What I think is perdurable is the mind as the 'tool' — Danileo
Coming back I exposed how we can have actually non-physical thoughts and asked you why they are formed in a physical determinant brain — Danileo
It's not a matter of not being able to experience what someone/thing else experiences. The puzzle is why anything has any subjective experience at all. — Patterner
Why does the physical activity of moving ions, signals moving through neurons, neurotransmitters jumping the gap between neurons, and any and all other physical activity, have a subjective experience? — Patterner
I could use your logic and say that because there are non physical occurrences in the mind and mind is attached to physical world then all the world is non-physical. — Danileo
You do seem to be conveying a Dualist approach in term of Properties, meaning you have stated that there is a good reason to distinguish between Physical and Mental Acts. So maybe looking at this metaphysical delineation would help in expressing how Causation could differ? — I like sushi
Two tokens of the same word, say “cat” typed twice, aren’t the same instance, but they are instances of the same word. — Wayfarer
So it's nonsense to say that different versions of the same song are not the same song. They're numerically different instances of the same idea - which is the point! — Wayfarer
Your 'papers' contain no references to any other philosophers or philosophies - yet you seem to believe that they should be regarded as authoritative sources for any reader. — Wayfarer
That is, if we assume that physicalism is actually wrong and there is something else going on, then the Causal relation between Mental and Mental Acts compared to Physical to Physical may very well be quite different. — I like sushi
I am not trying to "make consciousness something non-physical." Consciousness is non-physical. I'm interested in this particular hypothesis. — Patterner
But if someone says “I can see that you have explained how information is discriminated, integrated, and reported, but you have not explained how it is experienced”, they are not making a conceptual mistake. — David Chalmers
Why is it that when
electromagnetic waveforms impinge on a retina and are discriminated and categorized by a visual system, this discrimination and categorization is experienced as a sensation of vivid red? We know that conscious experience does arise when these functions are performed, but the very fact that it arises is the central mystery. — David Chalmers
Why should it be that consciousness seems to be so tightly correlated with activity that is utterly different in nature than conscious experience? — Donald Hoffman
And within that mathematical description, affirmed by decades of data from particle colliders and powerful telescopes, there is nothing that even hints at the inner experiences those particles somehow generate. — Greene
Because nothing in our modern mathematics days, "Ok, well, do a triple interval and carry the 2, and then *click* here's the taste of feta cheese. — David Eagleman
It's not just that we don't have scientific theories. We don't have remotely plausible ideas about how to do it. — Donald Hoffman
I think proto-consciousness is a property of matter, just like mass and electric charge are. When the body dies, mass and electric charge are still in the particles. So is proto-consciousness. But there is no longer a thinking brain experiencing itself. — Patterner
I don't need to respond to a false distinction. Two instances of the same song are of the same song. If you put out a version of a Beetles song that you created in GarageBand, you would be sued for infringing copyright. — Wayfarer
This is the question of nature of identity that has occupied philosophers for centuries. But you won't find it in neuroscience, as neuroscience doesn't need to consider these kinds of questions. — Wayfarer
To say that meaning is reducible to brain activity is to confuse the physical substrate that enables cognition with the semantic content of thought. That's a category mistake. Neural activity may correlate with thought, but it isn't identical to meaning. Meaning belongs to the realm of intentionality—aboutness—which isn’t captured by physical properties like mass or charge or ion transmission. — Wayfarer
Consider: “The cat is on the mat” can be expressed in English, French, Morse code, or binary. The physical forms are completely different, but the meaning is the same. So clearly, the meaning isn't reducible to any particular physical configuration. It’s multiply realizable—something that’s deeply problematic for strict identity theory. — Wayfarer
You seem to assume that unless a word can be pared down to a physical or operational definition, it lacks explanatory value — Wayfarer
So yes, we should clarify our terms—but not by reducing them to what can be physically pointed at. — Wayfarer
Not so. A melody can be reproduced in any number of media, but remain the same melody. Not 'similar', not 'like', but 'the same'. — Wayfarer
Likewise, a story, a recipe, a formula - it can be reproduced in any number of languages or media or formats, but still retain the same information or meaning. — Wayfarer
What a sentence means, and what it refers to, lack the properties that something typically needs in order to make a difference in the world. The information conveyed by this sentence has no mass, no momentum, no electric charge, no solidity, and no clear extension in the space within you, around you, or anywhere. — Deacon, Terrence W. (2011). Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter (Function). Kindle Edition.
The more general a term is, the harder to define. — Wayfarer
But very broad terms, like physical (or non-physical), will, intention, purpose - these are very hard terms to define. But acknowledging that, doesn't mean they're not real. — Wayfarer
As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer
As I said, numbers, laws, conventions, principles - these are not physical but they're real nonetheless. — Wayfarer
Some say they're constructs of the brain, but I say they're perceived by reason. — Wayfarer
But among non-physical things are theories of the physical. These include mathematical constructs and hypotheses which are in themselves not physical. — Wayfarer
But what if what we think if the 'physical world' is also an action of the brain? And that this is what makes it non-physical. — Wayfarer
↪Philosophim maybe even the brain could have something non-physical?
Otherwise how do you explain dreaming about flying? — Danileo
Why does a physical determinant brain produce non-physical products. — Danileo
The only explanation could be that the mind is independent of the world. — Danileo
I mean that energy transforms constantly and does not disappear. Energy disappearing would be the non physical. — Danileo
Then if I dream I am flying? How can I dream of something that is not physical if the dreams are a physical product — Danileo
I think consciousness is simply subjective experience, and thinking/mental is something humans are conscious of. So we can talk about mental being a physical process without touching on consciousness. — Patterner
Therefore non-physical principles should be different principles from those who are physical, for example I could came up with a law that is claiming that the energy is limited or being generated randomly etc. — Danileo
One argument for the presence of non-physical principle is why people can end up believing in those principles and transcending them to earth. — Danileo
I mentioned in an earlier post there are a few things that might be non-physical, they've just never come up.
Care to elaborate? — Punshhh
I just got obfuscation. If you start to pin him down he will miraculously agree with you. — Punshhh
↪Philosophim I think I am getting lost in the meaning of what is physical, for example if I start flying it would be physical? — Danileo
If your philosophy cannot allow for the existence of a song, and copywright to it, then all I can say is that it has a serious deficiency. — Wayfarer
Melodies, as discussed. Numbers, laws, conventions, chess. There are thousands of these general kinds of things that are grasped by the mind (but not by 'neural activity'). — Wayfarer
Your critique of my work reflects a surprisingly limited and elitist perspective on philosophy — Sam26
You say philosophy is solely “the love of wisdom” built on logic, dismissing belief-based arguments as mere fiction or faith. That’s not just a misreading of my project, it’s a fundamental misunderstanding of philosophy itself — Sam26
First, your assertion that arguing from belief isn’t philosophy, likening my NDE work to debating Gandalf’s height, is absurdly reductive. — Sam26
Philosophy isn’t an ivory-tower club for logic-chopping purists; it’s the systematic exploration of life’s big questions, engaged by everyone from Socrates to the average person pursuing meaning in a coffee shop. — Sam26
As I argue in my book, epistemology, a core branch, is precisely about how we form and justify beliefs, whether about black holes, morality, or NDEs. — Sam26
NDE testimonies involve real people reporting verifiable experiences, like accurate surgical details during flatlined EEGs, documented in peer-reviewed studies (e.g., 2024 ScienceDirect on consciousness continuity) — Sam26
You sneer that my work is “faith” or “religion,” not philosophy, because I explore consciousness survival. — Sam26
Philosophy has always tackled the speculative: Leibniz on possible worlds, Kant on noumena, even Chalmers on the hard problem of consciousness. — Sam26
Dismissing this as non-philosophical because it’s not yet “proven” ignores how philosophy engages open questions. — Sam26
My book and this thread confront counterpoints head-on. — Sam26
Finally, your patronizing advice to “apply my passion” elsewhere, charity, neuroscience, teaching kids, reveals your contempt for philosophical inquiry into the profound. — Sam26
A 2024 Taylor & Francis review shows NDEs’ cross-cultural consistency, suggesting a universal phenomenon worth exploring. — Sam26
If you think philosophy should only chase “real issues,” you’re not loving wisdom; you’re stifling it. — Sam26
Incorrect. The melody IS the same. RIght now, my 10-month-old grand-child is playing with an electronic toy which is playing the song My World is Blue. — Wayfarer
The problem is, that is not at all what philosophy of mind believes by the immaterial or non-physical. — Wayfarer
The fact you can only conceive of alternatives to the physical in terms of magical unicorns indicates a misunderstanding of the subject. — Wayfarer
A melody can be represented in musical notation or binary code. It can be engraved in metal or copied on to paper. Then it can be played back on different instruments or through digital reproduction. In every case the physical medium is different but the melody is the same. So how then can the melody be described as physical? — Wayfarer
I clearly told you I don't associate with the physicalist position.
— Philosophim
Every post of yours that I’ve read assumes physicalism. — Wayfarer
Maybe because you assume that everything is physical — Wayfarer
and don’t understand how anything can described in other terms — Wayfarer
A computer does not have a mind's eye, cannot imagine, and cannot experience anything. — RogueAI
When I imagine a sunset, I'm experiencing the colors. I'm seeing red. You're saying the redness isn't really there, it's just brain activity, — RogueAI
but that is easily contradicted by imagining something, hallucinating, or dreaming. — RogueAI
All right, let's talk about that. What is it about the brain that makes experience happen? What's it doing that my heart or gut biome isn't doing? Information processing? — RogueAI
Mental causes are really physical causes so I see no real difference in them than any other cause.
— Philosophim
Is there any need for the word "mental"? — Patterner
Are you claiming that if we got rid of all of these physical things that the information of music would be floating out in space somewhere?
— Philosophim
Certainly not floating in space, but existing in a similar sense that numbers exist. There is no 1, 2, 3, floating in space, these numbers must be instantiated physically to "exist", in your sense. — hypericin
Yet we routinely think of them independently from any particular instantiation, math wouldn't exist if we didn't do this. — hypericin
The physical notes I write on a page. The physical intstrument I play it with. The physical ears that hear it.
— Philosophim
Here, we only identify the notes as information. The instrument is a tool to convert the information contained on the sheet into audible music, and the ears interpret this. — hypericin
A song on a vinyl LP that is the same as the song you hear on Spotify. If you grant that it is the same song, this song cannot be physical, as their physical instantiation could not be more different. — hypericin
I created this thread to talk about the different perspectives regarding Physical and Mental Acts and how I believe there is a problem when using Causation at a micro and macro level as well as between nomological and metaphysical positions. — I like sushi
What are your thoughts regarding Mental Actions as Causal Actions? — I like sushi
When it comes to then trying to establish a Physical to Mental or Mental to Physical causal route a much bigger problem emerges as we have no grounding for what constitutes a Mental Act — I like sushi
Even within the world of physics causation is a quite difficult item to deal with at the extreme ends of the micro and macro scales. — I like sushi
Information is not physical. If it was, it could not retain its identity as it propagates through completely different physical mediums. Information requires a medium, but it is a mistake to conflate information with its medium. — hypericin
If the mind's eye is physical, then its contents should be physical too. But when I imagine a blue flower, my brain doesn’t turn blue. There's no blue in my skull. So where is the blue? — RogueAI
I was not labelling you I was labelling the position you are expressing. Physicalism comes in many forms. It is not a religious doctrine. — I like sushi
You were expressing that everything we know of, and can know of, is physical which is obviously (for most) associated with a physicalist position. — I like sushi
Philosophim non-physical for me, is defined by a property that is not found in the tangible universe, for example symmetry. — Danileo
What is symmetric in our minds? The time, with time comes notions like our own death and with it beliefs of what happens after we die.
Note that with this I am not saying that our mind is capable to produce perfect symmetric thinking ( as for that I am not sure ) but at least is close to it. — Danileo
No, I'm dismissing it because you can't show that it exists. You need to explain what it is to have a non-physical thing exist, then demonstrate that such a thing actually exists in reality.
I note you didn’t answer my question, what sort of proof do you require? You do understand, I presume how hard it is to prove something. — Punshhh
I have put forward a rational argument for consciousness to be present in life forms. A presence which doesn’t appear to be necessary if the world is just physical. If the argument has merit — Punshhh
Correction, you are claiming that consciousness is emergent from computation alone, aren’t you?
Saying it is emergent from physical processes is hand waving, because that also includes what a I am saying and which you were denying previously. — Punshhh
Line of argument is used in discussions of qualia, about differences between people’s qualia due to genetic variation. It doesn’t include the fact that 99% of the experience of one person is identical to that of another, with a nuance of difference. — Punshhh
We cannot know that. For all we know, there is a subjective experience of being a single cell.
You’ve just accepted my rational argument. That’s pretty much what I was claiming and you were rejecting. — Punshhh
We don't have the answer to what its like for something else to subjectively experience, therefore it is outside of what can be known.
This is incorrect, it can be known, we are it. We don’t fully know the processes involved, be it is known, we just need to be able to see the wood for the trees. — Punshhh
I’m not saying it isn’t a physical process, it’s just a different physical process, an ethereal one in a supevalent relationship with it’s physical partner. — Punshhh
↪Philosophim . Non-physicality is a way of describing not a object. — Danileo
I could do a reverse argument and say that what is physical is a construction of our mind and therefore is grounded on our mind. So the foundation of what exists occured in our mind and therefore all theories have the same validation in matters of how they are constructed (not talking on probability or proofs) — Danileo
↪Philosophim You understand that this is one philosophical position. It is called physicalism. — I like sushi
If you claim you are not talking about physicalism just spit out what you are talking about to avoid confusion if possible. — I like sushi
↪Philosophim and a physical process can only produce physical theories? — Danileo
What was your point?
You are dismissing the ethereal being because it can’t to demonstrated physically to exist. — Punshhh
No, consciousness is simply a more advanced form of computation.
To the extent, perhaps, that a chemical reaction is a form of computation. But that does not encompass what consciousness is.
You seem to be about to declare that consciousness is emergent from computation alone. That if there is sufficient computation going on in a system, or body, then it will be conscious. — Punshhh
I don’t know why anyone would think that AI might be conscious. Perhaps they conflate intelligence with consciousness. — Punshhh
Just like I won't know what its like for you to be subjectively conscious as you are either.
It’s not that difficult, we are near identical. — Punshhh
Yes, that all makes sense, but it doesn’t capture consciousness, it’s all within the scope of computation and intelligence. — Punshhh
But it is still a mechanical machine, you know levers and rope. — Punshhh
Have you come across the idea of a philosophical zombie? There could be another universe like ours, but without any consciousness. — Punshhh
Once they were self replicating,( I am oversimplifying to make my point) they were able to evolve more sophisticated forms. All very well, they were like our philosophical zombie. — Punshhh
Again, sounds like you're ascribing what is non-physical to a physical process.
No, they coexist in a supervenient relationship. — Punshhh
↪Philosophim a mental construction, are not physics a theory and theories come from our minds — Danileo
You have just re-asserted your claim that anything that can’t be proved to exist is a figment of my imagination. You have proved my point for me. — Punshhh
Yes, that's consciousness. Consciousness does not exist as some independent ethereal thing. It’s simply a category of physical process from the brain.
That’s not consciousness, it’s computation. The brain performs computation, like a computer. Are computers (AI even) conscious? They can perform the same computation as the brain, surely. — Punshhh
This is simply creating a category, but not denying its a physical process.
I am denying it’s a physical process, it has a supervenient relation to the physical. It is hosted by the physical, but is itself not physical. — Punshhh
You remove the physical process, this 'non-physical' thing does not exist independently as something real.
Perhaps, but the physical being would not exist either, in this scenario, they are joined at the hip. — Punshhh
Philosophim is not physical a claim of imagination too? — Danileo
Yes, here is the language game (in bold), because you are requiring something non-physical to be demonstrated with physical apparatus/experiment. — Punshhh
This different process is the evolution of an ethereal body, or being. A being hosted, maintained, sustained by the physical body. This ethereal body is a sentient conscious, self conscious entity with a rich experience of a subjective world, real experiences etc. But is entirely dependent on the physical processes in the physical body for its continued existence (in this world). It shares these processes with the physical body. This not only includes the chemical processes, but the processes of mind (x). — Punshhh
Now (x) can perform every mental action required for humanity to live in a material world. Without sentience, without self consciousness. After all, it is all computation. We know that computation can produce an intelligent body, because we have super computers and AI. All the senses in the human body can be responded to computationally without the body being conscious of them, experiencing them. They can be processed in the usual way, by the mental activity of the brain. — Punshhh
Citations, please. — Wayfarer
Many scientists are methodological physicalists for the purposes of doing their work, while remaining agnostic or noncommittal on the ontological status of consciousness. — Wayfarer
Moreover, many philosophers of mind—including those working closely with cognitive science—do not regard physicalism as an adequate or complete explanation of consciousness. — Wayfarer
But what is not explained by appealing to physical substrates is why and how such interaction results in semantic content, intentions, or meaning. — Wayfarer
To continue with the analogy: you can describe how a violin works in physical terms—strings, bow pressure, air movement—but that doesn’t explain what makes a musical phrase evocative, expressive, or meaningful. — Wayfarer
Semantic content is not a mere epiphenomenon of molecular motion. It’s a distinct order of intelligibility, one that involves interpretation, context, and intention—none of which are physical properties. They're not found in the particles or interactions. — Wayfarer
If you don't include the meaning, content, and intentions, then of course they aren't included. If you do, they are.
— Philosophim
This is tautological. — Wayfarer
To "include" meaning or intention in your description is not to reduce them to physics, unless you're simply smuggling them in and calling them physical. — Wayfarer
That’s what the “explanatory gap” and the “hard problem” are actually pointing to: not a temporary lack of data, but a categorical difference between the vocabulary of physics and the nature of conscious experience. — Wayfarer
↪Philosophim It depends what you mean by 'physical'. Plenty of people happily refer to subjective feelings as non-physical entities (qualia and such).
Then there is the question of what you mean by 'exist'. Numbers do not exist and nor does love (physically), and there is a vast array of abstract concepts that have no physical existence too. — I like sushi
I replied the way I did because of comments like the one I quoted above. — Sam26
If you believe X, and you argue for a particular conclusion, then you're doing philosophy. — Sam26
