Heidegger had quite a bit to say about 'the forgetfulness of being' in Being and Time. He traced it back to the ancient Greek philosophers, Plato and Aristotle in particular, and found fault with the way that the Western metaphysical tradition had 'objectified' being. So - how would it be possible to 'forget being'? If we've forgotten being, what has been forgotten? — Wayfarer

For me "forgetfulness of being" is not an intellectual oversight, but a failure to live to the fullest due to being distracted by various kinds of preoccupations. Consumerism is a big one―so I see materialism in that sense as the "enemy", but I don't see materialism as a metaphysical position as detrimental at all, unless it be considered that all such intellectual preoccupations distract us from living to the fullest.

And I don't think it is the case that such intellectual pursuits (provided they don't become unhealthy preoccupations) need detract from a life lived to the fullest.

The mere struggle to survive can be an all-consuming distraction. I wonder how the ancient peasants―those lacking any intellectual education―lived. Did they live fuller lives than we do today? And how many people today are preoccupied with working out the best metaphysics? Do all, or even most, or even many, people have a propensity to be driven by intellectual concerns? Are there more such people (as a percentage of the population) today than there were three thousand, two thousand, one thousand or five hundred years ago?

What could "forgetfulness of being" even mean to those who lack an intellectual interest?

Again, I have acknowleged that there are good reasons to believe there is something non-physical about mental activity. — Relativist

I asked you before, and you gave no answer, as to what good reasons there are to think there is something non-physical about mental activity? Presuming that you have in mind something other than the obvious notion that "abstractions, concepts, generalities and logic are not physical".

I believe the issue which Wayfarer is trying to bring to our attention, is that there is a specific type of characteristic of being, which is only provided by the first person perspective, I, or myself. Since this is a real characteristic of the being which I call "myself" we need to determine whether it is a characteristic of all beings before we can make any conclusive judgement about "the general characteristics of all beings". — Metaphysician Undercover

It seems obvious that all percipients have some kind of "first person perspective", so of course beings can be classed as living and non-living, sentient and non-sentient, and even sapient and non-sapient. None of that has been forgotten or is even controversial, though.

Animals arguably live with more presence than we do―our symbolic language has enabled us to become caught up in all kinds of "mind-distractions", and that is what i would say is "forgetfulness of being". And there are all kinds of other pursuits which can become unhealthy preoccupations. That is not to say I think an intellectual pursuit, or any other kind of pursuit, necessarily leads to forgetfulness of being.

I agree there is logic used in "cognitive methods" (given that I'm understanding correctly what you mean by that), but that logic is not deductive, so I would say its results cannot be apodeictic. Rather the logic there is inductive (expectation based on observed regularities) and abductive (speculative inferences to what seem to be most plausible explanations, i.e. explanations most consistent and coherent with what has been currently accepted as knowledge).

So, I disagree with Kant that non-analytic judgements can be apodeictic. There can be no synthetic apriori certainty. I think what Kant was doing in working out the forms of intuition and the categories was phenomenology―that is he was reflecting on the nature of perception in order to establish its general characteristics. So, in that sense it's more of an observation-based inquiry. We can be certain of observationally confirmed judgements, but only within the appropriate context―the are not deductively certain and their negations are not logically self-contradictory.

That said I cannot, for example, imagine a non-spatiotemporal visual perception―visual perceptions are strictly defined in terms of spatiotemporality, so anything that doesn't comply would not be defined as such, and it can therefore be said to be, in that sense, an analytic judgement that all visual perceptions must be spatiotemporal.

I agree with you that something not being logically necessary does not entail it being logically impossible. If all the events in this world are not logically necessary, they must nonetheless be logically possible, so I also agree that there is apodeictic certainty in establishing what is logically possible―it's basically anything which is a non-contradiction. But the downside of that certainty is that it doesn't really tell us much about anything.

I am not, therefore I don't think. — Jack Cummins

I've heard it said that I think, therefore I am not.

Okay, cheers, I won't say any more since I would be speaking from relative ignorance if I did.

But "x is y" is not an explicit assertion of being as such, but an assertion about some being's characteristics. That it exists is already implicitly given. On the other hand "x is" is explicitly an assertion of existence. "It is true that x" is not necessarily an ontological claim at all.

I agree 'being' is not the description of "what exists" it is a noun referring to an existent or a verb referring to the act or fact of existing.

Anyway, you acknowledge that what ontology is considered to consist in may have changed over time, but the point is that it is the contemporary understanding, or range of understandings, of what ontology is concerned with that is important.

Why look back to the ancients when they did not have the immense benefit of our prodigious scientific knowledge and understanding? Ontological enquiry should be about what it is reasonable to think about being today, not two thousand years ago.

Ontology, then, is not merely a massive catalogue of “what exists.” That is an ontic question, about beings and the nature and kinds of things that exist. — Wayfarer

Ontology is the general study of being, of what it means to be or to exist. Once the general characteristics shared by all beings are decided then what can be counted as a being can be
established.

With your etymological prescriptions you make it sound like it is a monolithic study in the sense that there could be only one way to think about it. However, you have an eccentric understanding of 'being' such that for you it applies only to living beings, whereas the most common meaning of 'to be' is simply 'to exist', and the most common meaning of 'to exist' is not 'to stand out for some percipient' but simply 'to be'.

And, contrary to what you claim, part of ontology does consist in deciding what all beings or existents have in common, and thus what kinds of things, and what particular things, can be said to exist. Yours is a tendentious and dogmatic, as opposed to an openminded, approach, unsurprisingly.

I've read that entanglement enables faster than light information―and I've wondered whether that is just hype, given that it seems that all that's being said is that knowing the spin of one particle we are close enough to observe will tell us what the spin of the entangled particle is no matter how far away it may be. So, it seems we would not be deriving the information from the far away particles but from the proximate one.

Connection is in essence uninteresting. It results in the hot and maximally featureless vacuum. But mix in disconnection as a contrast and now you can have a world made of definite things. The world that we really want to know in terms of how it got here. How it could have evolved and have such a robust classical structure. — apokrisis

Seems an interesting counterpoint to the usual predictable spiritualistic story where it is disconnection that is considered to be merely an illusion, where the classical picture is entirely a construction of the mind and where the promise is one of salvation or liberation from suffering brought about by the delusion of separation.

It's obvious that you have a different view of things than I do, but that does not constitute either an explanation or a justification for your views.

I haven't said that what people are conscious of is what consciousness is―I've asked you what the difference is between consciousness and being conscious. To give some analogies sleeplessness just is being sleepless, restlessness just is being restless and sexlessness just is being sexless. Or, closer to home, unconsciousness just is being unconscious.

You also say that you don't think being conscious means being aware, and yet you offer no explanation of what you think the difference is.

I don't understand why you talk about subjective experience of various functions of our brain, when I think it is obvious that we have no in vivo awareness of brain functions. Perhaps you meant to say that our subjective experience is a manifestation of certain brain functions.

I disagree with pretty much everything you said. I'm speaking from an entirely different angle. And I know nobody agrees with me, but I still think what I think. — Patterner

Okay, it's too bad that I can see no reason at all why you would think such things―are you just being contrarian or perverse?

At the same time, an objective answer to the question, for example: "Why do you live?" Does not exist. — Astorre

Why not? If you do have a reason to live, then surely having that reason is a fact about you? Your reason may of course also be said to be subjective, in that it will not necessarily apply to everyone.

There are logical facts, and facts determined by observation, and even facts which may not be determinable by us at all, such as whether a god or gods exist, or the facts about the actual genesis of the Universe (about which we can only theorize). There are also, presumably, countless facts of history which can never be determined, even in principle.

Of course indeterminable facts as such cannot be of much use to us, but noting that there are such facts may be useful in establishing plausible worldviews.

objectivity is simply empty and indifferent
— Astorre
This only a subjective statement ...

"Objectivity" as such is essentially a subjective idea ... it does not "lie" somewhere in nature.
— Astorre
Genetic fallacy.

It was invented by people.
... just like all logico-mathematical and empirical knowledge. — 180 Proof

:up: :up: :up:

Thanks there's a lot there, but I'll just address this at the moment:

When two particles are entangled, no one can really say which one is which. But when the particles are further constrained by the decoherence that is some further act of measurement, then each is fixed by that new context, that new point of view. — apokrisis

My question about entanglement (which I have only a superficial understanding of) was whether it might be plausible to conjecture that all particles in the Universe are already entangled. If that were so, then everything might be connected much more so than seems likely based on our macro-observations and their understandings.

Perhaps an example might help. It is not logically impossible that Mt Everest might detach form the Earth and float up into the sky. We might say it is physically impossible, given what we understand to be the laws of nature governing this Universe. We could say it is metaphysically possible since a Universe where the laws of nature or the lack of them allowed such a thing to happen is not a logical contradiction.

Is it possible that something could both be Mt Everest and not be Mt Everest in any imaginable world. It would not seem possible, since it is logically contradictory.

In any case, the point of my question was more concerned with understanding whether you think anything which is not logically necessary (or impossible) could be apodeictically certain.

To say that something is physical is already to draw upon a lot of theoretical abstraction and conceptualisation. ‘This means that’, or ‘this is equivalent to that’ is an intellectual judgement based on abstraction rather than anything physically measurable. You might argue that were we to understand the brain well enough, we could identify the structures which underpin meaning, but even that requires the kind of abstraction that we seek to explain. I can’t see how a vicious circularity can be avoided. — Wayfarer

In my book to say something is physical is to say it is either mind-independently existent and measurable, a property or activity of something mind-independently existent and measurable or a relation between mind-independently real and measurable existents.

Thus I would consider theoretical abstraction and conceptualization to be physical insofar as they are activities of (at least) humans, who are mind-independently real and measurable existents.

So, your objection is without teeth, and what you can't see is irrelevant, for me.

Indeed you have, and I have previously acknowledged that your criticisms provide a good basis to believe there is some non-physical aspect to mind. So I haven't rejected anything you've said on the sole basis that it's contrary to physicalism, as you alleged. — Relativist

I wonder what "some non-physical aspect to mind" could even mean. Of course we can say, based on a kind of "folk" intuition, that abstractions and concepts are not physical, but then if mental activity is always correlated with neuronal activity, any abstracting or conceptualizing will be at one level (at least) a physical activity. And just what could any purported "other level" consist in?

That leaves me wondering what could be the criteria for logical impossibility other than contradiction.

And then what would be the criteria determining whether something would count as a physical or metaphysical impossibilty?

Can anything we know except those things whose negation would be a logical contradiction be apodeictic?

Right, I'm not claiming that Kant necessarily believed he knew that space and time and the categories are purely subjective (subjective in the sense of being entirely due to the constitution of subjects) but that there are those who proffer dogma using Kant as purported support for their contentions.

I think Kant can be read as claiming that we cannot apply our sense of time and space to a mind-independent reality, not that reality in itself cannot be in any way spatiotemporal. As I've said many times it seems implausible that an undifferentiated in itself could produce our experienced world of unimaginable diversity.

Also the very idea of differentiation, diversity is incomprehensible without time and space. Of course we have no cognitive access (by definition) to the in itself, but we may infer its nature in accordance with what seems most plausible given the nature of our cognitive experience.

One helpful way of using the terms might be: an objective fact is one which others can verify, whereas "I'm having thought X at the moment" is a fact, but not objective. — J

It's like "I'm reading sentence X at the moment". I don't see the words 'objective' and 'subjective' as unambiguous. If I can only determine some fact on my own can I talk about it being objective? Looking out the window behind my laptop I saw a bird just now alighting for a moment in a tree near the creek and a leaf fall into the creek simultaneously. If you had been here you might have witnessed those two events, but they were so brief that chances are you would not have. Can we talk about those events as facts regardless, just on the basis that in principle it is possible you could have witnessed them?

The ambiguity here is the reason I prefer 'intersubjective' to 'objective'. The witnessing of the alighting bird and the falling leaf could in principle be shared. An experience of God, or the thought I am having right now cannot be, even in principle.

As above, the question is, Whose observation? I'm assuming you don't think we need objective confirmation of observations about what goes on in our minds (as a rule). — J

I don't count introspection as all that reliable. That said personally I tend to think in language...I can hear a 'silent' voice speaking my thoughts. so I am fairly confident that I know what I am thinking if I pay attention in the moment of thought.

Yeah, the more I think about Hick's idea, the less I like it. I suppose what he meant was, If you had an experience after death that checked all the boxes of what mystics claim God (and the afterlife) is like, and you in fact found yourself surviving death, as promised, you'd probably be convinced! But we're guessing about how reliable afterlife experiences are . . . — J

I agree and I think this points to the importance of faith in our lives. We all take many things on faith, and it pays to see ourselves doing that, and then from a critical mindset, deciding what to provisionally accept and what reject.

Many folk seem to be uncomfortable with uncertainty...but for me understanding uncertainty and the challenge of living with it is a major part of doing philosophy. So I don't have much time for the dogmatists who want to claim things like, for example, that we know, thanks to Kant, that space and time and all the categories are purely subjective or that intellectual intuition could be a reliable guide to the way things really are.

A holomorphic function is something else. It is a function that is "holistic" in the sense that it uses a number base that is more complex than the reals. Instead of counting points, you are counting something else like rotations. — apokrisis

Thanks for the interesting and allusive (not to mention elusive) explanation. 'Holographic' was either a typo or an outcome due to predictive text. And I'm afraid I don't at all understand imaginary numbers or the importance of counting rotations rather than points, beyond a vague feel.

Did you mean to use 'holographic' rather than 'holomorphic'? I understand the holographic idea to be that every part in some sense contains the whole. Do you think that could be related to quantum entanglement?

Anyway a good bit of it is somewhat over my head, and because of my mathematical shortcomings I have remained reluctant to enter into philosophical discussions involving QM and Relativity. At least I get the point about the liveness of relativistic spacetime, where space is not a mere container, but a real contributor to cosmic events.

I am drawn to the idea that science offers a pathway out of inveterate anthropomorphism, and that there is no better guide, even no other guide, to metaphysical speculation than science.

I wish I could offer a more adequate response.

Well, you've packed a lot into that question! To begin simply: "God exists" as a proposition is surely meant to state an objective fact, and that's really all I meant. (I'll say something below about why I think it may be inseparable from how we rate the plausibility of accounts of mystical experiences.) — J

This seems to be the central issue―what is a fact, and does the qualifier "objective" add anything? Obviously there are many facts in and about our everyday experiences. Facts are usually taken to be determinable by either observation or logic.

So, what is the role of "objective fact" in relation to the question of God's existence?

Your further qualifications seem extreme. "No possibility?" John Hick points out that, at the very least, claims about God may be "eschatologically verifiable" -- that is, we may find out when we die (or, of course, we'll cease to exist). — J

Say you die and you find you still exist―how will that confirm the existence of God? Say you have an after death experience that seems to you to be an experience of God―given that interpretations of experiences are not the same as the experiences, how will you know, any more than you would in this life, that an experience that you felt was of God is really a confirmation of said entity?

Surely in order to know that an experience is an experience of some particular entity, we need to know what the entity's characteristics are. Do we know what the characteristics of the hypothetical entity God are? Say we know that God possesses certain moral characteristics―perfect goodness and perfect love, say―how would we know that the experience we thought was of God showed us that he is perfectly good and loving? It doesn't seem analogous to being able to recognizing a physical entity on account of its physical characteristics.

As a pansemiotician, it is heartening that physics has arrived at this dichotomy of information-entropy. — apokrisis

As far as I understand in biosemiotics it is the membrane which is the basic interpretant. So, I wonder what serves as interpretant in the pansemiotic conception. Hoffmeyer seems to think of the evolution of the membrane as the origin of 'minding'.

I don't have any kind of grasp of holomorphic functions (my general understanding of mathematics leaves a lot to be desired). Is there any way you can make "Information is physical in being the global holographic horizon on the Cosmos" understandable to me despite my being math-challenged?

The idea of entropy as local material fluctuations or degrees of freedom is new to me. I think of entropy―the omnipresent tendency to dissipate― as the most universal global constraint.

The idea of information as substance has never made much sense to me―some like to think that information, since it can be manifested in different media, is independent of any substrate―but that seems to transform information into a ghost. Can we make sense of the notion of a ghost as substance―not the ghost in the machine, but the machine as ghost?

Are you familiar with any of the physicists who suggest that information is ontologically basic and that matter and energy emerge from it? — Count Timothy von Icarus

The idea makes no sense to me since information, as far as I know, is always carried by a material substrate. Also science informs that for the majority of its existence the universe contained no interpretants, which would mean that although there was a physically existent universe, there was no exchange of information. That said, some semioticians advocate for pansemiosis, and it really depends on how attenuated you are prepared to allow the concept of 'interpretant' (not to mention 'mind') to become.

That something can be a sign for something else is a process which cannot be modeled entirely in physical terms, but it does not follow that the processes involved are anything other than physical, it just follows that they cannot be a matter of mere efficient causation.

As @apokrisis often reminds us, there is an interplay in the physical world between global conditions and local causation, or in Aristotelian terms, final (and/or formal?) causation and efficient causation.

Yet physically, an optical disk is very different from paper which is very different from a sound wave, which is very different from sound waves. The physical substrate does not seem to matter much. It is the information (form) that matters, and arguably this is "immaterial" in a number of senses. — Count Timothy von Icarus

That there is always some form of physical substrate is the point. There is no "immaterial " information.

Information is like currency...fungible... in that it has to be in some form of physical substrate or other, but is endlessly interchangeable.

Yes, it wasn't very well put. I only meant that, in addition to the possible explanations you named, it's also possible that the universality of mystical intuitions is explained by their actually being what they claim to be, namely experiences of God or some transcendent consciousness. — J

That's true it is logically possible―given that no self-contradiction is involved in the idea. The problem is we have no way of determining whether mystical intuitions actually come to us from God or some transcendent consciousness.

This situation opens up the way for faith, as Kant said of his own critical project. Faith should never be conflated with knowledge, though―as I never tire of saying that way lies dogma and fundamentalism.

Unfortunately, some cannot accept that limitation of the human condition and would rather fantasize about there being the possibility of direct knowing of the absolute nature of reality or some such nonsense which simply cannot stand up to scrutiny.

I haven't followed every post between you and Wayfarer today, so I'll just speak for myself. I don't think a statement like "I have had an experience of the Godhead" or "My third eye opened" or "I encountered Jesus and was born again" or any of the countless variants of this should be presumed to be "demonstrably true." Nor are they demonstrably false. It's not clear to me that they can be separated from 3rd-person/objective claims such as "God exists". — J

I'm puzzled by your last sentence here. How can "god exists" be an objective claim if there is no possibility of confirming it such that anyone unbiased would have to acquiesce, or even at the very least the possibility of assessing it against our overall experience in terms of plausibility?

All I can say is, we're left with possible explanations, possible ways of assigning probability values to the statements under discussion. And we'll rate these probabilities differently, based on our own knowledge and experience -- just as we would for any topic that's tough to know about for sure. I see plenty of daylight between "My account of my mystical experience is demonstrably true" and "Here's what I think probably accounts for my experience." The latter seems unexceptionable to me.

I agree of course that subjective elements come into our assessments of metaphysical claims, but I also think that some metaphysical claims are far more consistent and coherent with the human store of knowledge and understanding than others.

Of course it is still up to the individual to make their own assessments. It's like aesthetics in a way―it cannot be definitively demonstrated that Shakespeare's or Dostoevsky's works are finer works of literature than Mills and Boone, or that Jacksons Pollock's 'drip' paintings could not have been executed by a monkey, but...

:up:

Consciousness does not have physical properties. — Patterner

And yet being conscious does have physical properties. So, I'll ask again―what is the difference between consciousness and being conscious?

Do any of these things, or combinations of them, explain how the physical subjectively experiences, and, in at least our case, can be aware and self-aware? — Patterner

Being conscious means being aware. But being aware as in being able to respond to signs does not necessarily entail being conscious. Awareness happens at all levels of life. In simple forms of life, the presence of different molecules at the the cell membrane elicit different responses inside the cell. Those processes cannot be entirely understood in mechanistic terms, they are understood to carry information to the cell, but they are nonetheless physical processes.

Stated in biosemiotic terms there are interpretants as all levels (of life at least), but it does not follow that there is consciousness at all levels. It is probably symbolic language that enables reflective self-awareness.

It is not! Verificationism is not specific to philosophy of science. — Wayfarer

That's strictly true―I misspoke. What I had in mind was that it is a thesis in epistemology., and it is commonly, as applied to scientific theories, compared to and contrasted with Popper's falsificationism. the Wiki entry says:
Verificationism, also known as the verification principle or the verifiability criterion of meaning, is a doctrine in philosophy which asserts that a statement is meaningful only if it is either empirically verifiable (can be confirmed through the senses) or a tautology (true by virtue of its own meaning or its own logical form). Verificationism rejects statements of metaphysics, theology, ethics and aesthetics as meaningless in conveying truth value or factual content, though they may be meaningful in influencing emotions or behavior.[1]
Scientific statements (in the broadest sense as statements of what is observed) are along with tautologous statements are taken to be the only kinds of statements which can be definitively verified.

I am not a positivist in that I don't believe non-verifiable statements are meaningless. Apart from the observational aspect, the other aspect of science―the theoretical is not itself strictly verifiable.

Then you're still saying the only criterion of factuality is science, again. — Wayfarer

No, I'm saying the criterion of factuality is observability. How can be sure that a statement is factual if what it asserts is not observable? Following that reasoning a statement is factuality-apt, i.e. could be either a fact or not, if what is proposes is, at least in principle, checkable by observation.

You keep summoning the positivist bogey man, but this is an evasive tactic designed to discredit your interlocutor. I've asked you to cite one fact or piece of knowledge that is not based in observations of or about this world; that is not, in other words, based in human cognition of the world. Apparently you are both incapable of that, and incapable of admitting that you are incapable of that.

How to test a 'metaphysical theory'? Just now Kastrup was interviewed by Robert Lawrence Kuhn, he suggests internal consistency, explanatory power, and parsimony would be good starting points. I would concur with that. — Wayfarer

Not "how to test", but "how to evaluate".

All true, if you mean "offer as possible explanations." But another way we can explain it is in the accuracy or correspondence-to-the-facts context -- that is, these intuitions are correct as to their source.

But . . . how do we determine which context, which putative explanation, is the right one? This is what you and Wayfarer are thrashing out. — J

Can you explain what you mean by "these intuitions are correct as to their source"? I'm trying to thrash out how we should categorize what is knowledge and what faith. Wayfarer is more just thrashing about, reacting emotionally to what he apparently sees as personal attacks, as attacks on his beliefs. I'm not attacking the beliefs, but the presumption that those beliefs are demonstrably true.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

There is nothing in the quoted passage there about Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself being religious dogma. I haven't even used the words "religious dogma" there at all. What I have implied is that claiming what is accepted on faith is knowledge is to be asserting some religious dogma.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be.
— Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience? — Janus

Meanwhile, as expected, you make no attempt to address my refutation of your ridiculous and obviously false claim that we don't know much of and about the world. You make a lot of claims, but when they are challenged you deflect and hide behind strawmen.

You know, it's not a matter of "I'm right and you're wrong", but of "I think this" and "Oh, I disagree with that because..." You seem to think that your perspective is unimpeachably correct and that the reason people disagree is because they are mired in a kind of modernist forgetting of truths know to the ancients. Such a claim is unsupported, hopelessly underdetermined, that's why I don't share that view. You cannot even be confident that you really understand what the ancients thought, since you don't read ancient languages and you rely on translators, who each have their own take on ancient thought.

So, I don't say you are so much wrong as you are spinning a story that suits your wishes as to how the world should be. You are basically a dogmatic proselytizer.

You think the Kant's description of the unknowability of the in itself is a religious dogma, because you don't understand it. — Wayfarer

What a ridiculous statement―I never claimed it was a religious dogma.. The in itself is unknowable by mere definition/ stipulation―the in itself is also just another human idea. We see things as they appear to us, and we have a natural tendency to want to know of those things what the fundamental nature or existence independent of their appearances to us is, and we recognize that it is impossible to know that―we might even say that since it is impossible the very idea is irrelevant or even a nonsense.

It is also true that we can speculate about what seems to be the possible alternatives, and we can consider whether it seems more plausible to think that our cognition of things gives us some knowledge of them or not.

It is also a ridiculously presumptuous and petulant statement―as usual you claim that anyone who has a different take than you must therefore not understand.

Meanwhile, 'the world', which you so confidently proclaim our knowledge of, is itself not the knowable, familiar and determinate realm which you so casually believe it to be. — Wayfarer

Human knowledge of this world as it appears to be is vast and comprehensive. Can you cite even one piece of knowledge which is not of, about, or dependent upon this world of human experience?

I don't expect you to answer of course, because you apparently don't think it necessary to answer questions that present difficulties your dogma cannot handle.

Which is verificationism in a nutshell . — Wayfarer

No, it's not: verificationism is a theory in the philosophy of science. I've already said that scientific theories cannot be verified to be true, so I don't agree with verificationsim. I don't reject metaphysics; in fact I agree with Popper that, even thought the truth of metaphysical theses cannot be determined by either verification or falsification, they can provide a stimulus that may lead to important scientific results.

Popper himself acknowledges that scientific theories can only be definitively falsified, not verified. I don't believe they can even be definitively falsified. We believe they are true or not only on the grounds of predictive success and general plausibility. As to my attitude to metaphysics: metaphysical speculation is fun, and some of the idea can be inspiring for creative pursuits.

I keep asking you to explain how the truth of any metaphysical thesis could be determined, and you never even attempt to answer the question, which is telling; it seems to show that you are in a kind of denial...not wanting to abandon precious beliefs. It would help the discussion if you read more carefully, and curbed your tendency to jump to silly conclusions about what's being said.

We can verify simple everyday observations such as that plants usually grow better if you feed them with the appropriate fertilizer. There are millions of examples of such easily verified truths.

The four ways of knowing: — Wayfarer

Yes I was already familiar with those conceivable modes of knowing, I formulated them myself before I ever came across them in Vervaeke's lectures.

Truth and falsity, in the sense I intended in this discussion are properties of sentences, or assertions, or propositions. How would you determine the truth of "consciousness is fundamental to reality"? I am not even sure what it means, let alone how I could find out if it true or not. I think you need to open your mind a little.

You say this repeatedly, as if it were revealed truth, when in fact it’s simply the dogma of positivism: that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated definitively. — Wayfarer

Thanks for distorting what I've said yet again. I have never said that only what can be scientifically validated can be stated. It is obvious that we can state whatever we want to.

Instead I said that only in the case of statements whose assertions are either self-evident or demonstrable by observation can the truth or falsity be determined.

And Armstrong is wrong in my view...religious truth is not "a species of practical knowledge", it is religious practice which is a species of practical knowledge. There is no religious truth in any propositional sense.

Just as in science where the observed predictions of theories do not guarantee their truth, so it is with religious practice...that a practice may transform does not guarantee its truth. And further, the very notion of a true or false practice is inapt. Practices are efficacious or not, not true or false.

We know that such an intuition has been with humanity since there were civilizations, and no doubt before. Whether it's true or not, isn't really about one's predisposition to believe or disbelieve, wouldn't you agree? — J

The problem is that the truth (or falsity) of such intuitions is not in any way definitively decidable. We can explain the universality of such intuitions in the moral context, as I said, as stemming from a demand that there should be perfection and justice. We can explain it in the epistemological context as being due to not having scientific explanations for phenomena. And we can explain it in the existential context as being on account of a universal fear of death.

There are all kinds of things which are commonly referred to as 'things', and not all of them objects of the senses. A thing is simply something which stands out for us.

The title of the thread is* (in a nutshell), to tease out a blindness in the view that, supported by science etc. the physical world**is what exists and anything else is mere speculation. A view which is held by the majority of the population. That the overwhelming truth of this orthodoxy cannot in all seriousness be challenged, and that this (orthodoxy) results in a blinkered view. — Punshhh

It's not a blindness but a sensible intellectual humility. All we know is this world. We can have no way of knowing if there is more. I think your assertion that most of the population think this world is all there is unsupported by the data: It is estimated that more than 85 percent of the global population identifies with a religious group.

I'd say those who want to believe in something that cannot be known to be true are the ones wearing blinkers. They see only through their own confirmation bias. I have no problem with people believing whatever they like provided they can be honest that it is all about faith, not knowledge. Apparently to admit that would undermine their beliefs, though. People's priorities are pretty sad considering the state the world is in.

Yes, my comments about certainty were meant to cover both the occurrence of the experience and the interpretation of it. So I'd call it highly likely, but by no means certain, that such experiences are "genuine" in that they do give access to a divine reality. Even using such a phrase, of course, takes us outside of philosophy entirely, in my opinion, though I know Wayfarer thinks we can expand our understanding of what philosophy is and does so as to include it. — J

Would you say that it is likely, if someone believes that certain kinds of altered states of consciousness give us access to a divine reality, that they were already inclined, most likely by cultural influences during their upbringing, to believe in a divine reality, and that others who do not have such an enculturated belief might interpret the experience as being a function of brain chemistry?

In other words, is not this world marvelous enough, if seen through fresh eyes? Wherefore the intuition of another world? Is it not more likely on account of a demand for perfection, and the surcease of all suffering and injustice and the introjection of cultural tropes that seem to promise those, than it is an unmediated intuition?

My general idea is that it we shouldn't be surprised if our physical science can't examine something that does not have physical properties. So examine consciousness with tools that do not have physical properties. Ideally, with tools that have the same properties consciousness has. But there is often disagreement over what those properties are. — Patterner

You assume that consciousness does not have physical properties. Is consciousness something different than being conscious?

If yes, then what is the difference?

If no, does not being conscious have physical properties, and is it not those physical properties that allow us to tell that consciousness is present?

Yes to both. But we cannot hook them up to anything kind off detector and see the consciousness that their behavior suggests is present. We can see the physical correlates of consciousness, but not there consciousness. — Patterner

That might indicate that the idea of consciousness as something undetectable is a kind of reification, as distinct from simply being conscious, which is a detectable condition.

Veganism prevents harm and promotes the well-being of trillions of sentient organisms. Yet, more than 99% of the humans currently alive (8.24 billion) are not yet vegan. Non-vegans kill 80 billion land organisms and 1 to 3 trillion aquatic organisms per year. Why isn't veganism legally mandatory in all countries? — Truth Seeker

What, despite the vast habitat destruction necessary to install the huge acreages of monoculture sustained with petrochemical based fertilizers and toxic insecticides, weedicides and fungicides necessary to feed the human population with grains, fruits, nuts and vegetables?

To say that what exists must be subject to a perspective is not to deny its existence; it’s to say that “existence” is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of possible experience. — Wayfarer

On one way of reading this: that 'existence' is only ever intelligible to us under the conditions of immediate experience, what you are saying is, firstly, a dogmatic statement, since you are only entitled to say what is intelligible to you.

Secondly saying that the idea of existence is unintelligible under said conditions just is to deny that anything can exist that is not presently subject to a perspective, or that it cannot be said to exist outside of that perspective.

It's true that we cannot think the existence of something, in the sense of thinking what the existence is like, without applying a perspective to it, that is to say we cannot imagine what a totally perspective-less existence could be like.

But that is not to say that we cannot coherently imagine that things can and do exist absent any perspective―that they can and do exist completely independently of us and our imaginings. It's all about nuance.

Another possible reading is more sensible: you could be saying that we cannot say that anything exists or has existed which in principle we could not possibly experience or perceive. If that is all you are saying then I don't think I disagree, although I might need to think some more on that. Dark matter and energy come to mind, although admittedly their existence is speculative, even if supported by the physics.

A tendentious "just-so" story if there ever was one! What you outline is merely one perspective of what happened historically among many others. Of course the dogmatist thinks their version is the one true account. :roll:

Vacuous question!

Anything that appears presumably exists somehow independently of appearing. You contradict yourself when you say that you don't deny the existence of the external world, and then claim that anything that exists must be subject to a perspective. That is to conflate perception of something with its actual existence.

If you want to get away from bare phenomenalism― the idea that all that exists are perceptions ―then you must allow that there is something, not generated by the percipient, that appears, whether it is actual existents or ideas in God's mind. Either way when it is not appearing it cannot be subject to any perspective unless in the "God's mind' scenario, God is held to have a perspective.

Your anthropomorphism lacks credulity.

Okely dokely...well done, medium, medium rare or rare?

I would say you could be fairly certain you had a mystical experience or not by comparing it to the quite substantial literature documenting reports of experiences which are classed as such. What I don't think anyone can be at all certain about is as to what could be the metaphysical implications of such experiences.

I've had quite a few such experiences, some of them under the influence of psychedelics, and some while meditating and some while listening to or playing music, painting or writing, and some while in wild surroundings. I don't interpret them to mean anything beyond themselves―of course for me they hold a great deal of emotional force and meaning in themselves, but that meaning is not discursive. If those experiences can be given voice at all, it would be via the allusive language of poetry.