A pointless comment.

Your whole case against my arguments seems to rest on my use of the word "propositional" which I did put in inverted commas several times to indicate that I have not accepted moral statements, beliefs, thoughts, feelings or whatever you want to call them as being propositional in the sense that empirical, logical and mathematical claims are.

I have explicitly stated that several times as well, saying that no truth makers can be found for such expressions of moral thought and feeling. So, you are now, it seems, resorting to the practice of uncharitable reading, on account of which I now have no interest in conversing with you further.

No. I can perhaps teach you how to interpret behavior, though.

Lets say there's another form of existence that's not empirical. It exists right? — Philosophim

Sure, we can entertain the idea that there might be some kind of existence we have no idea of, but it's no better than fiction, in fact it's worse, because fiction is really based on our experience of this world. Moral questions concern our existence, human life as we know it to be, so when we ask whether there should be existence that question, if coherent at all, can only be coherent in reference to the human existence we know. We cannot even coherently ask moral questions about the goodness or otherwise, of animal or plant existence let alone the inanimate world, much less some existence we cannot know or even imagine at all That's my take on it, anyway.

I.e. "existence is" a sentence fragment. — 180 Proof

:smirk: :lol:

The point is that if you had listened to me you would have realized that I agree with you that we can feel what can't be known. Calling that feeling "knowledge" is using 'knowledge' as in the biblical "a man shall know his wife".

That is also how we know (feel) our non-dual being and life, and how we know poetry and the arts. All I've ever said about this, over and over, is that in that "knowing" (feeling) nothing determinate or discursive or propositional is known.

And the irony is that all that time you have been claiming that I don't understand your position, whereas now it turns out we've been saying what amounts to the same thing and actually agreeing all along, and it has been you that didn't understand my position.

If I didn't understand what you were saying, it was because it seemed like you were asserting that something discursive or propositional is known in that "feeling" you are speaking about. and because you took umbrage at what I said when I denied that and accused me of being a logical positivist or empiricist.

And now here you are saying the same thing, and still refusing to admit that I understand what you are saying. I must say it's kind of weird! The other irony is that even a good staunch logical positivist or empiricist could agree with this kind of feeling/ knowing, and I believe that is pretty much Wittgenstein's position as well.

I'm still considering it, but if I no longer respond, it's not out of defensiveness, it's out of a feeling you have no idea what I'm trying to convey. — Wayfarer

This just confirms my opinion that you won't give up the idea that you can say what cannot be said, but can only be felt or lived, and thus shown. You often cherry-pick from Wittgenstein: I think it would do you some good, clear up these apparent confusions of yours, to actually read him closely.

The only existence we know is our empirical existence and so the question, "should there be existence?" if it doesn't refer to that empirical existence, is meaningless.

I think It’s essential that you learn to feel what you cannot know. Coming to think of it, this is a large part of what 'mindfulness meditation' comprises - learning that the verbal or discursive element of your being is only one facet of a much greater whole. — Wayfarer

And yet when I tell you I think it all comes down to faith and feeling and that nothing discursive can be known via meditation, intuition or enlightenment you disagree and label me a positivist. Now it looks like a double standard or perhaps merely peevishness, I don't know which.

Its not an opinion. You didn't address the arguments of the OP. No citation of the steps, nor refutation of the specific reasoning given. — Philosophim

I believe I did:

But, I'll try a different tack (which amounts to the same thing):


d. Assume the answer is no.

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Janus

I addressed the above and pinpointed what I thought was the salient problem with the reasoning. Perhaps I wasn't explicit enough, even though I thought I gave an illustrative example in the Gnostics, so I'll try one more time.

If something morally objective existed, it could not be an empirical existent. It would enjoy a different kind of existence; one which we cannot coherently imagine. Since its existence could not be an empirical one, it could conclude that there should be no empirical existence without concluding that its own existence is morally wrong, and would thus avoid contradicting itself.

You've given a personal opinion, but not a refutation of the OP. Its ok, I know not everyone reads and understands the OP. — Philosophim

I've given an argument that in my personal opinion refutes the OP. In your personal opinion it does not refute the OP. I'd be disappointed if I had to conclude that you're one of those who reads all disagreement as misunderstanding.

I'm not convinced you really think our exchange was a good conversation; if I sincerely felt someone had not understood what I had written I would not deem it to have been a good conversation.

In any case, it's nothing personal, I wish you all the best.

They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former

I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality. So, it's of no help to us.

Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding". The very idea is incoherent, meaningless as far as I can tell. Even if there were a God, a lawgiver of objective moral truths, that would not be "binding", it certainly isn't for those who profess to be believers, even priests. As I said before the normative is what is normal, not what is imperative.

Because moral statements are not truth-apt

Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross

Now you're starting to get it.

Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves". I said that if all normal people believe in some moral principle, or in feeling something to be right or wrong, then it makes it true, makes it right or wrong, not in some imaginary "objective" sense, but for all those normal people.

Those normal people make up the largest part of the communities we live in, and the fact that they all agree on moral issues constitutes normativity, normativity is not some abstract principle or some purported objective moral imperative, the guarantor for which can bever be found.

I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross

People stating their feelings or beliefs does not necessarily qualify as propositional..

They would have to be, or they aren’t propositions at all. That’s the mistake you keep making: you think there are types of propositions. — Bob Ross

The mistake you are making is believing that I think there are moral propositions, when I think I have made it quite clear that I don't think there are.

You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former

I already did: I said it would be what is morally good (which is not dependent on beliefs). — Bob Ross

Unfortunately for your argument you are depending on something which either doesn't exist or is unknowable. It is nothing more than an empty tautology to say that what is morally good is a truth maker for what is morally good.

It can be known to be true, if what the proposition refers to corresponds to reality. — Bob Ross

How would we know if it corresponded to reality? What kind of reality? Certainly not an empirical reality. So, it's of no help to us.

Then, that is not truth, nor are they normatively binding (in the strict, traditional sense). You cannot have the cake and eat it too (; — Bob Ross

You're really not paying attention. I've already said I don't think anything is "morally binding". The very idea is incoherent, meaningless as far as I can tell. Even if there were a God, a lawgiver of objective moral truths, that would not be "binding", it certainly isn't for those who profess to be believers, even priests. As I said before the normative is what is normal, not what is imperative.

Because moral statements are not truth-apt

Then they don’t have the “form of a proposition”. — Bob Ross

Now you're starting to get it.

Then, you don’t think they are propositions; and should abandon your view that beliefs make moral propositions true or false. You can’t just ad hoc change what a proposition is because you don’t believe moral statements fit the standard description. — Bob Ross

I said that what people believe, morally speaking, makes it true for themselves, in the sense of being "true to themselves". I said that if all normal people believe in some moral principle, or to feeling something is right or wrong, then it makes it true, makes it right or wrong, for all those normal people. Those normal people make up the largest part of the communities we live in, and the fact that they all agree on moral issues constitutes normativity, not some abstract principle or some purported objective moral imperative, the guarantor for which can bever be found.

I have never invoked any moral beliefs, feelings, or thoughts that are propositions; but, yes, a statement can be one...that’s just the nature of propositions 101: a proposition is a truth-apt statement. — Bob Ross

People stating their feelings or beliefs does not necessarily qualify as propositional..

Did you understand the logic that lead to the answer being "Yes"? — Philosophim

I've already told you why I disagree with it.

But, I'll try a different tack (which amounts to the same thing):

d. Assume the answer is no.

e. If it is the case that there is something objective which concludes there should be no existence, that objectivity must exist.

f. But if it exists, then according to itself, it shouldn't exist.

g. If it shouldn't exist, then the answer "No" objectively shouldn't exist thus contradicting itself. — Philosophim

That it exists doesn't contradict the idea that the rest of existence shouldn't exist. That would only be so if it were the creator, as the 'Gnostic' example I gave shows. According to that account the Good is a transcendent God, not the deluded demiurge who created this world.

So, you are conflating the (purported) existence of an objective good (however we might conceive that) with the actual existence of the world.

'Apologists' being anyone who questions naive realism, right? — Wayfarer

No, "apologists" denoting anyone who desperately (and futilely) tries to find intellectual justification for believing what they wish to be so, in spite of the obvious fact that it is unknowable.

If you want to have a faith, just accept the faith and practice it (there's nothing wrong with having a faith and practicing it, and I have never said there is) and stop the futile tail-chasing

Where in the OP do I go wrong when I show you what objective goodness must be? — Philosophim

You merely define it as "what should be". That doesn't tell us what should be, and since there are obviously many aspects of existence that, at least from a human point of view, should not be, it just seems inconsistent and unwarranted to claim that existence must be good if we assume (for the sake of argument) that there is an objective good, because even with that assumption the nature of that good we cannot know.

I usually can't tell from their posts what most members like Wayfarer or @Constance intelligibly mean by either of these terms. — 180 Proof

That's because you are religiously blind, don't you know? :wink:

With apologists it always comes down to "you must not understand" if you disagree with them and/or present arguments they can't cope with. Also, they argue from the mindset of wanting something to be true and ignoring anything that doesn't confirm their wishes, rather than seeking to discover the truth with an unbiased disposition.

This denial of our mortality has a more basic analysis, for the question is begged, why bother with this issue at all? Fear of death assumes there is something fearful about death. — Constance

Death is feared because it represents the radically unknown, the radically unknowable, and this is naturally profoundly unsettling, as the very idea of non-existence may also be.

Add to this that death is associated with the humiliating loss of physical and cognitive powers, as well as being possibly associated with terrible pain. Add to this the loss of loved ones and everything familiar. It is not surprising that people should wish for immortality and an afterlife which is perfect, unlike the present life.

I already said why I don't think it works, because it all depends on what objective goodness is (assuming for the sake of argument that there is any such thing). For example, the Gnostics thought the created world is defective, objectively bad, because they believed it was created by a deluded, if not evil, demiurge. For the Gnostics escaping from this fallen existence to re-unite with the transcendent God (which they understood as The Good) was good and not this existence (which as I said they saw as intrinsically bad).

An objective morality would be an analysis of what good is apart from culture, emotions, or subjectivity.

How do you define "The Good"? I'm not using that term here so I don't know what it means. — Philosophim

Such an analysis would need an objectively good object of analysis, and that object would be "The Good" if it existed.

No, I mean the steps that I go through on the OP to reach the conclusion. If good is "what ought to be" and there is an objective morality, it must necessarily conclude "Yes" to the question of "Should there be existence?" — Philosophim

What is the difference between there being an objective morality and there being The Good? What would there being an objective mporaity look like for you?

Good is "What should be"
I conclude that if there is an objective morality, it necessarily must answer the question, "Should there be existence?" with Yes. — Philosophim

Do you mean something like 'If there is the Good, then existence must be good'? Buddhism proposes that the Good would be the end of suffering, and that all existence is suffering, which entails that existence is bad, something to be transcended.

I'm not arguing for the truth of Buddhism, just pointing out that it's always going to be a matter of interpretation.

I already did, and I will, at this point, refer you to the OP. You are still fundamentally claiming that propositions can be made true or false relative to beliefs about them which is quite obviously the issue I was expounding in the OP. — Bob Ross

The problem is you are treating moral "propositions" as though they are empirical, logical or mathematical propositions. You can't or won't say what kind of imaginable truth makers apart from people believing them there could be for the former.

You are confused about how moral propositions, beliefs, and truth work: if they are true, then they are binding irregardless if the subject-at-hand realizes it or is motivated by it. — Bob Ross

You just keep claiming this. You need to give an argument for why moral propositions, if they could be known to be true, would be binding. What happens if someone refuses or fails to be bound by a moral proposition even when they believe it to be true, let alone when they don't believe it to be true?

The other point is that you apparently cannot explain how a moral proposition could ever be known to be true. If they cannot (unlike empirical, logical or mathematical propositions) be known to be true, then how could they possibly be binding (assuming that they would be binding even if they were known to be true)?

Janus, you don’t believe that there is a truth of the matter about moral judgments; so I don’t see how you are confused about this: the moral judgments you are advocating for are not even attempting to get at the truth because there is no truth of the matter. This plainly follows from what you are saying. — Bob Ross

No, you are not listening. The only truth of moral beliefs, the only normative force they could possess, the only bindingness, lies in the fact that most normal people believe them, think and/or feel them to be true.

It is patently incoherent to think that a statement can and cannot be propositional; which is what you just said (with word-salad). — Bob Ross

Because moral statements are not truth-apt, beyond the empirical facts of whether people believe them, I don't see how they qualify as propositions in the sense that empirical, logical or mathematical do, so I see the incoherence as being yours.

This is an entirely separate question: I am just trying to get you to see the implications of your moral anti-realism; because you don’t see it yet. — Bob Ross

It's not an entirely separate question because the very coherence of your reference to moral beliefs, feelings, thoughts or statements as "propositions" hinges on it. This is, ironically, something you don't see, while accusing me of not seeing something which you apparently cannot identify or are at least yet to identify. If there is something you think I don't see, then spell it out; I'm listening.

If it's games and feelings of usefulness all the way down, no one can ever be wrong about anything — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can be shown to be wrong about logical, mathematical and empirical claims. How could you go about showing that someone is wrong regarding a metaphysical, religious or aesthetic claim?

Sorry, Russell, I'm not seeing the relevance to the point we were labouring over.

Whether or not you claim moral propositions are true or false relative to one or a several beliefs about them does not get around the issue expounded in the OP. Your moral “inter-subjectivism” falls prey to the same internal inconsistencies. — Bob Ross

I don't think so. Make your argument and we'll see how it stands up.

There’s a difference between a proposition being binding, and people being forced to honor something: the former is binding purely in virtue of the truth-value of the proposition, whereas the latter is binding insofar as one wants to avoid the consequences of not obeying it. — Bob Ross

No, most people hold to finding murder, rape, etc., morally wrong because they feel compassion for the victim, and that is normal. You keep talking about truth being binding, but it's not. There is no reason other than a love for truth that would bind someone to accepting a true claim, and even then, they may not act on it. And there I am talking about logical and/ or empirical truths.

The "objective" truth of moral beliefs cannot even be established let alone made binding. You seem to have some kind of idealized notion of human morals. The only fact that could be established regarding attitudes to carious moral issues would be surveying people to see what they think and/ or feel about those issues. What other imaginable criterion could there be?

What you have described, is the irrational position that we should impose beliefs which do not even attempt, in principle, to correspond with the truth on other people. Do you see how irrational that is? — Bob Ross

That is nothing like anything I've been saying. You need to read more closely. I have nowhere spoken about forcing anyone to do or not to do anything. In any case the most significant moral prescriptions, those regarding what are considered to be serious crimes, are codified in law, and those laws would not hold if most people didn't agree with them. That's normativity at work, not some kind of nebulous notion of being bound to imagined "objective" moral truths which can never be established as such.

(e.g., how can something be stated in “propositional form”, yet not be a valid proposition?). — Bob Ross

This is classic! People can propose whatever they like, valid or not. It's the soundness, not the validity of moral "propositions: which cannot be established. I think you need to ask yourself whether you can imagine any kind of truth maker for such "propositions".

All you can say is that “you believe that torturing babies is wrong”; and this is not normatively binding nor is it a moral proposition. — Bob Ross

If torturing babies is wrong because normal people think it is wrong then it is true that it is wrong for most people, I have not claimed anything beyond that. The very idea of objective wrongness of a moral proposition in some kind of imagined quasi-empirical or objective sense seems to be incoherent. And normative does not mean objective. Unless you take objective to mean nothing beyond 'intersubjectively agreed'.

If it is the case that eating some food is wrong (harmful) for the human body, it does not necessarily follow that it is normatively binding not to eat that food. Note the semantic relation between "normative" and 'normal'. If we say that because it is normal to find torturing babies repugnant, then there is some normative force in saying it is generally wrong for people to do it.Normative does not equate to imperative.

NO. You cannot deny that “torturing babies is wrong” can be evaluated as true or false (which can only be done objectively) and then turn around and say it can be if we just evaluate people’s beliefs about it. — Bob Ross

I think you have it backwards; moral principles cannot be objectively evaluated. The only such evaluations are empirical or logical, and moral beliefs cannot be evaluated in either way. Beliefs can only be evaluated normatively, that is whether or not it is normal to hold them. If someone thinks torturing babies is OK, most people will conclude there must be something wrong with them, that is normativity at work. Chasing moral objectivity beyond this kind of inter-subjective agreement amounts to chasing a chimera.

"I feel like murdering is abhorrent" (subjectivism) and "Boo murder!" (emotivism) are in no way binding on others, and they are arguably not even binding on oneself. — Leontiskos

They are binding socially (normatively) only insofar as most normal people hold to them. So, I am not advocating moral subjectivism or skepticism, but rather a kind of moral inter-subjectivism. What is morally wrong is what most people would find to be so. Of course, I don't deny that this position has its weaknesses, and I think these show up in the case of social mores, like sex before marriage, but when it comes to significant moral issues like murder, rape, child abuse, theft, and so on I think it works well enough.

How does commonality between humans work because of their shared DNA?

For the same reason that there is more commonality between humans who share 99.9% of their DNA than commonality between humans and chickens who only share 60% of their DNA — RussellA

Right, but I was talking about commonality of particular perceptions, for example seeing the same things in the same places and being able to agree about all the details of those things. I don't see how DNA would explain that, rather it might explain why we see things in the same kinds of ways.

As I said the behavior of animals shows us that they see the same things in the environment as we do, but they probably don't see those things in just the same kinds of ways we do due to their different perceptual setups.

How would that work?

But, there is a good argument to be made that these discrete things don't exist "outside minds," even if it is the case that minds do not create these identities ex nihilo or at all arbitrarily. To my mind, this should call into question the idea that "the view from nowhere/anywhere," should be the gold standard of knowledge. Rather, things most "are what they are," when known. — Count Timothy von Icarus

My view is that although what things are in themselves is unknowable, we have good reason to think that the structures of things constrain how we perceive, differentiate and understand them. Of course, I don't know that for certain.

In other words, we simply don't know whether things exist outside minds, but that they do has always been the default assumption on the basis of our shared experience and the fact that the behavior even of animals shows that they perceive the same things we do.

Other than positing some hidden connection between all minds, there is no way to explain the commonality of human experience, a commonality that extends even to some animals.

Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"
— Janus

but my believing that does not make it so for them
— Janus — Leontiskos

I'm saying that for me to say torturing babies is wrong is equivalent to me saying I believe torturing babies is wrong. Og course the two sentences are not semantically equivalent, what I'm talking about is my own intentions my own meaning when I say that.

It's like if I say to you "Your wife is having an affair" when I don't have hard evidence for it but I believe it very strongly for whatever reason; what I'm really saying is I beleive your wife is having an affair if I am honest,

I can't make sense of the claim "torturing babies is wrong" if I take that to be saying it is wrong tout court, because I can't imagine anything that could make that true, apart from what most people would feel and believe. Which means that the proposition is inextricably tied to belief, mine, someone else's, even most peoples'.

Torturing babies is wrong
I believe torturing babies is wrong

The point is that (2) does not entail (1). — Leontiskos

As I explained in the absence of any other truthmaker belief is all we've got. I'm opting for intellectual honesty.

The obligation towards a moral proposition, is its truth-binding nature. If you deny this, then you are saying that you can affirm that it is true that “you should not torture babies” without affirming that it is true that you should not torture babies. — Bob Ross

You are talking about committing a semantic contradiction. That has nothing to do with what may or may not be morally binding. Really nothing is morally binding: people can believe something is wrong, even feel terrible shame in doing it, and yet do it, nonetheless.

In general, when I say I believe something is morally wrong I mean that it is morally repugnant to me, it feels wrong because I don't want to hurt another or whatever.

.

No I didn't, I asked what could make something wrong beyond it being believed to be so. If I believe something is wrong, then that belief is sufficient to make the something wrong for me. I might believe it to be wrong for others too, but my believing that does not make it so for them: they also need to believe it. If I want to claim something is wrong tout court, then I need to be able to say what it is that makes it so, otherwise it is mere hand-waving.

I haven't anywhere said the two sentences are semantically equivalent. Are you going to answer the question, which is exactly the same question I've been asking Bob?

We know what would make "aliens exist" true. We don't know what would make torturing babies wrong, other than that it is (presumably) deeply felt to be so by most people. What else do you have?

If “I should not torture babies” is true, then you are obligated to not torture babies. You can’t affirm that it is true that “I should not torture babies” without conceding it is true that I shouldn’t torture babies: that’s incoherent. — Bob Ross

On the strength of what would I be obligated? And what would it mean for such a claim to be true beyond my feeling or thinking it to be so? Would there need to be a lawgiver who would punish me if I transgressed.

It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim.

But it wouldn’t be a normative claim, and that’s the point. — Bob Ross

What makes a normative claim a normative claim other than people believing it to be so. You didn't answer my question: if it is people believing it, then how many would be needed? If it is something else, then what is that "something else"? Are you invoking God?

If the proposition expresses something about how something ought to be. Saying “I believe one ought to ...” is not a proposition about what ought to be: it is about what one believes ought to be. — Bob Ross

You continue to leave out the critical part. If a proposition expresses how something ought to be for some individual, then it is the fact that the individual believes that proposition that "supports the ought", so to speak. If you want to go beyond that you need to discover what "supports the ought"—you need to address that question.

There is nothing about “I believe torturing babies is wrong” being true that obligates you not to torture babies: it is a non-normative statement about your belief about babies being tortured. It isn’t expressing that “I shouldn’t torture babies”. — Bob Ross

There is nothing about any moral proposition that obligates anyone to adhere to it. If torturing babies is morally repugnant to me, I am unlikely to torture babies,

If I say, "I believe torturing babies is wrong" then that amounts to saying, "I believe no one should torture babies". It follows that I believe it to be a normative claim. Saying Torturing babies is wrong" is really just shorthand for the former "I believe......"

How do moral propositions become normative under your view? Does it require that they be believed by many people? How many people would be sufficient or insufficient?

but I don't agree that it amounts to reason in the sense that h.sapiens demonstrates it. — Wayfarer

I agree it doesn't amount to reasoning in symbolic language, since animals don't have symbolic language.

I refer to it as historical background. I'm simply making the point that Plato's epistemology differentiated between different levels or kinds of knowledge in a way that modern philosophy does not. — Wayfarer

Again, I agree, but that historical background says nothing about the relative value of Platonic versus modern epistemologies.

The last paragraph is a reference to Kant's idea of synthesis and synthetic a priori judgements. I think there's an important point here, which you've gone from objecting to, to seeing nothing significant about (although I'm hesitant to explain why I think it's important). — Wayfarer

I don't recall ever objecting to Kant's idea of synthetic a priori judgements, but as you may recall I think they are made possible by reflecting on the general nature of human experience, perception and judgement. For me that is the foundation of phenomenology, which I think you should know I have a great deal of respect for as a discipline.

I am differentiating this from what used to be called 'intelligible objects' - logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on. For example, if I were to say to you, 'show me the law of the excluded middle', you would have to explain it to me. — Wayfarer

I think it is fine to refer to logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on as objects of thought, by analogy to the way we refer to physical objects as objects of the senses. As you say to present an object of thought to another it must be explained, because it obviously cannot be seen, heard, touched, smelled or tasted.

All of these can only be grasped by a rational intelligence. I could not demonstrate or explain them to a cow or a dog. — Wayfarer

They cannot be explained to a dog, because dogs don't speak English. You would not be able to explain them to someone who spoke a different language from you either without consulting a dictionary, or a translator. From this it does not follow that animals are not rational. I think there is plenty of good evidence that some animals are capable of reasoning, although obviously not in English or any other language.

As I said at the outset, in regular speech it is quite clear to say 'the number 7 exists'. But when you ask what it is, then you are not pointing to a sensable object - that is the symbol - but a rational act. (That's the sense in which I mean that 'counting is an act', but it doesn't mean that the demonstrations of rudimentary reasoning in higher animals amounts to reason per se.) — Wayfarer

That's true and it's a loose kind of usage. If you ask anyone just how the number 7 exists, they won't be able to say. I've often said to you that number exists, and it seems obvious to me that it does. We see numbers of things all the time, so number in a sense, exists in the phenomenal world. It could be said that numbers exist as numerals, and it is true that without those anything more than the most rudimentary counting or arithmetic would be impossible unless an abacus were to be used, and even then I don't think you could get too far in your mathematical endeavours

In Plato these levels or kinds of knowledge were distinguished per the Analogy of the Divided Line . Those distinctions are what have been forgotten, abandoned or lost in the intervening millenia due to the dominance of nominalism and empiricism. But In reality, thought itself, the rational mind, operates through a process of synthesis which blends and binds the phenomenal and noumenal into synthetic judgements (per Kant). — Wayfarer

In this passage you appeal to Plato as someone who thought as you do. But there is no argument to support that way of thinking, just the claim that it has been "forgotten, abandoned or lost" which may be so, but says nothing about whether those ideas were right or had good rational support.

The last paragraph just seems to say that we synthesize sensory experiences (particulars) and ideas about them (generalities) into judgements. This is uncontroversial, but says nothing about what, if any, inferences we could draw from that fact regarding the reality of universals.

So, I find nothing there to disagree with other than the exclusion of animals from the "rational club", which I see as an example of human exceptionalist thinking. I think the latter is mistaken and also a net negative in relation to human and other biological life

Just tell me concisely, and without bringing in other authorities, what evidence or rational support you think there is for the reality of universals.

It wouldn't be a pointless argument if you could actually make an argument; then we might actually get somewhere.

If you don't want to try, then I'll conclude that you don't have such an argument.

Reading those you have cited, I would say they make the same mistake you do: the mistake of thinking that there is a rational case to be made in the absence of either empirical evidence or logical necessity, or else some other kind of evidence. As I see it, the fact that others make the same mistake as you do does not make it any the less a mistake.

What is it precisely you think I don't understand about your position? You should be able to pinpoint that and you should be able to lay out your case clearly if you have a cogent one, and I haven't seen you do that. When, or if, you do then I will respond.

I deal with every interaction on its merits, or lack thereof. — Wayfarer

Why is it that you cannot tolerate disagreement? Surely you know that when it comes to philosophical questions there never has been consensus, or any way to prove the truth or falsity of positions. I'm not demanding any kind of proof from you; there is no proof even when it comes to scientific theories. But you have stated many times that your views are in the minority on this forum, and there is nothing intrinsically wrong with that, but it should give you pause when you want to level accusations of "misunderstanding" to your interlocutors. It just makes you look defensive.

Unfortunately I don't have the rhetorical skills to fend of such exalted polemics. And, as always, you declare what you yourself don't understand as the limits to what anyone else would consider. — Wayfarer

I've noticed that if anyone disagrees with you or questions your ideas you fall back on the claim that they don't understand. I think that if you understood what you meant by saying that universals are real, you would be able to explain it. But no such explanation is ever forthcoming, which leads me to conclude that you don't understand it yourself.

I have no problem with you believing that universals are real entities in some way on the basis that it "feels right intuitively" or whatever, but when you enter a forum like this and want to argue for your belief then you'd better have a strong case to support it, otherwise discussions will devolve into "yes, it is", "no, it isn't".

I'm actually not saying that universals are not real, just as I don't positively claim that God doesn't exist, but I freely admit that I cannot positively imagine any such reality or existence or see any evidence to lead me to conclude that I would have rational justification for believing that there is such an existence.

Doffing my rational hat, I do tend to be intuitively drawn to such ideas, and I allow myself to entertain them in my feelings, and in my poetry and art practice, but I don't claim to have any rational arguments to support my doing that.

"in the same way", Frege says "that a pencil exists independently of grasping it. Thought contents (e.g. numerical value) are true and bear their relations to one another (and presumably to what they are about) independently of anyone's thinking these thought contents - "just as a planet, even before anyone saw it, was in interaction with other planets." — Frege on Knowing the Third Realm, Tyler Burge

In the same way the rules of chess, or the value of money could be said to exist and be mind-independent. Likewise for the perfect form of the turd or the pile of vomit. Do you want to claim noumenal (in the platonic sense) status for those?

Do you believe logic existed begore it was formulated by humans? Frege in that passage says that planets and their interactions with other planets existed before they were known—I bet you don't agree with that.

The real problem I see with saying that universals are mind-independently existent or real is that no one has the foggiest notion of what kind of reality or existence they could enjoy.

Are you not arguing for two kinds of reality—the reality of the body and the different reality of the mind?
— Janus

Not two kinds but two levels, phenomenal and noumenal - and the role of the mind in synthesizing them to produce a unity. — Wayfarer

Below is quoted from you on this;

By 'existent' I refer to manifest or phenomenal existence. Broadly speaking, this refers to sensable objects (I prefer that spelling as it avoids the equivocation with the other meaning of 'sensible') - tables and chairs, stars and planets, oceans and continents. They're phenomenal in the sense of appearing to subjects as sensable objects or conglomerates.

I am differentiating this from what used to be called 'intelligible objects' - logical principles, numbers, conventions, qualifiers and so on. For example, if I were to say to you, 'show me the law of the excluded middle', you would have to explain it to me. It's not really an 'object' at all in the same sense as the proverbial chair or apple. — Wayfarer

Kant's phenomenal/ noumenal distinction as I understand it is not between sense objects and abstracta, but between what we can know and what we cannot.

You seem to be claiming there are two kinds of objects: the physical (phenomena) and the mental (abstracta)_and claiming that at least abstracta are real independently of the mind. If you claim both phenomena and abstracta are mind independently real, then that would be dualism. I guess if you claim that only abstracta are real then that would be idealism, but certainly not of a Kantian kind.

Just what your position consists in remains unclear to me.