Actually, the human mind is capable of far outstripping the requirements for 'successfully interpreting the world'. Any animal must do that if it is to survive. But h. sapiens has gone far beyond what can be rationalised solely in terms of the requirements for survival. You don't need to be able to weigh and measure the Universe just to get by. — Wayfarer
Of course but that is because the interface/brain has been damaged. If a camera is damaged you can not see through it but that does not mean the camera sees. The body is an interface between the mind and the world. If the interface is damaged then of course information cannot reach the mind. But the mind is also conscious independently of the body. For example, it can think and it can say 'I think therefore I am'. The mind's knowledge is not restricted to the five senses. — EnPassant
What has been established is that there is a physical analogue of the mind's interaction with the world via the brain. — EnPassant
If you replace the meter stick with geometry you'll get very close. Geo-metry means 'earth measuring'. — EnPassant
There is no evidence that the brain is conscious. What does exist is a materialistic dogma that insists there is no difference between the brain analogue and the mind. It is simply dogma. — EnPassant
No, because the mind is the processing brain.
— Philosophim
That has yet to be established. — EnPassant
The question is; how closely does subjective experience resemble the objective reality that is the source of that experience? — EnPassant
But that does not mean the physical context is consciousness. — EnPassant
I guess technically on my account there is no such thing as an unexamined “belief“, because that would just be a “perception”: belief are what you get when you examine your perceptions and either affirm or deny their accuracy. — Pfhorrest
Emotions are not a bad thing. They are just another way to think, in fact. — Olivier5
What on earth is an "emotional argument"? :chin: — TheMadFool
what I'm saying is that such a situation is neurologically impossible. No matter how much you insist you did, there is no know (or even plausible) mechanism by which a belief can be formed without the sensory, or interoceptive inputs to form it. — Isaac
The abstract point I'm making is we can have beliefs that are examined, and beliefs that are unexamined. Is an unexamined belief knowledge? — Philosophim
"If the body is a physical context, then can't we extend this reasoning further and argue that the pain is not really in the brain either, but in the mind? — EnPassant
If we are locating things in the body can't it also be argued that neuroscience is locating/contextualizing experience in a physical context in the brain but the real conscious experience is outside the physical context altogether? — EnPassant
Indeed, can physical matter, no matter how complex, have experiences? — EnPassant
Do 'we' know that? What does 'produce' mean, here? What is it that is being produced? And how is it being produced? And, is the brain 'a physical thing?' Extract a brain from a human, and it is still the same matter, but it's now an inert object, even though it's stil a physical thing. When situated in a living being, the brain has more neural connections than stars in the sky. It is no longer simply an object, but a central part of cognition and is central to any possible theory, including any theory about 'what is physical'. So in what sense is it a 'physical thing' in that context? — Wayfarer
But the fact of the existence of this school shows that the ground is already shifting towards a more 'mind-like' and top-down causal model of life and mind. — Wayfarer
But as I've said - the contrary also works, and that is demonstrable by observation and experiment. Humans can perform mental acts which alter the physical configuration of the brain. A physical change to a brain is through injury or a medicine or substance which literally alters the material structure. But if the structure is altered through a volitional act, then that is mental in origin. — Wayfarer
That is 'brain-mind identity theory'. But 'wetness' does not stand in the relationship to hydrogen and oxygen that consciousness does in relation to matter. — Wayfarer
Besides, consciousness does not only work within the brain, it is present at some level in the operation of all living organisms. — Wayfarer
So, you're operating within the latter explanatory framework. So any 'theory of consciousness' that I would try and submit, would have to fit within that explanatory framework. But there's a fundamental problem with that, because to do so requires treating 'res cogitans' as an object - which it never is. There is no object anywhere called 'mind'. You can only deal with the question if you can conceive of the subject of the question in objective terms. — Wayfarer
Can you really think of a scenario where you'd have zero justification though? — Isaac
Government forbidding or not, what does this have to do with people respecting other peoples exercising their right to vote to suppress other people's rights to vote? Not trying to be hostile, just curious about this answer. — The Questioning Bookworm
On my account, you were weakly justified to believe your friend went on a date at first, and then when observation that could have falsified that didn't, your justification increased. It's difficult to state that in the terminology of "knowledge", because it's odd to say something like you "knew a little" at first and then "knew a lot" later. — Pfhorrest
And you're simply assuming the opposite. And, what is 'physical', anyway? What does it mean? — Wayfarer
My point, exactly. Can't be fit into the bottom-up scenario. — Wayfarer
Have you ever heard Karl Popper's expresssion 'the promissory notes of materialism'? This refers to the tendency to say in just such cases, 'hey, science hasn't figured it out yet, but we will! It's just a matter of time!' — Wayfarer
— Wikipedia (For Chalmers) — Wayfarer
A nonreductive theory of consciousness will consist in a number of psychophysical principles, principles connecting the properties of physical processes to the properties of experience. We can think of these principles as encapsulating the way in which experience arises from the physical. — Philosophim
— Howard Pattee — Wayfarer
In other words, because semantic and semiotic laws can't be derived from physical laws. — Wayfarer
Because, if it were a purely physical process, then intentionality would have no impact on it. In those experiments where a conscious mental activity causes changes to the brain structure, then the changes are brought about by a conscous act, not by a physical cause. If I tell you something that has physical consequences, that is different to my hitting you or giving you a physical substance. Intentionality is not a physical thing. — Wayfarer
It (Self-repair) is never observed in non-living matter. — Wayfarer
Go back to this post about the 'neural binding problem'. — Wayfarer
It is now known that neuroplasticity enables the brain to regain from a lot of damage by re-purposing. In those cases, the mind changes the brain - it's top-down causation. If physicalism were the case, this ought not to happen. — Wayfarer
There have been experiments where subjects have shown changes in brain matter simply by conducting thought experiments, such as imagining they're learning to play the piano (with no actual piano). So in those cases, and there are many, the mind shapes the brain. They are an example of top-down causation, which physicalism can't accomodate — Wayfarer
Ever heard of Wilder Penfield? — Wayfarer
What about, for instance, meaning. You can't get from 'the laws which govern molecules and energy' (i.e. physics, organic chemistry, etc) to 'the laws which govern semantics'. — Wayfarer
I don’t see the apparent contradiction. Can you elaborate? — Pfhorrest
I’m basically applying the same standard of justification to belief as we usually do to action, at least in the modern free world: any action is by default justified, until it can be shown somehow wrong. We’re not obligated to do nothing at all except those things that we can prove from the ground up that we must do. We would normally consider than an absurd standard for justifying our actions, but it’s all too common to apply that standard to justifying our beliefs. — Pfhorrest
You really should read this review. — Wayfarer
However...what about the much-talked-about concept of qualia in re consciousness that seems to be last remaining stronghold of dualism? Do you think the redness of a strawberries changes with age? :chin: — TheMadFool
This leads to an infinite regress. You never end up getting at any fundamental understanding if it is always a step lower than your present understanding. Fundamental understanding would be fleeting and unattainable. This leaves us with simply understanding, and some understanding is only useful in a particular domain. Any distinction between fundamental and non-fundamental understanding is incoherent. — Harry Hindu
What exactly do you mean by "arises from the brain"?
What exactly do you mean by "caused by their interaction?
Is it a temporal or spatial change that you are talking about? In other words, does the change occur over time, or over space? — Harry Hindu
Brains and their neurons are what are seen, so what would it mean for the sight of a brain to be in the brain? — Harry Hindu
Then what does it mean to be "physical"? If everything were "physical" then "physical" seems like a useless term. — Harry Hindu
Knowledge is merely justified belief, where justification itself implies a reason to think it is true; — Pfhorrest
any belief is justified (including contrary ones) until there is support to the contrary — Pfhorrest
The "parts" and "wholes" are comparisons of views, or a comparison of measuring scales, like comparing millimeters to light-years and nano-seconds to centuries. Each of these measurements "make up" the larger scales, but those smaller measurements just aren't useful on such large scales, and vice versa. So I would reject your use of "fundamental" and instead say that there are certain scales that are useful, depending on what purpose we are trying to achieve. — Harry Hindu
I think you misunderstood. Brains are not molecular-sized objects. Neurons are. And neurons are made up of atoms, which are made up of quarks. A brain is a part of an organism. Organisms are part of a social group or species, etc. Between which layer does consciousness lie, and how do you explain the causal relationship between the upper and lower (underpinning) layers? — Harry Hindu
You said before that I am my brain, but now you say that I am merely one part of my brain. — Harry Hindu
You seem to be equating a mind as something different from the physical brain. It is not. No mind can exist without a brain. I was pointing out that you noted whether we examine something from a distance or close, its functionally the same thing. Thus brain and mind are the same.Unfortunately, I don't see the contradiction. — Harry Hindu
Are choices "physical"? — Harry Hindu
I'm extremely worried that it might be read as a theory in itself, whereas it's meant more as an illustration that on-going, high-profile research in a field that is itself a tad loosey-goosey shows that there is a lot of obvious potential for massive paradigm shifts in some pretty fundamental areas. — Kenosha Kid
Hi Baden, I guess I don't rhyme well with people in here, with my unorthodox thoughts. — Konkai
I can't fool myself and say that one of these two scenarios can be suitable to my nature.
How do I know this?
I simply can't relate, speaking logically, the set of the various action/reaction rules that defines my nature/being... with such scenarios :( — KerimF
My response to this problem is similar to that of Robert Nozick: I say that knowledge is believing something because it is true, such that not only does one believe it, and it is true, but if it weren't true one wouldn't believe it. — Pfhorrest
The "small component parts" would still be part of the "illusion", so Dennett can't ever escape his own visual illusion - even when talking about "fundamental" parts of a whole. His and your explanation sound visual to me. You can only hypothesize about the components by observing the "illusion" — Harry Hindu
But what if consciousness doesn't operate at the molecular level? — Harry Hindu
Observing a process from far away vs close up changes the way the process appears, but it is still the same process. The difference is not based the observed process being different from different vantage points, but our sensory systems' relationship with the process being different from different vantage points. — Harry Hindu
It's not other brains out there (naive realism), it's other minds, and brains are how some consciousness measures other minds (indirect realism). — Harry Hindu
First there is the notion that all that exists is your mind. This might encompass an experience.
If if encompasses an experience then nothing disproves solipsism.
Since each consciousness only has access to its own consciousness, it has no way of proving that any other consciousness exists.
Now, for what it's worth, I do think that there is a thread within the model that makes it stable across time and context (which is related to logic) — TVCL