I don't understand what you're getting at.

As a simple example, I can think of a number and not tell you (or anyone). I don't have to perform any kind of overt action to do this. I just think.

Do you accept this?

I claim that we talk about the tree and not an image of the tree. — plaque flag

Which has nothing to do with perception. I can see footprints in the snow and talk about the animal that left them. I can see mental imagery and talk about the tree that is causally responsible for it.

Seeing something and talking about something are two different things. One involves the eyes and the occipital lobe, the other the mouth and the frontal lobe.

The human applies the concept smoke. — plaque flag

What's a concept? All you appear to have done is replaced the notion of phenomenal character with that of cognition. I'm not sure how that helps you avoid the "private" aspect that you take so much issue with.

I'm challenging this framework itself. — plaque flag

Then I think it's disingenuous of you to characterise your position as being direct realism.

I've noticed that people on TPF sometimes say things like "perception can't be linguistic because I can see things without saying anything," or "language cannot be social because if I were stranded on a desert island I'd still be able to talk and read." In these cases I wonder if they're making a solid point that I'm just not getting, or if they simply don't understand what we mean. — Jamal

I guess I should have clarified. It's about human perception. The idea is that in perceiving, a human cannot help but be linguistic. Both we and dogs perceive, but our perception is inextricably linked to our concepts and thereby to language. — Jamal

Let's take colour as an example. Take someone who doesn't have a colour vocabulary. Show them two balls; one that we would say is red and one that we would say is blue. Do you believe that this person can see these balls? Do you believe that these balls appear coloured to this person? Do you believe that these balls appear differently coloured to this person? I would answer "yes" to each question. This person isn't blind; they can see the balls. The balls won't appear transparent (or white or black). These balls won't have an identical appearance.

Even if they don't have words to describe the colours, they nonetheless see them, just as I can distinguish between a variety of different smells despite not having words for each individual kind of smell.

The chains come later and depend upon us being able to access reality to be able to say — Moliere

I'm sorry but I don't really see how that's an answer. Does it make a difference if I amend my explanation above to end with "the thalamus sends electrical signals to the occipital cortex, generating sense data"?

"directly connected" I'd say means there is no more than one relationship between a perceiver and a percipient. — Moliere

Again, which means what? What is a "relationship"? In the context of visual perception, we know that there is an apple, that the apple reflects light, that the light stimulates the rods and cones in our eyes, that the rods and cones in our eyes send electrical signals along the optic nerve to the thalamus, and that the thalamus sends electrical signals to the occipital cortex, generating a conscious visual experience.

How many "relationships" is that?

Exactly! That's what it means! — Moliere

Almost nobody says that experience happens ex nihilo. Indirect realists accept that experience is a causal consequence of real things – and often things that are external to the body.

There's simply more to the meaning of experience being direct than this.

Only that our perceptions tell us about the real. They are directly connected to the real, in some relation. Because they are directly connected to the real we can utilize them to come to understand the real better. — Moliere

Which means what? What does it mean for a perception to be "directly connected" to the real? All experience, whether veridical or hallucinatory or illusory or imaginary is a causal consequence of some real thing, so it can't just mean this.

I want to float an idea -- What if both experiences of the dress are Directly real? — Moliere

Then I'd question what "direct" even means here.

The direct realist claims that talk about the tree is actually about that tree — plaque flag

Direct realism is a position regarding the nature of perception, not conversation. I really don't understand why you keep talking about language. It just has nothing to do with it at all.

Try starting with the problem of perception and epistemological problems of perception.

What does it mean for you to be convinced that you saw a gold dress ? — plaque flag

There's not really any convincing involved. The character of my experience is just that of a white and gold dress, just as the character of someone else's experience is that of a black and blue dress.

I just see colours. That's it. It has nothing to do with being convinced and nothing to do with language.

As I said, I just don't know what the brain is doing to create the experience of hearing. — frank

We know it has something to do with the cerebral cortex. Those with cortical deafness have functioning ears but damage to their primary auditory cortex and so can't hear but can exhibit reflex responses to sound. Cortical blindness is a comparable condition for sight, where there is damage to the occipital cortex.

When we talk about the schizophrenic hearing voices we're talking about the activation of the primary auditory cortex despite no signals sent from the cochlea. I think it's a perfectly acceptable use of the verb "to hear". Hearing happens when the primary auditory cortex is activated. Seeing happens when the occipital cortex is activated.

I think it's better to talk about people being able to be wrong. The point is they are trying to talk about the world. — plaque flag

This has nothing do with talking about the world and everything to do with sight. I can see things without saying anything. I can see a white and gold dress without saying "I see a white and gold dress".

I see a tree on a private internal screen — plaque flag

There's no seeing "on a private internal screen". There's just seeing. Some see a white and gold dress, some see a black and blue dress. Given that different people see different things despite the shared stimulus there's obviously a (second) meaning of the word "see" that concerns something about the individual rather than something about the external world object. Much like the case of the schizophrenic who hears voices. You don't have to accept the existence of some private, immaterial mind to at least accept this much.

Exposing a brain to a particular wavelength of light to see how the brain or particles/waves of a brain reacts to the light does not necessitate the need to posit “sense data” to understand the science behind the phenomenon. — Richard B

I'm happy to talk about brain activity rather than sense data if you prefer. Pain is a type of brain activity, not a property of whatever external world object stimulates that kind of brain activity. Colour is a type of brain activity, not a property of whatever external world object stimulates that kind of brain activity.

If the biological act of hearing involves using the body to perceive physical sound waves, it cannot be said that a man is hearing voices in his head, because there is neither the biological activity nor the sound waves required to hear such sounds. — NOS4A2

That's obviously not what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and so obviously there is a second meaning of the word.

A philosopher, as such, makes claims about semantic norms — plaque flag

Not always. Sometimes we make claims about trees and colours and experience.

Interestingly, we by-pass the talk of “sense data”, and use everyday ordinary language of objects to set up some sort of correlation. — Richard B

I would say we don't (always). When we talk about pain we're not talking about objects but about sense data. When we talk about colour we're not talking about objects but about sense data.

But you only can say some empty generalization like “it is cause by some mind-independent object.” — Richard B

At first, yes. But then after a detailed scientific analysis (and assuming scientific realism is correct) we can extend it further to the cause being a collection of quarks, neutrons, and electrons, with the latter reflecting photons.

But I do know with great certainty about my “sense data”. Even if I don’t know what is causing my “sense data”, I know for certain what my “sense data” is. And what is that? In this case, “sense data” of a tree. But did you not say that you did not know what is causing your “sense data”, so you can’t say it is “of a tree”. — Richard B

I didn’t say that I don’t know what is causing it.

To what are you appealing to say so ? How could you possibly establish truths about the nature of perception without relying on inferential and semantic norms ? How could any theory avoid absurdity if it neglected to address or even acknowledge the condition of its possibility ? To do philosophy is to take up a duty to conform to certain norms and speak about a world beyond the self. Or is logic a private matter ? But that would be a self-cancelling statement. — plaque flag

I really don’t understand you at all. Whether or not I’m blind has everything to do with whether or not I can see and nothing to do with whether or not I can talk.

It's not I see the tree directly but (much better!) I talk about the tree ( our tree) and not my image of the tree. — plaque flag

Then this has nothing to do with direct and indirect realism, which concerns the nature of perception, not the nature of conversation.

I’m not saying it’s an hallucination. An hallucination is when there is some sensation that appears to be of an external world object but isn’t.

What I’m saying is that in both the case of the veridical and the non-veridical experience, there is a sensation. This sensation can be described as “feeling cold” or “tasting a sweet taste” or “hearing voices” or “seeing a red sphere”. In the case of the veridical experience we can describe this further as “hearing my friends talking” or “tasting an apple” or “seeing my neighbour’s ball”.

I think you are missing the point that the self is not 'in there' to begin with but more like an avatar within a conversation. — plaque flag

This is where we will never agree. There is more to life and the world than language. Things happen that aren’t talked about. I don’t need a language or a community of people to interact with to have experiences.

Yes, I understand that this is what indirect realists argue. — Jamal

But you take issue with it? You seemed to accept it in the case of feeling cold. I feel cold. I feel pain. I taste a sour taste. Why can’t the same kind of thing be said in the case of hearing and seeing?

It’s not the case that if we see images then we don’t see the tree, just as it’s not the case that if I feel pain then I don’t feel the fire. These things aren’t mutually exclusive.

How you could possibly know though ? If 'external' impossibly gestures toward whatever we don't 'experience' ? — plaque flag

I don’t know, but I’m inclined to believe that scientific theories such as the Standard Model give us the best approximation of the nature of the external world, and the world it describes is very unlike the world as it appears to me.

I see the tree, not an image of the tree. — Jamal

This is where I think direct and indirect realists talk past each other.

Do you understand what is meant when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices, and that these voices are “in his head”?

The indirect realist argues that this exact same thing happens in the case of veridical experience. The only relevant difference is that in the case of veridical experience the voices-in-my-head are triggered by external world voices rather than by spontaneous brain activity.

You’re welcome to describe veridical experience as hearing external world voices. It makes no real difference to the epistemological problem of perception.

But I think you’re really describing how you feel the arctic air. — NOS4A2

Sure, it’s perfectly correct to describe it this way. As I have said many times, this semantic argument makes no real difference.

You can say that the schizophrenic hears voices that aren’t there or you can say that the schizophrenic doesn’t hear voices because there aren’t any. Both are correct ways of talking that simply utilise slightly different meanings of “hear”.

The indirect realist just argues that the sense of “hear” that is used when we say that the schizophrenic hears voices is the sense that is correct when we consider the directness that concerns the epistemological problem of perception.

I think it’s important, given that it’s the epistemological problem of perception, to distinguish between sensation and cognition.

Even if we grant that sensations are directly “of” external world objects, our cognition is directly “of” sensations, and by virtue of that indirectly “of” external world objects.

The problem concerns the relationship between the nature of sensations and the nature of external world objects.

There is always an intermediary inserted into the logic. In this case it’s “experience”. It cannot be that a perceiver is experiencing the cold weather. That is too direct of a relationship. Rather, the perceiver is experiencing himself experiencing the cold weather. He feels the feeling of cold before he feels the weather. It’s entirely redundant. — NOS4A2

The claim is that we directly feel cold and by virtue of that indirectly feel the Arctic air, or directly feel pain and by virtue of that indirectly feel the fire, or directly see a red sphere-like shape and by virtue of that indirectly see the apple.

I don’t think anyone would disagree. — Jamal

But many appear to disagree when it comes to the quality of visual experience. They claim that the shapes and colours that constitute images are more than just a causal consequence of electromagnetic stimulation; they “resemble” the mind-independent nature of things.

There can be no talk of resemblance between how something looks and how something is, if the latter means beyond perception. It’s not comparing like with like. That kind of talk secretly or unknowingly depends on the notion of something’s having an appearance without an appearance.

Now you may say: Exactly! And that’s why the direct realists are wrong, and I’ll say no, that’s why the indirect realists are wrong, because they misinterpret direct realism. And as always, I wonder which direct realists you’re thinking of. So it goes. — Jamal

That’s the direct realism that indirect realism was arguing against. Howard Robinson calls it phenomenological direct realism. It’s the direct realism that Locke addressed in his distinction between primary and secondary qualities. It’s the direct realism talked about here:

Consider the veridical experiences involved in cases where you genuinely perceive objects as they actually are. At Level 1, naive realists hold that such experiences are, at least in part, direct presentations of ordinary objects. At Level 2, the naive realist holds that things appear a certain way to you because you are directly presented with aspects of the world, and – in the case we are focusing on – things appear white to you, because you are directly presented with some white snow. The character of your experience is explained by an actual instance of whiteness manifesting itself in experience.

As Robinson noted, faced with arguments and evidence that showed the failure of this kind of direct realism, direct realists retreated to “semantic” direct realism, which although keeping with the naive realist’s way of talking, lost the substance of that traditional view, and this modern view isn’t actually inconsistent with indirect realist theories like that which posits sense data.

Or am I wrong about my 'image' of my characterisation of direct and indirect realism ?

Of course I'd be wrong about direct and indirect realism 'directly,' because language is how we refer to our world. — plaque flag

You don’t appear to be using the terms “image” and “directly” in a manner that concerns the epistemological problem of perception.

This does not seem entirely accurate. Problems have to be articulated and understood. Solutions need to be articulated and understood. With what? Language. — Richard B

These are two different claims:

1. I talk about external world objects
2. The nature of external world objects is given in my experience

Yes, both these claims require language to state, but they don’t mean the same thing.

If x is representative of y then x by definition informs us about what y is like, no? — Jamal

Only if the representation is one of resemblance. This is why I don’t like the term “representation”. I don’t think experience resembles the external world at all. I think it is a casually covariant consequence, nothing more.

Given my body, being in a particular temperature will cause me to feel cold. That cold feeling doesn’t “resemble” a low temperature. I don’t even know what that could even mean. And I’m not entirely sure what it would mean to say that the cold feeling “represents” a low temperature. It’s just a consequence, and one that wouldn’t follow were my body or brain sufficiently different.

Why should I be accurate, seriously ? — plaque flag

You don't have to be, but if you're not then you're wrong in your characterisation of direct and indirect realism.

What really matters are linguistic norms. — plaque flag

That doesn't seem accurate. The epistemological problem of perception concerns the extent to which perception informs us about what the world is like. That doesn't seem to have anything to do with language at all.

Direct realists argued that we can trust that perception informs us about what the world is like because the world and its nature presents itself in experience. Indirect realists argued that we can't trust that perception informs us about what the world is like because experience is, at best, representative of the world and its nature.

They are all trying to estimate the state of some external node. To exactly the same extent that we can say that external node is 'square' we can say it is 'green'. Both are just ways of describing our estimating its state in ways which dictate appropriate responses. — Isaac

What’s the actual physics of this? What mechanical process counts as “estimating external states”? Obviously you don’t believe in anything like an immaterial mind, so I assume that you believe that everything is a physical event?

I would say that “estimating external states” is itself just the firing of certain neurons.

So what all perception reduces to is an external stimulus influencing sense receptors which in turn trigger the firing of certain neurons and then sometimes a bodily response. That is perception at its most fundamental.

But given the mostly deterministic nature of such physical processes (I say mostly because at the quantum scale it is stochastic) it doesn’t make much sense to describe the firing of certain neurons or its response as being correct or incorrect. One can only say that it’s adaptive or maladaptive. But with this it really makes no sense to talk about seeing the world “as it is”. There’s just neurons firing in a useful way, and it’s not a given that there’s just one useful way for neurons to fire in any given situation.

I didn't limit the description to overt responses. — Isaac

Then what covert response counts as seeing red? Perhaps the firing of certain neurons?

No where is there a state of affairs which some other part of the brain can detect as being 'an experience of red'. — Isaac

I’m not suggesting that. I’m suggesting that seeing red just is the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation, comparable to feeling pain just being the firing of certain neurons as a response to external stimulation.