Rather, what we are immediately conscious of is the already "processed" phenomenological content. So an indirect realist account should identify this phenomenological content as the alleged "sense data" that mediates our access to the world, not the antecedent neural processing itself. — Pierre-Normand

If someone claims that the direct object of perceptual knowledge is the already-processed phenomenological content, and that through this we have indirect knowledge of the external stimulus or distal cause, would you call them a direct realist or an indirect realist?

I'd call them an indirect realist.

These are the three positions:

1. Naive realism: a) naive realism is true and b) I experience distal objects
2. Indirect realism: a) naive realism is false and b) I experience mental phenomena
3. Non-naive direct realism: a) naive realism is false and b) I experience distal objects

Each a) is the relevant philosophical issue that concerns the epistemological problem of perception.

Each b) is an irrelevant semantic issue. They are not mutually exclusive given that "I experience X" doesn't just mean one thing.

Naive realism is false and I experience both distal objects (e.g. apples) and mental phenomena (e.g. colours and pain).

Therefore indirect realism and non-naive direct realism are both true and amount to the same philosophical position; the rejection of naive realism.

I also believe that distal objects are constituents of experience in the sense that you could not have an experience of a distal object without them. — Luke

That's not the sense that is meant by the naive realist and rejected by the indirect realist. The sense that is meant by the naive realist and rejected by the indirect realist is the sense that would entail naive realism.

Why wouldn't you use the same argument against naive realists? — Luke

Because this is what naive realism claims:

"Distal objects are constituents of experience such that experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects, and so there is no epistemological problem of perception."

This claim has nothing to do with the grammar of "I see X".

Your insistence of continually addressing the grammar of "I see X" is the very conceptual confusion that I am trying to avoid. It's a red herring.

Is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists also "an irrelevant argument about grammar"? — Luke

No. Naive realists believe that distal objects are constituents of experience and so that experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. That's a substantive philosophical dispute.

I don't see how this example is related to distal objects. — Luke

In this case I'm being imprecise with the term "distal object" to mean anything outside the experience, and so including body parts, such that my skin is a distal object.

Naive realists and non-naive realists both claim that we see distal objects. Indirect realists say instead that we see representations. — Luke

Which is an irrelevant argument about grammar. From my previous post:

Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that colours are a mental representation of some distal object's surface properties. Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see colours. Therefore, both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see mental representations.

Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.

The relevant philosophical issue is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. Everything else is a red herring.

Therefore, Big Ben is not a constituent of a photograph of Big Ben? — Luke

Correct. The photograph is in my drawer. Big Ben is not in my drawer. The only things that constitute the photo are its physical materials.

Surely Big Ben is a component of the photograph. It's the subject of the photograph.

What does it mean for something to be the subject of the photograph? What does it mean for something to be the subject of a book? It's entirely conceptual. The conceptual connection between a photograph or book and their subject does not allow for direct knowledge of their subject. Photographs and books only provide us with indirect knowledge of their subject.

This is the distinction between non-naive realism and indirect realism. Indirect realists holds that we perceive perceptions or mental representations, whereas non-naive realists holds that perceptions are mental representations and that they represent external objects. — Luke

Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that colours are a mental representation of some distal object's surface properties. Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see colours. Therefore, both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see mental representations.

Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.

The relevant philosophical issue is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. Everything else is a red herring.

To correct my earlier statement, what direct realists mean by "of" in "our perceptions are of distal objects" is the same as what we mean by "this photograph is of Big Ben" or "this painting is of Mr Smith". Just as photographs or paintings represent their subjects, perceptions represents distal objects. — Luke

Direct realists say that the perceptual content represents external objects. — Luke

The representational theory of perception that claims that perceptual content is some mental phenomenon (e.g. sense data or qualia) that represents the external world is indirect realism, not direct realism.

Direct realism, in being direct realism, rejects the claim that perception involves anything like mental representations (which would count as an intermediary).

If by "the experience is of distal objects" you only mean something like "the painting is of Big Ben" then indirect realists can agree. The relevant philosophical issue is that we only have direct knowledge of the experience/painting and only indirect knowledge of distal objects/Big Ben, hence the epistemological problem of perception.

What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false? — Luke

I don't say that it's false. I have been at pains in this discussion (and others over the past few years) to explain that trying to address the epistemological problem of perception in these terms is a conceptual confusion. It's an irrelevant argument about grammar.

"I experience X" doesn't just mean one thing. I can say that I feel pain, I can say that I feel my hand burning, or I can say that I feel the fire. I can say that the schizophrenic hears voices. I can say that some people see a white and gold dress and others see a black and blue dress when looking at the same photo.

These are all perfectly appropriate phrases in the English language, none of which address the philosophical issue that gave rise to the dispute between direct and indirect realism (as explained here).

How does that follow? — Luke

If A is true and B is false then A and B do not mean the same thing.

If indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true then when they say "our perceptions are not of distal objects" they are not saying "our perceptions are not caused by distal objects."

It is not a dispute over different meanings of the phrase "of distal objects", is it? — Luke

The dispute between naive realists and indirect realists is not a semantic dispute. Their dispute is a legitimate philosophical dispute over the epistemological problem of perception.

The dispute between non-naive direct realists and indirect realists is an irrelevant semantic dispute. They agree on the philosophical issue regarding the epistemological problem of perception.

Even if there were no substantive dispute over whether our perceptions are of distal objects, you have still not addressed the other difference that I noted between the two parties: their different beliefs regarding perceptual content. — Luke

What does it mean to say that something is the content of perception? Perhaps you'll find that what indirect realists mean by "X is the content of perception" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "X is the content of perception", and so once again it's an irrelevant dispute about language.

I'll refer you again to Howard Robinson's Semantic Direct Realism.

Do you deny that indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data? Or do you refuse to accept that non-naive direct realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects? — Luke

What does "our perceptions are of distal objects" mean?

Given that indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true, it must be that "our perceptions are of distal objects" doesn't mean "our perceptions are caused by distal objects".

If what indirect realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" then you are equivocating.

Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" non-naive direct realists mean "our perceptions are ABC".

Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" indirect realists mean "our perceptions are XYZ".

Non-naive direct realists believe that "our perceptions are ABC" is true. Indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are XYZ" is false.

Where is the disagreement?

And if non-naive direct realists agree with indirect realists that "our perceptions are XYZ" is false and if indirect realists agree with non-naive direct realists that "our perceptions are ABC" is true, then non-naive direct realism and indirect realism are the same.

In any case, it’s unfalsifiable and cannot be proven — NOS4A2

I might agree; realism, idealism, atheism, pantheism, and the many-worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics are all unfalsifiable and cannot be proven.

except when it comes to the science of perception. — NOS4A2

We can look at what follows if we are scientific realists and accept the literal truth of something like the Standard Model and the science of perception. If true, indirect realism follows.

Of course, you can be a scientific instrumentalist and reject the literal truth of the Standard Model and the science of perception if you wish to maintain direct realism, although there may be some conflict in rejecting the literal truth of something that you claim to have direct knowledge of.

I’m not sure there is any good reason for the indirect realist to believe in any of them, since any evidence regarding anything about the external world lies beyond his knowledge. He doesn’t know what he is experiencing indirectly. Hell, he can’t even know that his perception or knowledge is indirect. — NOS4A2

His experience is the evidence. He has direct knowledge of his experiences. What best explains the existence of such experiences and their regularity and predictability? Being embodied within a greater external world, with his experiences being a causal consequence of his interaction with that greater external world.

This is the reasoning that leads one to believe in realism (and so for some direct realism) over idealism.

Given that any evidence of the external world lies beyond the veil of perception, or experience, is the realism regarding the external world a leap of faith? — NOS4A2

In a sense, hence why indirect realists claim that there is an epistemological problem of perception, entailing the viability of scepticism.

But the term "faith" is a bit strong. It's no more "faith" than our belief in something like the Big Bang or the Higgs boson is "faith". We have good reasons to believe in them given that they seem to best explain the evidence available to us. The indirect realist claims that we have good reasons to believe in the existence of an external world as it seems to best explain the existence and regularity and predictability of experience.

It's considered the most parsimonious explanation for the existence and regularity and predictability of experience.

Although subjective idealists disagree.

But given that direct and indirect realists are both realists we can dispense with considering idealism in this discussion.

We infer on the basis of evidence and reasoning, but since we only have direct knowledge of experience, we cannot be aware of the evidence of anything outside of it. — NOS4A2

Experience is the evidence. From it we infer the cause. Much like from the screen readings of a Geiger counter we infer the nearby existence of radiation and from reading history textbooks we infer the past existence of a man named Adolf Hitler.

How does one know that experience is the causal consequence of his body interacting with the environment if he only has direct knowledge of his own experience, and not of what causes it? — NOS4A2

Inference.

How do we know that a Geiger counter measures ionizing radiation? How do we know that the Higgs boson exists? How do we know that Hitler is responsible for the Holocaust?

Not all knowledge is direct knowledge.

Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what it means to say that an experience is "of" some distal object. I answered that and you said that an indirect realist would agree. I'm no longer sure what you are arguing for or where you disagree. — Luke

You said that indirect realism and non-naive direct realism are different positions because non-naive direct realism believes that "my experience is of distal objects" is true and indirect realism believes that "my experience is of distal objects" is false.

But you say that "my experience is of distal objects" means "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience".

Indirect realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true.

So given that both indirect realists and non-naive direct realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true, what is the difference between being a non-naive direct realist and being an indirect realist?

It seems to be that their only disagreement is over what the phrase "my experience is of distal objects" means. But that's not a philosophical disagreement; that's an irrelevant disagreement about grammar. And a confused one, because there is no 'true' meaning of the phrase "my experience is of distal objects". It just means whatever we use it to mean, and clearly non-naive direct realists and indirect realists are using it in different ways and so to mean different things.

Philosophically, non-naive direct realists and indirect realists are the same: they agree that distal objects are not constituents of experience, although play a causal role, and so that there is an epistemological problem of perception; our knowledge of the external world is indirect, inferred from experience.

I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see. — creativesoul

I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. The grammar of "I see X" has nothing do with the epistemological problem of perception, much like the grammar of "the book is about X" has nothing to do with any epistemological problem of a history textbook.

The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.

Okay. So then are distal objects mental constituents of experience? — creativesoul

Distal objects are physical objects. What would it mean for a physical object be a mental constituent?

If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not sure what to make of this:

"Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body." — Luke

Why not?

The Sun is physically separate from the grass, but (light from) the Sun has physically interacted with the grass to cause it to grow. It seems pretty straightforward.

Likewise, the apple is physically separate from my sense organs, but (light from) the apple has physically interacted with my sense organs to cause a conscious experience. Also pretty straightforward.

Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception.

Are you saying that none of that counts as a distal object? — creativesoul

I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience, much like Hitler is not a constituent of some book about him. Each are separate entities.

What it means to say that an experience is of some distal object is that the distal object has somehow interacted with one's senses to cause the experience. — Luke

The indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience.

It follows that no constituent of experience extends beyond the body.

Is that about right as well? — creativesoul

Yes.

Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. — Luke

Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body.

What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here?

Perhaps you'll find that what non-naive direct realists mean by "of" isn't what indirect realists mean by "of" and that, given their different meanings, both claims are mutually agreeable.

I look out into the distance and see a tree in the yard. There's a squirrel running around the tree, doing its thing. You're claiming that the squirrel and the tree are either not distal objects or - if they are - they are not(cannot be) constituents of experience.

Is that about right? — creativesoul

Yes. Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.

Experience and distal objects are in a very literal physical sense distinct entities with a very literal physical distance between the two.

The dispute between direct(/naive) and indirect(/non-naive) realism concerns the epistemological problem of perception; does experience provide us with direct knowledge of the external world?

Direct(/naive) realists believe that experience does provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge of experience and that the external world is a constituent of experience.

Indirect(/non-naive) realists believe that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge only of experience and that the external world is not a constituent of experience. Knowledge of the external world is inferential – i.e. indirect – with experience itself being the intermediary through which such inferences are possible.

So-called "non-naive direct realism" is indirect(/non-naive) realism. The addition of the (redefined) word "direct" in the name is an unnecessary confusion, likely arising from a confused misunderstanding of indirect(/non-naive) realism.

The answer to all of your questions depend on the meaning of the word “direct” which you have already admitted mean different things to the indirect realist and the non-naive direct realist.

According to the indirect realist’s meaning, perception of distal objects is not direct₁.

According to the non-naive direct realist’s meaning, perception of distal objects is direct₂.

If you replace the word “direct” with each group’s underlying meaning then you’ll probably find that indirect and non-naive direct realists agree with each other, which is why they amount to the same philosophical position regarding the epistemological problem of perception.

Their ‘disagreement’ is over the irrelevant issue of the meaning of the word “direct”. Words just mean what we use them to mean. It’s not like there’s some ‘true’ meaning of the word “direct” that each group is either succeeding or failing to describe.

Are you saying that distal objects are unnecessary for the response? — creativesoul

Yes. When the visual and auditory cortexes etc. activate without being triggered by some appropriate external stimulus then we are dreaming or hallucinating, but nonetheless seeing and hearing things because the visual and auditory cortexes are active.

I get all that, I just don’t understand how someone can see something without eyes. If sight involves eyes, and those eyes are missing or closed, then is he really seeing?

I don’t think so. In my view the nomenclature is strictly metaphorical, a sort of folk biology, the result of the disconnect between states of feeling and states of affairs. — NOS4A2

Unless we're dealing with technical terms like those in maths and science, the notion that there is some singular "correct" meaning of a word or phrase is wrong. The ordinary uses of "the schizophrenic hears voices", "I see a white and gold dress", and "John feels a pain in his arm" are all perfectly appropriate.

Perhaps better verbs are in order, for instance “I dream of such and such” or “I am hallucinating”. — NOS4A2

Dreams and hallucinations have different perceptual modes, exactly like waking veridical experience. Some schizophrenics see things; others hear things.

As you say, experience doesn’t extend beyond the body, and the indirect realist does not believe the external world is a constituent of his experience. Well what is? — NOS4A2

Smells, tastes, colours, etc.: the things that are the constituents of hallucinations and dreams. The only relevant difference between a waking veridical experience and an hallucination or dream is that waking veridical experiences are a response to some appropriate external stimulus (as determined by what’s normal and useful for the species and individual in question).

That’s what I don’t understand. In layman’s terms viewing, seeing, looking etc. involves the eyes. How does one see a representation? — NOS4A2

I can see things when I close my eyes, especially after eating magic mushrooms. The schizophrenic hears voices when suffering from psychosis. We all see and hear and feel things when we dream.

There's more to the meaning of "I experience X" than simply the body responding to external stimulation, else we couldn't make sense of something like "some people see a black and blue dress and others see a white and gold dress when looking at this photo" or "I'm looking at this 'duck-rabbit' picture but I can't see the duck".

Do we experience the external world? The direct realist would say yes, the indirect realist would say no. After answering we can approach the philosophical disagreement. So what’s missing? — NOS4A2

Do we directly experience the external world? The indirect realist accepts that we experience the world; he just claims that the experience isn't direct.

So what is the relevant philosophical meaning of "direct"? It's the one that addresses the epistemological problem of perception (does experience inform us about the nature of the external world) that gave rise to the dispute between direct and indirect realists in the first place. Direct realists claimed that there isn't an epistemological problem because perception is direct, therefore the meaning of "direct" must be such that if perception is direct then there isn't an epistemological problem.

Given that experience does not extend beyond the body and so given that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience, and given that experience is the only non-inferential source of information available to rational thought, there is an epistemological problem and so experience of distal objects is not direct. Furthermore, many of the qualities of experience – e.g. smells and tastes and colours – are not properties of distal objects (as modelled by our best scientific theories), further reinforcing the epistemological problem and so indirect realism.

For indirect perception, something in the world causes a representation of an apple, which is viewed by something in the brain. — NOS4A2

What does it mean for some A to view some B?

Sometimes you seem to be suggesting that A views B iff A has eyes that respond to light reflecting off B. But then the above is claiming that indirect realists believe that something in my brain has eyes that respond to light reflecting off some representation in my brain. Which is of course nonsense; no indirect realist believes this.

So this would seem to prove that what indirect realists mean by "A sees B" isn't what you mean by "A sees B", and so you're talking past each other.

Perhaps we can formulate it another way. Do we experience “distal objects”? — NOS4A2

That question doesn't address the philosophical disagreement between direct and indirect realism. It's a red herring.

It's like asking "do we kill people?" Yes, we kill people; but we kill people using guns and knives and poison and so on.

So one person says "John didn't kill him; the poison killed him" and the other person says "John killed him (using poison)" and then they both argue that one or the other is wrong. It's a confused disagreement; it's just two people describing things in different but equally valid ways.

This is the confused disagreement that you and others are engaging in when you ask "do we feel distal objects or do we feel mental sensations?".

Thanks, I'll check it out.

I do also want to further reply to this:

Secondly, the indirect realist's insistence on the pure subjectivity of secondary qualities like color is a significant weak point in their view. Pushing this line of argument risks collapsing into an untenable Cartesian dualism, where the "real" world is stripped of all qualitative richness and reduced to mere geometric form.

I believe it's Paul Churchland who argues for eliminative materialism and that pain just is the firing of c-fibers? The same principle might hold for colours: colours just are the firing of certain neurons in the brain. Given that apples don't have neurons they don't have colours (much like they don't have c fibers and so don't have pain). This might "strip" apples of all "qualitative richness" but it doesn't entail anything like Cartesian dualism.

The naive view that projects colours out onto apples is as mistaken as projecting pain out onto fire. It misunderstands what colours actually are.

Do you think the roundness of the apple merely is a mental property of the human beings (or of their brains) who feel it to be round in their hand? — Pierre-Normand

Roundness as seen or roundness as felt? Because these are two different things. In fact, there have been studies of people born blind who are later given sight and are not able to recognize shapes by look even though they recognize them by feel. They have to learn the association between the two.

So, roundness as seen is a mental phenomenon and roundness as felt is a mental phenomenon. I don't know what "mind-independent" roundness would even be.

This sounds like a form of Berkeleyan idealism since you end up stripping the objects in the world from all of their properties, including their shapes and sizes. — Pierre-Normand

I wouldn't strip them of the properties that the Standard Model or the General Theory of Relativity (or M-Theory, etc.) say they have.

Does not your property dualism threaten to collapse into a form of monistic idealism? — Pierre-Normand

I don't think so. I can continue to be a scientific realist and accept the existence of the substances and properties that our best scientific models talk about. I just accept that these scientific models don't (or even can't) talk about consciousness. Worst case scenario I can be a Kantian and accept the existence of noumena.

Secondly, the indirect realist's insistence on the pure subjectivity of secondary qualities like color is a significant weak point in their view. Pushing this line of argument risks collapsing into an untenable Cartesian dualism, where the "real" world is stripped of all qualitative richness and reduced to mere geometric form. — Pierre-Normand

I don't think that this is a weakness. I think that this is a fact entailed by scientific realism and the Standard Model. I think that the hard problem of consciousness entails something like property dualism.

Although, this latter point isn't strictly necessary. It is entirely possible that property monism is correct, that mental phenomena is reducible to physical phenomena like brain states, and that colour is a property of brain states and not a property of an apple's surface layer of atoms.

I think that this is clearer to understand if we move on from sight. The almost exclusive preoccupation with photoreception is a detriment to philosophical analysis. Let's consider other modes of experience: sounds, smells, tastes, touch. Is it a "weakness" to "strip" distal objects of these qualities?

I think that direct realists are deceived by the complexity of visual experience into adopting a naive and ultimately mistaken view of the world. I wonder what born-blind philosophers think about direct and indirect realism.

The non-naive direct realist agrees with the indirect realist that we do not perceive the WAIIII, but does not define direct perception in these terms. For the non-naive direct realist (or for me, at least), direct perception is defined in terms of perceiving the world, not in terms of perceiving behind the appearances of the world to the WAIIII. — Luke

So what you're saying is that what indirect realists mean by "direct" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "direct", and so that it is possible that experience isn't "direct" as the indirect realist means by it but is "direct" as the non-naive direct realist means by it, and so that it is possible that both indirect and non-naive direct realism are correct because their positions are not mutually exclusive.

This is the very point I am making. Non-naive direct realism is indirect realism given that they both accept that distal objects and their properties are not constituents of experience, that experience does not inform us about the mind-independent nature of the external world, and so that there is an epistemological problem of perception.

Any "disagreement" between indirect realists and non-naive direct realists is regarding irrelevant issues about grammar (e.g. the meaning of the word "direct").

I'll refer once again to Howard Robinson's Semantic Direct Realism:

The most common form of direct realism is Phenomenological Direct Realism (PDR). PDR is the theory that direct realism consists in unmediated awareness of the external object in the form of unmediated awareness of its relevant properties. I contrast this with Semantic Direct Realism (SDR), the theory that perceptual experience puts you in direct cognitive contact with external objects but does so without the unmediated awareness of the objects’ intrinsic properties invoked by PDR. PDR is what most understand by direct realism. My argument is that, under pressure from the arguments from illusion and hallucination, defenders of intentionalist theories, and even of relational theories, in fact retreat to SDR. I also argue briefly that the sense-datum theory is compatible with SDR and so nothing is gained by adopting either of the more fashionable theories.

Phenomenological Direct Realism is incorrect and Phenomenological Indirect Realism is correct.

Semantic Direct Realism ("I feel myself being stabbed in the back") and Semantic Indirect Realism ("I feel the sensation of pain") are both correct, compatible with one another, and compatible with Phenomenological Indirect Realism.

That's just reading too much into the grammar. If one person claims that we read words on a page, that the painting is paint, and that we feel a sensation and another person claims that we read about Hitler's rise to power, that the painting is of a landscape, and that we feel being stabbed, arguing that either one or the other set of claims is correct is a complete confusion. They are not mutually exclusive. They are different ways of talking about the same thing.

It's not even clear what the arrows are supposed to represent in your pictures. What physical process does the arrow represent in your picture of direct realism? What physical processes do the arrows represent in your picture of indirect realism? How would you draw a picture of the direct realist and the indirect realist dreaming or hallucinating?

The relevant philosophical difference between direct and indirect realism is that regarding the epistemological problem of perception; are distal objects and their properties constituents of experience and so does experience inform us about the mind-independent nature of the external world. To be a direct realist is to answer "yes" to these questions and to be an indirect realist is to answer "no" to these questions.

It appears that you only want to argue against naive realism, which is fine, but I think I've addressed that in my post above. — Luke

I have yet to hear a meaningful description of non-naive direct realism. Every account so far seems to just be indirect realism but refusing to call it so.

If you accept that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that experience does not inform us about the mind-independent nature of the world then you are accepting indirect realism, because that's all indirect realism is.

The grammatical argument over whether we should say "I feel a sensation" or "I feel a distal object" is irrelevant – and again not mutually exclusive: you can describe it as feeling pain or as feeling your skin burn or as feeling the fire.

You don't see the screen; you see sensations? — Luke

Light reflects from the screen, stimulating the sense receptors in the eyes, sending signals to the brain, eliciting a visual sensation. Presumably we all agree on that.

You can call this seeing the screen or you can call this seeing a visual sensation. It makes no difference. That’s simply an irrelevant grammatical convention, and not in fact mutually exclusive.

The relevant philosophical concern is that the visual sensation is distinct from the screen, that the properties of the visual sensation are not the properties of the screen, and that it is the properties of the visual sensation that inform rational understanding, hence why there is an epistemological problem of perception. That’s the indirect realist’s argument.

What's the intermediary? — Luke

Sensations.