Not necessarily. I’m undecided between eliminative materialism and property dualism.

All I will say is that experience exists inside the brain, distal objects exist outside the brain, and so distal objects are not constituents of experience. Therefore naive realism is false. Indirect realism as I understand it is nothing more than the rejection of naive realism, and these further disputes between indirect realism and so-called non-naive “direct” realism are confusions arising from different groups meaning different things by the terms “direct” and “see”.

If "the cow I see isn't a constituent of my visual experience" makes sense according to the position you're arguing for/from, but you cannot clearly and unambiguously state what does count as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see, then that is not a problem with the question. It's evidence that there's a problem with the framework you're practicing. — creativesoul

The constituents of visual experience are shapes and colours, the constituents of auditory experience are sounds, the constituents of olfactory experiences are smells, etc.

I don’t understand your question. It’s like asking “what counts as a constituent of a portrait of the President if not the President the portrait is of”.

The fact is that the President is not a constituent of the portrait. The portrait is paint and canvas hanging on a wall. The President is in the White House having breakfast.

What counts as a constituent of seeing cows if not the cow you see? — creativesoul

The cow I see exists outside my head. My visual experience exists inside my head. Therefore, the cow I see isn’t a constituent of my visual experience.

Yes.

No

In the field I presume.

That we coin the term “X” to refer to some Y isn’t that Y depends on us referring to it using the term “X”. This is where you fail to make a use-mention distinction.

If we take the term “1 year” as an example, the Earth orbiting the Sun does not depend on us measuring it. It just orbits it, independently of us.

So to rephrase my example:

A white box turns red when the Earth completes a half-orbit, turns blue when it completes another quarter-orbit, turns back to white when it completes another eighth-orbit, and so on.

What colour is the box when the Earth completes its orbit around the Sun?

Your claims so far are akin to claiming that the Earth will never complete its orbit around the Sun, which just makes no sense. The box does not have the power to influence the Earth's velocity or the Sun's gravitational pull.

In this view, mental representations are seen as immediate reflections of the external world rather than intermediaries that stand between the mind and reality. — Luke

I don't understand this distinction. What is the physical/physiological difference between the two?

If you accept that mental "representations" exist and if you accept that we have direct knowledge only of these mental representations and if you accept that the qualities of these mental representations (smells, tastes, colours, etc.) are not (and are possibly unlike) the mind-independent properties of distal objects then I agree with you.

I call this view "indirect realism" as it is all I understand indirect realism to be; the rejection of naive realism. If you want to call this view "direct realism" then go ahead. The label is irrelevant.

Just understand that your direct realism is not inconsistent with my indirect realism. They're the same position, just given different names.

If you truly believe that an increment of time exists without being measured, tell me how I can find a naturally existing, already individuated increment of time. — Metaphysician Undercover

I don't know what you mean by "finding a naturally existing, already individuated increment of time", but it is a fact that 60 seconds of time can pass without anyone looking at a clock or a stopwatch. Billions of years passed before humanity evolved, and this isn't some retroactive fact that only obtained when humanity started studying the past.

I don't know whether you're arguing for some kind of antirealism or if you're failing to understand a use-mention distinction.

Regardless, the arguments I am making here are directed towards the realist who believes that supertasks are possible.

I was referring to such things as the projectively extended real line.

Increments of time must be measured — Metaphysician Undercover

No they mustn’t.

The contradiction is very obvious. I'm surprised you persist in denial. The supertask will necessarily carry on forever, as the sum of the time increments approaches 60 seconds, without 60 seconds ever passing. Clearly this contradicts "60 seconds will pass". — Metaphysician Undercover

An ordinary stopwatch is started.

After 30 seconds a white box turns red, after a further 15 seconds it turns blue, after a further 7.5 seconds it turns back to white, and so on.

When the stopwatch reaches 60 seconds, what colour is the box?

Your claim that the box changing colour entails that the stopwatch will never reach 60 seconds makes no sense. The stopwatch is just an ordinary stopwatch that counts ordinary time as it ordinarily would and is unaffected by anything the box does.

Sorry, what? You don't believe that 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ... = 1? You don't believe in calculus? You are arguing a finitist or ultrafinitist position? What do you mean?

Of course if you mean real world events, I quite agree. But your three-state lamp is not a real world event, it violates several laws of classical and quantum physics, just as Thompson's two-state lamp does. — fishfry

There is a difference between saying that 1/2 + 1/4 + 1/8 + 1/16 + ... = 1 and saying that one can write out every 1/2n in order. The latter is not just a physical impossibility but a metaphysical impossibility.

Some say that the latter is not a metaphysical impossibility because it is metaphysically possible for the speed with which we write each subsequent 1/2n to increase to infinity, and so that this infinite sequence of events (writing out every 1/2n) can complete (and in a finite amount of time). Examples such as Thomson's lamp show that such supertasks entail a contradiction and so that we must reject the premise that it is metaphysically possible for the speed with which we write each subsequent 1/2n to increase to infinity.

So if you wish to define a final state, you can make it anything you like. I choose pumpkin. — fishfry

If you want to say that supertasks are possible but then have to make up some nonsense final state like "pumpkin" then I think this proves that your claim that supertasks are possible is nonsense and I have every reason to reject it.

Take the scenario here:

After 30 seconds a white square turns red, after a further 15 seconds it turns blue, after a further 7.5 seconds it turns back to white, and so on.

We can sum the geometric series to determine that the limit is 60 seconds. The claim some make is that this then proves that this infinite sequence of events can be completed in 60 seconds.

However, then we ask: what colour is the square when this infinite sequence of events is completed?

As per the setup, the square can only be red, white, or blue, and so the answer must be red, white, or blue. However, as per the setup it will never stay on any particular colour; it will always turn red some time after white, turn blue some time after red, and turn white some time after blue, and so the answer cannot be red, white, or blue. This is a contradiction.

The conclusion, then, is that an infinite sequence of events cannot be completed, and the fact that we can sum the geometric series is a red herring. To resolve the fact that we can sum the geometric series with the fact that an infinite sequence of events cannot be completed we must accept that it is metaphysically impossible for an infinite sequence of events to follow a geometric series: we must accept that it is metaphysically impossible for time to be infinitely divisible.

The description of the Thomson lamp only actually specifies what the lamp is doing at each finite stage before 2 minutes. It says nothing about what happens at 2 minutes, especially given the lack of a converging limit. — Lionino

That's precisely the point. The lamp turning on and off and the square changing colours are each examples of an infinite sequence of events. If you claim that it is possible for an infinite sequence of events to complete then you should be able to determine the completed state of the lamp/square. If you cannot determine the completed state of the lamp/square then I will reject your claim that it is possible for an infinite sequence of events to complete.

Of course the solution doesn't work when you change the mechanism to be exactly like Thompson's lamp without the limit.

Likewise, Earman and Norton's solution doesn't work if you remove the limit (falling ball).

My example keeps the falling ball so I haven't "removed the limit".

Your "solution" doesn't work, as shown by this alternative:

The ball bounces at a rate such that it first strikes the panel after 30 seconds, then again after a further 15 seconds, then again after a further 7.5 seconds, and so on.

Each time the ball strikes the panel the colour of the panel changes, rotating through white, red, and blue.

What colour is the panel when the ball comes to a rest?

by whatever mechanism, the plate knows at what part of the parabola the ball is at, — Lionino

This is just a meaningless hand-wavy rationalisation and is inconsistent with the specific timing intervals:

Red after 30 seconds, blue after another 15 seconds, white after another 7.5 seconds, etc.

Each bounce of the ball is the timing interval, e.g. when it first hits the plate it turns red, when it hits the plate a second time it turns blue, when it hits the plate a third time it turns white, etc.

The simplest answer is that supertasks are illogical. It is metaphysically impossible for an infinite sequence of events to be completed in a finite amount of time.

Let's move away from numbers as that is clearly causing some confusion.

After 30 seconds a white square turns red, after a further 15 seconds it turns blue, after a further 7.5 seconds it turns back to white, and so on.

What colour is the square when this supertask completes (after 60 seconds)?

What contradiction? — Lionino

That the counter doesn't show 0 and doesn't show 1 and doesn't show 2 and doesn't show 3 and doesn't show 4 and doesn't show 5 and doesn't show 6 and doesn't show 7 and doesn't show 8 and doesn't show 9 even though it must show exactly one of them.

we already have the possibility of infinity as an assumption — Lionino

And that assumption entails a contradiction, proving the assumption false.

Now, you introduce another premise, "Unless the universe ceases to exist then 60 seconds is going to pass". This premise contradicts what is implied by the others which describe the supertask. — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't.

But the counter only shows the standard 0-9 digits. At no point does it switch from showing some natural number to simply showing the ∞ symbol.

To repeat what I said earlier: with these paradoxes we shouldn't be looking for some answer that is consistent with the premises but should accept that they prove that the premises are flawed.

Supertasks are illogical. Time cannot be infinitely divisible.

But then I am interested in a counter that would indeed count to infinity — Lionino

Assume the counter counts to infinity. After 30 (or 60) seconds, what is the first digit of the number it shows?

But does that imply necessarily that time and or space in our universe must be discrete and not continuous? — flannel jesus

If continuous space and/or time entail that supertasks are possible and if supertasks are not possible then space and/or time are not continuous.

I'll repeat what I said to andrewk above:

There are some who claim that a supertask is possible; that if we continually half the time it takes to perform the subsequent step then, according to the sum of a geometric series, an infinite sequence of events can be completed in a finite amount of time.

Examples such as Thomson's Lamp show that this entails a contradiction and so that supertasks are not possible. Continually halfing the time it takes to perform the subsequent step does not just contradict the physical laws of our world but is a metaphysical impossibility.

With these paradoxes we shouldn't be looking for some answer that is consistent with the premises but should accept that they prove that the premises are flawed.

You seem to take issue with that first paragraph, but your reasoning against it doesn't make any sense. Unless the universe ceases to exist then 60 seconds is going to pass. The passage of time does not depend on the counter.

The counter stops after 60 seconds.

No mathematical thought experiment can determine the nature of reality. — fishfry

We can determine whether or not something entails a contradiction. If time is infinitely divisible then supertasks are possible. Supertasks entail a contradiction. Therefore, time being infinitely divisible entails a contradiction.

You can argue that reality allows for the possibility of contradictions if you want, but most of us would say that it is reasonable to assert that it doesn't.

If time is infinitely divisible, the counter would go up to infinity. — Lionino

The counter resets to 0 after 9. It will only ever show the digits 0-9.

I see that 30 and 15 and 7.5 sums up to 52.5 seconds. I also see that as it progresses the sum approaches 60. But I do not see how it could ever get to 60. — Metaphysician Undercover

Because 60 seconds will pass. I don't understand the problem you're having. The passage of time does not depend on what the counter is doing.

So to make this simpler; I am watching a stopwatch whilst the counter is counting according to the prescribed rules. When the stopwatch reaches 60 I look at the counter. What digit does it show?

Except there have been plausible solutions given to Thomson's Lamp. — Lionino

I wonder if there's such a solution to my variation.

If we agree that time is infinitely divisible, it seems to follow that an infinite task may be completed in a finite amount of time — Lionino

And so conversely, if an infinite task may not be completed in a finite amount of time then we must agree that time is not infinitely divisible.

There are some number systems that define division by zero as ${a\over0} = \infty$.

Clearly, what is implied by "and so on", contradicts "for 60 seconds". — Metaphysician Undercover

No it doesn't.

The "and so on" refers to repeating this formula:

Step 1 occurs after 30 seconds, step 2 occurs after a further 15 seconds, step 3 occurs after a further 7.5 seconds, and so on.

As per the sum of a geometric series this supertask takes 60 seconds.

we postulated the existence of a finite-sized mechanism that can switch state in an infinitesimally small time, which contradicts the laws of our world. — andrewk

That's precisely the argument being made.

There are some who claim that a supertask is possible; that if we continually half the time it takes to perform the subsequent step then, according to the sum of a geometric series, an infinite sequence of events can be completed in a finite amount of time.

Examples such as Thomson's Lamp show that this entails a contradiction and so that supertasks are not possible. Continually halfing the time it takes to perform the subsequent step does not just contradict the physical laws of our world but is a metaphysical impossibility.

With these paradoxes we shouldn't be looking for some answer that is consistent with the premises but should accept that they prove that the premises are flawed.

We don't directly see cows – according to the naive and indirect realist's meaning of "directly see"¹ – but we do indirectly see cows.

Given that the adverb "directly" modifies the verb "see", the phrases "I directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" do not mean the same thing. The phrase "I indirectly see a cow" entails "I see a cow" and so the phrases "I do not directly see a cow" and "I see a cow" are not contradictory.

_{¹ A directly sees B iff B is a constituent of A's visual experience.}

Why on earth must there be a behavior defined at the limit? — fishfry

By the law of excluded middle and non-contradiction, after 60 seconds the lamp must be either on or off.

That's the point. There's no paradox. You've simply neglected to tell me what the lamp does at 1, and you're pretending this is a mystery. It's not a mystery. You simply didn't defined the lamp's state at 1. — fishfry

We're being asked what the lamp "does at 1", so you saying that we must be told what the lamp "does at 1" makes no sense.

Given the defined behaviour of the lamp, will the lamp be on or off after 60 seconds? If the answer is undefined, but if the lamp must be either on or off, then the behaviour is metaphysically impossible.

The paradox is resolved by recognising that the premise is flawed.

Yes, in other words rejecting iii), namely the idea that one can finish counting an infinite sequence. — sime

True, but that's only part of the issue.

If after 30 seconds he's flipped the switch once and if after a further 15 seconds he's flipped the switch a second time and if after a further 7.5 seconds he's flipped the switch a third time, and so on, then it would suggest that a supertask can be completed in 60 seconds.

So if a supertask can't been completed in 60 seconds then the time between each flip cannot continually decrease. At some point no further division is metaphysically possible.

For example, Thompson's proposed solution to his Lamp paradox is to accept (i) and (ii) but to reject (iii). — sime

I didn't think he proposed a solution. Rather, it was an example to show that supertasks are impossible.

It seems impossible to answer this question. It cannot be on, because I did not ever turn it on without at once turning it off. It cannot be off, because I did in the first place turn it on, and thereafter I never turned it off without at once turning it on. But the lamp must be either on or off. This is a contradiction.

By such a method, one can count from negative infinity to zero. — noAxioms

Given that each division is some ${1\over{n}}m$ then such a movement is akin to counting all the real numbers from 0 to 1 in ascending order. Such a count cannot start because there is no first real number to count after 0.

But I've been arguing that the above reasoning is fallacious. Yes, each division must be passed, and each division is preceded by other divisions (infinitely many), and yes, from that it can be shown that there is no first division. All that is true even in a physical journey (at least if distance is continuous).

But it doesn't follow that the journey thus cannot start, since clearly it can. — noAxioms

It does follow that the journey cannot start. Therefore given that the journey can start then the premise that there is no first division is false. It's a proof by contradiction.

As such there is some first division and so movement is discrete.

The paradox does not require the physical possibility of such a counter. It simply asks us to consider the outcome if we assume the metaphysical possibility of the counter. If the outcome is paradoxical then the counter is metaphysically impossible, and so we must ask which of the premises is necessarily false. I would suggest that the premise that is necessarily false is that time is infinitely divisible.

It is metaphysically necessary that there is a limit to how fast something can change (even for some proposed deity that is capable of counting at superhuman speeds).