Yes, it is descriptively moral in human societies to solve cooperation problems that prevent the society from achieving its goals, for instance genocide or mass murder. — Mark S

Descriptive morality is just the study of people's opinions on morality. If you claim "Cooperation is moral," that's not descriptive. A study of descriptive ethics would be to ask, "Why do people consider cooperation moral?"

The science of morality tells us BOTH what is merely descriptively moral as well as what is universally moral. This is as it must be, because the science of morality must explain all of human morality, not just the parts we like. — Mark S

That's a fine thing to claim, but where is science in your example describing a universal morality?

Moral philosophers tend to focus only on what is universally moral. We have missed a lot by not being able to explain what is descriptively moral. — Mark S

I don't think that's the case at all. In attempting to discover a universal morality, oftentimes philosophers look to the reason behind why people take the actions that they claim are moral. For example, why was it considered moral to kill a deformed child in ancient times? Understanding why people believe actions are moral is fundamental to creating a rational universal morality, as it should explain why they have these intuitions, and if they are misguided, why they are misguided.

This is a very good start to a discussion and I think can highlight a key difference between philosophy and science. Science often times takes hypotheses and established definitions and uses them in identifying tests. Thus if we say 'morality is cooperation," then we observe where cooperation happens in animals and say, "That is morality."

Philosophy on the other hand is the logical establishment of "What does this definition mean?" which we can then test. You see, in the first case, there is no question as to what the definition of morality is. Its, "Cooperation". So we observe a few serial killers working together to mass murder people. "Ah, look at that morality in action!" we would say as scientists. But as philosophers we would take a step back and say, "Huh, cooperation as morality in this situation doesn't make sense. Maybe its not as simple as that."

I think any good philosopher must understand up to date facts and observations. You cannot create a reasonable definition without a strong foundation on what is already reasonable. But the creation of the definitions that we use can also color how we see facts. The goal is to create a definition that solves potential contradictions, emotional conflicts, and has universal rational agreement. When such a definition does contradict our emotional intuitions, it must provide rational points which can often explain why we feel that way, but also why that feeling is incorrect.

So, should we use observations of cooperative behavior? Yes. Should that be the only consideration in morality? No, because it leads to unintuitive contradictions to people sense of what morality is without adequately explaining why those contradictions to our intuitions are incorrect.

If you're interested, I'm exploring the idea of an objective morality here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1

Correct, because you cannot draw 'nothing'. This doesn't negate what I've stated. If you have limits, nothing must be beyond those limits. The only way to avoid there being 'nothing' is if everything is infinite and eternal.
— Philosophim
It negates what you have said. I am afraid that I don't see any point to repeat myself. — MoK

I disagree, but we've both said our piece now. :) Good chatting with you again MoK,

Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly.
— Philosophim

Neither a bat nor a fly will ever know that. — Wayfarer

But you understood the point that the intellectual gap between a bat and a fly is as wide as the intellectual gap of a human and a bat right? The point is that us being a 'different kind' from other animals is simply the same pattern repeated in nature again and again. Having an intellectual or consciousness gap between other animals does not mean we are separate from them. Some thing will be at the top in the animal kingdom, and it appears that its us.

I mean, have you ever seen the comparison between a human brain and other mammals? https://news.wisc.edu/study-shows-differences-between-brains-of-primates-humans-apes-and-monkeys-are-small-but-significant/ We're not an alien species to the planet by any means.

I think one of the unfortunate consequences of popular Darwinism is the myth of h. Sapiens being ‘just another species’. There’s a leap - an ontological gulf - between h. Sapiens and other species. We’re of a different kind. — Wayfarer

Look at the gulf between a bat and a fly. The gulf between an octopus and a platypus. A dolphin and a fish. We're all of different kinds.

A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely".
— Philosophim

I understand. Don't you think plant behaviors could be replicated by fairly simple machines (or a system of pretty simple machines)? — RogueAI

I don't know enough to make that judgment call. First, we're still learning so much about neurology and systems. I'm sure we can make a simulation, just like we can simulate human behavior. But to capture the actual full behavior of what a specific creature would do in every instance may still be beyond the limitations of hardware and software at this time.

Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature.
— Philosophim

Try teaching the concept 'prime' to your dog. — Wayfarer

You may want to read the rest of what I wrote. I noted we are possibly the most conscious beings on the planet. What you are describing is advanced intelligence. That doesn't mean simple intelligence doesn't exist, just like simple consciousness doesn't exist. There are humans with enough cognitive impairment that they cannot learn what 'prime' is either. Same with young children until they reach a certain age. Does this mean they aren't conscious Wayfarer?

What behavior is the plant doing that would lead you to think it might be conscious? — RogueAI

Its a really good question. Right now, its a debate. And I think a better way to summarize it is not to give you a 'plants are conscious' argument, but an argument that they aren't.

https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC8052213/

At the least scroll down and check out table 1 for some arguments over the years. I have no skin in the game one way or another at this point. A part of me leans a little more towards that side that plants have some type of consciousness, but not enough for me to say, "Definitely".

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.
— Philosophim

Could a rock be conscious? A shifting sand dune? A car engine? — RogueAI

To our current knowledge, no. We really can only evaluate consciousness by behavior, not by subjective experience. To objective evaluations, rocks, sand dunes, nor car engines exhibit any behavior we would call conscious. Consciousness is generally viewed as the ability for something to be proactive, such as plan ahead or actively plot a future outcome.

Consciousness can of course have different degrees. A crow for example can think to put rocks into a beaker of water to make what's in the water move up higher until it can grab it. Dogs can be trained and understand commands. Humans are not some separate and magical species that exists apart from all of nature. We are part of nature, just possibly the most refined and successful consciousness on this planet.

I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not.
— Philosophim
How would AI consciousness be different from that of human consciousness? — Corvus

By the fact it is not the same material as a brain. You can play the same melody on different instruments, but it will have its own sound and feel.

I'm now expressing big gratitude to 180 Proof. He's done a superb job fulfilling my request. I now believe his statement above detects a fatal flaw in my argument. — ucarr

180 proof is a great person to ask Ucarr. :) I'm glad he was able to clear up the issue for you. Feel free to read his argument against the OP. I did not think it addressed the argument back then, but I would be happy to discuss it with you if you would like.

I believe that consciousness can express itself through different mediums. The consciousness of a plant for example, would not be the consciousness of a human. Same as the consciousness of a fly or a dog. Consciousness can only be identified by behaviors, as the internal experience of being consciousness is impossible for any other being to experience. As such, we can see several behaviors apart from human brains that convey consciousness.

I fully believe that AI will have consciousness as well. Will it be the same as a human brain? Likely not. As for consciousness existing outside of some physical medium, that is currently impossible. There has never been any evidence demonstrating consciousness existing apart from physical reality, only conjectures and imagination.

If it's true that: "before first cause, nothing," then a justification of this premise with a supporting premise that employs the material things of our everyday world as an example of first cause inception -- a rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing. — ucarr

Let me break this down because this is still a run on of a sentence.

1. Before a first cause, there was nothing. Assume true.
2. A rolling die with numbers on six sides -- cannot be a pertinent and probative example of first cause from nothing.

Sure, I never used this as an example of a first cause from nothing. Its an analogy to make it simpler to understand the abstract point we're discussing Ucarr, not an actual example. The 'die' is an example of potential randomness. The result of a 'six' is an example of potential being realized. Nothing more. There is not an actual six sided die. There is nothing being rolled. We've gone over this before.

The point is that prior to a first cause's inception, the potential is limitless. After its inception, the result is what is. Thus prior to the inception of a first cause, "It could be anything." After the inception of a first cause, and all the causality that follows from it, there is a definitive first cause and definitive caused objects and states.

Thus, if I'm looking at things that already exist, not everything I look at can be a first cause. In this case, it must be proven that something which exists, or existed, was a first cause. Just like we don't know what side a six sided die will come up before we roll it, but we have to demonstrate what side it showed after it was rolled. Its just an analogy, not literal dice Ucarr.

Ucarr, I read your reply twice and I don't understand what you're trying to say. Instead of asking me if I think my premise does something, just point out what you see and I'll respond once I understand.

I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. — ucarr

There're no limitations on what a first cause can be — ucarr

When something exists, its potential is realized. If it is a first cause, it must be proven that it is a first cause.

Prior to a first cause's inception, there is no limit as to what can potentially be incepted.

Imagine a die with all possibilities. Now the die is rolled. Whatever lands is what is. If someone claims, "Its a six", we should be able to prove that it did roll a six. Once it is rolled we are out of the realm of possibility and in the realm of actuality.

As you can see, no contradiction.

My intention here is to understand that a first of all first causes, if it happens, holds no special status because first causes are independent. — ucarr

You are correct.

I've been striving to understand that the gist of your claim is to say each causal chain must have a first cause. In so stating, I understand you take no particular position on the ontic identity of a first cause and its following chain. — ucarr

This is also correct.

You've previously stated there're no limitations on what a first cause can be. Are you now presenting an elaboration that rejects the notion "there're no limitations on what a first cause can be and "anything that can exist might be a first cause"? are logically equivalent? — ucarr

No. Please explain how you came to this conclusion from what I wrote.

Are you allowing that "real" names a comprehensive set of things that funds first causes and that whether or not this set includes both material and immaterial things is irrelevant to your work in this conversation? — ucarr

Ucarr, you are overcomplicating things again. I told you, "I don't know what immaterial means. Its not something I brought up." If it exists, it doesn't matter if its material, immaterial, in immaterial, or bizantiane whibble material. :) Real is what exists.

You presume incorrectly my questions are darts aimed at your previous statements. I like to think I'm slowly improving my understanding of the intentions behind your words. — ucarr

I don't think they're darts, but you do seem to take strange leaps from what I'm saying. You read far too much into my words many times and often make conclusions I never assert.

Are you advising me to stop undertaking my own independent inferential thinking because you think it [sometimes] erroneous? — ucarr

No. This is what I mean by you reading into things that aren't there. Why do you think this? Where did I tell you to stop? If I had one piece of advice when reading my writing, read only what I write. If I don't outright say I intend something, I don't.

In a concomitant action, are you trying to restrict the range of actions, techniques and approaches I can use in my interactions with you? — ucarr

I don't think so. Why do you think that?

If you think you're repeating yourself in your responses, name the topic, tell me I'm repeating my questions thereof and I'll agree not to ask additional repeat questions on the topic. — ucarr

Sure. I'm just telling you that nothing has changed.

My mistake. I should've written: So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Correct only in the technical fact that it is possible there were two different 'firsts' that happened at the same time.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with an unlimited number of possible and independent first causes? — ucarr

Its been a while, so recall the 'chains'. The start of each chain is separate and independent, though they might cross paths. Nothing I've stated here has negated what I've stated before.

I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause.
— Philosophim

So, you're saying anything that can exist might be a first cause? — ucarr

We're having a language barrier issue here. :) Think of it as a variable set Ucarr. I'm noting the variable of 'a first cause' is logically necessary. What's in that actual set, one or many more, is irrelevant. What actual first causes have happened over the lifetime in the universe is up for other people to prove. I am not saying that anything which exists can be a first cause. I'm just noting at least one first cause must exist. If you wish to claim that 'This thing right here is a first cause," you have to prove it.

By immaterial existence I mean an abstract concept -- or some such entity -- that inhabits the mind apart from matter. Have you not agreed with Gnomon (below) that concepts are immaterial and real? — ucarr

No. I don't care whether they're immaterial or not. Are they real? Yes. That's all that matters.

Have you not agreed with Gnomon (above) that immaterial yet real concepts -- as distinguished from matter -- are useful for correctly understanding your thesis, and therefore pertinent to it? — ucarr

I am speaking to Gnomon in the context that I know he understands, and only one aspect of it. That is not your context. I do not want to explain his full context and what parts I do and do not agree with, because I have already done that while speaking speaking to him. If he has questions, he can ask me. I can tell you that nothing has changed from our conversation in which I spoke to you Ucarr. So its best not to confuse yourself by trying to follow it. If you have questions from our previous conversations, please ask. Do not worry about Gnomon and myself.

So, you're saying that even though a first cause is logically necessary, that doesn't necessarily imply the necessity of a first cause of all first causes? — ucarr

Let me clear this up a bit.

First, if you remember a first cause cannot cause another first cause. That's just a first cause causing something else.

Second, its possible that there was a first cause that happened, then other first causes happened later. Or it could be that two or more first causes happened simultaneously.

I hope that answers the question.

Are we looking at a concept of causation with potentially unlimited number of first causes and yet no first cause for the set of first causes? — ucarr

Correct because a first cause cannot cause another first cause. If A causes B, B is not a first cause.

You've said you're not making a claim that a thing -- such as a God, or the Big Bang -- acts as the first cause. — ucarr

No Ucarr, I'm saying I'm not claiming any one PARTICULAR thing is a first cause. If the big bang is a first cause, then it is. I'm not claiming that it is. That's not what this is showing. I'm not saying "X" is a first cause. Just noting there must be at least one.

Also, you've clarified that your thesis only posits the logical necessity of a first cause. Now you say you don't know if immaterial existence is a thing. — ucarr

Right. Its not anything I cover in here, nor is necessary to do so. I don't even know what immaterial existence is. Let someone else prove that.

Is it pertinent to the content and intentions of your thesis to suppose you take no definitive position on the materiality or immateriality of the logically necessary first cause? — ucarr

Its completely irrelevant whether there is immaterial existence or not. I talk about existence, and the adjective does not change that. It doesn't matter what form it takes.

I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe.
— Philosophim

Are you saying: a) the logical first cause has no material physicality; b) the logical first cause that has no material physicality exists within our universe? — ucarr

I'm not sure where you got that. I'll point out again: This is not a claim of any 'one thing' being a first cause. Its just a logical note that there must be a first cause, and that first cause has nothing prior that limits or influences what it should be.

To be clear on definitions, I define 'the universe' as 'all that exists'. Is immaterial existence even a thing? I don't know. If it exists, then its a thing. If not, then its not.

You cannot draw a figure in which the whole has a limit and there is nothing beyond its limit. — MoK

Correct, because you cannot draw 'nothing'. This doesn't negate what I've stated. If you have limits, nothing must be beyond those limits. The only way to avoid there being 'nothing' is if everything is infinite and eternal.

I know but the very existence of a limit means that there is nothing beyond it! What is beyond the end? It is either something or nothing. Take your pick. — MoK

If 'the whole' is everything and the whole has a limit, then by consequence there is nothing past that limit. If the whole is limitless, then there is no end, thus 'nothing' cannot exist. But one has to prove that the whole of existence is limitless, which we cannot do.

If by nothing you mean the black area then that cannot be nothing since nothing cannot have a geometry, property, and occupy room. — MoK

No, I'm not saying there exists a black area, I'm saying there's nothing. It is the logical consequence of there being a limit. To state there is a limit means there is an end. What is beyond the end? Nothing. The only way to avoid this is to state that the whole is limitless. But this has to be proven, and I'm not seeing anything but a conjecture here.

This was an answer to you when you asked whether the whole is infinite. I answered that the whole is bigger than any infinity you can imagine. — MoK

I understood that was your answer, but your answer doesn't explain itself well. I am familiar with Cantor's theory and I still don't see how this applies to what you stated.

Creativity is the ability to come up with ideas that few if any other people come up with. Positive creativity results in a new idea that other people like or benefit from. You can be creative, but it doesn't mean your idea will resonate with others or contribute beyond the fact that its original.

This is certainly true, but lack of reason is not the same thing as disrespect for reason or arguing that it is involved in justification for some claims. — Count Timothy von Icarus

To be clear, its not a lack of reason. Its rationalization. Its about constructing some reason to distrust those that would go against what you want. Using some political examples, the "liberal media". Because the liberal media is liberal, they are LIEberal and thus you cannot trust them. They are against conservatism, and sense they lie, you can't trust them so listen to Fox News.

You can explain to a conservative that buys into this why this is a false narrative. They aren't dumb. They just don't CARE. Conservatism is always correct and good, therefore anything which challenges that must be a trick and bad. Your "Rationality" is merely a liberal disguise to trick me into thinking conservatism is wrong.

Rationalizing people will often say they are being rational. They aren't rejecting rationality in their view. My 'common sense' is more rational than the experts. They are rejecting the source as being incapable of being rational, while holding up those who hold conservative ideology as being 'the real rational people'. Reject the source and the facts, and you can win the argument every time.

In short, it is a rationalizing argument to reject rational arguments, because it preserves the intelligence and 'rationality' of one's own argument. Its evil, yes, but it feels good.

One thing to remember is that people are not inherently rational. It takes effort, oftentimes training, and a willingness to be wrong. Most people are rationalizing. In other words, they have an outcome they want to see and create justifications that support the conclusion they want, while only critically critiquing to reject anything which goes against what they want.

Pragmatism and politization are simply avenues where rationalization is more prevalent and accepted by others. I think misology can be a rationalization when what is rational rejects the conclusion that you want. But ultimately what is behind it all is that most people want what they want, and are inclined to reject points that deny that what they want is rational or correct.

What do you mean by directional sense? — MoK

Imagine a grain of sand. Outside is nothing. "Outside" is the direction.

This doesn't make any sense. Infinity means 'uncountable', or 'without end'. How can something be larger than something without end?
— Philosophim
Georg Cantor showed that there is an infinity of infinities. — MoK

I think you need to go into the specifics of how Cantor's theorem applies to the argument. This doesn't explain anything by itself.

I apologize for the belated response! I have not found the time to respond adequately until now. — Bob Ross

Not a worry Bob! I was away this weekend myself.

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down.

Ok, so, correct me if I am wrong, you seem to be going for calculating ‘more existence’ in terms of the nearest scientific measuring unit of a thing: is that correct? — Bob Ross

Scientific measurement is a fine way to represent identities at times. When removing the human element and its identities it can bring to paper, we are left with the molecular to consider. The question of 'what is a meaningful identity' is based on when the combination of more than one existence creates an identity which could not exist if the two were separated.

The degree of this can be described by the change in expressions. A large puddle of water vs a small puddle of water is still just a conglomeration of water molecules. The identity of 'water' does not change. But if an animal drinks water and that water combines with tree pulp and chemicals to become paper, its now become a part of new identity, and thus more potential expressions, then it could as water alone.

For our purposes, because neither of us are chemists, we're trying to process and develop an overall general measurements of existence that is comprehensible, and attempt to observe patterns which we can build upon. If the there is something to this as a general theory, perhaps 'molecular morality' would be a sub genre to explore. For our purposes, I'm simply trying to demonstrate that identities are different ways of existential expression, and that the marriage of potential and actual interaction between different types of identities allows new identities which can form which would not otherwise.

Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper)

Unless I am correct above, then I don’t see why you would choose to use molecules rather than pieces of paper; nor mass of the paper. It isn’t always clear what “one step down” really is. — Bob Ross

'Paper' without any context of its use, is just a conglomeration of paper molecules into a mostly flat shape. When you split a piece of paper, you are dividing its molecular make up. That's the 'one step down' in this context. As such, dividing a piece of paper in two in this context only has its molecular makeup in consideration.

For example, take water. I could say that 2 Liters of water is more existence than 1; or I could equally say 100 molecules of water is more existence than 50. There’s no clear “one step down” here. — Bob Ross

Yes, in this isolated context considering nothing else, 2 liters of water is more existence than 1. The one step down from the liters of water, would be the molecules. One step down from the molecules of water would be atoms. Until we find the material foundation I spoke about, there's always one step down.

Ok, a piece of paper doesn’t qualify then; but, it really doesn’t take away from my point: cutting a piece of paper cleanly into two pieces retains the molecule count and (total) mass. So it is an morally indifferent action under your view? — Bob Ross

It seems to be. Within this context, as long as the actual and potential are there to recombine, there doesn't seem to be any real gain or loss. And within the context of a humane doing it? The molecular separation level is completely irrelevant.

If so, then you need to clarify (I think) better in the OP what you mean by “more existence is better”, because it clearly isn’t “more → better”. — Bob Ross

More existence is based on the foundation of "More material, more expressions of the material, more potential expressions from the material, and this pattern through the combination of expressions.

The act of a bunch of paper molecules losing bonds to be separated doesn't seem like much of a difference, at least with the last calculation I made. The context of the dividing of a substance alone gives us very little existential change, and seems meaningless. I never considered it to be morally meaningful myself, and I think looking at it closer after your example hasn't really changed that.

I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios

The problem is that it is all-too conjectural. Neither of us know the nature of fundamental entities other than they are the smallest parcel of reality: they may not even be analogous to atoms combining; and, on top of that, it serves no legitimate purpose to your calculations. — Bob Ross

Since it is irrelevant for yourself, then its not necessary to discuss. I know there will be someone who would think its relevant, so it needs to be included in the theory for consistency. But currently our exploration of this is not going down those paths, so no need to address it. It changes nothing for where we are in the discussion at the moment.

While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent

I don’t see how this creates more existence; because, again, I don’t know exactly how you calculating this: it is also very vague so far. — Bob Ross

An atom can express itself in particular ways. However, once it joins as a molecule, it loses certain potential expressions as an individual atom as long as it remains a part of that molecule. As a simple example, we cannot breath water right? We would drown despite there being oxygen in water. It is only when oxygen is in its separated state that we gain the interaction of being able to breathe it.

If everything joined into one giant blob, the loss of potential existence would be tremendous. My point is that when an atom can combine, but also has the potential to uncombine, this creates more potential existence then a combination which can never break apart again.

How do you calculate the comparison between expressions and potentials? — Bob Ross

Expressions are what is, potentials are what could be. They are a necessary addition when considering any future change. For example, at any moment a life has the potential to die. That's an important consideration when planning what that life should do in the next moment. The universe in theory has the potential to separate into complete entropy. Could a universe such as that every come together again? There are potentials which if made actual, eliminate other potentials permanently. If a person dies, they can't just be reassembled together. Perhaps the potential is there in theory, but not practically.

The potential vs actual is a struggle for myself as well. Beyond the general use for it, it can quickly grow in complexity depending on the context we create. The goal here is to see if the established vocabulary and patterns can make sense in a manageable general sense where it is most relevant to people's moral questions. Specific and isolated contexts deserve their own study. If what I'm proposing is viable, this is a field of study, something which cannot be easily covered in an introductory conversation.

1. Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1? — Bob Ross

2, in this context. This is not necessarily the same context when we introduce other variables.

2. is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces than not to? — Bob Ross

In this context I would say it is mostly meaningless. Depending on how its cut and organized, my intuition is that we could find instances in which some expressions end up creating slightly more or less existence, but not meaningful enough beyond an isolated thought experiment.

3. Is it better to combine two pieces of paper into one big piece of paper than not to? — Bob Ross

Same answer as point 2.

I still think it is perfectly reasonable to analyze it in terms of non-scientific units (e.g., is better for there to be one potato or two?); but let’s go with that for now. — Bob Ross

It is, depending on the context. If you've created a context in which the molecular composition as well as small variations of mass are irrelevant, then yes. For example, we're talking about shipping millions of potatoes to Ukraine to feed people. If you create a scenario in which those things are relevant, than no. This would be talking about splitting a potato into two parts.

I hope this helps a little! I'm happy the conversation has transitioned to this line of thinking as this lets us really explore the foundations of theory first.

I appreciate your insight, thanks!

My apologies for initially missing this Gnomon!

But one sticking point seems to be confusing a logical First Cause (of some resulting chain of events) with an objective Thing or God operating in space-time. — Gnomon

Correct. People seem to think I'm using this to claim the existence of some specific first cause like the Big Bang, God, etc. I am not, and note that doing so would be an extremely difficult burden of proof.

That's simply a philosophical/mathematical concept, as contrasted with a physical/material object. — Gnomon

Also correct!

And a mereological distinction is that the hypothetical Cause is not a part of the system of secondary causes & effects. The analogy I like to use is a pool-shooter, who stands outside the table and bouncing balls. :smile: — Gnomon

I'm only going to tweak this a bit for clarification. You may not be implying this, I just want to be clear that a first cause as proven here is not outside of our universe, but a necessary existent within our universe. The balls on the pool table are not separate from the pool shooter. The entirety of the interaction is part of the universe.

Finally, I think I did indeed deduce this from the propositions put forward here. So I wouldn't call it a first principle. Then again, I think everything needs to be deduced or proven in some way.

Hey Mok, been away a few days. :)

I don't agree with you that space is synonymous with nothing but for the sake of argument, we can assume that space is a substance. — MoK

As long as we're identifying space as 'something', that's fine by me for this argument.

Well, this we discussed it. Nothing has no geometry nor can occupy a room therefore nothing cannot surround a thing. — MoK

Lets make sure we're not making 'vocabulary reality', a common thing we can do in philosophy. Vocabulary is used to describe reality, it does not create reality.

Nothing does not 'surround' anything in a substantive sense. But if there is a limit to something, does nothing surround it in a directional sense? Yes. Its just words to describe the idea that beyond something, there is nothing. The only way this cannot be is if the entire universe is a thing without limits. This is what we're trying to prove by your philosophy, so it cannot be part of the premises.

I also do not understand this. Are you saying that the whole is infinite?
— Philosophim
The whole is larger than any infinity that you can imagine. — MoK

This doesn't make any sense. Infinity means 'uncountable', or 'without end'. How can something be larger than something without end?

That seems to be the conclusion, so once again we're begging the question.
— Philosophim
It is not the begging the question. If the whole has an outside then there is something outside of it therefore what we consider as the whole with an outside is not the whole. — MoK

No, if the whole has an outside, that outside can be something, or it can be nothing. I get the feeling what you really want to prove here is "Nothing is impossible". Maybe that would be a better tactic?

Well, that is a matter of definition of things. Could we please agree that the condition in which there is no thing, namely no space, no material objects,.... is nothing? — MoK

As long as you view space as a substance, this is fine. This is why it is not irrelevant. If space is not a substance, it is usually synonymous with 'nothing'.

The question which is relevant then is what is beyond the edge if the whole is open. What is beyond the edge cannot be nothing as we discussed so it is something. This means that what we call the whole is not whole but something else. — MoK

I still don't see why there cannot be nothing beyond the edge of something. I get that you want to define the whole as bounded by something else, but you've given no reason why that necessarily must be. Try to disprove the scenario I'm going to put in front of you. Referring earlier, I have a grain of sand with nothing else in the universe existing around it. Why is that a contradiction under your viewpoint?

The whole does not have an outside. — MoK

I also do not understand this. Are you saying that the whole is infinite? That seems to be the conclusion, so once again we're begging the question. I think what would really help to flesh out your definition of the 'whole' is to give an example of what that would be.

Time doesn't exist somewhere on a hard drive. The universe is in a state at one moment, then another state in the next. The reason why the universe is in one state is because of the forces and matter in the previous state. Meaning that if we could reshape the forces and matter to what it was 1000 years ago, we would be in the state of the universe 1000 years ago. But we can't go back. There is only now, and what was before.

Philosophy in the general sense can be. Philosophy as a discussion of rigorous proofs, logic, and proposals is not. Since we are in online forums open to the public, many people approach philosophy as opinions, ways of life, or even religion. Get in a conversation with a good philosopher though and they'll push you into clearly defining your terms, demonstrating your logical steps, and requiring your conclusion to be sound.

Wouldn't a continuous area that is unoccupied be 'nothing' though?
— Philosophim
No, nothing is the absence of space, physical objects, etc. — MoK

You need to redefine space as being something then. An 'unoccupied' area is seen as 'nothing'. Things occupy. Nothing does not.

I am ok with the idea of simply stating, "space is a substance" as a start.
— Philosophim
That is alright. Saying that space is a substance does not resolve any issue here nor it helps us to prove the argument. — MoK

Its fairly important here because most people see space as 'nothing'. There is an old term for the idea that there really is no emptiness, and that all of space, or nothingness, is filled by a substance called "Aether". Aether was eventually debunked by science, but for your purposes the idea of space being 'something' instead of nothing, can be helpful here.

That is what I am trying to show in OP. is either limited or limitless. W1
is either limited or limitless. If it is limitless then we reach the conclusion otherwise it is surrounded by something else, B1. Then the whole is W2 =W1+B1. W2 again is either limited or limitless. Etc. — MoK

Oh, I see what you're doing here now! Clever! The only problem is you have necessitated that something always be bounded by something else, when it is commonly known that things are not bound by other substances, but the mass of their own matter. So while clever if things were bound by other things, its just not the case that they are. Further, that's not really the definition of "the whole" but really, 'a thing'. The whole is generally considered 'everything' which of course is bound by the entirety of its internal parts, and can have no other thing outside of itself.

I mean if space is open is limitless otherwise it is closed which means that it is limited. — MoK

No disagreement here, you just have to demonstrate that space is limitless or limited.

Ok, I see. So if I have your idea right, you believe that space is a thing.
— Philosophim
If by "space is a thing" you mean that space is a substance then that is still the subject of debate. If by space you mean a continuous area that is unoccupied then we are into business. — MoK

Wouldn't a continuous area that is unoccupied be 'nothing' though? I am ok with the idea of simply stating, "space is a substance" as a start.

Once again, wouldn't the bounds of space be the internal limitations of space itself?
— Philosophim
Space in principle could be limitless. A section of it is however limited. — MoK

In principle, perhaps. But the entire point you're trying to make is that the whole is limitless. If space is the whole, we have to prove that, not declare it. If I'm trying to prove that cheese is a moon rock, I can't just say, "Cheese is a moonrock" as one of the arguments. This is a 'begging the question' fallacy.

In this case, the space is limited but it is surrounded by something else, let's call it hyperspace. — MoK

Alright, lets look at hyperspace then. Doesn't he same question about space and the grain of sand apply here as well? Isn't hyperspace bound by its own self?

Space is bounded by its own volume which is limitless if it is flat otherwise it is limited. Space then is surrounded by something else in the second case so-called hyperspace. — MoK

This is a contradiction though. Something cannot be both limitless and limited.

First, you need a space as large as the size of the sand to embed the sand within. Now, the question of what is outside of the space is valid. — MoK

Ok, I see. So if I have your idea right, you believe that space is a thing. If this is the case, and space is an actual thing, then just replace my example of 'a grain of sand' with 'a section of space'. Once again, wouldn't the bounds of space be the internal limitations of space itself? I agree with you that nothing cannot bind space, but if space is limited, how is it bound by something outside of itself then? How is the limitation of space not bound by its own internal volume?

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.
— Philosophim

But don't you think progress has been made in ethics, even though it's not a science? I think John Rawls and J.J. Thomson have done important work. — RogueAI

I'll clarify as I wrote this all quickly. Philosophy can generally be seen as protoscience. In some ways I personally view it as logically derived hypotheses that then need to be tested. In some cases, I believe philosophy is needed before a science can form. Two of these cases are Morality and Knowledge.

Before you can test morality, you must have a logical idea of what it is. If I say, "The survival of society is moral," then my tests will all be done towards this. If I say, "Human individuality is moral", then my tests will be done with this definition. While we can make tests and come to conclusions, we can see before we begin that there will be a conflict at some point between the two ideas of morality. The tests will not reveal to us which is correct, as what is 'correct' will be different based on the definition of morality being used. As we can see, its important that we have a logically established definition of morality that is prepared to handle conflicts that we can see tests running into.

Knowledge runs into a similar problem. How do we test and discover what we can know about knowledge, before we have a clear definition of what knowledge is? Thus these are viable fields of study within philosophy that are needed.

As we do not have an established morality that can be called a science as of yet, philosophy is all we have to go on. Which in my opinion, is a terrible and primitive way of handling something so important. So can ethical philosophers contribute to areas other than science right now? Yes, because there's no alternative. This is why religion's influence is also so strong within moral discussions and policies. We do not have an objective alternative to turn to yet, and in my opinion, that's a terrible problem.

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.
— Philosophim

I'm curious - you don't think reality is one of these - or do you have a presupposition about the nature of reality which informs the others? — Tom Storm

I'm currently working on one right now. https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14834/a-measurable-morality/p1 Been having a good discussion with it with Bob Ross. When we're done I'll likely rewrite it up with all the things we've been discussing.

As for knowledge, I've finished it here: https://thephilosophyforum.com/discussion/14044/knowledge-and-induction-within-your-self-context/p1 Not only does it work for knowledge, it introduces a hierarchy of inductions, also giving a starter solution to the problem of handling inductions claims as well.

Wouldn’t a ‘successful’ philosophy also be integrated into art, literature, politics , education and business? Is science the supreme arbiter of the truth of philosophy? — Joshs

Very good question. Let me think.

Art and literature are for entertainment? Sure.

Politics, education, and business? If its because the philosophy is popular or the motivation behind ideologies, I would be careful here. There are a lot of poor political, education, and business decisions driven by reasons. Philosophy would not be my first choice here unless the philosophy was agreed on as the most viable solution by rational and knowledgeable people.

Is science the supreme arbiter of the truth of philosophy? — Joshs

Yes.

↪Philosophim How would ethical theories become science? — RogueAI

If philosophy ever gets around to proving an objective morality, then it would become science. The great mysteries that philosophy has yet to solve are: Morality, knowledge, and (my opinion) art. Perhaps there are others, but those are the big three.

To be fair, if the philosophy has been around for more than a few decades and isn't integrated into science in some way by now, its likely a failed or highly controversial philosophy. Its true: most philosophy is poor. Since any successful philosophy becomes science, all we have remaining to study is its failures.

Hello again MoK!

Let me take your abstract into a thought example for a minute. Lets say that in the universe, only a single grain of sand exists. Now we claim that is the whole, but what is the definition of the whole? Usually 'the whole' is seen as 'everything'. But then you add in something outside of the whole as binding the whole. I'm confused here. What is outside of the grain of sand that is binding the sand?
It would seem that the bind to me is the internal limitation of the sand's matter.

But let me explore your other line of thinking and be charitable where possible. Lets say that the grain of sand is actually bound by 'nothing'. You then note that this binding plus the original whole creates a secondary whole. This doesn't quite work in your variable setup, as W1 and W2 are clearly different concepts here. While a whole indicates 'totality', these are obviously different totalities. So how do I see fixing this?

Perhaps what would make more sense is that some 'thing' is bounded and has limitations where there is 'nothing'. 'Nothing' may bind 'something', but 'nothing' has no limits. Is that more along the line of what you were thinking of?

And to measure morality, or existence, we need to follow the same pattern of manageability.

In that case, I think your original counter to my paper analogy is invalid: using ‘pieces’ as opposed ‘molecules’ of paper is more manageable, and thusly my conclusion still holds. — Bob Ross

It is manageability combined with relevant accuracy. I noted a while back that when we use a staging level as a base, what is reasonably relevant is one step up, or one step down. Paper is just a combination of molecules one step down (unless there's another name for a 'particle' of paper). In this particular context, we are also dividing a piece of paper, which makes its composition very relevant.

As noted, we are not creating 'two pieces of paper' we are 'splitting a conglomeration of paper molecules apart'. We can't let the fact that we can casually call it, "Two pieces of paper" override the fact that its really splitting one piece of paper into two smaller pieces of paper. Not including the fact that these are smaller mass is leaving out a huge component of the equation.

I think you should use an example that uses ‘atoms’ as a selected, base expression entity; and demonstrate how, from there, one ends up with the particular conclusion you are looking for. This sidesteps any epistemic concerns about ‘material entities’ and demonstrates exactly what you are doing when determining these general patterns. — Bob Ross

I appreciate the feedback, and on thinking about it, I agree. I do think fundamental entities are an important part of the overall theory for certain invented scenarios, but I don't want that to detract from the overall point of measuring expressions. It is a complete change in thinking as it is about morality, so the less confusion at the start the better!

I think you need to clarify the terminology first. By my lights, you were using ‘fundamental’ in the sense of ‘material’ this whole time and not a contextual base: it may be worth it to semantically call them different things, or slap a different adjective on one of them, to avoid ambiguity. — Bob Ross

Yes, this is true. I probably should stop calling them something special and just 'identities'. Why I feel like their needs to be an adjective there is to separate it from a purely subjective identity. 'Identity' in this case is when the combination can potentially express itself in a manner that the combination could not have expressed alone. I suppose I'm trying to find a way of expressing a difference between a new chemical bond and a mixture (as per chemistry). They are both identities, but a mixture generally keeps the same underlying expression of its components with mass being the main difference. When I'm thinking of a 'foundational' identity, I'm thinking of a chemical change. H20 becoming water vs hydrogen and oxygen mushed together as gasses somewhere.

I would also suggest explaining what, ideally, the contextual base should be for one who is abiding by this ethical theory; so far it is not clear what that is. — Bob Ross

That is at the context of human morality. The context of calculation will be determined by the context of the people involved. We'll get there, but lets satisfy where we're at first.

Hmmm...I would like to explore this more; because I am not seeing it. I am assuming by ‘fundamental identities’ you are no longer referring to ‘material identities’.

Firstly, ‘results in more existence’ is, again, ambiguous. According to your view, it is equally true that existence cannot be created or destroyed which prima facie contradicts your claim here. — Bob Ross

Correct, I am really referring to identities. And for the initial pass at the theory, new chemical identities. Mixtures generally don't have an overall change in potential expression.

Secondly, depending on what you mean by ‘more existence’, I can get on board with materially bumping < expressions; but it entirely depends on what you mean specifically as opposed to notionally. — Bob Ross

This would be an interaction that does not result in a chemical bond.

Thirdly, it seems like a false dilemma to compare “one big thing” (exclusively) against the ability to recombine: it seems perfectly plausible (to me) that a thing is comprised of smaller things, and that larger, united thing contains, thusly, smaller things that can recombine. I don’t see why I need to choose one or the other. — Bob Ross

Let me clarify what I meant by this, as I referenced this incredibly briefly way back that you would not remember. Real quick, it is fun when sharing a philosophy with another person for the first time to see what they consider important and relevant, vs what you think they'll consider important and relevant. When I first wrote the knowledge paper, it was an over 200 page monster that covered all sorts of small scenarios that I found people just never thought of or didn't care about. :) I find the same situation here.

Recall that potential existence is the possibility of an identities expression. While atoms may combine with molecules, they also have the potential of unbonding and becoming just atoms again. That is overall more existence then if such bonds were permanent. So atoms can combine, uncombine, recombine, etc. They are not permanently locked in thus losing potential existence.

Ok, so I don’t think 6 demonstrates that life > non-life; and 7 (here) doesn’t entail intelligent life > unintelligent life. Perhaps this is what you are going for; not sure. — Bob Ross

In the most simple terms, imagine baking soda and vinegar. When combined, we have a very excitable chemical reaction. But eventually the vinegar and baking soda all combine and the reaction is finished. Its a short burst of identities forming over time, then a cessation of combinations. A life is baking soda and vinegar that seeks to renew itself indefinitely. Even if a life will perish, it simply creates a new one to take its place. Chemical reactions will always run out, thus there is a shelf life on its existence over time. Life, if given the chance, will never end. Thus this is a higher concentration of reactions and identities localized over indefinite time.

Life vs intelligent life is another step up because life at its simplest is still very reactionary. Intelligence allows life to be more proactive then reactive. Intelligence allows the creation of self-awareness, and a comprehension of the universe. It is existence which can recognize that it is existence. It can envision and plan for complex constructions, ideas, and impacts within the universe beyond what an unintelligent life can do. Not only is this ability to plan a unique existence of its own, the enactment of the plans of intelligent life is something which cannot happen in any other way. Thus the potential existence of intelligent life is incredible.

Using pieces of paper with the calculation has nothing to do with whether or not a human being is the one that tears the paper. — Bob Ross

Ok, I'm glad you understand that.

E.g., I could ask “is it, all else being equal, better to have two or one pieces of paper” and, within this context, you could choose a plethora of different types of entities as the ‘base entity’ (e.g., atoms, molecules, paper, etc.); so I am not entirely sure what you are going for here. — Bob Ross

You just need clarification. "Is it better to have two pieces of paper of equal mass or 1" is different from, "is it better to divide a mass of paper into two smaller pieces".

You did it again: chose to use molecules instead of the paper. Just like you can say cutting paper is molecular separation, I can say it is really atomic separation. This gets us nowhere. — Bob Ross

I am hoping you'll understand the point that dividing a paper's mass is not the same as creating two pieces of paper of equal mass.