Are the examples I just provided to this very effect rationally or empirically in any way contradictory to - or else do they in any way not cohere to - reality as we all know it? — javra

I don't know, I don't know what examples you are referring to or what "reality as we all know it" refers to.

For one thing, a metaphysical worldview is a strictly conscious construct which is itself pivoted upon - and hence not equivalent to - some core conviction (or core set of convictions to be more precise) regarding the causal, spatial, temporal, etc. nature of the world, the later often enough not being consciously analyzable in fully explicit manners the way that the metaphysical worldview is. — javra

I don't deny that people may have unconscious or implicit metaphysical worldviews, whereas you seem to be doing so. What we variously might think "the causal, spatial, temporal, etc. nature of the world" (if we all have such a view, which is what I disagreed with and thought to be an egregious generalization) is
in my book nothing other than a metaphysical view. It seems we have different ideas about what constitutes a metaphysical view, so it looks like we are bound to disagree. I don't disagree that people generally have some basic orientation or other to the world, but I don't see those orientations as "core commitments" for those who haven't thought about it much.

comes down to an opinion that you can provide no meaningful justification for, outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”. — javra

Can you provide for your contention that people cling to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information"some "meaningful justification" for "outside of “it doesn’t sit well with my own intuitions”"?

Read more carefully what I actually wrote and you might find I never once mentioned that we cling to “metaphysical worldviews” but to “some core conviction regarding the nature of the world — javra

Can you explain the difference?

These are good questions and for me highlight esoteric ideas' reliance on faith (since you could hardly expect, even just based on definition, esoteric ideas to constitute demonstrable propositions). I think it has to be acknowledged that esoteric ideas just as religious faith and adherence to metaphysical views can change one's worldview and consequently experience.

As you've expressed in a post elsewhere last time we chatted, you don't care what I think. All the same:

1) I am speaking for myself: it's my established worldview. (Right up there with you not being a p-zombie.)

2) On what rational or empirical grounds do you affirm that what I previous expressed is "an egregious generalization"? (Hint: that "I don't like it" is not such a justification.) — javra

I don't care what anyone thinks meaning that what I think is most important to me. If you say all people have metaphysical worldviews and cling to them in the grip of confirmation bias I say you are not speaking for yourself but for all people and what you are according to your own argument clinging to is not a metaphysical worldview but a general psychological assessment of human nature.

I think that assessment is an egregious generalization based on my own experience of people. Maybe we simply move and mix in different circles. No empirical or logical grounds can be adduced to support or deny the contention. It comes down to how you see people and whether in this particular connection you see uniformity or diversity.

Does that seem rational? Or is it just more rational than accepting the possibility that we are most likely Boltzmann brains? — Michael

I had already seen the argument and commented on it previously. I like to keep it simple. The Heat Death may be the most favored current scenario, and it may be more rigorously supported than the idea of random particles forming Boltzmann Brains. So I don't think the two necessarily go hand in hand.

If we were Boltzmann brains all bets would be off and none of our theories would have any support. I see that as a simple refutation of the idea. If you don't agree that's fine then we are not going to agree is all. Does it even matter whether we are Boltzmann brains or not? Would it change anything about how you live your life?

Don't bother, your memory of it will be an illusion anyway.

That's just something programmed into my false memories. — Patterner

How do you know that, or even how to understand what I am asking you, if all your memories are false?

Memories are stored, are they not? In the brain, in some physical manner. — Patterner

No, that is a false memory of some knowledge you imagined you had.

Not we. It's just me. The rest of you are false memories. — Patterner

There are many memories of me, whether false or not, and you don't have hardly any of them.

If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if our scientific models are correct, then we are most likely Boltzmann brains.

If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if we are not most likely Boltzmann brains, then our scientific models are incorrect. — Michael

Both these sentences above are mere tautologies.

If we are most likely BBs then our scientific theories are most likely incorrect, which means that their entailing that we are BBs is most likely incorrect, the point being that we cannot coherently use scientific theories to draw the conclusion that we are most likely BBs. As far as I can tell, and in the absence of any cogent counterargument to this, that is the end of the story.

We all consciously or unconsciously cling to some form of what Mircea Eliade termed an axis mundi when more abstractly appraised—some core conviction regarding the nature of the world via which we assimilate all novel information, without which we would loose our bearings, around which all of what we interpret to be the world pivots, and which, because of all this, we either implicitly or explicitly consider to be sacred (at the very least in relation to ourselves). — javra

I think this is an egregious generalization—all I can think of to say in response is "speak for yourself".

My belief that it is a worthwhile issue. It is pretty common sense: if several smart(er than me) people work on something, is it not rational to conclude that there is something to it? — Lionino

Certainly, in relation to science or mathematics or any subject where much information has to be incorporated into a coherent understanding of the field. Not so much in relation to philosophy, which is potentially a pursuit for everyone, and the questions are naturally accessible to any intelligent and thoughtful person.

Is a question without a decidable or even satisfying answer worth pursuing? Perhaps is would be better, once one has become aware of and thought about such questions and their possible answers enough to realize they cannot be definitively answered, to move past them.

And do we not come to understand the world through reason? — Lionino

I'd say we come to understand the world via the background presuppositions that underpin human life and reason itself and that understanding may be elaborated and augmented by reason. In any case is not the world presupposed in any attempt to come to understand it?

Is it more rational to believe that an infinite multiverse in which every metaphysical possibility is realized is less probable? — Michael

What determines what is metaphysically possible? Is it merely what is logically possible? Are they the same? is any possible universe governed by logic?

It wasn't quite an argument. You asked me why I think something is worthwhile, I gave one of my reasons why — rather, I agreed that what you said is indeed one of my reasons. — Lionino

You gave it as a justification for your belief.

That is a possible argument against solipsism, that all the body of knowledge produced so far is generated/contained by/in my mind, and yet we struggled with Abstract Algebra 2.
But that is not what the person said, I didn't even understand what he said as it is not clearly written, so that is why I said it is unsuccessful; but there is nothing extraordinary about coming up with symbols for concepts, people make up conlangs all the time. — Lionino

I don't know who you are referring to nor do I understand what you are trying to say in your second sentence.

Questioning is a process that involves reason. Does it presuppose the outside world when we use reason? I don't think so. — Lionino

Reason is nothing without its basic presuppositions, which are not themselves arrived at, or justified by, reason.

If our scientific models entail that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, and if our scientific models are correct, then we are most likely Boltzmann brains. This is a straightforward modus ponens. — Michael

I get that, but if we are BBs then our scientific theories are incorrect; this is straightforward paradox, it has something in common with the "Liar' sentence.

If our scientific theories are correct, we are most likely to be Boltzmann brains.
If we are Boltzmann brains our scientific theories are incorrect.

Do you not see the problem?

You're just doubling down and are still ignoring the fact that if we are BBs our scientific models are incorrect; illusory because based on illusory memories.

A metaphysical position is closely related to a scientific paradigm. To empirically confirm a paradigm is just to tighten up the definitions and boundaries that were formed prior to confirmation . Such validating procedures allow us to identity what it is we are overthrowing when we eventually dump that paradigm in favor of another. But the movement from one paradigm to another is not driven by confirmation. It is driven by a wholesale qualitative reconceptualization of premises, the fabricating of a new world. This does not have to do with what is ‘true’ but with how the world can be organized to make sense in a qualitatively different way. Truth is then a secondary procedure within the newly created frame. — Joshs

I think you are confusing yourself by thinking in terms of paradigms...that's not how science works. In any case I think that way of thinking about it is wrong-headed so there is little point presenting arguments to me in those kinds of terms.

Therefore, either our scientific models are correct and we are most likely Boltzmann brains or we are not most likely Boltzmann brains and our scientific models are incorrect. — Michael

No, you have it backwards, if we are BBs our scientific models are necessarily incorrect (assuming that it would even be possible for BBs to have scientific models, which is extremely questionable), as I already explained.

Then I'll make it clear: I'm not saying that therefore all science is completely wrong and that all the facts may be utterly different than what we believe them to be. — Michael

If we are Boltzmann brains—random quantum fluctuations will false memories—then it stands to reason that all our science is completely wrong because based on false memory. But since it is our science that (purportedly) tells us that we are Boltzman brains and that hence all our science is wrong, why would it be rational to believe such a self-eliminating conclusion? It is precisely this problem that you have so far completely failed to address.

Also, Caroll in your post above seems to be saying that it is only in the unimaginably far future that BBs will arise in any case, so, given that, why is it likely that we are BBs now?

I'm not assuming it. It's what physicists like Boltzmann, Eddington, Feynman, Sean Carroll, Brian Greene, and others say. I'm deferring to their expertise. — Michael

So, an argument from authority then? Even worse, it seems that they are not really saying what you seem to want them to be saying.

I'm closer to saying that there is no metaphysical speculation; it is rather metaphysical imagination. We speculate only about that which might later be confirmed or disconfirmed. Much of metaphysics consists in playing dialectically with language—what if such and such (such and such that is the dialectical opposite of what we actually encounter) is really the case.

For example, we appear to be mortal...but...what if we are really immortal? We appear to be finite intelligences...but... what if there is an infinite intelligence...and further what if that is our real nature? We appear to encounter only the physical...but...what if what appears physical is really mental? And so on.

The problem is we have no idea what the physical really being mental could mean. We have no idea what a disembodied, immortal life could be. We have no idea what an infinite intelligence could be. All these ideas only gain the illusion of having any sense at all insofar as they are dialectical opposites of what does make sense to us. So, it really is all just a case of "pouring from the empty into the void". It may have some poetical value, but philosophical value, not so much.

The problem of induction is that there is no reason to be sure that the future will be like the past, or simply that we can't derive a "will be" from a "has been". We agree on that? — Lionino

Yes, as I said, inductive inferences, unlike valid deductive inferences, are not logically necessary.

If we do, according to your proposal that "something should be thought to be less likely if it is less plausible in light of our experience", the problem of induction dissolves. — Lionino

I don't think so. All we have to go on in order to decide what is more or less likely to happen is prior experience, Is the Sun more or less likely to rise tomorrow? It's really not a question of deductive certainty at all.

I understand what you say about consistency with our past experiences, but in this one case I don't think it applies, since we are questioning the background of our experiences. — Lionino

Questioning the background of our experiences is incoherent, since it presupposes the background of our experiences in the very act of questioning.

For the most part, yes, people who are just as smart as or smarter than me are still arguing about it. And for them it is profession, not hobby. So it leads me to conclude it is not something that we can brush aside easily. — Lionino

For me, that is an argument from authority, which I don't accept, so we are going to disagree on this.

Another, the argument from language is bad, — Lionino

Actually, I think the argument from language(s) makes solipsism most highly implausible. Did you invent the English language and write all the poetry and literature that exists without even being aware of doing it, using many words you don't even know the meaning of.

Did you invent all of mathematics and science, which use countless concepts and theorems you don't even understand, without being aware of having done so? What about all the other languages?

I didn't see what the memory question was. — Lionino

The question wasn't addressed to you, but it was this: apparently the theory of Boltzmann brains entails that our memories are illusory, cannot be trusted; if this is so how could we trust our scientific theories, or even trust that we remember them correctly, or that they were ever really formulated? The other question was as to how distant do your memories have to be to be illusory: a year, a month, a day, an hour, a minute, a second?

That works in practical everyday life. But if we are to go by that, we would simply do away with the problem of induction, for one; we would do away with so many things that are still considered worthwhile in philosophy. Experience is not the goal to end all goals. — Lionino

There is no "problem of induction"; Hume merely showed that induction is not deduction, that inductive inferences are no necessary. All we have to go on is experience, on what other criteria could we ever justifiably decide to place our faith? You might say logic or mathematics, but they don't tell us anything definite about things, except insofar as their pronouncements and predictions are found to obtain.

What are the "so many worthwhile things" you see in philosophy and why do think they are worthwhile? Is it just because they are still around, because some people are still arguing about them?

All the ones I rebutted to and that at the end of the discussion I did not acquiesce to the person's point. — Lionino

You mean all the ones you, in your opinion, successfully rebutted? That isn't helpful at all and you should be able to cite at least one or two of those arguments and explain why you think they didn't stand up to your purported rebuttals. I suspect you think you rebutted them simply because they did not achieve 100% certainty.

Agreed, we cannot be 100% sure of most things, or perhaps any. Though to rule something as less likely we need some successful arguments against it, I am pointing out that many of the arguments raised in this thread are not successful as they seem. — Lionino

The way I see it is that something should be thought to be less likely if it is less plausible in light of our experience, less consistent with that experience, and to my way of thinking solipsism seem way less likely, in fact improbable in the extreme, in light of that experience.

Which arguments in this thread do you see failing and on what basis do you assess them as failures?.

That just begs the question by assuming that our scientific theories show that we are most likely Boltzmann brains, it doesn't explain how a random fluctuation like a Boltzman brain could come up with consistent and coherent scientific theories that show that it is most likely a Boltzmann brain, nor does it answer the questions I posed about memory.

Sure, if you want to add math to the equation, after all what is metaphysics but mental gymnastics — kindred

Gymnastics, like math, is constrained, disciplined, and logical inconsistencies may have poetic value, and that's the way I see metaphysics: as poetry which introduces only novel thoughts in the way of flights of the imagination and multiplies no entities, since the latter belong only to the empirical.

only good critical thinking need be applied to various metaphysical postulations insuring against logical inconsistencies. — kindred

And the multiplication of entities?

Hence, the top tier of Maslow's hierarchy, self-actualization of personal potential, is inherently a meta-physical "fiction" that we tell ourselves to provide non-physical motivation. That "need" is self-understanding ; including the relationship of the Self to the non-self world. Not just to experience the world, but to "understand the experience". — Gnomon

Or is it merely a shift in consciousness, in feeling, away from the neurotic need to understand, that leads to the deluded belief in the possibility of understanding, the relationship of the self to the non-self world in any way beyond, or more perfect than, the ordinary everyday?

I’d go as far as to say, beyond merely taken for granted, fundamental understandings are not even within Everydayman’s conscious considerations; that is to say, he hasn’t slowed himself down enough to figure out that he has them, and to know what they are.

And while it may be true you make that case for yourself alone, given that all humans are intellectually and morally equipped in exactly the same manner, it follows any other of congruent rationality may come to the same conclusion. I mean…look….you convinced me, so…that ya go. — Mww

Yes, I think that's true of "Everydayman". I also agree that all humans are intellectually and morally equipped in the same manner, but I find myself unsure of the degree. Degrees—agrees, disagrees—should I be aggrieved?

Drop the requirement of proof and take it as a "hinge" proposition, not to be subject to doubt. — Banno

:up: Yes, I think I do, but some are not satisfied with being unable to attain the unattainable.

I am. — creativesoul

I also feel absolutely certain that solipsism is not the case, but since it cannot be proven to not be the case, I cannot be absolutely certain.

↪Michael I wonder what more Janus wants? What more could he want? — Banno

That's all I want, and since it seems incoherent to want something unimaginable, you might also say it's all I could want.

They tell us how to make sense of how things appear to us. Whether or not we are ordinary humans or Boltzmann brains is the very question being considered. — Michael

If Boltzmann brains are random fluctuations, it begs the question as to how anything like that could make sense of anything, and thus how they could (in concert?) construct the whole edifice we know as science.

Also, if, as Boltzmann brains our remembered past histories are illusions, whence the shared memories that humans routinely experience? Can you make sense of that? How far back into the memories of the past before we, as Boltzmann brains, encounter illusion? Years, months, day, hours, a few seconds. The whole idea seems, however it might be supported by (the mathematics of?) some theories, absurd. Are not all theories interpretations? Are our memories of what we have learned of science and mathematics also illusions? If so, then how can we justifiably use them to support any conclusions at all?

It is a fact that our current scientific theories entail that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary humans. — Michael

No, it is a fact that some interpretations of our current scientific theories entail that we are more likely to be Boltzmann brains than ordinary humans. It pays to remember that scientific theories, and science generally, only tell us how to make sense of how things appear to be to ordinary humans.

That still does not defeat solipsism, what I said before to Banno applies to language too:
In the case that I think there is no world, it follows that I believe that everything around me is merely a projection of my mind (or simply is my mind). If I also believe that I am here discussing for a purpose, it could very well be that I believe that I am interacting with the very contents of my mind — Lionino

Solipsism cannot be defeated with certainty, but it is defeated by plausibility. You say, "in the case that I think there is no world", but no one or almost no one thinks that due to its implausibility. The issue of solipsism only gets raised because we cannot be, as with many other things, absolutely certain it is not the case.

Yes, I would say that discussion performatively, if not logically, presupposes the existence of a mutually experienced world external to the body. We all believe in such a world, so why give any air to faux-doubt about it?

"intended for or likely to be understood by only a small number of people with a specialized knowledge or interest." — Pantagruel

The usage of 'esoteric' relevant to this thread is in connection to religious or spiritual teachings and metaphysical claims, not to disciplines like quantum mechanics and relativity; the latter are disciplines that yeild predictions whose obtaining or failure to obtain are observable.

You seem to be, whether willfully or not, muddying the waters.

Again, I don't see where you are qualified to make that judgement for anyone but yourself. You claim to be capable of acting in the absence of a deep commitment, fine, I accept that. I think that most people care, and that care about what they do is indicative of values, in other words, beliefs. Propositional knowledge is just "facts." The most important decisions in life are value-laden. Some of the most stirring events in human history involve people acting in a counter-factual way, symbolically, based on belief. Bottom line, you can't turn ethics into propositional knowledge. You can express it propositionally, but you can't found or reduce it on propositions. — Pantagruel

I don't see evidence of "deep commitments" commonly at large in the human society I inhabit. I don't deny that most people care about things—notably mostly themselves, their families, close friends and their property and possessions.

In any case I haven't been arguing against values and beliefs, but against the idea that those constitute propositional, decidable knowledge, so I agree with you that ethics cannot be turned into propositional knowledge.

That said, I see ethics and morals as pragmatic matters—if people wish to live harmoniously with others, then they are best served to have a sense of honesty, justice and fairness. On the other hand, many people, according to my experience, will do unethical things if they believe they can get away with it undetected; I see evidence of that all the time.

I don't see any evidence that those extreme forms of esotericism are what is in question here. — Pantagruel

So, what do you think counts as esoteric knowledge then? Or can you give an example of what you would count as an esoteric tradition?

Difficult physics and math subjects are not esoteric in my book, they are just difficult.

That the discussion in this thread pressuposes a belief in a real world outside our minds, my comment is a rebuttal exactly to that claim. — Lionino

I would say that it might not logically presuppose the existence of a world, but that it does pragmatically presuppose it. No one really believes they are the only person or that there is no external (to the body) world; and anyone who consistently behaved as though they believed those things would likely be scheduled and put on medication for the protection of themselves and others..

I don't recall where esoteric knowledge became infallibly divine revelation in this discussion. That's a straw man by me, and not reflective of how I view intuitive knowledge. — Pantagruel

Esoteric knowledge is usually claimed to be knowledge by revelation or enlightenment, and hence.
by implication, to be infallible. The very concept of gnosis, direct knowing, exemplifies this character.

Of course people can deceive others, and even themselves, about what it is they truly believe. I haven't claimed there is not more to belief, in the psychological sense, than propositonality.

I don't believe that many people actually have "deep personal commitments", but even if they do, they are just that, personal, subjective, and they are beliefs, and hence don't count as knowledge in the intersubjective sense.

I don't deny that people make decisions based on intuitions: I do myself all the time. But firstly, I don't believe any intuitive (or propositional for that matter) knowledge is infallible, or context-independent, and secondly such "knowledge" is by its very nature personal, subjective.

Those two conditions are what the "afficionados" do not wish to acknowledge in relation to so-called "higher" knowledge, if not in relation to personal intuitions.

I don't see any evidence anywhere that this is the case. I accept your avowal that this is true of yourself, but what evidence do you have that people betray their own fundamental understandings as a matter of course? — Pantagruel

Fundamental understandings are just what is taken for granted given the empirical nature of our lives and the necessity of the notion of causation in order to make any sense at all of our experiences (even animals show this basic disposition), so I am not referring to those, but to religious and metaphysical worldviews.

I don't see many Christians living up to Christ's ethical teachings. We can only generalize from what we have personally experienced, and my personal experience is that I don't often see people living up to their professed views.

I acknowledge that your experience may be different in that regard and that any of us can only personally experience the tiniest fraction of humanity, but nonetheless I would remain skeptical if you were to claim that your experience has differed in that regard.

It is the knowing of things that by their nature or current status resist propositional knowledge. The fact that you reject this kind of knowledge in favour of propositional is perhaps the problem. Since that's the gist of the OP I'll just reiterate my response. — Pantagruel

If you are not merely referring to know-how or to belief and the fact that our worldviews may to some degree change the way we actually live and perceive and judge the world, can you give me an example of such non-propositional knowledge?

I don't know what "problem" you are referring to: is it perhaps the fact that I apparently disagree with you?

Just to be clear, I don't favour the propositional over know-how or knowledge by acquaintance, or the ways in which our conceptions and beliefs may condition our experience and judgement, my argument all along has merely been that there is no intersubjectively decidable knowledge apart from the empirical and logical; the rest is subjective.

Afficionados of esoterica generally don't want to admit that, though.