Given that any evidence of the external world lies beyond the veil of perception, or experience, is the realism regarding the external world a leap of faith? — NOS4A2
I’m not sure there is any good reason for the indirect realist to believe in any of them, since any evidence regarding anything about the external world lies beyond his knowledge. He doesn’t know what he is experiencing indirectly. Hell, he can’t even know that his perception or knowledge is indirect. — NOS4A2
In any case, it’s unfalsifiable and cannot be proven — NOS4A2
except when it comes to the science of perception. — NOS4A2
So given that both indirect realists and non-naive direct realists believe that "distal objects are causally responsible for my experience" is true, what is the difference between being a non-naive direct realist and being an indirect realist? — Michael
Non-naive realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data. Likewise, non-naive realists believe that our perceptual content can be about distal objects, whereas indirect realists believe that our perceptual content is only about mental representations or sense data. — Luke
It seems to be that their only disagreement is over what the phrase "my experience is of distal objects" means. — Michael
Given that any evidence of the external world lies beyond the veil of perception, or experience, is the realism regarding the external world a leap of faith? — NOS4A2
Do you deny that indirect realists believe that our perceptions are only of mental representations or sense data? Or do you refuse to accept that non-naive direct realists believe that our perceptions can be of distal objects? — Luke
What does "our perceptions are of distal objects" mean?
Given that indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true, it must be that "our perceptions are of distal objects" doesn't mean "our perceptions are caused by distal objects". — Michael
If what indirect realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" then you are equivocating. — Michael
Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" non-naive direct realists mean "our perceptions are ABC".
Assume that by "our perceptions are of distal objects" indirect realists mean "our perceptions are XYZ". — Michael
Where is the disagreement? — Michael
What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false? — Luke
How does that follow? — Luke
It is not a dispute over different meanings of the phrase "of distal objects", is it? — Luke
Even if there were no substantive dispute over whether our perceptions are of distal objects, you have still not addressed the other difference that I noted between the two parties: their different beliefs regarding perceptual content. — Luke
What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false?
— Luke
I don't say that it's false. — Michael
Given that indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false... — Michael
"I experience X" doesn't just mean one thing. I can say that I feel pain, I can say that I feel my hand burning, or I can say that I feel the fire. I can say that the schizophrenic hears voices. I can say that some people see a white and gold dress and others see a black and blue dress when looking at the same photo.
These are all perfectly appropriate phrases in the English language, none of which address the philosophical issue that gave rise to the dispute between direct and indirect realism (as explained here). — Michael
If indirect realists believe that "our perceptions are of distal objects" is false but believe that "our perceptions are caused by distal objects" is true then when they say "our perceptions are not of distal objects" they are not saying "our perceptions are not caused by distal objects." — Michael
The dispute between non-naive direct realists and indirect realists is an irrelevant semantic dispute. They agree on the philosophical issue regarding the epistemological problem of perception. — Michael
What does it mean to say that something is the content of perception? — Michael
Perhaps you'll find that what indirect realists mean by "X is the content of perception" isn't what non-naive direct realists mean by "X is the content of perception", and so once again it's an irrelevant dispute about language. — Michael
What do you mean by "our perceptions are of distal objects" when you say it is false?
— Luke
I don't say that it's false. I have been at pains in this discussion (and others over the past few years) to explain that trying to address the epistemological problem of perception in these terms is a conceptual confusion. It's an irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael
And yet you argue that we can never know if the smell of smoke indicates that there is smoke (or that one perceives smoke), due to the possibility of illusion, hallucination or error. — Luke
Naive realism and indirect realism are both based on the presupposition that there is a “correct” way to perceive the world, which is to perceive the world as it is in itself. Naive realism supposes that we do perceive the world as it is in itself. Indirect realists oppose naive realism based on the possibility of illusion, hallucination or error. — Luke
If this presupposition is rejected, then it is no longer a question of whether or not we perceive the world as it is in itself directly, but a question of whether or not we perceive the world directly. The latter does not require a superhuman form of perception that can infallibly see "behind" the appearance of the world, but simply a form of perception that provides an appearance of the world, fallible or not. — Luke
Direct realists believe that we perceive external objects whereas indirect realists believe that we perceive internal objects. You continue to avoid this difference between the two views by claiming that they are the same view. — Luke
One question: why did the brain adjust for color constancy in the cube picture but not the snow pictures? — hypericin
To correct my earlier statement, what direct realists mean by "of" in "our perceptions are of distal objects" is the same as what we mean by "this photograph is of Big Ben" or "this painting is of Mr Smith". Just as photographs or paintings represent their subjects, perceptions represents distal objects. — Luke
Direct realists say that the perceptual content represents external objects. — Luke
This is vaguely inspired by Fodor's criticisms of meaning holism. As appealing as Wittgenstein-inspired meaning holism is, it doesn't work out on the ground. It's not clear how a human could learn a language if meaning is holistic. Likewise, the student of biology must start with atomic concepts like the nervous system (which has two halves). Eventually it will be revealed that you can't separate the nervous system from the endocrine system. It's one entity. But by the time this news is broken to you, you have enough understanding of the mechanics to see what they're saying. And honestly, once this has happened a few times, you're not at all surprised that you can't separate the lungs from the heart. You can't separate either of those from the kidneys, and so on.
This isn't new. As I mentioned, the boundary between organism and world can easily fall away. Organisms and their environments function as a unit. If you want to kill a species, don't attack the organisms, attack their environment. It's one thing. And this leads to my second point: you said that philosophy is the right domain for talking about this issue, but philosophy won't help you when there are no non-arbitrary ways to divide up the universe. Your biases divide it up. All you can do is become somewhat aware of what your biases are. Robert Rosen hammers this home in Life Itself, in which he examines issues associated with the fact that life has no scientific definition. The bias at the heart of it is the concept of purpose. He doesn't advise dispensing with the concept of purpose because there would be no biology without it. What he does is advise a Kantian approach. — frank
The representational theory of perception that claims that perceptual content is some mental phenomena (e.g. sense data or qualia) that represents the external world is indirect realism, not direct realism.
Direct realism, in being direct realism, rejects the claim that perception involves anything like representations. — Michael
Indirect realism opposes direct realism based on the fundamental meditative role brain-produced phenomenal experience plays in our contact with the world. Illusion, hallucinations, and error are consequences of, and are only possible because of, this mediation. — hypericin
That contact with the world is mediated by an appearance that is itself not the world can only mean that contact with the world is indirect. The fact that direct contact with the world is not possible does not constitute an argument against this. — hypericin
You seem want to argue that because direct, immediate experiential contact with the world is impossible and even incoherent, therefore, there is direct, immediate experiential contact with the world. No, if unmediated experience of the world is impossible, experience of the world is therefore mediated. — hypericin
Again, if we do not perceive/experience/have awarenesw of internal objects, what are we perceiving/experiencing/aware of when we hallucinate? External objects? — hypericin
This is the distinction between non-naive realism and indirect realism. Indirect realists holds that we perceive perceptions or mental representations, whereas non-naive realists holds that perceptions are mental representations and that they represent external objects. — Luke
The relevant philosophical dispute is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. — Michael
Therefore, Big Ben is not a constituent of a photograph of Big Ben? — Luke
Surely Big Ben is a component of the photograph. It's the subject of the photograph.
Indirect realists describe this as "seeing representations" and non-naive direct realists describe this as "seeing distal objects". This is the irrelevant semantic disagreement that amounts to nothing. — Michael
Indirect realists claim that perceptions involve mental representations, e.g qualia and sense-data, as contrasted with naive realists who don't. That's the substantive philosophical issue, — Michael
Naive realists and non-naive realists both claim that we see distal objects. Indirect realists say instead that we see representations. — Luke
Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that colours are a mental representation of some distal object's surface properties. Both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see colours. Therefore, both indirect and non-naive direct realists believe that we see mental representations.
Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.
The relevant philosophical issue is that distal objects are not constituents of experience and so that our experience only provides us with indirect knowledge of distal objects. Everything else is a red herring.
Which is an irrelevant argument about grammar. — Michael
Experiencing a mental representation and experiencing a distal object are not mutually exclusive. "I feel pain" and "I feel my skin burning" are both true. The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.
Is the dispute between naive realists and indirect realists also "an irrelevant argument about grammar"? — Luke
I don't see how this example is related to distal objects. — Luke
Naive realists believe that distal objects are constituents of experience and so that experience provides us with direct knowledge of distal objects. — Michael
The grammar of "I experience X" is not restricted to a single meaning.
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