But, if I am understanding your objections properly, wouldn't this equally apply to knowing that anyone else is having any experiences at all?

How do you "demonstrate" that someone else is experiencing red, enjoying a song, or in pain, for instance? — Count Timothy von Icarus

You can demonstrate that people see red by showing them something red and asking them what colour it is. We tend to think we can tell when someone is in pain or enjoying something by their behavior, by reading their facial expressions and body language for example—but it is always possible they are faking.

Presumably the same way we "verify" other historical claims. But if your problem is not the plausibility of particular Christian claims, but rather our capacity to verify these sorts of claims at all, it would seem that the problem of verification you identify here would apply equally to virtually all fact claims about historical events. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The more we can cross-reference documents that record the same events when or close to when they happened, the more reliable we would think the records are—the more likely we would be to believe the events happened. There is no way to go back and observe though.

When the recording documents are understood to be more distant in time from the described events then their reliability would reasonably be thought to be inversely proportional to the temporal distance. When the described events are extraordinary, things of which we have no well-documented examples, like walking on water, raising people from the dead or turning water into wine. then we would be justified in skepticism.

In general, we cannot be sure of any historical events because as I said above, we cannot go back in time to observe for ourselves.

:cool:

My point is we, especially empiricism, designate the info perceived from sight as "superior" to the info received from feelings. — ENOAH

Not "superior" but just more reliable. In the context of epistemology, we are discussing what we can be justified in saying we know. That means rationally justified. It leaves untouched the question of the power of emotions, of lived experience, to convince the experiencer of anything. If I have a so-called religious experience, I know the experience in a participatory sense, but the experience cannot justify any post hoc interpretations of, or judgement about, it. Such experiences cannot yield discursive knowledge other than that I had the experience and whatever intutions or feelings that came with it.

Nevertheless maybe if God does exist, we "know/believe" this from fellings rather than the conventionally admired organic triggers of construction (perception). — ENOAH

But that "maybe" is of little use to us, since it is unknowable.

After all, how does one demonstrate that reason itself is valid or has any authority, or demonstrate the Principle of Non-Contradiction, etc.? It seems quite impossible to give a non-circular argument in favor of reason, one that does not already assume the authority of reason. — Count Timothy von Icarus

We have no other criteria other than those of reason, so there can be no point in questioning its authority—we can imagine no other reliable authority. We don't need to argue in favour of reason, because any possible argument against it would be using it, and that would be a performative contradiction.

So, this is a "feeling" that underpins the authority of argument itself, and one might suppose that because of this it is better known than knowledge that is achieved through rational demonstration. — Count Timothy von Icarus

It doesn't seem to say it is just a feeling that underpins arguments. The validity of arguments consists in their consistency. If you contradict yourself then it is impossible to determine what you are wanting to say. If you make a claim about something that can be observed, the claim can be checked and confirmed or disconfirmed. metaphysical claims in general are really undecidable because as valid as they might be they are based on premises which cannot be confirmed. In those cases, we argue for plausibility. Unfortunately, plausibility does not have a precise measure. It's a similar problem as with claims about aesthetics. One might say it is not plausible to claim that MIlls and Boon is better literature than Shakespeare, and it seems good arguments can be given against such an absurd claim, but ultimately no proof can be given.

This does not, however, imply that all noesis is equally easy for all people to come to. Indeed, if it is akin to dianoia, to discursive knowledge, we shouldn't expect this sort of democratization. — Count Timothy von Icarus

The question is whether noesis alone can justify dianoia. Noesis is personal—it cannot be definitively conveyed. Dianoia is interpersonal, and it is reliably shareable experience which gives it any basis. So it would seem that noesis cannot justify dianoia because noesis cannot be reliably shared.

Just as my mind displaces the raw visual sensation of round red object into the perception of "round" > "red" > until it settles on the belief, "apple" projected as knowledge; my mind displaces the raw feeling sensation of X into the perception of "y"> "z">until it settles on the belief, "god" projected as faith, a particular shape of knowledge. — ENOAH

The two are different, though, insofar as everyone sees the apple but no one sees god..

In this discussion we see people who don't believe that faith is a valid way to know anything. — T Clark

Faith or intuition are valid ways of knowing—simply because inhabiting a faith or intution is a knowing. It is a knowing of a certain kind of experience. It is not, however, a propositional knowing—although it might lead to propositional beliefs, those beliefs cannot be verified by the faith or intuition. And note, this is not to say that the faith or intution cannot be convincing to the one inhabiting it, it is just to say that it cannot provide sufficient grounds for an argument intended to convince others.

If others are convinced by your intution-based conviction then it will be on account of their being convinced by your charisma, or they are sufficiently lacking in critical judgement to buy an under-determined argument, or they can relate to the experience you describe because they have had similar experiences and feel the same way. In other words, they are being convinced on the basis of rhetoric or identification, not reason.

As distressingly anti-philosophical as it is, the ultimate truth is a feeling. — ENOAH

Nevertheless, i do think everything we think, departs from the feeling, and in its departure alienates the truth of god as a
human feeling. — ENOAH

This seems exactly right to me. It's basically what I've been arguing on these forums for years. Experiences of any kind which are not simply observational are feelings. When we base beliefs on those feelings, we enter the realm of interpretation and judgement and have already moves away from the living experience.

Nice analysis! We see a similar thing in the international arena. If a country's leaders defy international law, even commit what are considered to be war crimes, or humanitarian violations, the perpetrators usually cannot be brought to justice,

Silly examples are helpful. So what is your "microscope"? Why do you say a Buddhist claim is unverifiable? — Leontiskos

Claims are verifiable by observational evidence or logic (self-evidence). I cannot see how Buddhist claims can be definitively verified, just as claims that one artwork is better than another cannot be definitively verified.

So, I ask how can the claimed supreme enlightenment of the Buddha, a claimed lack of enlightenemnet of Osho, be verified to an unbiased subject?

Sorry, but this is gish gallop. You are just throwing as many random objections out onto the table as you can. If you have an argument it will need to be much more focused. — Leontiskos

No, they are just examples of the kinds of claim that I can see no possibility of verifiability for. I'm not presenting an argument but rather a question to those who believe that such claims are definitively verifiable—I am asking for an argument, for the claim that they are verifiable—an explanation for how they can be verified.

That said, I just don't believe that such experiences yield any determinate knowledge, other than that such experiences may happen. The rest is interpretation after the fact, and usually culturally mediated. That is if people interpret such experience religiously, then they will usually do so in terms of the religion they are familiar with. Of course, such experiences may yield a profound sense of knowing, but that is a different thing and although they might serve to determine my own personal beliefs, they cannot serve to justify anyone else's. They would need to have their own experience.
— Janus

And do you think your claims here are verifiable? — Leontiskos

Which claims do you have in mind? You need to be more specific, as I'm not sure I've made claims here, but am just laying out what I personally believe on the basis of personal experience, and what I don't believe on the basis of having a lack of reason to believe.

But he himself asserts that such claims are false. — Leontiskos

That's bullshit—I have not said that post hoc claims based on, or interpretations of, religious experiences, are false—I have merely claimed that they cannot be verified to be true. This discussion will proceed better if you don't misrepresent what I have said.

So I don’t think claims based on religious experience are unverifiable, even though they are more difficult to substantively verify or falsify. — Leontiskos

If you think such claims are verifiable, whereas I don't believe they are simply because I cannot see how they could be, then the burden is on you to explain how they could verifiable. And bear in mind I am asking how they can be verifiable to the unbiased. I don't deny that the "choir" might agree with any kind of outlandish claims. For example, some Christians believe that Jesus caused Lazarus to return to life when he had been dead, that Jesus walked on water, and that Jesus himself "rose from the dead". How would you verify such claims? 'Verify' does not mean merely 'convince others'.

Does that bolded sentence contain a typo? — Leontiskos

Yes, thanks for pointing that out—the "can" should have been a "cannot".

I haven't addressed anything as silly as verufying Buddhist claims with a microscope. so that seems like a red herring to me.

I think someone could achieve the same level of proficiency as Gautama, and at that point they would be positioned to vet such a claim. A person in that position would be capable of verifying or falsifying such a claim. The same thing could be done to a lesser extent by someone who has not achieved that state, but has learned to recognize proficiency or hierarchy in that realm. These are all forms of verification, are they not? — Leontiskos

So, you are saying that if I became supremely enlightened, I would know whether the Buddha was supremely enlightened? Can the claim that it is possible to become supremely enlightened be verified in the first place? If I thought I was supremely enlightened, allowing for the sake of argument that I could know such a thing, how could I know the same thing about someone I had never met? And even if I had met him or her, how could I know? And further even if I could know, how could I demonstrate that knowledge to someone else? And all that aside, how could I rule out self-deception in my own case?

I believe that altered states of consciousness, epiphanies and what are called religious experiences are certainly possible, they do sometimes, under certain conditions, happen. I know this from personal experience. But I cannot demonstrate even that possibility to anyone who has not experience an altered state themselves, and then I don't need to demonstrate anything—my experience is irrelevant to them. It is their own experience that might lead them to belive.

That said, I just don't believe that such experiences yield any determinate knowledge, other than that such experiences may happen. The rest is interpretation after the fact, and usually culturally mediated. That is if people interpret such experience religiously, then they will usually do so in terms of the religion they are familiar with. Of course, such experiences may yield a profound sense of knowing, but that is a different thing and although they might serve to determine my own personal beliefs, they cannot serve to justify anyone else's. They would need to have their own experience.

The point has nothing to do with humility. Anyone of intelligence can learn to think critically—if their excessive biases of thought don't preclude their being interested in developing the capacity of course. I don't deny that to develop that mind set would have been that much harder in Ancient Greece than it is today.

There can only be unverifiable abilities or knowledge if the bearer is irretrievably separated from all other subjects. — Leontiskos

Right, which is to say that something can be verifiable even if it is not verifiable according to some particular metric. For example, a Buddhist claim can be verified, but not with a microscope. — Leontiskos

We might agree—what kind of Buddhist claims do you have in mind? For example, do you think the Buddhist claim that Gautama was supremely enlightened can be verified?

not as I understand it - ontotheology was the concentration on beings instead of Being, but writ large as the ‘supreme being’ — Wayfarer

You are wrong about that...look it up.

But you are not Socrates — Wayfarer

Judging from Plato's reports of Socrates, I'm just as capable as he was as he was of critical thought It's a pity the same cannot be said of you.

You're a hopeless interlocutor. I make an effort to answer your questions and all you care to address are the trivial points you can carp over. I hope you go back to ignoring me now.

:up: Nicely articulated!

What you are saying is that what I'm tagging 'higher knowledge' can only be subjective or personal, as it can't be objectively measured or validated: — Wayfarer

That's right. It's like aesthetic quality in that sense. We experience the beauty and profundity of works, but we have no way of confirming that those are objective qualities.

I guess by 'rigorously tested' you mean subjected to empirical testing. This is what I mean when I said you are appealing to positivism, as it is what positivism says. — Wayfarer

Empirical testing is definitive only in cases of observational propositions, not in the case of scientific hypotheses. The fact that the predictions that are made on the basis of an hypothesis can be observed to obtain does not prove the hypothesis to be true. So, the 'verification' principles of positivism I don't hold.

But notice that I have nowhere in this thread mentioned those as facts. — Wayfarer

The problem is that if someone says that rebirth or afterlife or God is real, then they are claiming that they are facts. If you want to say such things and yet also say that they are not facts, then what would you be saying? It seems to me you would be saying nothing cogent, or else you would be contradicting yourself. If you merely want to say that those things are believed, then if true (and we obviously know it is true) it would be a fact that they are believed—but what would be the point since we already know that.

What I've referred to are some specific Buddhist texts (among others) on the meaning of detachment. But the terms 'karma', 'rebirth' were introduced to the discussion by you, and 'God' in the context of the writings of Meister Eckhardt (who was a Christian theologian). — Wayfarer

As I've said many times, I have no issue with ideas like detachment or Stoic acceptance—I think they are commonsense principles for the attainment of peace of mind. My whole argument is just that the so-called enlightened do not know anything demonstrably true about the nature of reality or the meaning of life. The teachings are only valuable insofar as they may help people gain peace of mind. If you need to believe in God to gain peace of mind there's nothing wrong with that. But trying to prove that God exists to others is futile, and also, I don't think it's a good way to attain peace of mind.

I don't deny the reality of so-called 'spiritual experiences'—the experiences are real, but the conclusions people draw on account of those experiences are subjective. I think it's important to get that clear, or else the door to fundamentalism and ideology and abuse swings wide open.

I agree that in one sense, it can only be known 'each one by him or herself'. But in the long history of philosophy and spirituality there are contexts within which such insights may be intersubjectively validated. That is the meaning of the lineages within such movements. — Wayfarer

It's like how people within art or literary or musical movements intersubjectively validate their mutual aesthetic judgements. It only works if you're already converted, so to speak. There can be definitive intersubjective validation of the kind that would convince the unbiased.

With difficulty! Delusion and mistakes are definitely hazards and there are many examples, which fake gurus are quick to exploit. — Wayfarer

Sure, but you have no definitive way of determining who is fake and who is not. Otherwise, intelligent, even highly intelligent, individuals could not be deceived, as they apparently very often are.

I'm not ruling out the possibility of a "much deeper understanding of reality", but I have no idea what it could look like, and if it were not based on empirical evidence or logic, then what else could it be based on?
— Janus

Metacognitive insight - insight into the mind's own workings and operations. After all one of the foundational texts of Western philosophy is about Socrates' 'know thyself' and he was keenly aware of the possibility of self delusion. A lot of his dialogues were focussed on revealing the self-delusions of those to whom he spoke. — Wayfarer

Introspection is notoriously unreliable. Also, I was talking about the nature of reality in the universal sense, not just of the human condition. Socrates claimed to know nothing other than that he knew nothing. The Socratic dialogues seem to be mostly concerned with showing people, via critical examination, that they do not know what they think they do about things like justice, virtue, the good and so on. I'm attempting to do a similar thing here.

It's not unique to me. And I'm not condemning modernity. What I've said that is objectivity has a shadow. There is something that exclusive reliance on objective science neglects or forgets. And I'm far from the only person who says this. You probably have read more Heidegger than have I, but this is a theme in his writing also, is it not?

Really recommend John Vervaeke's lectures in Awakening from the Meaning Crisis on all this. — Wayfarer

I think it's obvious that we cannot rely on science when it comes to aesthetic and ethical judgements. Humans understand one another in terms of reasons, not in terms of causation, so science is of little use in our everyday attempts to understand one another. Heidegger counts science ( 'present at hand' enquiry) to be secondary to and derivative of lived experience, and I think that is true. But he cautioned against 'ontotheology' which I understand to consist in the absolutization of the human undertsnding of being. I think it is what you get when you say that because nothing is experienced and judged without the mind, that therefore nothing exists without the mind. I think this confuses knowledge and understanding with being.

I have watched about 30 episodes of Vervaeke' lectures, and I found them quite interesting. I didn't find much there to disagree with if I remember rightly (I watched them over a year ago now).

I've pointed to the psychics that the FBI uses any number of times now. — Leontiskos

I have no idea whether that is well-documented or not.

The claims they make are not testable predictions
— Janus

Sure they are. I've already shown that. You just keep asserting the contrary. Again: — Leontiskos

I have already told you I am not concerned about claims that could be verified by observation. I'm talking about claims like 'the Buddha was enlightened, whereas Osho was not' or 'god exists' or 'the soul is reincarnated' or ' there is a spiritual realm that we all go to when we die' and so on.

I don't know why you keep addressing what I've already told you is not my target.

That’s what I mean by ‘subjectivising’ - that you regard such claims as possibly noble, but basically subjective. I don’t think they are *either* claims of fact, *or* articles of personal belief. It’s too narrow a criterion for matters of this kind. — Wayfarer

If claims are not intersubjectively verifiable and yet not "articles of subjective belief" then what are they? You are not actually saying anything that I could either agree or disagree with.

You're limiting valid knowledge claims to the propostional, even while denying it!

Two of the three points you make are in the form of 'this type of knowledge is just[/...] - if that is not reductionist, then what is it? You are literally explaining them away. So, what's to discuss? — Wayfarer

I'm limiting valid knowledge claims to claims that can be rigorously tested. If someone says that rebirth is a fact, or Karma is real, or the existence of God is a fact, or the Buddha was enlightened...these are not valid knowledge claims, they are articles of personal belief.

Also, If I've said, "this type of knowledge is just...", and you disagree then the proper response would be to make an argument that shows that this type of knowledge is not just whatever. There is no point saying I'm being reductive without counterargument to what I've said. Also, I'm not explaining them away—I think those different kinds of knowledge are really validly distinguishable different kinds of subjective know-how and/ or experience.

It is my conviction that there is a vertical axis of quality, along which philosophical insight can be calibrated. It is distinct from the horizontal plane of scientific rationalism. That is 'where the conflict really lies'. — Wayfarer

You are entitled to that conviction, and I'm entitled to lack it, and I've never said otherwise. It is an impossible conviction to argue for, though, or at least I've never seen an argument for it, from you or anyone else, that would convince the unbiased.

I suppose. But I went to a seminar once, where there was a discussion of whether traditional Buddhism had any kind of environmental awareness in the modern sense of respect for the environment. The view was pretty much, no, it is not something that Buddhism ever really thought about, in the pre-industrial age. — Wayfarer

It wasn't thought about because the science had not yet been developed. Also, the shit was not about to hit the fan as it is now.

Nothing whatever. I present ideas and texts, and then discuss them. If they irritate you, which they apparently do, then by all means don't participate. — Wayfarer

What irritates me is that you present your beliefs as if they are Truth, I make what I honestly believe are valid objections to your apparent belief that you can know what you apparently think you do, that it is something more than just your personal conviction, and then instead of attempting to address those telling objections you deflect, simply ignore them or pretend that you have already answered them when you most obviously have not. If you presented your beliefs and just said "this is what I believe although I realize it may well not be true" then I would have no reason to complain.

You simply ignored all the points I made about the different kinds of knowledge, points which were in response to your attempt to paint me as reductively refusing to recognize more than one kind of knowledge. If you disagreed with what I said and had valid reason for disagreement then charitability would have dictated that you should address the points I took the trouble to make, and if you realized that I was right in what I wrote then intellectual honesty should have dictated that you admit as much.

And note, I have not been addressing you because you said you were going to ignore me. In this instance, it is you who responded to something I wrote which was addressed to someone else.

Your claim that I want to claim that there is only one kind of knowledge is false, and you should know better if you ever read what I write on these forums. I'm not denying that there are those other kinds of knowledge—I've said so on these forums many times myself. It is only propositional knowledge which is intersubjectively decidable or testable in terms of truth.

Procedural knowledge is not a matter of truth but of skill. Of course, that said whether or not someone possesses a skill is demonstrable if the ability in question is observable. In other words, whether one can ride a bike or perform open heart surgery is testable, but whether or not one knows the truth about the nature of reality is not. In fact, even whether or not one is in an altered state of consciousness is not definitively testable—because it relies on testimony, and it could be faked.

Perspectival knowledge is just knowing what logically follows from whatever presupposition are in play. If we assume that God created the world and that it is all good, all knowing and all powerful then...If there is no God and all of reality is just material, then...And so on...

Participatory knowledge is just knowing what this or that involvement or activity feels like. We cannot know what things feels like for others beyond what we can glean form their behavior and testimony. To say we know always presupposes self-knowledge and honesty on the part of those reporting their experience. The possibility of faking or self-delusion is always there. I can know what things feel like for me, of course, but that cannot really be rigorous intersubjective knowledge.

One of the points I've made to you more than a few times is the case of Osho. As I've said I've employed several sannyasins and also been friends with a few others, and acquainted with some through other friends. They make all the same arguments about Osho being enlightened as you would about the Buddha, the difference being that they actually knew the man himself. And yet you think he was a phony despite (I assume, perhaps incorrectly) never having met him.

So, all you have to go by are your own intuitions. What leads you to assume that your intuitions are better than the equally intelligent people I have met who were convinced he was the real thing? I predict you won't attempt to answer that question, and I think it is because you don't want to admit I am right. Your inability to answer that shows that personal intuitions are not intersubjectively testable knowledge of any kind, even though we might say they are perspectival and participatory (subjective) knowledge

Aren't exploration of those sorts of questions fundamental to philosophy proper? I know the analytical-plain language types don't think so, but then, they didn't feature in the original post. — Wayfarer

I don't believe there is any "philosophy proper"—philosophy is a multifarious thing. We have the diverse field of traditional metaphysics, we have post-Kantian metaphysics and critical philosophy, analytic philosophy, phenomenology, Pomo and so on.

I think Kant put paid to the idea that metaphysical truth in the traditional sense is attainable. Metaphysical questions as traditionally understood are undecidable, because there are no answers for which cogent evidence can be marshaled, and because there are no answers which are logically self-evident. So, answers to metaphysical questions are down to personal conviction, to one's own assessment of what seems most plausible or parsimonious.

I have no problem with speculative philosophy in the creative sense that it may present us with novel ways of thinking about things. Nothing wrong with exploring the imaginable possibilities, but I think intellectual honesty demands that we acknowledge that the truth of such speculations cannot be known.

It's really down to Kant's "limits of knowledge", that Wittgenstein also echoed. Some would say that even Kant transgressed his own principles in claiming to know things which the logic of his own system, if followed consistently, denies the possibility of knowing.

There are themes and insights that are discernable in many different schools of philosophical and religious thought. When you say these are not 'testable', in fact, they are, insofar as generations of aspirants, students and scholars have endeavoured to practice them and live according to those lights, in the laboratory of life, so to speak. As for 'assessing the results of practice', there is an often-quoted Buddhist text on that question, the Kalama Sutta: — Wayfarer

The claim that some techniques work to change consciousness is not in dispute. I know this from personal experience both with meditation, art practice and hallucinogens. I'm questioning the metaphysical ideas that often accompany such practices, the claims to know by direct insight the true nature of reality and the meaning of life.

We've been over this before.

If someone can make an accurate prediction then this is a sign that they had knowledge of the future. — Leontiskos

If someone could make, not just one or two accurate predictions, but could consistently make accurate predictions that were not based on observation and calculation, then we might assume they had some hidden way of knowing what will happen. I know of no such case, so it is just speculation, unless you can present a well-documented case.

And this talk about testable predictions is shifting the goalposts anyway, because the question is about purported direct knowledge of the nature and meaning of reality and being and of life, purported knowledge which has been claimed by different 'sages' and mystics in different cultures throughout history, and right up to the present. The claims they make are not testable predictions, and nor are they logically self-evident, so how are we to assess the veracity of what is claimed by them?

I would not be saying that if it was demonstrated that someone was able to reliably predict eclipses. If they were using observation and calculation and I did not understand how that was possible I would probably have believed that they must have direct non-empirically derived knowledge. In ancient times it was commonly believed that people could be given direct knowledge by the gods. We moderns are of a much more critical mindset when it comes to believing things for which there is no empirical evidence or logical support. Do you think that is a bad thing?

So you believe that the ancient philosophers ability to predict eclipses was based, not on observation and calculation, but on some direct insight into what would happen in the future? If so, do you have any evidence that that is so?

The kind oif direct knowledge I have in mind is the supposed knowledge of the sage into the true nature of reality, not foreknowledge of temporal events. In any case how could it be shown that foreknowledge of some event like an eclipse, if not based on empirical observations and calculation was anything more than a lucky guess. I suppose if someone could demonstrate such foreknowledge constantly, then that might give us pause. I am not aware of any well-documented cases of such reliable "direct" foreknowledge.

For example, if an ancient philosopher claims to have knowledge of an eclipse, and the eclipse occurs when they said it would, then their knowledge is confirmable. — Leontiskos

Yes, but that is empirical knowledge. We were discussing the confirmability of so-called "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition I thought.

The person who claims to have that sort of knowledge propounds theses that are not accessible to the current paradigm, and if those theses are verified then you have evidence for their knowledge. This is the same way any new paradigm establishes itself. — Leontiskos

If those "theses" cannot be confirmed by logical or emprical evidence, then how will they be confirmed? Have such theses been justified in the past? Can you give an example?

What point is there to detachment if there's no emotion to experience the resulting tranquility? There is no peak without a valley. — Christoffer

What do you mean "no emotion to experience the resulting tranquility"? Who says there is no emotion for the Stoic? For example, say you love nature, and you enjoy nothing more than immersing yourself in its beauties. Say it's a peak experience for you—where is the valley (meaning downside not actual valley) in that?

The idea of not worrying about what you cannot change also ends up being ignorant for fixing issues of the world. It's easy to end up in a state of not caring. Emotions about what feels like cannot be changed is often a drive into innovation that do change. — Christoffer

The Stoic advocates learning to let go of concern over those things which cannot be changed. Things like death, illness, loss of loved ones. It doesn't mean you won't feel fear, pain or sorrow—it means that you accept those emotions as inevitable too—we cannot change how we feel, but perhaps we can let go of tendencies to excessively indulge such emotions out of addictive feelings of self-pity.

As to social change, why should I not work to better my circumstances and the circumstances of others if that is what interest me? On the other hand, what would be the point of working towards something I know is impossible to achieve?

You are misunderstanding and misrepresenting the Stoic message. I doubt you have read much of the works of the Stoics.

This seems a little too conclusive to me, but it basically affirms what I was suggesting about separating the two senses of "consciousness." I just think we have to be careful about putting limits on what science can or can't do. There's a natural tendency to regard "science" as meaning "everything we know now, which is all there is to know." A moment's reflection shows how wrong this must be; why would we imagine we have reached the End of Science? Or that we have the conceptual equipment to declare what science must be? So I'm willing to keep an open mind on whether both 21st-century science and phenomenology may one day be shown as antiquated descriptions of a much deeper understanding of reality -- one which, in 25th-century (e.g.) terminology, is understood to be scientific. — J

I don't know what led you to think I was suggesting that we have reached the "end of Science". We know what science consists in as it is practiced. It basically consists in observing, examining and analyzing what our senses reveal to us of the world. It is inherently a "third person" endeavour. Subjective experience cannot be the subject of science because it is not an observable entity or process.

Phenomenology attempts to deal rigorously with subjective experience. Whether it can achieve that is arguable. I'm not ruling it out. The real point at issue for @Wayfarer is the possibility of "direct knowledge" or intellectual intuition. Is it possible to have such knowledge of reality? Obviously, he believes it is possible, and that some humans have achieved such enlightenment. The problem is that if it is possible, you would have no way of knowing that unless you had achieved it yourself.

And even then, how could you rule out the possibility of self-delusion? What kind if argument could possibly show that such knowledge is possible, in fact not merely possible, but real for some? It could not be an argument based on empirical evidence, and it could not be a purely logical argument either. What other kind of argument is there? Personal conviction cannot be intersubjectively justificatory for anything.

I'm not ruling out the possibility of a "much deeper understanding of reality", but I have no idea what it could look like, and if it were not based on empirical evidence or logic, then what else could it be based on? In any case it would not be science as we now understand science. People who think like Wayfarer believe that such an understanding existed more in the past than it does today, but they would not call it science, unless by 'science' is intended something like the original meaning of simply 'knowing'.

Suck it up—where the world is going is not nice.

Can we differentiate between "consciousness" as a possible object of scientific knowledge, and "consciousness" as a lived experience of a particular subject? I think we can. — J

It is not the business of science to study the lived experience of subjects. That is the province of phenomenology, leaving aside the question of whether it delivers coherently and usefully on that. The epoche in phenomenology (bracketing the question of the existence of an external world) is the methodological counterpart to science's bracketing of questions about subjective experience. Those questions simply aren't relevant to the practice of the natural sciences.

I agree with most of what you say there, except for your characterization of the Stoics. I have been interested in and read the main works of the Stoics for years and I see their basic philosophy as being very simple—worry about what you can change and learn not to worry about what you cannot change. It is a philosophy of the inevitable, it posits no afterlife or immortality for us (just as the Epicureans do not) and rather counsels personal acceptance of mortality and all its attendant rigors as the way to peace of mind.

That's right, any well-schooled undergraduate should be able to spot the faulty reasoning, the unjustified conclusions in these kinds of arguments.

The irony is that @Wayfarer can offer only psychologistic explanations of how Western culture has arrived where it has with the additional assertion that we have lost something of the ancient wisdom, when most of the critiques of those ideas are not psychologistic in nature but purely based on critical thinking that examines what we have the best evidence for.

Psychologistic explanations of how idealist thinking is based on wishful thinking could be given, since those ideas which include the possibility of enlightenment, personal salvation and redemption including ultimately immortality would seem to be, for many at least, more attractive than the deflating realist idea that we have just one life.

Why is it not plausible that organisms with sensory equipment have evolved to perceive what is there? How long would we survive if our perceptions were not mostly accurate?
— Janus

Isn't the famous argument by Donald Hoffman and others that evolution does not favour seeing the world as it truly is, but rather seeing it in ways that enhance survival and reproduction. — Tom Storm

Presumably that argument is based on the understanding of evolution of species which is in turn based on the assumption that the fossil evidence is giving us an accurate picture of what organisms existed, when they existed and how they related to one another in terms of structural developments.

But the theory has no justification if it assumes that our senses, and hence the fossil remains, do not give us an accurate picture of the reality, or in other words does not give us an accurate picture of the evolution of species. It is a performative contradiction and as such I cannot take it seriously.

The argument that we all operate with similar mental structures cannot explain more than the common ways in which we perceive and experience, it cannot explain the common content of our experience. I've lost count of how many times that point has remained unaddressed or glossed over.

In any case we cannot understand those structures other than via science, and in vivo they are precognitive, part of the in itself, which would indicate that the in itself has structure, and so is not undifferentiated at all. Structure without differentiation is logically impossible.

If structure exists independently of any mind, then it exists independently of all minds, unless there is a collective mind, and we have, and could have, no evidence of such a thing.

I have sympathy for Wayfarer's account. — Tom Storm

Wayfarer's account does not consist in cogent argument, so in the context of discussion I have no sympathy for it. His account says that he understands something "deep and difficult" that anyone who disagrees with his conclusions doesn't, mustn't understand. This is the same game played by ideologues, would-be gurus and fundamentalists in all times and places. This is part of the problem, not part of any solution.

It is arguable that this mindset is a significant contributor to the problems humanity faces. I have no sympathy for it. And I have experience; when I worked as a landscape contractor I employed quite a few followers of Osho, and Da Free John and I was entangled for years, many more years than I otherwise would have been, with the Gurdjieff Foundation due to my being married to a woman who was devoted to the "spiritual leader" there. Now there was nothing really sinister I ever witnessed about that organization, and I knew hundreds of people there from all walks of life and most of them were decent people.

Now, of course Wayfarer will say they, Gurdijieff, Osho, and Da Free John were charlatans, not the real deal like the Buddha, but their followers will just say he doesn't understand: the exact same "argument" Wayfarer constantly presents to his detractors. How do we know what shenanigans the Buddha might have got up to with his disciples? All we have are scriptures written many years after the death of Gautama.

Of course, the principle of letting go of attachments may well be a good one for personal tranquility and peace of mind, but all the superstitious, otherworldly stuff is the real problem. It leads to devaluation of this life. For me what is important is how one lives this life, because that's all we know.

Wayfarer pushes the idea of direct knowing, of intellectual intuition. I have no problem with someone following their own intuitions, or even their own fantasies: I do so myself, but I am not arrogant enough to count my intuitions or fantasies as reasons for anyone else to think or believe as I do. Doing that opens the door to ideology, guruism and fundamentalism, as I said earlier, and I will have no truck with that.

It does seem to be the case that our mind - our particular cognitive apparatus, with its characteristics and limitations - 'creates' the world we experience from an undifferentiated reality. — Tom Storm

I don't think it is the case at all. It seems implausible that a completely undifferentiated, amorphous "reality" could give rise to the vastly complex world, with all its regularities and the shared experience which makes it possible to study and understand its workings.

I agree that we are pre-cognitively affected, and that everything we do understand is only on account of our cognitive capacities. We know, form observing animal behavior that they perceive the same environments we do, albeit in different ways according to their sensory equipment.

All we know about how we are affected precognitively comes via observation, analysis, conjecture, prediction and experiment, in other words via science. All we know about the way the world works is only possible via observation, analysis, conjecture, prediction and experiment, via science.

Why is it not plausible that organisms with sensory equipment have evolved to perceive what is there? How long would we survive if our perceptions were not mostly accurate? Do we reject such an idea just because we cannot know and understand absolutely everything with absolute certainty?

The only cogent arguments are those which are justified by observation and logic. What possible argument can there be to support the veracity of intellectual intuition or direct knowing other than personal conviction?And personal conviction is not an argument at all, it is only effective when "preaching to the choir', and I don't see how that is going to help us with our common problems, considering how different people's personal convictions are; following that path can only lead to more division.

No, it has nothing to do with "limits of understanding". That's just a ploy you're using to try to justify your nonsense. You're saying something incoherent—"neither existence nor non-existence"— and just plain wrong. There is no reason whatsoever not to think the Universe existed before there were any minds.

I don't care if you ignore me, that's your prerogative. I didn't address you anyway, you responded to something I said addressed to someone else.

As I’ve patiently explained many times, I do not say that nothing exists without the mind. I say that without the mind, there can be neither existence nor non-existence. — Wayfarer

The same error. Proposing that nothing can be said and then saying something for which there can be no warrant.

What do you know about time? Please tell us.
— Corvus
Later. — Banno

Nice :lol: I can almost guarantee he won't get it.

What time might be, or indeed anything might be, in the absence of any mind whatever, can a fortiori never be known.
— Wayfarer
And yet some go a step further, as in this thread, and insist that time does not exist, when at most they can only conclude that they can say nothing. — Banno

Yes, this is indeed the "step too far"—saying that we cannot know anything about anything without the mind (well, duh!) and then concluding that therefore nothing exists without the mind. The epitome of tendentiously motivated thinking!

The world is not a static frame with objects in it, it is a process of reflexive self-change , and our sciences, arts and other forms of creative niche construction particulate in this process. — Joshs

I presume you meant 'participate'...anyway I haven't anywhere said the world is a static frame with objects. It becomes that in the discursive telling, though.

That's true, as I see it.

Any one who disagrees with Corvus is a part of a conspiracy...

It's a now familiar play...

Yes, what Corvus is doing is symptomatic of the malaise in western civilisation. It's about to hit the wall. — Banno

:up: Yes, it's "us and them" and "doubling down" seemingly all the way down and more and more. It's very disturbing to see its playing out intensifying on the world stage. I guess this forum is a microcosm, although thankfully it's not all bad here.

Everything science says is a statement of subjective experience. Your subjective experience sits smack dab in the very heart of scientific concepts, by way of the intersubjective interaction which transforms subjective experience into the flattened , mathematicized abstractions that pretend to supersede it, while in fact only concealing its richness within its generic vocabulary. — Joshs

Science attempts to explain how and why what we all observe is the way it is. It is unquestionable that we, and the other animals live in and experience the same world. Nonetheless how we experience the same things differs from individual to individual.

Science records individual observations of phenomena and attempts to understand them in ways which are consistent with the vast and coherent body of scientific knowledge and understanding which has evolved over at least hundreds of years,

I agree with you that science deals in generalities—pretty much everything we talk about does. Symbolic language is all generalizing, and individual experience is very particular. Symbolic language cannot discursively present the living particularity and dynamism of experience—it can only do that allusively via poetry and literature.

:roll: Now you presume to speak for everyone else—just how low can you sink?

I would be astonished if consciousness as a phenomenon didn't turn out to be biological, and capable of scientific explanation. Subjectivity -- what it's like to be conscious -- may be a different matter. — J

It may be a different matter, or perhaps not. "What it's like to be conscious'—is that not a manifold of perceptions and bodily feelings? Surely animals have such manifolds, different to ours of course, and neither we nor they are conscious of all the different aspects that go to making up what might be described as simply a sense of being there that we and they may be more or less aware of.

I can't but agree. It would be better if OPs had to meet certain standards.

In my view you lack humility and have a deluded sense of your own abilities.