. The philosophical dispute between direct (naive) and indirect (non-naive) realists concerns the physics and physiology of perception. Indirect realists are right and direct realists are wrong. — Michael

Balls. If that were so there would not be a philosophical issue. There is no difference in the physics or physiology between direct and indirect descriptions. The difference is that the direct realist sees a cow, the indirect realist sees... something mental. You keep setting out a scientific account as if it settles the issue, but there is no disagreement here.

There is a difference in language attribution.

But further, I am not here advocating direct realism as you see it, and it seems to me you have not addressed, indeed perhaps not followed, what I has writ.

So again, we talk past each other. And i don't think that's down to me.

Balls. If that were so there would not be a philosophical issue. There is no difference in the physics or physiology between direct and indirect descriptions. The difference is that the direct realist sees a cow, the indirect realist sees... something mental. You keep setting out a scientific account as if it settles the issue, but there is no disagreement here. — Banno

If you don't understand what naive realists are claiming then that's on you. They are saying much more than just "I see a cow" is true.

Again, you are addressing what you expect to be said, not what has been said.

Attempting to use purportedly reliable scientific knowledge to support a claim that we have no reliable knowledge of distal objects is a performative contradiction. — Janus

We're in agreement.

There's semantic hijacking going on in here concerning what counts as direct realism/perception. Earlier fdrake posted some SEP stuff that is more in line with where I'm at. I also have sympathy for disjunctive views on this topic.

I also find little sense in a self divorced from physiological sensory perception.

Cut out my tongue, and I'm still me, but there's a bit less. The tongue remains a part of me, just disconnected. Self and sight, hearing, etc. seems the same.

I don't claim not to have reliable knowledge of distal objects. I claim that mental representations are distinct from distal objects, that I have direct knowledge of mental representations, and that I have indirect knowledge of distal objects.

If it is not a performative contradiction for a direct realist to be scientific realist (i.e. believing in the existence of objects that he cannot directly see) then it is not a performative contradiction for an indirect realist to be a scientific realist.

Even direct realists can trust a Geiger counter. You're being a hypocrite.

I don't claim not to have reliable knowledge of distal objects... — Michael

The end.

:wink:

:smile:

There's semantic hijacking going on in here concerning what counts as direct realism/perception. — creativesoul

Yep, a continuing attack on "direct realism", a position that no one actually holds.

So we have two scenarios. In both there are things in the world. In both there are representations of those things. But in indirect realism one says that "what I see is the representation". Here the "I" doing the "seeing" is seperate to the representation, and the "I" never sees the thing.

Now this leads to various difficulties. It means, for instance, that when you say that you see the cup has a handle, what you mean is that the representation of the cup has a handle. You are not saying anything about the cup. It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives.

In the other account, one says something like that "I see things by representing them". Here, the "I" doing the seeing is doing the representing. When you say that the cup has a handle, you are saying that it is the cup that has the handle, not the representation.

The physics and physiology is the same in both cases. The wording in the first account cuts one off from the world. The wording in the second account embeds one in the world. The framing, the grammar one chooses, has consequences well beyond mere perception. — Banno

The trouble here is how indirect realism can produce reliable information about the number of handles on the cup.

I feel pain and see and hear things when I dream and hallucinate. You're reading something into the sentence "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there.

The trouble here is how indirect realism can produce reliable information about the number of handles on the cup. — Banno

If we agree on the physics and physiology and only disagree on the grammar then why would the indirect realist have any more trouble than the direct realist?

Your very question here seems to accept that the dispute between direct and indirect realists is about more than grammar.

If both direct and indirect realists accept the existence of mental representations as caused by distal objects then what do you think the (non-grammatical) substance of the dispute between the two is?

I feel pain and see things when I dream and hallucinate. You're reading something into the sentence "I experience mental representations" that just isn't there. — Michael

...things...

When you have an hallucination of a cow, you do not see a cow, because there is no cow to see.

When you have an hallucination of a cow, you do not see a cow, because there is no cow to see. — Banno

I still see something when I dream and hallucinate, and that thing I see is a mental phenomenon. When I feel pain I feel something, and that thing I feel is a mental phenomenon. So there's clearly nothing wrong with the phrase "I experience mental phenomena".

This sense of seeing and feeling and experiencing is also satisfied in veridical experience – even if there's some other sense of seeing and feeling and experiencing that allows us to truthfully say "I see a cow" – and so there's clearly nothing wrong with the indirect realist saying "I experience mental phenomena" about veridical experience.

What indirect realists dispute is that seeing a cow counts as direct perception, because by "direct perception" they mean something very specific. The phrase "direct perception" is related to the epistemological problem of perception.

To make sense of this, I'll refer to What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

The epistemological problem of perception concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. Naive realists claimed that experience does provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claimed that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience; they are simply the cause of the mental representations of which we have direct knowledge.

"Direct perception" meant that distal objects are constituents of experience and "indirect perception" meant that distal objects are not constituents of experience.

You're welcome to redefine "direct perception" if you like, but in doing so you're no longer addressing the indirect realist's claim. Your arguments against indirect realism are against a strawman.

Here's the point, again; one does not see the representation; seeing is constructing the representation.

Why would someone construct a representation if he wasn’t to perceive it? It seems to me if we accept the assumption that biology performs such a task, indirect realism follows.

There is a "blind spot" in each local visual field where the optic nerve enters the eye. — Agree-to-Disagree

Cool. Did you know spiders don't have a blind spot because their eyes evolved in a different way.

Indirect realism has you sitting inside your head, seeing and touching what is constructed by your nerves. — Banno

This shows the crux of the misunderstanding.

"Feel" does not mean "touch". I feel pain, I don't touch pain (rather, I touch the fire).

Unfortunately, when it comes to words like "see" and "hear" and "smell" and "taste" we don't have terms that can be separated out in this way, and so Banno conflates the meaning of "see" in "I see colours when I hallucinate" and the meaning of "see" in "I see a cow". Indirect realists are using the former meaning when they say that we see mental images, and Banno's homunculus is a strawman.

Unfortunately, when it comes to words like "see" and "hear" and "smell" and "taste" we don't (as far as I know) have terms that can be separated out in this way, and so Banno conflates the meaning of "see" in "I see colours when I hallucinate" and the meaning of "see" in "I see a cow". Indirect realists are using the former meaning when they say that we see mental images.

“Hallucinate” would be a better verb than “see” when comes to such events. “I am hallucinating voices”, for instance, doesn’t imply that the sound of a voice is hitting the ear, and recognizes that some bodily activity is producing the phenomena.

“Hallucinate” would be a better verb than “see” when comes to such events. “I am hallucinating voices”, for instance, doesn’t imply that the sound of a voice is hitting the ear, and recognizes that some bodily activity is producing the phenomena. — NOS4A2

There is a difference between visual and auditory hallucinations and using words like "see" and "hear" to describe that difference is perfectly appropriate.

The difference concerns which of the visual and auditory cortexes are involved. The words don't imply anything about sense organs, and assuming that they do is why you are misunderstanding indirect realism.

You have to interpret another's claims according to what they mean by the words, not what you mean by them, else you're arguing against a strawman.

A voice, though, is the sound released from the larynx. To hear a voice is to have that sound affect the ears. Since neither of these things and events are present in a hallucination, to say “I hear voices” is to mischaracterize the experience.

One can distinguish between between two different hallucinations by simply describing how they are different. One might be audible or visual, for example.

A voice, though, is the sound released from the larynx. To hear a voice is to have that sound affect the ears. Since neither of these things and events are present in a hallucination, to say “I hear voices” is to mischaracterize the experience.

One can distinguish between between two different hallucinations by simply describing how they are different. One might be audible or visual, for example. — NOS4A2

Saying that the schizophrenic hears voices is a perfectly ordinary and appropriate use of the English language.

If you don't want to phrase it that way then you're welcome not to, but to misinterpret someone who does phrase it that way as suggesting the involvement of the sense organs in the schizophrenic's ears is your problem, not theirs. And this kind of misinterpretation is the root of your disagreement with indirect realism.

I’m fine with them saying it. But I’m not fine with the indirect realist saying it, especially if accuracy is any concern.

What would be your motivation for wishing to retain the language used to describe the interactions of distal objects and the sense organs to describe mental objects and the mental organs?

I’m fine with them saying it. But I’m not fine with the indirect realist saying it, especially if accuracy is any concern.

What would be your motivation for wishing to retain the language used to describe the interactions of distal objects and the sense organs to describe mental objects and the mental organs? — NOS4A2

Because that's how the language is ordinarily used. I see colours, I feel pain, the schizophrenic hears voices.

Why must the indirect realist restrict the meaning to some specific subset of its ordinary uses?

Not that this really matters. What matters is what they mean by the words they use, not what you think is the "proper" use of the words.

And this is where my earlier comment to Banno above is relevant. Naive realists claim that we have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are constituents of experience. Indirect realists claim that we do not have direct knowledge of distal objects because distal objects are not constituents of experience; they only play a causal role in producing mental percepts of which we have direct knowledge.

This is the philosophical dispute, not some irrelevant argument about the grammar of "I see X".

Throwing out an accusation of "performative contradiction" (a mouthful instead of just "hypocrisy") does very little to defend the opposite side. A smoker claiming that smoking is bad for you with a cigarrette in his mouth is being a hypocrite, but that bears no relevance on the truth of his statements.

As a sidenote, in the last 5 out of 54 pages of discussion, it seems to me that a lot of disagreement is stemming from different interpretations of words that are being used — for example, some say "see" with an embedded unstated meaning of directness, others do not. Either look things up in the dictionary and stick to the agreed definition — and add the appropriate adverbs to the verbs and adjectives to the nouns —, or switch to drawings for communication instead.

The claim “I hear voices” in the case of hallucination is not true, though. It’s not that I demand that you should make true claims, implying some restriction, I’m just explaining why I cannot believe the claim. You need not restrict your theory to true claims, but I wager it would help your case, not to mention it would better help those who hallucinate.

For those who claim we do not have direct knowledge of mind-independent things, it just boggles my mind why they’d appropriate the language used to describe those things and interactions to describe mind-dependant things and interactions. It’s curious why they’d use the terminology used to describe that which we have no knowledge of, to describe that which we do have knowledge of. I think it’s an indication that indirect realism is a little more naive than it is letting on.

The claim “I hear voices” in the case of hallucination is not true, though. — NOS4A2

According to what you mean by “hear”, but what you mean isn’t always what others mean, and certainly isn’t what they mean when they say that the schizophrenic hears voices.

it just boggles my mind why they’d appropriate the language used to describe those things and interactions to describe mind-dependant things and interactions — NOS4A2

Words often mean more than one thing. It boggles my mind that you don’t understand this.

According to what you mean by “hear”, but what you mean isn’t always what others mean, and certainly isn’t what they mean when they say that the schizophrenic hears voices.

You can tell me what you mean by “hearing” and “voices” and I’m willing to adopt your definitions. If you think hearing doesn’t involves the use of ears and that a voice isn’t the sounds from the larynx, then what are they?

You can tell me what you mean by “hearing” and “voices” and I’m willing to adopt your definitions. If you think hearing doesn’t involves the use of ears and that a voice isn’t the sounds from the larynx, then what are they? — NOS4A2

We see things when the visual cortex is active and we hear things when the auditory cortex is active. The cortical blind have functioning eyes but don’t see because of damage in the occipital lobe.

When these cortexes are active in response to some appropriate proximal stimulus we describe it as a veridical experience and when they’re active without some appropriate proximal stimulus we describe it as an hallucination (if awake) or a dream (if asleep).

It seems that everybody in the thread agrees that there is a causal chain between outside objects and the contents of our mind when we say things such as "I see red" and "That smells great".

It also seems that nobody here believes that our perceptions are the objects (note that this is different from saying we perceive objects). But I imagine that is because no idealist has entered the thread yet.

If both hearing and hallucinating are the activities of the auditory cortex, and the voice is merely the product of this activity, there seems to me no way to distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination, whether it arrives from an appropriate proximal stimulus or not.

If one only has direct knowledge of the voice as the cortex has constructed it, how does one infer whether there is a proximal stimulus of the cortex or not? It seems to me there must first be some direct knowledge of a proximal stimulus that is not merely the product of the cortex.

Careful, if you think about this too much you might come to understand how words do things.

If both hearing and hallucinating are the activities of the auditory cortex, and the voice is merely the product of this activity, there seems to me no way to distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination, whether it arrives from an appropriate proximal stimulus or not. — NOS4A2

How do you distinguish between veridical experience and hallucination? It certainly wouldn't make sense to say that you can distinguish them because the English word "see" should only be used for veridical experience.

If one only has direct knowledge of the voice as the cortex has constructed it, how does one infer whether there is a proximal stimulus of the cortex or not? It seems to me there must first be some direct knowledge of a proximal stimulus that is not merely the product of the cortex. — NOS4A2

By definition, if I have to infer some X then I do not have direct knowledge of X, so I don't understand your argument here. Are you asking how inferences are even possible? Are you calling into question the very scientific method?

It leads to a whole network of philosophical garden paths in which, absurdly, the self is forever "cut off" from the world in which it lives. — Banno

Reminiscent of Kant's Noumena. The whole denial that I know that the heater grate to my right is what I'm seeing. I know what it's made of. I know where it's located. I know the size and shape. I know it's function. I know some dangers it poses to passersby. I know it's not located in my head/body. I know mental representations are. Thus, the grate I'm looking at is not a mental representation.

It also seems that nobody here believes that our perceptions are the objects (…). But I imagine that is because no idealist has entered the thread yet. — Lionino

So idealists believe our perceptions are the objects? What brand of idealists does that?

I’m a card-carryin’, non-apologetic dualist, which makes me half-idealist, and neither that half nor the empirical half believes our perceptions are the objects.

Even if the idealist grants we perceive objects, or, which is the same thing, our perceptions are of objects, he does nothing by such warrant to explicate what perceptions are.

To perceive, to have perceptions, is to be affected by the real;
Perceptions are that which affords the immediate consciousness of the real, in a sensation.

After this physiological groundwork, and for sufficient methodological epistemic justifications, it’s off to the metaphysical rodeo, like it or not.