...but in that trashy book of lies, the guardian, so you won't have seen it. — Banno
For almost a decade after qualifying, Duxbury worked as a livestock specialist and a stud person for national farming companies.
Suffice to say, in response to your clear implications, nothing you've provided gives me anything new. It may be worth stepping back from the constant internal accusations you throw at people, which undergird many of your responses :) — AmadeusD
recognising it as a cow consists in not running for the gate because it's a bull, keeping a eye out for pats on the surrounding ground, counting how many cows there are as opposed to kangaroos, and so on. That is it consist in interacting with the cow and with other things. You know it is a cow by those interactions - indeed, knowing it is a cow is those interactions. — Banno
Veridical experiences are caused by some appropriate proximal stimulus, e.g. seeing the colour red when light with a wavelength of 700nm interacts with the eyes, or feeling pain when putting one’s hand in a fire. — Michael
it follows that, contrary to your claims, we do have reliable knowledge of distal objects. — Janus
e have reliable, certain in the relative but not certain in the artificial "absolute" sense, knowledge of external objects. — Janus
This seems to betray the idea that we have some 'direct' relationship with those objects, no? — AmadeusD
We have a reliable relationship with those objects, and with the world, and that is all that matters. — Janus
While I didn't skip over the line before this one, this strikes me as giving up. It's all that matters for every-day consideration, but within this thread that is wholly inadequate, I think. — AmadeusD
Given that both "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, what do you think direct and indirect realists are arguing about? — Michael
What you're missing is the fact that light carries a great deal of information about distal objects, from which it follows that, contrary to your claims, we do have reliable knowledge of distal objects. Perhaps you're trading on the absurd demand for certainty. We have reliable, certain in the relative but not certain in the artificial "absolute" sense, knowledge of external objects. — Janus
I don’t see how this relates to whether we perceive objects directly or indirectly or, in particular, how it relates to the supposed perception of representations or perceptual intermediaries. This is the philosophical substance of the dispute as I understand it. Direct realists claim we do not perceive any perceptual intermediary or representation, whereas indirect realists claim that we do.
Furthermore, I don’t see why a direct realist must hold the view that “distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience” in the physical sense that you suppose. A direct realist can have an unmediated perception without the perception needing to be the perceived object. Otherwise, it’s just a strawman of perception. — Luke
Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both. — creativesoul
I'll offer you the same answer as given to Frank, above. Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist...
We do not simply passively "experience" cows. we feed them, move them into yards, slaughter them and eat them.
All this by way of pointing out that the "constituents of our experience" are not one way, from world to mind; we also change what is in the world, and this is part of our experience of the world. While you read this, you are already formulating your reply.
And you do not feed, herd, slaughter and eat sense impressions. — Banno
That seems non-productively reductionist to me.
— wonderer1
It seems consistent with the scientific evidence. Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the brain. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael
And attempting to frame things in absolute terms, as though there is a real fact of the matter, rather than merely competing or alternative interpretations and their attendant ways of speaking is a lost cause in any case. — Janus
So, we have every reason to reject the whole debate as being wrongheaded from the get-go. — Janus
I didn't say that we don't have reliable knowledge. I said that we don't have direct knowledge. — Michael
How could we have reliable knowledge of objects if they were not experienced by us? — Janus
According to the scientific method, a statistical significance of five sigma is accepted as the criterion for reliable knowledge of unobservable entities like the Higgs boson. — Michael
Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both.
— creativesoul
Yes it can. I feel pain and I feel the fire. I see cows and I see colours. — Michael
Think how much greater than five sigma confidence people would have to have in all those distal objects such as measurement instruments, computers, and a bunch of scientists, to have a reason to believe a five sigma level confidence for the Higgs Boson. — wonderer1
I don't like the idea that we have no direct access to the world. — AmadeusD
Are you referencing the problem of induction? — Michael
The representation is the condition for seeing something, not some thing that you see.
The condition of the body, I presume? — NOS4A2
I’m curious because as far as I know representations prohibit us from seeing the world, and I’m interested in how you can see (or represent) around them. — NOS4A2
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