ecently, I stumbled upon a paper titled "Alignment of brain embeddings and artificial contextual embeddings in natural language points to common geometric patterns" (published last month in Nature Communications) and I asked Claude 3 Opus to help me understand it. I was puzzled by the fact the the researchers had chosen to look into Broca's area rather than into Wernicke's area in order to find semantically significant neural correlates of linguistic representations. Claude 3 informed me that:
"Historically, the Wernicke-Geschwind model of language processing has been influential, positing a division of labor between Broca's area (in the IFG) for speech production and Wernicke's area (in the superior temporal gyrus) for speech comprehension. However, more recent research has challenged this strict dichotomy, suggesting a more distributed and integrated network for language processing in the brain. — Pierre-Normand
I look out into the distance and see a tree in the yard. There's a squirrel running around the tree, doing its thing. You're claiming that the squirrel and the tree are either not distal objects or - if they are - they are not(cannot be) constituents of experience.
Is that about right? — creativesoul
So-called "non-naive direct realism" is indirect (non-naive) realism. Their use of the word "direct" in their name is an unnecessary confusion. — Michael
Indirect (non-naive) realists believe that experience does not provide us with direct knowledge of the external world because they believe that we have direct knowledge only of experience and because the external world is not a constituent of experience. Knowledge of the external world is inferential – i.e. indirect – with experience itself being the intermediary. — Michael
Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. — Luke
Yes. Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. Therefore, distal objects are not constituents of experience.
Experience and distal objects are in a very literal physical sense distinct entities with a very literal physical spatial distance between the two. — Michael
It follows that no constituent of experience extends beyond the body.
Is that about right as well? — creativesoul
Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body.
What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael
Are you saying that none of that counts as a distal object? — creativesoul
The indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience. — Michael
What does it mean to say that some experience is of some distal object? What is the word "of" doing here? — Michael
Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body. — Michael
Yes, distal objects are not physical constituents of experience, which is why knowledge of experience is not direct knowledge of distal objects, hence the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
If the indirect realist agrees that some distal object has interacted with one's sense to cause the experience, then I'm not sure what to make of this:
"Experience does not extend beyond the body. Distal objects exist outside the body." — Luke
Okay. So then are distal objects mental constituents of experience? — creativesoul
I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see. — creativesoul
None to me. I'm trying to make sense of the conclusion that the heater grate six feet to my left is not what I see.
— creativesoul
I'm not saying that it's not what you see. I'm saying that distal objects are not constituents of experience. — Michael
The relevant disagreement between direct and indirect realism concerns whether or not experience provides us with direct knowledge of the external world and its nature. Our scientific understanding is clear on this; it doesn't. Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences. — Michael
Sorry, you've lost me. You were arguing that indirect realism was the same as non-naive direct realism. You seem to have abandoned that to ask me what it means to say that an experience is "of" some distal object. I answered that and you said that an indirect realist would agree. I'm no longer sure what you are arguing for or where you disagree. — Luke
Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.
How does one know that experience is the causal consequence of his body interacting with the environment if he only has direct knowledge of his own experience, and not of what causes it? — NOS4A2
Experience is a causal consequence of our body interacting with the environment but our knowledge of that environment is indirect; we make inferences based on our direct knowledge of our own experiences.
We infer on the basis of evidence and reasoning, but since we only have direct knowledge of experience, we cannot be aware of the evidence of anything outside of it. — NOS4A2
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