I have subjective empathy and that causes me to give a person 5$ who needs it. I don't have subjective empathy but I have objective knowledge that a person needs 5$ so I give it to them. The action of giving 5$ is correct because it actively helps them. — Philosophim

Right, the act of helping them is correct, the act of harming them not correct. There you have objective morality in a nutshell.

Morality is not a feeling. That's just someone being directed by their own emotions. — Philosophim

When I spoke of a "moral sense" I did not have in mind any mere feeling. Sure, you could do what you think is the right thing, helping someone, without actually feeling any empathy. In that case what would you be motivated by? Is that motivation to do help, even absent any empathy, not a moral sense, a sense of what is right and wrong?

Also, I spoke of not causing others to suffer, actively helping others is a more complex issue.

A huge question, but it boils down to whether there's anything at all that can properly be called "objective." In the conversation about mental/physical, supervenience, the nature of consciousness, etc., I think it's generally assumed that an objective account of all this is possible. If it isn't, then a great deal else that we consider objective knowledge would also have to be given up. This might be the case, to be sure, but to consider it would immediately open a different conversation. For myself, I do think we can talk about subjectivity from a subjective point of view, and still discover truths about it that are general and open to reasonable investigation -- which is all the objectivity we're likely to get. — J

I count as objective that which is actually encountered or experienced. Say I feel sadness, then I would count the sadness as an objective fact or an objective feeling. You say it is generally assumed that an objective account of say the nature of consciousness is possible. I'd say that all accounts are objective in the sense that they are actual accounts, but it would seem that in the sense you probably mean an objective account of consciousness would be possible only insofar as it is encounterable as an object. Are so-called "quales" able to be encountered, experienced, or are they after the fact ideas of the subjective qualities of what we experience?

Some people say things like 'consciousness cannot be an object, it is like the eye that sees, nut cannot in the act of seeing see itself'. Of course, the cheeky response to that is 'go look in a mirror'. What parts of objective knowledge do you think would have to be given up if it were decided that an objective account of consciousness is impossible?

One finds what is there that is not among the many, not "a" being. — Astrophel

Seems to me that is just a general idea of existence. When it comes to what we encounter that we are able to talk about, it is only particulars.

There is a sense in which, as Markus Gabriel says the world does not exist. This is because 'world' signifies the totality, and this totality is never encountered—it is just an idea.

I'm not sure Spinoza had the last word on this, but yes, supervenience involves different levels of description. Where it gets tricky is to give an account of why a subjective description has the characteristics it does. — J

Would an account of why a subjective description has the characteristics it does not simply be another subjective description?

The difficulty is that the physical is contained within the mental, and only known or even conceivable within the mental. For "being" to mean anything at all (to have any content) if must be that which is given to thought. Hence, the Parmenidean adage "the same is for thinking as for being." — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea of the physical is contained within the mental, but it seems obvious that what the idea of the physical is the idea of is not contained within the mental.

Mental" can be understood to be just a word (and a misleading one at that) for a concept that signals that we cannot understand how experience, judgement abstraction and conceptualization, although always of physical things, are themselves physical processes. The only alternative is dualism, or the idea of a mental realm or substance which does not depend on the physical or idealism, which renders the physical as a mere idea.

What like atoms? Or something along those lines? If so, that's a bit different from substance as Locke (and others) talks about it. — Manuel

It might be atoms, or quantum fields, or something more fundamental. I was not suggesting we know what substance is, but that the idea of substance is not hard to understand.

What do we need to measure? If we are empathetic, we know when someone is suffering. The idea of an objective morality is, as much as possible, to avoid causing others to suffer. It is not so much a matter of a moral system; it is more a matter of having a moral sense.

I don't think the idea of substance is that difficult—it is simply what is fundamental, what everything is composed of-—the basic nature of things.

What you're describing is human empathy which is a subjective experience. — Philosophim

Whether someone fells empathy for others or not is an objective fact, just as whether or not someone suffers is an objective fact.

Because it doesn't hold up if we treat it as an objective principal. Suffering is a subjective principal in many cases. Take two people who are working at a job and look at them from the outside. How do we know how much suffering each has? — Philosophim

Empathetic people know when others are suffering. Suffering is an objective fact; if someone suffers they suffer regardless of whether anyone knows about it.

Some would argue that's just storytelling, making things out to be more than what they really are. — Darkneos

"What they really are" is just another story. Discursively rendered, what anything really is depends on how you are looking at it.

For Aristotle, this meant affirming the reality of the vast multiplicity experienced by the senses, while also affirming principles of unity that exist within this multiplicity. It is these principles which produce a “One” from the “Many.”iv

This is, though, a bare description not an explanation. We are left with no idea how the "one becomes the many".

I don't think it's obvious to many, most, people that this is true. As I understand it, the implication would be there is no objective reality, only a mixture of our internal and external worlds. I endorse this view as a metaphysical position, a perspective. — T Clark

What I meant is that the world, as experienced, is a cooperative reality involving the organism and the environment. I understand this world as experienced to be as objective as the world considered as it is absent any experience of it.

But this is all terminological -- I definitely concur with the need to stop trying to get mental and physical items to cause each other, under any description. — J

Spinoza already sorted this out—by understanding the physical and the mental as the same thing under different descriptions.

The world as experienced by humans is obviously "half human". Likewise, the world as experienced by animals is "half animal". This is in line with Spinoza's idea that matter or substance can be both extended and cogitative, both perceived and perceiving.

It's less inconsistent and more parsimonious, it seems to me, to conceive of "physical" and "mental" as two properties – ways of describing / modeling – substance than positing them as "two substances" (which do not share a medium by which to interact with one another). Property dualism, for example, does not have "substance dualism's" interaction problem. — 180 Proof

:up: Spinoza's model also resonates with me. It allows us to think of substance as "fundamental stuff" which can be both extended stuff and thinking stuff. The idea that thinking stuff is a contradiction only stands on the basis of thinking of matter as incompatible with thought because the latter is understood as an "immaterial" activity. This thinking reflects an entrenched Cartesian/ Newtonian prejudice.

:up: Yes contrary to the popular picture.

Judging from modern anthropological studies of existing forager societies it would seem likely that much of the violence towards both women and men would have involved members of other tribes and clans.

It seems that most social animals treat members of their own group well enough but can be savage towards rival groups.

:up:

Every morning, the sun rises, so one assumes it will rise tomorrow as well. However, despite consistent past experiences, there is no absolute guarantee this prediction will always hold true. — DasGegenmittel

Yes there is no absolute knowledge. But we do know many things beyond reasonable doubt. That the Sun will rise tomorrow is one of them because for it to fail to rise would, according to all our experience and scientific understanding, require conditions which we understand to verge on the impossible. So, this I agree mostly with

Even the rain could be an illusion, but we can still reasonably claim that it is not: — DasGegenmittel

...but...I would state it more forcefully; when I look out the window and see it raining (it is still raining here, and the creek is still in flood) I have absolutely no reason to think it is an illusion. Many, if not most things in our lives are like this. The mere logical possibility of error does not justify doubt in these kinds of cases. And even in cases where we do not, or even cannot, know the truth we have no reason to doubt there is a truth and that it is worth seeking.

Nice work! I basically agree with you. I think the two issues are, as you say, timestamping and justification. I would not want to discard truth—we know many truths. I know it is raining as a I sit at my desk writing this. I can see the creek from my window—I know it is flooded and up about two metres from its average level.

Of course, this knowledge and the truth of it applies to what for me is the present moment—the truth of the situation and the knowledge of it may be quite different in a couple days. But I can say that it is and will remain true that on 28/03/2025 at 12.42 EST at my then location it was raining.

The problem I have always seen with the Gettier examples is that there is no objective measure of just what counts as justification. Taking the fake barn example, I might have no reason to doubt when looking at the facade that I am looking at a real barn, so in the context of the everyday I might say that belief was justified. But if I didn't walk around the back then it might be said that I didn't investigate the situation adequately. Same with the cut-out sheep example.

Perhaps so. Yet rigorously identifying an out-of-tune note still depends on someone knowing how to do it. And identifying the aesthetic quality of music is learnt and requires practice. — Ludwig V

Out of tune notes can be detected by electronic devices. We all think some music is better (aesthetically) than other music, but it remains that there is no objective measure.

That's my impression as well. So I would have thought that identifying Enlightened people was a special case of identifying someone state of mind (mood) - anxiety, joy, etc. That's not like identifying the Word of God. And you need to learn how to do that from someone else who knows. It's a social/cultural tradition. — Ludwig V

So, again there is no absolute measure. We can identify someone's state off mind, but there is always the possibility of convincing fakery. Same for identifying enlightenment. Also, it's not clear exactly what the purported enlightened state consists in. Is it a permanent state of ecstasy? Or is it simply an invincible state of equanimity? Considering neuroscience and the discovered role of neurotransmitters on mood and disposition, and the reality of dopamine and serotonin depletion, are permanent states of mind even possible?

So, I would say there is no way of definitively identifying whether someone is enlightened or even what enlightenment is. That's not so different from identifying whether something really is the word of god as far as I can tell. I agree that these matters are "social/cultural traditions", but it follows that they cannot be absolute, as is usually claimed by adherents, but are culturally relative.

They cannot be taught like a mathematical calculation, which is a matter of drills and habits. But they are certainly learned and the reports of practitioners is that some people can help that process. It's a different kind of teaching for a different kind of skill. Perhaps we should not say that they are taught, but acquired through practice and that more experienced or expert practitioners can foster that process. — Ludwig V

It is true that aesthetic appreciation and creativity can be cultivated, but since there is no objective way of identifying when they are present or of knowing just what they are, their presence or absence or degree remains a matter of personal taste, so I agree with you that the claim that they can reliably be taught is implausible. If an aspirant believes that a teacher is an "expert practitioner" then that may indeed foster their process of development, but so might other means of inspiration.

I remember reading a quote from a famous poet. I can't remember who it was, but he was addressing a question from one of his students: 'How can I tell whether my poetry is any good?". The answer was, "If you need to know that then being a poet is not for you".

That's correct. Though I don't know enough to pronounce on Eastern ideas, interesting though they are. I got the impression that the idea was that a guru (who is himselt Enlightened) is able to discern whether someone else is Enlightened. I think of it as something like the idea that a trained musician is better able to detect when a note is out of tune than a member of the public. — Ludwig V

The point remains that the enlightenment of the guru must be taken on faith, whereas a note's being out of tune can be rigorously determined. Perhaps the aesthetic quality of a piece of music or performance would be a better analogy.

As I see it to be enlightened is not to know any extraordinary propositional thing about anything but rather to be in an altered state...of equanimity for example.

But then it remains questionable that those in such states know how to guide others to personal transformation. As an analogy, aesthetic judgement and creative vision cannot be taught.

What about "genocide is wrong"? Is that a hinge belief? — Hanover

Not according to the God of the Old Testament.

Regardless, change from what I said to "thou shall not stomp babies for fun." Is this just our rule, like a ball in the net counts as a goal, or is it immutable? — Hanover

That moral injunction is just an expression of a healthy human disposition. There's something wrong with you if you don't think stomping babies is wrong, and arguably almost every person recognizes this fact.

The answer is, of course, that such an authority is not much use. Do you think that applies to God? I fear it does. — Ludwig V

I do think it applies to God. According to general Abrahamic religious doctrine God can only be known via revelation, and the works of revelation are human works and thus cannot be considered infallible. Even if it is accepted that the voice of Gi9d was directly heard by the prophets, they are still just fallible humans, and their writings must be acknowledged to be infected by their own interpretations.

Ultimately the idea of God as authority must come down to considering some humans to be authorities, if not infallible, in their interpretations. We see the Catholic notion of the infallibility of the pope for example. I can't see how the same would not apply to the Eastern idea of spiritual enlightenment.

I have never found myself wishing I had never been born. For myself the interesting in life outweighs the boring, the enjoyable outweighs the distasteful and the pleasure outweighs the suffering. Of course, I've suffered through dark periods, and I have a dark side that is always there, but I find those prices acceptable.

Yes. I had in mind the possibility, for example, of someone believing that God is the final authority, but suitably cautious about thinking that they know the mind of God when it comes to what to do. — Ludwig V

That makes sense. It is not fundamentalism, The question it seems to leave me with though is: 'What use is an authority if you don't know what they want you to do?".

Morality is about what we think and feel about what we do. — frank

Intention? Sometimes we might seek to do good and unwittingly cause bad outcomes, is that what you have in mind?

There's a significant difference between faith in authority and forced obedience (imposition). — praxis

Apart from forced obedience imposition may also include brainwashing, resulting in faith in authority.

So how could Stalin effectively use enlightenment rhetoric to support totalitarian control? — praxis

It is well known that Stalin's most effective strategy was the cultivation of fear in the populace, and the imposition of punishment on transgressors.

Yes. Perhaps more cautiously, it is the confidence that one knows what the absolute authority is telling us that is the danger. — Ludwig V

Would you not say that one must first have faith that the authority is absolute before one could presume to serve it?

No specific "atheistic ideology" was mentioned in your initial claim that atheistic ideologies are equally as dangerous as religious ideologies so I mentioned a few. — praxis

I did say this

Those who feel certain there is no God and those who feel certain there is a God and that they know the will of that God and who believe they are justified in force-feeding their beliefs to others are equally ideologues, and thus equally dangerous. — Janus

which I think clearly shows that what I had in mind were dogmatic ideologies, whether atheistic or theistic. It is the belief in absolute authority whether human or divine and the imposition of dogma on others which is the problem.

Another way to say this is that the “will” used as a noun does not exist until we are willing something. We are not free first - we free ourselves afterwards with our consent or our denial of the pre-determined circumstances always already in front of us.

Or if not, maybe there simply is no freedom. Which seems impossible, just as freedom is impossible to explain. — Fire Ologist

You seem to be saying that freedom only obtains conceptually after the fact. The way I see it the only freedom is freedom from oppression, repression, depression and any other forms of constraint you can think of.

I think Schopenhauer got it right when he said, "A man can do what he wants, but not want what he wants," We are free to act according to our natures, our dispositions and desires, but we do not create our natures, our dispositions and desires.

So, I think it is clear that freedom in the sense of "freedom from" is real, but freedom in the libertarian sense is impossible to explain; on analysis the very idea seems incoherent.

As usual Janus posts are filled with scorn, anger and hatred towards others, — Corvus

I don't hate anyone on these forums. I just call out poor quality, and especially 'Dunning Krueger' type postings when I see them. Mww seems to know Kant better than anyone else on these forums, and it just seemed ridiculous that an obvious neophyte like Corvus would presume to know Kant better.

I never mentioned

humanism, secularism, rationalism, and existentialism — praxis

it's not that they are "tame" but that they are philosophical perspectives, not dogmatic ideologies.

So far, I have no reason to believe that you have actually read the Critique of Pure Reason. — Paine

Judging from the quality of his responses I doubt he has read it, or if he has read it, I doubt he has understood it. As usual more posturing than substance coming from Corvus.

Hitler used religious rhetoric so how can that be counted as atheistic?

Marxism is an economic and political ideology, and socialism isn’t incompatible with religious belief.

Funny you reject the actual atheistic ideologies as ideologies and pretend that Nazism and Marxism are necessarily atheistic. — praxis

Marxism is explicitly atheistic, even anti-theistic. Hitler's may have used quasi-religios rhetoric, but nazism is not explicitly or specifically theistic.

I don't "reject the actual atheistic ideologies as ideologies "—I have no idea what led you to think that—I don't know what it even means. My only point was that ideologies whether religious or not, being based on some dogma or other, are one of the main problems which plague humanity.

I remain unconvinced….
— Janus

My fault for not putting up a convincing argument; nevertheless…. — Mww

Or it may be that an argument strong enough to convince you may not work on me—or vice versa.

I don't count those as ideologies, they are just possible philosophical perspectives. Communism and Nazism—totalitarianisms of any colour—those I would count as ideologies.

There are few folk as dangerous as those who are certain there is no God. How many of those folks turned up on your survey of people who know the will of God?
— Fire Ologist
There are plenty of other, similar motivations for conducting horrors - nationalism/patriotism, for example. I'm aware that some religious people think that atheists are more likely to conduct horrors than religious people. But I don't know of empirical evidence that that's the case. — Ludwig V

Faith in God or some atheistic ideology—both equally dangerous. Those who feel certain there is no God and those who feel certain there is a God and that they know the will of that God and who believe they are justified in force-feeding their beliefs to others are equally ideologues, and thus equally dangerous.

Tesla est déclassé!

Fair enough...I remain unconvinced, but I acknowledge that a fact of the matter regarding the question cannot be established, so...it's going to come down to personal opinion or taste.

That seems to be a different issue. Not all, or even most, workers are gig workers. Also, if workers are paid, and not taxed below a very high threshold, then they are not serfs. Of course, I don't believe for a moment that Trump will do what he says.

Right, but not workable in today's world.