and it is always a pleasure thinking with you!

I'm wondering why. Have they sublimated their sex-drive into violent fantasy? Most of them will - I assume - never act on these impulses to "punish" women for their own inadequacy, so they'll just languish for years and die bitter old men. — Vera Mont

They've lost all hope. Since in their mind its impossible for them to succeed, they double down on bitterness and anger, then send it against the world. Lets say someone told you to lift 2 tons. You might see others effortlessly doing it, but everytime you get to that bar you fail in front of a large group of people. You feel them jeering at you behind your back. Women despise you. Society despises you. So why not despise them? Make them hurt.

Not justifying it, just trying to see it through their eyes.

t used to be a taboo to be an incel. In public, you would never have confessed your feelings of hatred and loathing at your lack of obtaining women.
— Philosophim

Somehow, hatred and loathing don't sound all that enticing in a prospective date. — Vera Mont

No, they generally don't. Incels have stopped trying. They've given into their worst impulses of bitterness and hatred.

This is not true that idealism has been 'solved' or refuted generally. There are quite a few people of scientific bent, of whom Bernardo Kastrup is one, who have made detailed arguments for philosophical idealism, which have not been refuted.

When discussing these matters, just be aware that your physicalist views are not supported by philosophical argument, but are simply expressions of your 'gut feel' as to what can and can't be true. Incredulity is not itself an argument. — Wayfarer

You are incorrect Wayfarer. Idealism, in the sense that there is no proof of something outside of our perception, has been refuted. My views are 100% supported by both philosophical, empirical, and scientific evidence. It is not about incredulity or gut feeling. This is not the thread for it, but if you wish to create a Bernardo Kastrup thread to prove your point, I'll join you there.

Not a bad question. A friend and I discussed years ago that one thing the internet did was erase taboos. It used to be a taboo to be an incel. In public, you would never have confessed your feelings of hatred and loathing at your lack of obtaining women. And if you have, the rest of society would have ridiculed and shunned you.

The internet frees you from the physical proximity of being shamed. Words are not the same as the personal looks of disgust and rejection from people in your community. Further, you can find like individuals like yourself, so even if you later experience that shame in person, you have people you can go back to. The internet can make an extreme minority seem bigger and more impactful than it is as well.

Finally, if you appeal to a person's lower desires, you will always find takers. Tell someone they're a victim. Tell them they have a right to be angry, to feel hurt, and to take that out on others. Feels gooooood. We used to call that the devil's temptations. Again, people around you would ward you off of those bad things. Now you can privately be tempted in your own home and give in again and again until you start to believe in your own rightness of your cause.

There can be disputes as to what constitutes what, including what objective criteria are to be used for that determination. — Hanover

Of course there can. But if we are to construct objective criteria that have logical consistency when applied to broad societies, certain criteria work better than others for communication, clarity, and consistency. In general, subjective definitions do not create clear communication, clarity, or consistency. A functional society will let people have their subjective definitions within their isolated communities. If they ask broader society to accept them as objective definitions that all communities within must accept, broader society is generally served better by rejecting these subjective notions unless there is good cause for society to change.

If they live in isolation from one another, then there is no pragmatic effect for their distinct uses of the term Jew — Hanover

Here is where your excellent initial analogy is breaking down. We do not have gender and sex isolated from each other. They also aren't variations of the same thing. I think this analogy has gone far enough and it should refocusing on the topic itself; that gender is a social construct, sex is an objective measure for all to agree despite one's societal culture, and that gender does not have the right to claim it can be equivalent with sex.

Now turning toward the question of what is a woman. If women are permitted to play on certain sports teams, use certain pronouns, and use certain bathrooms, the question then becomes who gets to decide who is a woman and be afforded those right, and that is a political dispute. — Hanover

You have the order mixed up. First you decide what a woman is, then you decide permissions, pronouns, etc. The definition of men and women has already been decided by society, and that basis has always been sex. Without that, gender itself is meaningless. If gender is a belief in how a woman should act, gender first relies on there being a clear definition of what a woman is by sex. Sex is stable across all cultures. That is why gender can vary across cultures, but always uses sex as the basis for this gender. The definition by sex is not political in the least. It is based off of biology, a science. Changing this definition of biology outside of biology would be political.

Sports and places of division by sex, are by sex, not gender. They were divided because of the biological consequences of sex, not a person's behavior or manner of dress. This is obvious, and not up for debate. In sports it is simply because of the unconquerable differences between men and women in physical exertion. I've done amateur weight lifting and have an interest in physical exercise and capability. Men's biological bodies are simply better adapted pound for pound than a woman's for competitive physical activity. This is a biological fact, not an opinion.

It ha nothing to do with whether a woman was butch or empathic. It has nothing to do with dress or make up. All of these personal expressions of individuals which do not come from sex, have no basis in decisions regarding sex.

You're simply restating the accepting orthodoxy and stating it shouldn't be challenged. That is, you're just telling me that we've traditionally separated men and women on the basis of sex, not gender identification, so we can't start changing things just because someone has changed their gender identification. My point is, says who? Why is that a dicate of reality that things be done tomorrow the way they were done yesterday? — Hanover

Of course we should not just keep doing things, "because we've always done it that way." But we don't also change things because "Well I want to." There has to be a logical reason. Perhaps an advance in science or understanding of human nature. Which is why I never shy away from the question. But the answer of some in the transgender community that gender should be the reason for division instead of sex doesn't make any sense.

As noted, gender is a subjective construct which can vary from individuals and group to group. My sister does not paint her nails or wear dresses. Does that mean she's the gender of a male? Of course not. She has the sex of a female, and in her mind, not wearing dresses or not painting your nails doesn't make her any less gendered as a female either. Yet there are people out there who would believe my sister is not expressing the female gender. Should we have society legislate that she is now a gendered male because she does not paint her nails or wear dresses? Of course not, that's absurd. Sex is unchanging and not subjective. It makes much more sense that sex would be the ultimate arbiter of sex identification, not gender.

The battle for authority is not the definition of sex. Its not the idea that gender is a self-subjective identity. The battle is from one segment of society who wants to have everyone take a small group's self-subjective identity, and have that be more important in societies decisions then sex identification. Sex identification has continued to exist because there are important divisions regarding sex, solely because of biology. The introduction of gender, or that acting in one person's particular stereotype of what one sex should act like means you should be identified as that sex, is illogical.

A MtF transsexual isn't saying she was actually born a biological female so she's therefore a woman. She's saying she was born a biological man, but identifies as a woman, so she is a woman to be afforded all priviledges afforded women, and she doesn't care about your definition of what a woman is and how it relates to sex. — Hanover

The word "man" and "woman" are not based on gender, they are based on sex. There is no question as to what a man or a woman is. There are no privileges afforded a man or a woman beyond this biological difference. We can say there are stereotypical expectations of men and women's behavior and expression, and many men and women do not fit into those stereotypes. Not fitting into a stereotype doesn't change your sex, period. If a man wants to wear dresses, paint their nails, and act flighty, that's fine. They are still a male that's expressing themselves in a particular way. You can say, "I like a particular gendered idea of the way a woman acts in society, so I'll act that way." There's nothing wrong with that. But you are still a man or a woman because of your sex, not your actions or expressions.

It also doesn't matter whether they care about societies definitions or not. Society always gets to decide. And if they really didn't care, they wouldn't be trying to change how society functions. I don't get to decide what the word "sheep" means, any more than you get decide what any other word means. I am open of course to hearing whether society should change the meaning of certain words or laws and regulations. In the case of gender and sex, I do not see any good arguments as to why society should use gender as an identifier for someone for whom their sex does not match. Give me some reasons, and I'll consider them.

Thank you Wayfarer, it is kind of you to attempt to clarify. Also, a fun story! I am well aware of this general idea, the problem is it is plainly false. I don't want to argue here and derails Bob Ross's fine thread, but in general such challenges to accepted theory are fun to consider when first entering philosophy, but are eventually solved.

So - the point I'm getting at is that the instinctive sense that the object is real whether or not anyone perceives it, is precisely the point at issue in idealist arguments - hard as that may be to accept. — Wayfarer

Its not that its hard to accept, its just wrong. When such arguments are examined in depth on their own merit, and not merely through the lens of challenging the status quo, a whole host of conflicts, ill defined vocabulary, and issues come up that collapse the idea in on itself completely. As such, I cannot consider any such argument on its terms without it clearly demonstrating a strong and unambiguous vocabulary and logic.

Bob, I confess you've lost me at this point. Try as I can, I can't relate to the terminology used here and any attempt to grasp it just doesn't make sense to me. I feel like we have a fundamental difference in understanding that perhaps isn't all that far off from one another, but at the same time, somehow is.

One statement that I think we both agree on in layman's terms is that the perception of a 'thing' is real in itself, and that the perception cannot exist without the perceiver. But we seem to have a disagreement on how that happens. I say that the perception of a thing is done completely through the matter and energy of the brain, which is the scientific consensus. You believe this to be the hard problem, which to my knowledge, is not it. You also have ideas about falsification and science that I do not agree with, which again I think has been explored and is at this moment an irreconsilable difference.

As I noted early on, if we diverge here I do not believe I can adequately contribute to the conversation any longer. My line of thinking is too different from yours for us to be able to discus what you want to address. That being said, a wonderful commitment to your thread, and I respect the attempt! Best of thoughts in fielding the remaining discussions, I will likely be reading your other replies to see if I can understand your side better.

All ideological identities are subjective because they relate to thought processes and they will only correlate to objective criteria if the subjective ideology requires it. — Hanover

Incorrect. Definitions are of course constructed by human subjective observation of reality, but for them to be of most use, they must be able to be objectively used. For example, if I define a tree as a "Thing with branches and leaves", its not very useful for details in a world with brushes and shrubs. A botanist wouldn't hold to such a definition because clarity and accuracy of definitions are important when discerning between plants as a profession.

If a Reform Jew and Orthodox Jew have definitions for their own branch of Judaism, that is fine. But then this needs to be objectively matched to the definitions to say, "That person is a Reform Jew, and not an Orthodox".

Back to transsexuals. If gender, as you define it, is a subjective belief, isn't it also a subjective belief that that belief must correlate to an objective criterion like sex? — Hanover

What I am saying is if you have a definition of gender, and a definition of sex, gender does not change your sex. Vice-versa, sex does not change your gender. Thus if we separate people according to sex, and the limitations of the body that sex entails, saying you identify with a gender that matches another sex does not entail you entry into areas divided by sex.

To do so would be to have the Orthodox Jew say to the Reform Jew. "I identify as a Reform Jew, even though I don't meet your birth criteria for it." This is not a battle over authority. This is a battle over people trying to say that gender equates to sex. That because you act in a particular self-subjective gender, that this qualifies you to be treated as if you are the opposite sex in all authoritative matters. Gender does not override sex, just like sex does not override gender.

Think of it this way: if no one is looking at the tree, then it does not continue to exist in the manner that we perceive it, but it continues to exist in the sense that it is an idea in the universal mind that if we were to go perceive it we would expect to see the same tree (because our ability to perceive will represent the ideas the same manner it did before).
...

The substance of reality under analytic idealism is mentality and the universal mind is fundamentally the one existing brute fact, and we are derivatives thereof (i.e., priority monism). — Bob Ross

I understand this point, but how is this semantically different from just saying that reality is independent of observers? A tree is going to be what it is no matter if we observe it or not. Why introduce mind and mentality? Mind and mentality imply an observer, which always leads to the question of, "Then what is the observer?" You have an outside entity which needs explaining. Is it also just a mentality? If a mentality can have a mentality, what does the word even mean at that point? If being is reality, then all of reality is being. I think I just need a better definition of "mentality" and "mental".

Because what we observe is also real (i.e., a part of reality). When I imagine a unicorn, that unicorn exists as an imaginary unicorn. My concept of a car exists in my mind and is thusly a part of reality: humans and other conscious beings are a part of reality. — Bob Ross

I agree, but this isn't any different from a physical reality based model. Reality exists independently of what is observed. This allows us to short circuit the "Are you observing what you are observing?" issue that can come up otherwise. No one can observe you observing, yet you are part of reality. You do not need to meta observe your own observation, or have a God observer observing you. Your observation itself is also part of reality. I feel this model is much clearer while still conveying the essence of what you're trying to prove.

I suppose this really asks us to break down what "physical" means, as its only been implicit. "Physical" essentially means there is an existence independent from our observation. As noted, this eliminates infinite meta self-observation. You exist as a physical being. Despite your lack of observing yourself, you still exist physically in the world. Your mind does not float, it is located within your body. Try extending it outside of yourself. Try thinking in a location outside of the room you are in. You can't. It follows the physical rules of reality despite our best wishes.

If one simply calls what is real what is perception-independent (or something similar) than (I would say) it fails under more in depth scrutiny. For example, one cannot evaluate the concept of concepts as true (even in the case that it references what a concept is correctly) because it doesn’t correspond to something outside of perceptive-experience (which is what you would be calling ‘reality’). — Bob Ross

So in here, yes, a concept of concepts is also real. We do not need to have a concept of "concepts of concepts" to make it real. We only need a concept of "concept of concepts" if we wish to observe a "concept of concepts". What is real is not perception-independent. What is real is what exists, and does not need to be perceived to exist.

Science (proper) tells us how things relate and not what they fundamentally are. — Bob Ross

I am not sure I agree with this assessment. Science uses falsification to test hypotheses by trying to break them. When they cannot be broken, what is left is considered scientific fact. This does in fact describe what certain things fundamentally are.

Consciousness emanating from the brain is not merely a correlation, its is a causation. It is provable with a hypothesis that can be falsified. We can experience the color green because of our brains. How could this be falsified? Destroying the brain and still seeing green. Destroying certain parts of the brain and still seeing green. There is a physical claim that can be falsified, and so far in science, it has not. Therefore at this point, it is scientific fact that consciousness comes from the brain. It is scientific fact that matter can be conscious if organized in a particular way. Whatever your conscious experience, there is a physical brain state that produces that. All of this is falsifiable, but has not been show to be false.

It is a common mistake to believe that the hard problem is claiming physicalism cannot link brain states and consciousness together. It clearly does already. Just think about drugs, anasthesia, etc. If we could not accurately link the physical brain to particular conscious states, the science of all of the above would be incorrect. Yet its not.

What I am open to is seeing if you can prove that physicalism cannot link the brain and consciousness together. If you can come up with a falsifiable theory that it cannot, I can think about it and see if you are correct. But claiming that this is the hard problem when physicalism has zero problem doing this is just an incorrect understanding of modern day neuroscience. It's getting to the point where I'm starting to feel like "the hard problem" is as often mistaken as quantum physics! People seem to hear a vague surface level explanation, or people who want there to be more than just our brain misinterpret the hard problem to be something its not.

For example, if a person claims that this mental state X is strongly correlated to this brain state Y, there is still the valid conceptual question of “how did Y produce X”? The physicalist then has to explain this either (1) by another appeal to the same relationship (i.e., “because Y is correlated with Z”) of which the same conceptual question applies (i.e., “how did Z and Y produce X?”) or (2) by positing that “because strong correlation entails or implies causation” — Bob Ross

Not to belabor the point, but this is an example of this misunderstanding. The answer a physicalist gives is, "Because our attempts to disprove this claim have all failed". Neuroscience does not assert a theory that we are to buy into. It asserts a theory that we cannot buy out of.

I have a problem with the idea that we are separate from the body. To me that's an awareness function that has gone rogue. A point of awareness is that we are the body's steward.
— Philosophim
Doesn't saying awareness is our body's steward imply awareness is separate from the body? — Art48

Its just a figure of speech. In a fully correct definition of body, we are not separate from the body. But, our brain is a bunch of individual brain cells. Those are distinct cells. We exist as a conglomerate. So while there is togetherness, there is also separation. Taken as a whole though, we are all part of the same body.

Thanks Bob for some great answers.

Good question: no. Solipsism is the idea that everything is in my mind, whereas analytical idealism is the idea that both our minds are in a universal mind. — Bob Ross

I've heard something similar to this before. Its sort of a "God observer of reality" idea (does not necessitate a God). I've seen this type of thought as the idea that if we could have an observer that could observe and comprehend reality, that would be the true understanding of reality.

I don't necessarily have a problem with that idea, but I have a problem with saying the God observer is reality itself. Isn't reality itself the substance the God observer observes, while the entire rational interpretation of it all can be known about that substance? Even if that is not what you are saying explicitly, this is a competitive theory with the idea that the observation is in fact reality.

I'm going to repost your intro and now dive a bit deeper now that I've asked a few questions.

By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). Thusly, I do find that there really is a sun (for example): it just as a 'sun-in-itself' is not like the sun which appears on my "dashboard" of conscious experience--instead, I think the most parsimonious explanation is that it is fundamentally mentality instead of physicality — Bob Ross

If I understand what you're going for here, its the idea that the "sun-in-itself" only has identity because of rational beings. Let us imagine a child who looks at a picture and see a sun in a sky. If the child has never been told that there is a sun and a sky, would the child necessarily see the sun and sky as separate? We identify it as separate, and so it is. But without a rational being doing the identifying, would the concept of the sun and the sky exist? Would there really be a separation, or would it just be a blend of atoms?

Taken one step less drastic, its like the air we breath. Its a combination of nitrogen, oxygen, carbon dioxide, and other gases. But since we cannot easily observe this, its simply, "Air". Its like the sun in the sky, except we do not see the sun as separate from the sky just like we don't, while breathing, see the nitrogen as separate from the oxygen.

If I have this right, this still does not eliminate the sun as an existence if an observer did not exist. An observer is necessary for there to be an identity; for "the sun" to be known. But the substance of existence would still be. I can very much agree to this, but this seems to me to be "known reality" while the idea of reality as "what exists" still exists whether a rational observer identifies it as such.

Truth, I would say, is a relationship between thinking (cognizing) and being (reality) whereof something is true if our concept corresponds to what it is referencing in reality. This can include concepts referencing other concepts as well. — Bob Ross

Perhaps our vocabulary is slightly different, but I believe you agree with this concept from your original post. If "being" is reality, why not just call it "being" instead of reality? In which case, why not simplify it to state that reality is what exists regardless of our observations, or our being, while what we know about reality is a combination of our rational identifications that aren't contradicted by what exists? What problems does your vocabulary and outlook solve that my above statement does not? How can your vocabulary and outlook solve all of the problems that would arise by removing the idea that reality exists independently of an observer?

They cannot understand what it is like to experience a green pen from your point of view.
…
This is where we run into the hard problem. How do we objectively handle personal qualitative experience when it is impossible to know if we can replicate it on ourselves? Is what I call green your qualitative green when you see the waves that represent green? So far this seems impossible.

They cannot explain why anyone experiences the color green. A strong correlation between a brain function and the qualitative experience of greeness does not entail that the latter was produced by the former. — Bob Ross

Bob, I'm fairly certain that neuroscience does explain why you experience the color green. There are certain areas of the brain that generate colors. Read the link about Cerebral achromatopsia I posted.

"Cerebral achromatopsia is a type of color-blindness caused by damage to the cerebral cortex of the brain, rather than abnormalities in the cells of the eye's retina. It is often confused with congenital achromatopsia but underlying physiological deficits of the disorders are completely distinct. A similar, but distinct, deficit called color agnosia exists in which a person has intact color perception (as measured by a matching task) but has deficits in color recognition, such as knowing which color they are looking at."

We clearly know that the brain is what allows us to produce color. The above is a provable statement, with several ways of proving it wrong. For example, if the areas of the brain associated on the cerebral cortex were damaged but a person could still see color. Yet this isn't the case. It is incontrovertible in neuroscience that the brain is the source of consciousness. Only philosophers are arguing otherwise at this point, and to my mind, not doing a very good job of it.

What neuroscience cannot explain is what its like to be a brain that "sees" the color green. We know they see green, but it is impossible for US to see that green the brain is experiencing, because we are not that brain. This is why I used the fire analogy earlier. We know that fire is caused by oxygen combusting. It is a physical process that can be described clearly. But we cannot know what it is like to BE that flame. Why do I say it this way?

Because once you realize the brain is the source of consciousness, you realize that matter can have consciousness if combined in the correct way. This is not philosophy, but known fact. You are your brain, and a your brain is matter and energy. Can a fire have consciousness? Unlikely considering how we have identified consciousness. But we can't observe what its like to be those molecules in the fire can we? Is fire simply the sun and the sky together, or are we missing an identity and there are more identities we could put if we could observe it more carefully?

And that's the hard problem that physicalism cannot solve. We can identify and know all of the mechanics behind what make a result, like the brain resulting in consciousness. Mechanics = outcome.
But we cannot experience what it like to be outcome from the viewpoint of the outcome itself. We cannot say, "According to the brain monitoring we've done, you are experiencing 20 microns of pain." Its currently impossible. We can say, "We see you are experiencing pain from your brain scan, how do you feel?" Then we have to take the experiencers subjective answer.

And in this way, that is the experiencers "observed reality" to lead back into your idea. We can't use physicalism to identify it. The only one who has that observed reality, is the observer themselves. Without the observer, pain as a sensation, a personal experience, could not exist. We could monitor a brain and see all the mechanical functions that result in pain, but we cannot measure the experience itself. This is like the idea of there being "zombies", or people who have the mechanical brains that should indicate they feel a certain way, but we can't really measure exactly what they're feeling. What if a person has the mechanical combination for pain, but their feeling isn't at all like what we would feel? What if there is a brain that has the mechanical function of denoting consciousness, but it doesn't feel to them the consciousness that you or I feel?

In sum so I avoid repeating myself, the hard problem is that physicalism cannot objectively identify and quantify a personal subjective experience of matter and energy. Can matter and energy have consciousness if combined in the correct way? Absolutely. Is the brain the source of consciousness? Unquestioningly. Can we objectively describe the sensation of experiencing the color green? It seems impossible at this point in time.

I don’t deny that we can manipulate conscious states by affecting brain states, this is also expected under analytic idealism. — Bob Ross

This is also expected under physicalism and direct evidence for why physicalism can prove that the brain is the source of consciousness. I'm usually open to different view points, but on this one Bob, its a hard fact that the brain is the source of consciousness. You'll need to show something in neuroscience that would disprove this to me. If we cannot agree on this fundamental issue, then we'll just have to agree to disagree. We can continue the conversation at your observer level, but I will respectfully bow out on the hard problem if that is your decision.

Wonderful thinking as always!

Right. Knowing all the details of what is physically going on in a system (brain) is a different matter from having the experiences resulting from the processes which are occurring in that system.

But why should we find that even surprising on physicalism, let alone a hard problem? — wonderer1

Its a hard problem because we cannot currently objectively describe experiences. Pain for example. Perhaps we see a brain fluctuation that denotes pain, but we don't know the degree of that pain. What does their pain feel like versus another person's pain? Two people may be having nearly identical brain responses in our measurements, but one may be screaming in agony while the other acts pleasant. If we could objectively ascertain the subjective experience through objective means alone, we could tailor pain medication to the individual more easily.

The hard problem has nothing to do with whether consciousness resides in the brain. Its about creating an objective measurement for subjective experience. Its extremely hard, and perhaps impossible.

I wasn't under the impression that the hard problem was specifically about our inability to experience the experiences of another, but rather a question of how can conscious experience be explained in terms of physical interactions at all. — wonderer1

Its not that conscious experience can't be explained in terms of physical interactions, its the qualitative experience itself. Qualitative experience is subjective. Therefore it cannot be objectively captured in a physical model. Think of it like this: We know how a computer works within all physical laws. If a computer one day becomes sentient, will we ever be able to objectively know what its like to be that subjective sentient computer? Not with physical laws. We can know its sentient. We can even map out why its sentient. But we can never know what its like to be that sentient system.

By “reality” I am abstracting the entirety of existence under an abstract entity. I view it kind of like speaking of being as “substances” which are abstracted entities of kinds of existences (e.g., substance dualism is two kinds of being where monism says there is only one): similarly, I abstract the sum total of existence into “reality”. Reality is being (including all types one may believe in). — Bob Ross

So if I understand this correctly, reality is the total abstraction of an observer. Isn't this just solipsism? Because this seems to run into the problem of multiple beings each having a separate, and often times conflicting representation of reality. An observer also often times assumes an entity apart from reality. If the observer is doing the abstracting, what is the observer? Is that also an abstraction of itself? In which case, what is it?

The competition in your case is the idea that there is a world separate from our abstractions. This notion of reality solves many of the problems that a solipsism-like view has. For example, if I abstract that I can fly, but fall and shatter half of my body, while I am in the hospital I have to find an explanation for why my abstraction failed.

In the case of reality as being separate, the answer is clearly that one's interpretation of what would happen in reality was incorrect. How does your world view handle this example?

So there is no question that mechanical processes of the brain cause qualitative experiences.

-Philosophim

I disagree. For example, let’s say that you are holding and seeing a green pen. A neuroscience (and biologist) can absolutely account for how your brain knows that the pen is green (i.e., the reflection of wavelengths in sunlight in relation to what the object absorbs and the interpretation of it by the brain), but they cannot account for the qualitative experience of the green pen. — Bob Ross

We may be saying the same thing here in different ways. They cannot understand what it is like to experience a green pen from your point of view. But take brain surgery. Generally operations are done while the subject is awake. They'll stimulate a section of the brain and ask what the subject is feeling. The subject, us, knows what its like to have a qualitative state from a mechanical brain stimulation in that region of the brain. So for us, we have a direct experience from the electrical stimulus and suddenly hearing a dog bark.

The reason we cannot learn from one patient and apply it to others is because we don't know what the other person is objectively feeling beyond what they tell us. We could stimulate the same brain region in another patient and they tell us they hear a cat meowing. We don't know the pitch, or if it sounds like the dog bark of the other patient. This is where we run into the hard problem. How do we objectively handle personal qualitative experience when it is impossible to know if we can replicate it on ourselves? Is what I call green your qualitative green when you see the waves that represent green? So far this seems impossible.

There is absolutely no reason why you should be having a qualitative experience of the green pen even granted the brain functions that interpret it as green. — Bob Ross

This is an often times misinterpreted understanding of the hard problem. No, we know you're going to see green when a green wavelength hits your eyes and the proper signals go to your brain. The fact that everything you experience is from your brain is not questioned in neuroscience at this point, only philosophy.

The question is, how do you qualitatively experience it? What is it like to be a fire for example? You know what makes a fire, but you don't know what its like to be a fire. That's the hard problem. We could say, "But do we know the full underlying quantum process that makes that particular fire?" No. Just because we don't understand all the mechanics to the exact degree in a system does not invalidate the overlaying mechanics that we do understand about that system. Do we understand exactly how your brain states create your qualitative experience? No. Do we know that the brain is the source of your qualitative experiences? Yes, through years of scientific study.

The hard problem is that the reductive physicalist method cannot account for qualitative experience at all. — Bob Ross

To sum it up, it is not that reductive physicalist method cannot account for qualitative experiences being linked to the physical brain, it is that a physicalist method cannot account for what it is like to be the thing experiencing that qualitative experience, because it is purely in the realm of the subject having the experience. We cannot objectively know through the mechanics of stimulating the brain what it is like to have the experience of that brain, as we can never be that other brain.

In my opinion, consciousness is being best handled by neuroscience, and is outside the pure realm of philosophy at this point. Check out brain surgeries, or the case of the color blind painter who had brain damage that removed his ability to ever see or imagine color again. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cerebral_achromatopsia

Good to see you Bob! I'm just going to start with some questions for clarity.

By analytic idealism, I take it to be that reality is fundamentally (ontologically) one mind which has dissociated parts (like bernardo kastrup's view). — Bob Ross

I did a brief look into Katrup, but I want to see where you're coming from. First, what is your definition of reality? How does the statement above differ from stating that the mind is simply an interpreter of reality?

Physicalism's conflation of the territory with the map is exposed (I would say) in the hard problem of consciousness whereof there is always an conceptual, explanatory gap between mechanical awareness and qualitative experience — Bob Ross

I'm not sure this fully expresses the hard problem. So there is no question that mechanical processes of the brain cause qualitative experiences. As our understanding of the brain grows, we will be able to map this out clearer. This is the easy problem. The hard problem is that we cannot ourselves know what it is like for another being to experience that qualitative experience.

For example, imagine that we are able to build a biological brain and monitor every section of it exactly. We've learned that a particular string of responses equates to the brain being happy. But do we know what its like to be that brain experiencing happiness? No. Another crude way of describing the hard problem is the act of trying to objectively experience another thing's subjective experience. We can only experience our own mind, we cannot experience another's. This is a problem whether you take a physical or mental view of the world.

So I'm not sure the three points you mention are accurate assessments of the way cognitive scientists view the brain. Of course, I'm not sure what you mean by "physicalism" either. I'm assuming we're speaking about the idea that everything is essentially reduced to matter and energy, so please correct me on this where necessary.