I'll put it this way: there can be matter without mind but not mind without matter. — Fooloso4
Agreed, but with respect to the case at hand, the form of the perceived, but as yet undetermined, object, is not the same as the shape of it, which is its extension in space and belongs to the object alone. — Mww
If I am understanding you correctly, then I would answer that they are ‘connected’ in the sense that they are perceiving the same objective world: it just isn’t fundamentally a physical world. — Bob Ross
I agree that science will not explain, nor is it its business to, but a reductive physicalism is required, by their own view, to expect neuroscience to explain it one day. — Bob Ross
I'm certainly not a materialist. However I cannot call myself an "idealist" either. Besides, there are different kinds of "idealism"! And even then I cannot identify or confine myself with(in) any of them.I see: are you an idealist? — Bob Ross
:up: Thanks for this. It explains a lot. I thought it was only a "local", personal phenomenon. :grin:idealism’s weak point prima facea is that it doesn’t give an incredibly detailed depiction of consciousness, which it is positing as fundamental. — Bob Ross
Nice. See, I don't know these things. I have never studied or talked extensively about "idealism", or any "ism" for that matter. I was never interested. But it is alsways good to know.Every metaphysical must stop its explanation at something which is metaphysically necessary, and for idealism it is mind. — Bob Ross
Nicely put. Yet, "obscurity" and lack of explanation for me means lack of real undestanding. And this holds for both physical and non-physical things. I always refer to Einstein her, who said "If you can't explain it simply, you don't understand it well enough.” I'm very positive in this.So there’s going to be a bit of obscurity in how it works not only because we have been living in a physicalist world so long that we haven’t bother to try and look for explanations in mind but also because we are trying to understand the bedrock of reality (which is certainly much harder to understand than entities within phenomenal experience). — Bob Ross
Yes, I know that. Yet, it does not explain what "consciousness" is. This was my point.distinction between being “in consciousness” and “having consciousness” — Bob Ross
That's fair. I don't think that anyone can know exactly how consciousness works. But there are a few I know that have descibed this quite well and in a plausible way.I don’t think Kastrup claims to know exactly how all of consciousness works, — Bob Ross
Interesting view.I think he would say that consciousness is, at its base, mental events “interacting” with each other ... — Bob Ross
Certainly not. As I say, to explain what Science considers "consciouness", is that it is talking about bodily consciouness, i.e., based on senses, with anesthesiologists being the experts on the subject. :grin:“consciousness proper”, under analytic idealism, is not to be confused with physicalist usages of the term “consciousness” — Bob Ross
Right.Under analytic idealism, consciousness can be attributed to the entirety of your being, including your organic processes that you don’t directly control, and the aspects that are within your every day-to-day experience — Bob Ross
I'm glad to hear that! :smile:I am also not convinced that the entirety of myself is an illusion, but can get on board with the ego being an illusion — Bob Ross
Nice! :up:We are concretely separate from others and the universal mind in the sense that two whirlpools in the same body of water are distinct but yet made of the same water. — Bob Ross
Nice!Unlike non-conscious objects, it is very clear (in a non-arbitrary way) where my conscious experience ends and yours begins if we were to touch hands. There is no illusion here.
... We reassimilate into nature, which is what I would expect and not that we are illusions. — Bob Ross
A stone carried along in a river will either continue on downstream or get stuck if it bumps up against some other object or objects depending on its shape. — Fooloso4
The stone either moves along with the current or not. This happens whether we observe it or not. — Fooloso4
It is not coincidence that in all traditional metaphysics you see the theme: The truth that is spoken is no longer the truth. — TheMadMan
I don’t think our mind works materialistic: I think that the modernist era has produced a predominant metaphysical view in favor of materialism. Also, why would our mind working materialistically entail duality? Are you saying materialism entails irreductive materialism? — Bob Ross
Do you mean that metaphysical theories evolve? Or that they don’t give absolute truth? — Bob Ross
Would make for a very sparsely populated philosophy forum, however. — Wayfarer
That it would be, to summarize, a category error to class the in-itself as either physical or mental entails, I think, that we have good reason to eschew any form of ontological dualism. So, I see monism, the idea that there are not ontologically different categories of being or substance, as the most rational conclusion to hold to. — Janus
Could you elaborate on the proof? — Bob Ross
As having "extension in space" is simply how we represent objects, conceptually. — Metaphysician Undercover
we cannot truthfully sat that "space belongs to the object" — Metaphysician Undercover
The same principle applies to all phenomenal experiences whatever. Stones move, mountains form, things get taken from the fridge. — Wayfarer
The basis of the idealist argument is all such phenomena still occur within experience — Wayfarer
If you show the same things to to me, then they will also appear in my experience, — Wayfarer
"Space" is conceptual, or intuitive, as a tool of representation, it really has no place outside of the mind. — Metaphysician Undercover
Suppose it gets to the point where there is general agreement that AI has become conscious. This would weaken rather than strengthen the case for idealism. — Fooloso4
How is that agreement going to come about? — RogueAI
Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin: — jorndoe
The things shown and their appearance in your experience are not the same. The phenomenal experience is of the thing shown. — Fooloso4
How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer
I can hold that thing and bring it to you, but cannot hold what appears in your experience. — Fooloso4
...the question you asked for: “can physicalism possibly account for qualia under its reductive physicalist methodological approach without appeal to an obscurity?”. That is essentially the question that expresses the hard problem of consciousness. If one answers not, then it is a hard problem; however, if they answer yes, then it is a soft problem. — Bob Ross
How do you differentiate between the thing shown and the thing as it is in itself? — Wayfarer
Not really. Having extension in space is that by which objects are sensed and represented intuitively as phenomena. Objects represented conceptually is that by which they are thought. Technically, albeit theory-specific, re: intrinsic human cognitive duality, having successions in time is how we represent objects conceptually, space not being a condition for conceptual representation. — Mww
Distance between Moon and Earth is in our heads...? :chin: — jorndoe
Ultimately, what we call “reality” is so deeply suffused with mind- and language-dependent structures that it is altogether impossible to make a neat distinction between those parts of our beliefs that reflect the world “in itself” and those parts of our beliefs that simply express “our conceptual contribution.” The very idea that our cognition should be nothing but a re-presentation of something mind-independent consequently has to be abandoned. — Dan Zahavi (quoting Hillary Putham)
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