Then how is it merely grammatical? You said: — Luke

The problem is that for each of your examples, the second sentence is wrong, not the "I see" part.

The problem is that for each of your examples, the second sentence is wrong, not the "I see" part. — Lionino

I take it you mean the second part of the sentence? Why should it be wrong if, as Michael claims, "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are both true? I take it this covers all instances of seeing.

Because cows are not mental phenomenons unless referring to the perception of a cow.
Colours and pain are not outside objects, they only exist inside our head and designate also an experience, it is a mental phenomenon.

Then how is it merely grammatical? — Luke

Because there's no philosophical disagreement. One group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing distal objects and the other group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing mental phenomena.

Given that both "I see cows" and "I see colours" is true, what do you think direct and indirect realists are arguing about?

Well, here's the puzzle: did you recognise it, or just think you recognised it? Dejà vu?

You have no way to tell.

Hence, following a rule has to be public. — Banno

So you're looking at a cow. Do you recognize it as a cow? Or just think you recognize it? Knowing that it's called a "cow" doesn't make any difference. There is no fact about which rule you've been following all this time. Other people can't help you with that.

Therefore perception has to start with innate confidence in a world circumscribed by space and time, where you, the real you, reside in an unchanging spot as it all swirls around you, or you fly through it as it rests on arbitrary x-y-z axes. The intention is emerging from somewhere you can't detect. It rests on nothing you know of.

And you have no vantage point on it to be able to say how it works. Pretty cool, huh?

How is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists any different? One group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to include distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience and the other group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to exclude distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience.

Because the dispute is exactly not grammatical, it is epistemological.

How is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists any different? One group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to include distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience and the other group just prefers to use the noun "visual experience" to exclude distal objects among its constituents when talking about having a visual experience. — Luke

Because naive and indirect realists mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on its constituents and so disagree on whether or not we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties.

Whereas the verb "to see" has more than one meaning, as shown by the phrases "I see a cow" and "I see colours". The meaning of "I see" in "I see a cow" is different to the meaning of "I see" in "I see colours". According to the former meaning we see distal objects; according to the latter meaning we see mental phenomena.

Because naive and indirect realists mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on its constituents and so disagree on whether or not we have direct knowledge of distal objects and their properties. — Michael

What are the constituents of visual experience?

What are the constituents of visual experience? — fdrake

Mental phenomena; colours (inc. brightness), shapes, orientation.

Mental phenomena; colours (inc. brightness), shapes, orientation. — Michael

Proximal stimuli?

Proximal stimuli? — fdrake

No. Experience exists within the brain (either reducible to its activity or as some supervenient phenomenon), whereas proximal stimuli exist outside the brain. So neither proximal stimuli nor distal objects are constituents of experience.

No. Experience exists within the brain (either reducible to its activity or as some supervenient phenomenon), whereas proximal stimuli exist outside the brain. So neither proximal stimuli nor distal objects are constituents of experience. — Michael

I think I understand. So for you, this process goes like:

distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> mental phenomenon

and/or

distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> experience

and for you, "interpretation" and "mental phenomenon", as steps of the process, are what perception is?

I think I understand. So for you, this process goes like:

distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> mental phenomenon

and/or

distal object -> proximal stimulus -> interpretation -> experience — fdrake

Yes, that looks about right, although it may be that interpretation and mental phenomena/experience should be combined as a single thing.

and for you, "interpretation" and "mental phenomenon" are what perception is? — fdrake

I'm not entirely clear on the meaning of the question. What I believe is that the dispute between direct and indirect realists concerns the epistemological problem of perception; does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects and their properties? Naive realists claim that it does – because distal objects and their properties are constituents of the experience – whereas indirect realists claim that it doesn't – because distal objects and their properties are not constituents of the experience.

I think that the science of perception supports indirect realism.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. — Michael

It seems to me that some elaboration is needed, on what you mean by "constituent".

If I see a cow, the distal object is a part of the causal web of events including the sun shining, sunlight striking the distal object, part of the sunlight being reflected off of the distal object in the direction of my eyes, my retinas encoding the light pattern falling on them into nerve impulses sent up my optic nerve, etc..

I'm not seeing a good reason not to consider the distal object to be a constituent of the causal process that results in my seeing the cow. Why would the cow be any less a constituent of the causal process which results in me seeing a cow, than are the photons that enter my pupil?

I'm not seeing a good reason not to consider the distal object to be a constituent of the causal process that results in my seeing the cow. Why would the cow be any less a constituent of the causal process which results in me seeing a cow, than are the photons that enter my pupil? — wonderer1

It is a constituent of the causal process that causes your visual experience but it isn't a constituent of the visual experience itself. See What’s so naïve about naïve realism?:

The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).

...

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not. — Michael

Objects and their properties. This implies the objects come fully equipped with whatever constitutes them as they are. While this is certainly true, it is not always the case these constituent properties are perceived, re: phases of the moon, how many feet of a running horse touch the ground at the same time, and so on. Insofar as it is impossible that any object not be completely constituted, and if it is at the same time impossible to perceive the totality of a manifold of constituent parts, it is not contradictory that the human intellectual system itself, imposes those properties. If it is not contradictory that the intellect supplies the missing properties, and given the impossibility of perceiving all possible properties, it is also non-contradictory that the intellect supplies all properties, insofar as there is no established mechanism by which it would be possible to determine which properties were perceived and which were supplied.

The direct realist wants his objects already fully equipped with its identifying properties, the indirect realist wants to assign the properties by which he thinks the object identifiable. If follows that the object along with its properties comprise the experience of the former, while the properties alone comprise the experience of the latter.

Breaking it down a little…..so we got one of each persuasion standing next to each other, watching the moon rise. It is a natural characteristic that the moon appears larger the lower on the horizon it is, from which follows the direct realist must allow the moon physically, naturally, changes its size/mass/volume as it traverses the sky, iff however the moon’s changing properties cum hoc just are the experience of it. The indirect realist, because he only assigns properties to the changing representations of an object post hoc, the object itself does not need the property of change insofar as the object itself never was a component of experience in the first place.

Breaking it down a lot…..the direct realist maintains space and time belong to things as properties of them, no more or less necessary for their experience than any other property, but the indirect realist maintains space and time belong to him alone, are not properties of things at all, but are the conditions absolutely necessary for the experience of them.

Breaking it down completely….the realism of objects is direct in the perception of them, their properties be what they may; the realism of properties is indirect in the experience of them, the object be what it may.

... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.

That seems non-productively reductionist to me.

That seems non-productively reductionist to me. — wonderer1

It seems consistent with the scientific evidence. Experience exists within the brain. Distal objects exist outside the brain. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Is anyone truly positing that the screen infront of me is part of my experience?

So you're looking at a cow. Do you recognize it as a cow? Or just think you recognize it? Knowing that it's called a "cow" doesn't make any difference. There is no fact about which rule you've been following all this time. Other people can't help you with that. — frank

recognising it as a cow consists in not running for the gate because it's a bull, keeping a eye out for pats on the surrounding ground, counting how many cows there are as opposed to kangaroos, and so on. That is it consist in interacting with the cow and with other things. You know it is a cow by those interactions - indeed, knowing it is a cow is those interactions.

There is a way of recognising that it is a cow that is shown by how one, not by setting out a rule. Pi §201. That's what is missed in Kripke's reading, powerful though it is.

Therefore perception has to start with innate confidence in a world circumscribed by space and time, where you, the real you, reside in an unchanging spot as it all swirls around you, or you fly through it as it rests on arbitrary x-y-z axes. — frank

It's not obvious that this follows from your previous paragraph. Yes, dealing with cows requires there to be cows, if that is what you are claiming. But you seem to want some Kantian transcendence here? I have a vantage point.

Consider that we are all deaf, illiterate mutes. Naive realists claim that distal objects and their properties are constituents of our experience and indirect realists claim that they're not. — Michael

I'll offer you the same answer as given to Frank, above. Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist...

We do not simply passively "experience" cows. we feed them, move them into yards, slaughter them and eat them.

All this by way of pointing out that the "constituents of our experience" are not one way, from world to mind; we also change what is in the world, and this is part of our experience of the world. While you read this, you are already formulating your reply.

And you do not feed, herd, slaughter and eat sense impressions.

It is very difficult to see how you avoid antirealsim of some sort, or even solipsism, if all you have access to are sense-impressions and never cows. The notion that such things are "inferred" seems very lonely.

One group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing distal objects and the other group just prefers to use the verb "to see" only when talking about seeing mental phenomena. — Michael

Can you not see that these are both wrong? We use the word "see" in both ways.

Blind, illiterate mutes can herd cows. You account seems a bit ableist... — Banno

I very much hope this is pure jest.

Can you not see that these are both wrong? We use the word "see" in both ways. — Banno

It is obvious neither are 'wrong'. They are unhelpful, when used in both ways. That's the entire incoherence of your account/s. You are attempting to use a concept to represent both opposing versions of that element of the account to which it could refer.

"to look" cannot be hte same thing as "to see". And using those phrases as they actually occur viz. looking is turning one's eyes to an object, and seeing is experiencing the mental representation caused by the light reflected from it - solves the disagreement. You have to just accept that your objection doesn't lie in the facts, but the form you prefer to use to describe it.

Oh, .

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-QWlTcF1JPk

The world is an amazing place.

I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael

Either we see distal objects, or we see mental phenomena. It cannot be both. Distal objects are not mental phenomena. On second thought, hallucinations are mental, so sometimes we see mental phenomena, other times we see distal objects.

Yes, we experience distal objects like cows. — Michael

Now, that looks like self-contradiction.

A [veridical experience] depends on a [distal object] but the [distal object] is not a constituent of the [veridical experience]. The constituents of the [veridical experience] are just [mental phenomena]. — Michael

:brow:

If colours are the end result of a biological process that is existentially dependent upon the surface layers of distal objects as well as a creature capable of detecting light, then what sense does it make to say that colors are a mental phenomena that has no external constituent?

If hallucinations of color emerge only after having veridical experience, and are impossible without ever having those, then "mental phenomena" misses something pivotal about the nature of colour vision.

Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism, which concerns whether or not distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience. Naive realists claim they are, indirect realists claim they're not. — Michael

I don’t see how this relates to whether we perceive objects directly or indirectly or, in particular, how it relates to the supposed perception of representations or perceptual intermediaries. This is the philosophical substance of the dispute as I understand it. Direct realists claim we do not perceive any perceptual intermediary or representation, whereas indirect realists claim that we do.

Furthermore, I don’t see why a direct realist must hold the view that “distal objects and their properties are constituents of experience” in the physical sense that you suppose. A direct realist can have an unmediated perception without the perception needing to be the perceived object. Otherwise, it’s just a strawman of perception.

A western example, but in that trashy book of lies, the guardian, so you won't have seen it.

OMG, he drives and uses a chain saw!!

You would benefit from watching this:

I take this to be irrelevant. AS was the initial comment. Hence, hoping it was Jest given how loaded it was. No one denies the disabled can function, per se.

Suffice to say, in response to your clear implications, nothing you've provided gives me anything new. It may be worth stepping back from the constant internal accusations you throw at people, which undergird many of your responses :)