Here's a characterisation in grammatical terms: When one says one sees that there is a cow in the field over there, the direct realist says we can be referring to the cow, but the indirect realist says we can refer only to the sensation-of-cow, and must rely on some form of inference to talk about the cow-in-itself.The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the mind-independent nature of distal objects. That's not a grammatical dispute. — Michael
But Anne may believe no such thing.Anne believes that Venus is the morning star.
the morning star = the evening star.
Therefore, Anne believes that Venus is the evening star.
Or if you are by yourself, you might come back tomorrow and puzzle as to if the smell has changed.
. — Banno
Well, here's the puzzle: did you recognise it, or just think you recognised it? Dejà vu?It's puzzling that I could have recognized the smell as something I'd experienced before. — frank
Perhaps. That's another multifaceted issue. But all the more grist for the mill.Kripke shows that it's not. — frank
Ordinary Objects Caveat: perceptual experiences are directly of ordinary mind-independent objects in the sense that mind-independent objects reliably cause percept properties to hold which intersubjectively count as each other. By this I don't mean that your red is identical to my red, but that if we both see the same apple, we can come to agree on whether it's red or not. For the dress, we can come to agree that it's either black and blue or gold and white.
[...]
I imagine, though please correct me if I'm wrong Pierre-Normand, that my ordinary objects caveat is similar to @Pierre-Normand's reference to Evans'. Though I come at it from the belief that there's good evidence perception - as well as its character - is socially mediated. — fdrake
Naive realists claim that “visual experience” includes distal objects among its constituents. Indirect realists claim that “visual experience” does not include distal objects among its constituents. Therefore, both groups mean something different by “visual experience”. — Luke
The second formulation is the constitutive claim, which says that it introspectively seems to one that the perceived mind-independent objects (and their features) are constituents of the experiential state. Nudds, for instance, argues that ‘visual experiences seem to have the NR [Naïve Realist] property’ (2009, p. 335), which he defines as ‘the property of having some mind-independent object or feature as a constituent’ (2009, p. 334), and, more explicitly, that ‘our experience […] seems to have mind-independent objects and features as constituents’ (2013, p. 271). Martin claims that ‘when one introspects one’s veridical perception one recognises that this is a situation in which some mind-independent object is present and is a constituent of the experiential episode’ (2004, p. 65).
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... Intentionalism typically characterizes the connection between perception (taken as a representative state) and the perceived mind-independent objects as a merely causal one. But if the connection is merely causal, then it seems natural to take the suitable mind-independent objects to be distinct from the experience itself and, therefore, not literally constituents of it.
Michael appears to claim that can only ever refer to the sensation-of-cow — Banno
They mean the same thing by "visual experience" but disagree on what constitutes it. — Michael
Given that you have said such things as "perceptual experience is a representation" and "we cannot directly perceive distal objects as they are in themselves" you reject naive realism and agree with the substance of indirect realism, even if you disagree with the grammar of "we see representations". — Michael
The claim "we see representations" is the substance of the dispute between direct and indirect realists. Indirect realists claim that we see representations, whereas direct realists claim that we do not see representations. — Luke
Do I see distal objects? Do I feel distal objects when I touch them? Are distal objects a mental phenomena? — Luke
And we feel pain. We smell cakes. And we smell smells. — Michael
If you could really feel a feeling in this or that way, then just like appears to be the possible with your account of seeing colors (i.e. "perceiving a mental phenomenon"), there could conceivably be cases of inverted pain/pleasure qualia whereby what feels to me like pleasure feels to you like pain and vice versa. — Pierre-Normand
That's certainly possible. Masochism might be one such example. I don't think it either incoherent or physically impossible for burning the nerve endings in my fingers to stimulate the pleasure centres in my brain; it just requires a "malformed" central nervous system. — Michael
There is no inverted qualia. — Pierre-Normand
And the fact that what you feel is pleasure rather than pain is not something private and incommunicable (as red/blue inverted qualia allegedly are) but rather is manifested by the fact that you don't retreat your hand from the flame but rather are inclined to prolong the stimulus. — Pierre-Normand
The experience is prior to the response. Those with locked-in syndrome can feel pain. — Michael
It still doesn't make sense to say that what you feel as pleasure (the sensation itself) feels to them as pain. — Pierre-Normand
Yes, we see distal objects.
— Michael
So, are distal objects a mental phenomena?
— Luke
No — Michael
What do you think "see" means? What do you think "feel" means?
Do I see colours? Are colours a mental phenomena? Do I feel pain? Is pain a mental phenomena? — Michael
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. I see cows and cows are distal objects. I see colours and colours are mental phenomena.
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism. — Michael
Which is why arguing over the grammar of "I see X" doesn't address the philosophical substance of naive or indirect realism — Michael
Are the following statements also true?
"I see cows and cows are mental phenomena."
"I see colours and colours are distal objects."
"I feel pains and pains are distal objects." — Luke
No. — Michael
I'm pointing out that both "I see distal objects" and "I see mental phenomena" are true. — Michael
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