I can't imagine a particular rock without imagining it in terms of perceptible attributes, but I can imagine that a rock could exist without anyone perceiving it.

If the material forms are evolving, then how do the "immaterial forms" evolve prior to them in order to give rise to the former's evolution, and why would there not be the same problem of infinite regress with the latter (assuming for the sake of the argument that the idea of "immaterial forms" makes sense)?

It's not an infinite regress of fixed forms, but rather an evolution of forms.

By "somewhere else" which I originally presented in quotation marks I was referring to "some transcendent realm". Previous oaks are not, in this sense, "somewhere else".

Charles Pinter makes his case very well. Try and imagine the Universe from the perspective of a rock. That might provide a hint. — Wayfarer

I can't even begin to imagine a rock having a perspective, but I can imagine a rock existing without there being any conscious observer of it. Of course, it would not look like a rock, feel like a rock and so on without some sentient creature to see it and feel it. Kant acknowledged that things exist in themselves, but of course that existence is not in terms of perceptual categories. Individuation is not a perceptual category, or at least not primarily a perceptual category. It's also worth noting that individuation does not entail separation.

So that passage quoted from Magee, which I have no argument with, puts paid to Kastrup's notion of mind at large, and even to Schopenhauer's notion of "noumena as will", since "will' is a human category.

The mind-independent world is not naturally divided into individual parts — Pinter, Charles. Mind and the Cosmic Order (p92)

Does that mean it is nothing but an amorphous mass of nothing? :lol:

I can see absolutely no reason to think that individuation relies on conscious observers.

But that line of reasoning is untenable. There is no way to compare noumena and phenomena in order to determine that the one is not the other. — creativesoul

But I know that my perception of the tree is not the tree, right? My perceptions are constituted by phenomena: sights, sounds, tactile sensations and so on, but the tree is not merely a sight, or a sound (say wind in the leaves) or a tactile sensation (say the feel of its bark) or the sum of those. Can I not be said to know that without knowing what the tree is as it is in its unperceived status?

It very well may be separate metaphysics attribute to things-in-themselves and noumena a knowledgeable reality of their own, but in Kant, having given only 26 pages to objective reality, the implication is that nothing about them has any significance. — Mww

So at this point noumena is a conception understanding thinks but can’t do anything with. — Mww

I agree that, by definition, the ideas of the noumena and the things-in-themselves are useless, but I think the fact that we can, indeed must, think them as the limits of knowledge, has great significance for understanding the situation we find ourselves in.

Meaning what?

But, he captured the basic idea metaphorically, by using the philosophical concept of "Form". In his Hylomorph theory he made a pertinent distinction between physical Matter and metaphysical*1 Form. — Gnomon

I already acknowledged that Aristotle's hylomorphism was prescient, so I don't know what point you think I missed. I do disagree with "metaphysical form"; the very idea seems meaningless to me; all forms are physical as far as I know.

I don't see any fundamental difference between mental and physical, so, nothing you've said there convinces me that mental information is not supervenient on physical processes.

Cheers Tom

Unless they turn out to be fallacious. Ideas have consequences. — Wayfarer

If an idea makes you miserable, or afraid, or ecstatic then yes it can have consequences. But such responses are not inherent in the idea: the same idea might make one person afraid and another ecstatic, for example.

Perhaps you are suggesting ideas might have afterlife consequences. I can't entirely rule that out, but how could you ever decide which idea, assuming that there is an afterlife, was the beneficial one? If rebirth is the right idea, then all the Christians who believe in resurrection are fucked, and vice versa for the Buddhists if resurrection is the right idea? All those who believe there is no afterlife are fucked regardless? The idea seems absurd to me, so I'll have to presume that is not what you meant, since I think you are a reasonably intelligent fellow.

When I said that I don't buy the idea that the form of the oak in the acorn comes from somewhere else I wasn't referring to previous oaks; in fact, I explicitly said so.

The concept of information refers to a formalist (i.e. computational) description of systematic transformations (i.e. entropy), the necessary and sufficient conditions of which are its instantiation in physical processes. — 180 Proof

I agree with you: the idea of non-physical information makes no sense at all to me, since all information requires a medium, and there does not seem to be any other medium than the physical as far as I can tell.

I'm in the dual-aspect school (à la Spinoza). — 180 Proof

Me too.

Yes, I also find the question of the difference or sameness of noumenon with thing-in-itself can be somewhat confusing. I think of the noumena as being what appears to us as the phenomena. But then would not the thing-in-itself be what appears to us as thing-for-us, making the two ideas pretty much equivalent?

I take Kant to be a realist; phenomena are real for us and noumena can only be ideal, in that we can only have ideas about their nature, whereas we perceive the phenomenal aspects of noumena that appear in the interactions with us we call "perception".

So in that sense noumena and phenomena can be understood to be the same thing seen under the two different aspects: in-themselves and as-they-appear.

I remember reading somewhere that there are two schools of thought among Kant scholars: the dual world theorists and the dual aspect theorists.

So, I don't think of the ideas of noumena and in-itself as add-ons, but as qualifications marking the limits of knowledge.

An add-on would consist in making claims about what the noumena or things-in-themselves are, as Plato and Schopenhauer do.

Maybe @Mww can shed more light.

Yes, I'm familiar with that parable and it is very pertinent.
We all seem to enjoy thrashing out these issues, maybe by way of diversion. I don't see any profoundly important moral battle going on between metaphysical materialism and spiritualism in modernity.

The only form of materialism I find ethically and spiritually compromising is the kind of materialism that consists in attachment to excessive material profit, wealth and status, and I think that exists equally among people of all kinds of metaphysical persuasions.

Nāgārjuna said that all spiritual teachings are like a stick you use to poke the fire. When the fire is well alight you can thrown the stick in with it. But only then. — Wayfarer

That says nothing about having to entertain any particular metaphysics in order to practice. Of course if you are drawn to a particular tradition with its particular set of metaphysical views you are not there to question the views, but to use them as aids and/ or inspiration for practice. Different traditions have different views and practices and will appeal to different aspirants.

Ancient philosphy, according to Hadot, consisted in several such schools or traditions. Nowadays there are schools which eschew metaphysical concerns altogether in favour of workable techniques. What is important is what works, and that will differ depending on the individual.

I think the idea of noumena is derived from the pretty much universal belief that the objects of perception are independently existent, coupled with the realization that naive realism is, on analysis, untenable. What follows is the realization that we know objects of the senses only as they appear to us.

That passage is not from Hadot. In any case, I don't think one's metaphysical views have any bearing on one's spiritual practice; on one's ability to realize equanimity, non-attachment, peace of mind or whatever you want to call it.

Whether you believe in an afterlife, in resurrection, rebirth or reincarnation or you don't believe in any afterlife at all is irrelevant. I find it most plausible to think that people are simply attracted to systems that accord with their personal views.

This is evidenced by the diversity and incompatibility of the metaphysical views associated with the various practices and cultures throughout history.

As to believing in an afterlife it can be plausibly argued that such beliefs are motivated by self-concern, and so if anything, might be thought to work against achieving equanimity and non-attachment to ideas of self and self-interest in general.

The burgeoning secular buddhist movement also speaks in favour of thinking that ideas like karma and rebirth are unnecessary to spiritual practice.

Thank you 180 :cool:

Looks quite interesting, but I cannot access the book. Anyway, it's probably a good thing given my list of books to read is already of ridiculous proportions.

Well of course they were a kind of precursor, since as I already said above, Aristotle thought the form of the oak to be immanent within the acorn, and not to be ordained by God or immaterial forms or whatever.

As I remember it (it's a while since I read the book) Pierre Hadot in Philosophy as a Way of Life understands the various ancient Greek philosophical systems as sets of ideas designed to live by, not consisting of claims to be critiqued and argued over. Philosophy under that conception has a different purpose: to provide ways of living designed to free practitioners from the unruly desires, petty concerns, existential anxieties, and worldly attachments that can make life a misery.

A modern equivalent would be Cognitive Behavior Therapy or Gestalt Therapy: if you undertake that practice, you are not there to argue about their different metaphysical or phenomenological claims, but rather to accept the set of ideas that constitute the therapy and practice in accordance with them to (hopefully) gain the result.

So, as Hadot points out Stoicism, Skepticism, Cynicism, Epicureanism, Platonism and Neoplatonism all had very different sets of metaphysical ideas, but they were all similar in there status as philosophical and ethical practices designed to live in better ways. Epicureanism, for example, explicitly rejects the idea of afterlife.

So, I don't think you can cite Hadot to support any contention that it was the metaphysical ideas in the ancient philosophies that were of primary importance: it is more likely that such ideas were as diverse within the systems as were the different kinds of people with their different mindsets, that they sought to attract.

Do you really want to argue that Aristotle knew about DNA?

Taking the example of the acorn: I would say the form of the oak is inherent within, immanent to, the acorn, and I think Aristotle thought the same. You seem to be claiming it is something "abstract" that comes from "somewhere else". I don't believe Aristotle would agree with this (although Plato might, depending on how you interpret him). Today we know about something Aristotle didn't: DNA. So, the form of the oak is encoded within the DNA in the acorn. But that DNA comes from previous oaks, and there is no reason to think the DNA itself has not changed, evolved, over time from ancestor trees, precursors to the oaks and other types of trees that evolved along different lines..

There are two senses of "form" in Aristotle, one is the formula, abstract pattern or design — Metaphysician Undercover

I accept the other sense, but all I am asking for is textual evidence for the above sense as being more, something ontologically fundamental and at the same time "abstract" according to Aristotle, than merely the commonsensically obvious fact that every particular form or pattern can be reproduced, copied or visualized.

In short, as I see it. abstractions are not primary or fundamental they are abstracted from particulars, so they are therefore secondary and derivative.

I don't think so. The issue here is that Kastrup would agree that conscious creatures emerged 'later' and the cosmological events or the 'reality' we have detected which predate life, like consciousness, is simply what mind looks like when viewed from a different perspective. — Tom Storm

The issue I have is that our understanding of mind comes from our human experience of "minding", or to put it another way our understanding of consciousness derives from the experience of awareness (or the awareness of experience). and what it feels like and intuitively seems to mean to be conscious. So, the idea of "what mind looks like" seems incoherent to me.

Schopenhauer is easier to swallow because he speaks of a blind will or striving (an idea I believe he got from Spinoza's "conatus") and this makes more sense to me than the idea of universal mind, since we do see what appears to be striving in the natural world, most particularly in the realms of flora and fauna.

Why should even "inanimate" matter not appear as striving, if it is fundamentally energetic? But a blind, striving will cannot explain how it is that we all see the same things in the world around us, unless the will generates real structures that are continually being formed and broken down by real forces. But this would just be a physicalist view, not an idealist one.

The idea of a universal mind is the idea of a container that holds things as constant thoughts that manifest as the objects of the senses, and look the same to us, because of this activity of the "mind at large", and this would be more than a mere "blind will".

The question then is, if this "mind" is not metacogntiive. is it at least cognitive? Is it aware of us and does it have a plan for us. It all seems too nebulous and far out to me to be taken seriously as anything more than a wishful fantasy. There is only one more wishful step up to a Giod that cares about us.

I'll take that as an admission that you cannot cite anything which supports the claim that form is first and foremost abstract or "immaterial".

Apparently, you are only willing to accept the manifesto assertions of authorities on the subject, and not the humble suggestions of mere amateurs. — Gnomon

Again, you are making unwarranted assumptions about me. I am willing to accept anything that seems plausible to me, that is sufficiently enough supported by cogent argument and/ or evidence to be convincing enough to at least be entertained, if not believed, whether it comes from amateurs or professionals.

I'm familiar enough with the idea that information is metaphysically fundamental to know that it seems that position cannot be coherently expressed; it always just seems to consist in some kind of handwaving exercise. The very idea of information that is not physically instantiated makes no sense at all to me. The medium of conveyance of information, and the energy necessary to convey it, must be more fundamental than what is conveyed, in other words, or so it seems to me.

What problem do you have with positing the physical as an outward expression of the mental? — Bob Ross

This is the crux of the issue for me. I am unconvinced by Schopenhauer's (and Kastrup's derivative) claims that we know the "in-itself" on the basis of some kind of postulated intellectual intuition; this cannot be knowledge but is just a feeling. Maybe that feeling is even correct, but how could we ever know? Of course, if that feeling is certain enough, then doubts would become irrelevant to the one who feels certain, but that feeling could only be relevant for those who might experience such certainty; it remains discursively useless, since the certainty cannot be demonstrated empirically or logically, which means that despite the fact that there might be such certainty, it could still be mistaken.

Another significant problem I have with the idea is that there is a huge body of consistent and coherent scientific evidence that tells us there we many cosmological events long before there were any minds. In order to accept the view that mind is fundamental I would need to discount all that evidence.

It is a foundational unprovable assumption/premiss, resting its laurels on terminological consistency(coherence) and/or 'logical' possibility alone(scarequotes intentional).

Indeed, there are all sorts of things that could be said to follow from it, if accompanied by some other premisses, but - by my lights anyway - 'logical' possibility alone does not warrant belief, and untenability is completely unacceptable. — creativesoul

OK, I don't see it that way: I think that the attributes of things that can be revealed in perception could not be exhaustive of what they are unless some form of idealism were true, and idealism seems very implausible to me. So, it's as I said a logical or conceptual distinction between things as they are perceived and things as they are in themselves, but I don't see the idea that things have their own existence independently of perception as being a mere logical possibility.

Right, it is merely a logical or conceptual distinction, and according to its own lights cannot ever be anything more than that. And yet the distinction seems to be the catalyst for so much speculation. Given the completely unknowable character of the noumena as it is defined can it provide any cogent grounds for such speculation?

I'm not asking you to interpret, or take out of context, but merely to quote any passage(s) where Aristotle speaks about abstract pattern or design.

There are two senses of "form" in Aristotle, one is the formula, abstract pattern or design — Metaphysician Undercover

Can you cite a passage from Aristotle where he speaks about abstract pattern or design?

Aristotle rejects the idea that forms are patterns (Metaphysics 991a-b). — Fooloso4

Thanks, I'll check that reference.



Thanks for giving me a rundown of your understanding of form and matter; I didn't find that to be unfamiliar or contentious.

You have given two footnote references to Plato's ideas, but we were discussing Aristotle's understanding of form. not Plato's. Also, one of your footnotes appears to be your own writing amd the other does not seem to come from a scholarly source.

If we are going to cite Aristotle or Plato on these questions, I want to know what they thought, not what you or someone other internet poster thinks about what they thought.

Leaving the Ancients aside, my own understanding is that form and matter are inseparable. The blueprint drawing you showed is just another example of configured material: in this case ink on paper or pixels on a screen. It's true that it represents something else: a house that may or may not be built, but my main point is that patterns are never abstract but are always materially instantiated.

How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer

It is a logical or phenomenological distinction.

If I am understanding you correctly, then I would answer that they are ‘connected’ in the sense that they are perceiving the same objective world: it just isn’t fundamentally a physical world. — Bob Ross

So, you agree there is a mind-independent world, you just don't agree that it is physical? I have no argument with that since the definition of 'physical' derives from how things appear to us: tangible and measurable.

I think Kant's claim that we don't know what things are in themselves stands, and if physicality is an attribute of things as they are sensorially perceived, then imputing that to things as they are unperceived would seem to be a category error.

Saying that things are fundamentally mental is an example of the same kind of category error, because 'mental' is a term denoting how certain phenomena: thoughts, feelings, volitions and so on, seem to us. That is to say they seem to be different than the objects of the senses in that they seem intangible and are not measurable.

I agree that science will not explain, nor is it its business to, but a reductive physicalism is required, by their own view, to expect neuroscience to explain it one day. — Bob Ross

The subjective 'feels' of experience cannot be explained by science and it is hard to see how science could explain exhaustively how neural processes can give rise to those subjective feels, since the former are third person observable processes and the latter are not; meaning that the former can be reductively modeled in a mechanical or causal way, and the latter cannot, which makes it seem as though there will always be am unbridgeable explanatory gap. I have never heard a convincing argument that this gap can somehow be crossed by an explanation that holds together on both sides of it, so to speak. It seems to me an issue of basic incommensurability.

That it would be, to summarize, a category error to class the in-itself as either physical or mental entails, I think, that we have good reason to eschew any form of ontological dualism. So, I see monism, the idea that there are not ontologically different categories of being or substance, as the most rational conclusion to hold to.

In the Hylomorphism quote from my post, Aristotle makes a pertinent distinction between Potential (not yet real ; insubstantial) and Actual (substantial) Form. So, I was not "misusing" Aristotle. Your own preferred definition of Potential as "substantial actualization of potential", is in agreement with my assertion that, prior to actualization, Form is an unreal abstract idea : a pattern in the mind, not in matter*2. Do you agree that Abstractions are patterns stripped of substance? If so, then we can continue to discuss Monism. :smile:


*1. Form, In the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle the active, determining principle of a thing. The term was traditionally used to translate Plato’s eidos, by which he meant the permanent reality that makes a thing what it is, in contrast to the particulars that are finite and subject to change. Each form is the pattern of a particular category of thing in the world; — Gnomon

But even Aristotle's theory of physical bodies combined Hyle (concrete matter) with Form (abstract pattern or design)*2. — Gnomon

I agree Aristotle makes a distinction between potential and actual. but I don't read him as thinking of potential as 'Insubstantial form" but as "primary matter" which I take to mean formless matter. We were not discussing Plato, but again I don't understand Plato's forms to be "abstract patterns" but rather understood to be things more real than actual forms.

For example, Aristotle, as I understand it, thought the form of the oak was in potential in the acorn, but not as something abstract, but a kind of real "concrete" potential. However, I am no scholar of Ancient Greek philosophy, and I welcome correction (or confirmation) by someone more knowledgeable; perhaps @Fooloso4 might weigh in on this.

I think of "abstract" as denoting general ideas which are arrived at by abstracting away from the concrete details of particulars to arrive at common patterns or structures, so abstractions in this sense would be secondary and derivative, not primary and determining.

Right, we all follow our instincts or intuitions and in some cases our intellects if what to do is a concern at all for us.

Personally I remain unconvinced that there is a grand scheme, but I think that how to live is an important issue, and that any one who cares about it just has to muddle through and hope for the best.

You are being very kind and understanding to those short, ugly, vicious morons.

But seriously, I agree; much of the viciousness and stupidity is culturally fomented and ideologically, economically and politically motivated.

You seem to be putting the cart before the horse; how could we be doing "what we are supposed to" if that should be according to a cosmic purpose no one seems to be able to discover and reveal to the satisfaction of all reasonable people?

. This goes back to the discussion about the erosion of the idea of an animating cosmic purpose. — Wayfarer

Many different cosmic purposes have been imagined; they are as diverse as the cultures that have imagined them; they each tell different stories.

Say there is a cosmic purpose; how could we ever discover it; then all of humanity decide what it is and agree?

If that would be impossible then what use to a global humanity beyond being perhaps interesting fictions could the diverse stories that are recorded or that might still exist in certain enclaves be?

Not good enough! I've met short ugly morons in happy marriages - and not always with short ugly morons.
— Vera Mont

Right, but that short ugly morons may have a greater tendency to become miserable incels than tall, handsome/ beautiful geniuses do, does not entail that all short ugly morons will be miserable incels, or that all tall, handsome/ beautiful geniuses will not be miserable incels.

That said, being an involuntary celibate, miserable or otherwise, does not equate to identifying as an incel; the latter would seem to entail a very special blend of viciousness and stupidity.

Deleted

Two attractive parents can birth and raise unattractive offspring and two unattractive parents can birth and raise beautiful offspring depending on gene recombination/complimetarity if the pairing in any given individual. — Benj96

I remember reading years ago that statistical studies have shown that two highly intelligent parents tend to have less intelligent offspring, too very tall parents tend to have shorter offspring and two very beautiful parents tend to have less beautiful offspring. The same goes in the cases of low intelligence, short and ugly parents; in reverse of course. If this were not so, humanity would have long since separated into two races: very tall, beautiful geniuses and very short ugly morons.

Why do they choose to be miserable? — Vera Mont

Because they're short, ugly morons...
:wink:

Yes there is an alternative explanation (in fact, there are many): idealist will argue that the brain states are extrinsic representations of the mental states. Substance dualism argues they are two independent things. Physicalists argue that the mental state is an intrinsic (or extrinsic depending on how one wants to view there qualia) representation of brain states. The hard problem is only a hard problem for physicalists, and different views (like idealism and substance dualism) attempt to provide a metaphysical theory that be rid us of the problem. — Bob Ross

If there are many minds and many mental states, and they are not connected with one another, then how to explain the unarguable fact that we experience the same things in the same environments? I don't deny that the way we perceive things is peculiar to humans because our brains and perceptual organs are constituted in the same ways, and in ways more or less similar to animals. But other animals, judging from their behavior, perceive the same things we do in the same locations that we do, which suggests that there are real structures there, which are independent of being perceived. Have you ever witnessed a bird trying to land on the branch of a tree that you could not see?

The hard problem is only a problem for physicalists if they presume that consciousness is not physical, and/ or that the emergence of consciousness in certain kinds of complex physical structures is impossible. The subjective "feel" of conscious experience is not available to third person observation, so it is not the business of science to explain it. Why should we think that everything whatsoever can be explained in terms of physical models?