You've not given any account of why you dismiss this meta-theory... — Isaac

It's inconsistent with the empirical evidence, and as I said, theories need to fit the facts, not the other way around. The empirical evidence is that external stimulation triggers brain activity that causes an internal, physiological experience. So either it does have a survival purpose or it's a deterministic effect of something else that does, such as a complex central nervous system.

The empirical evidence is that external stimulation triggers brain activity that causes an internal, physiological experience. — Michael

What empirical evidence?

What empirical evidence? — Isaac

I've already given one example:

There is no color in light. Color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus. This distinction is critical for understanding neural representations, which must transition from a representation of a physical retinal image to a mental construct for what we see. Here, we dissociated the physical stimulus from the color seen by using an approach that causes changes in color without altering the light stimulus. We found a transition from a neural representation for retinal light stimulation, in early stages of the visual pathway (V1 and V2), to a representation corresponding to the color experienced at higher levels (V4 and VO1). The distinction between these two different neural representations advances our understanding of visual neural coding.

...

Color is a perceptual construct that arises from neural processing in hierarchically organized cortical visual areas. Previous research, however, often failed to distinguish between neural responses driven by stimulus chromaticity versus perceptual color experience. An unsolved question is whether the neural responses at each stage of cortical processing represent a physical stimulus or a color we see. The present study dissociated the perceptual domain of color experience from the physical domain of chromatic stimulation at each stage of cortical processing by using a switch rivalry paradigm that caused the color percept to vary over time without changing the retinal stimulation. Using functional MRI (fMRI) and a model-based encoding approach, we found that neural representations in higher visual areas, such as V4 and VO1, corresponded to the perceived color, whereas responses in early visual areas V1 and V2 were modulated by the chromatic light stimulus rather than color perception. Our findings support a transition in the ascending human ventral visual pathway, from a representation of the chromatic stimulus at the retina in early visual areas to responses that correspond to perceptually experienced colors in higher visual areas.

...

Vision is effortless. We recognize faces, navigate a crowded sidewalk, or judge the ripeness of strawberries with ease. These behaviors depend on the light entering the eyes, but what we experience follows from biological responses to light that result in seeing. A sharp distinction between the physical image in the eye versus the biologically rendered percept from the image is essential for understanding vision.

Historical theories of color vision failed to appreciate this distinction, leading to the mistaken assumption that color perception could be explained by the laws of physics. We now know that the colors we see follow from biological neural representations generated by light, but light itself carries no color.

I've already given one example: — Michael

That's not evidence of an internal 'experience'. It tells us what happens in different regions of the brain in response to stimuli.

Your claim is that this internal state is a) consistent and whole - 'red' and b) the object of an internal sense, the subject of the sentence "I see red", and c) that it is not a property of external objects.

The experiment you've provided shows none of these three claims.

The experiment you've provided shows none of these three claims. — Isaac

It shows, as it says, that "color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus" and "color is a perceptual construct that arises from neural processing".

You're not going to convince me that it isn't saying what it's literally saying.

I explained that. Thinking is one of the most calorie intensive actions we do. The brain is a very expensive organ. There are no examples in the natural world of traits evolved which are calorie intensive (or otherwise costly) which nonetheless survive in the face of competition.

If you are arguing that features can be costly and still evolve, and that evolved features have no correlation to survival (or sexual selection), then you are literally arguing against the theory of evolution by natural selection. — Isaac

The brain is an obligate glucose consumer, yes. The brain does more than think, though. It directs the neuro-endocrine system, which controls blood pressure, metabolism, digestion, pretty much the whole enchilada.

I thought your argument was that there's no clear survival advantage to having experiences. My point was that if that is so, it doesn't rule out experiences. Evolution doesn't dictate that every feature of an organism provides survival advantage.

It shows, as it says, that "color is in the perceiver, not the physical stimulus" and "color is a perceptual construct that arises from neural processing".

You're not going to convince me that it isn't saying what it's literally saying. — Michael

For a start, what it 'shows' is the empirical data, what the authors 'say' is the conclusion they draw from it, which is not that same as the empirical data underlying that conclusion.

The empirical data from that experiment is neural potentials in response to stimuli.

The conclusions bring in a whole.modeling assumption which, whilst perfectly valid, is not universally shared, and certainly not what constitutes 'empirical evidence'.

Notwithstanding that conceptual confusion, I'm not disagreeing that colour is a construction of the brain's processing systems, I'm denying that it is thereby not a property of external nodes.

The switch rivalry paradigm your experiment uses, for example relies entirely on the fact that the colour slide presented is really a consistent magenta. How do the experimenters know what colour the slide 'really' is such as to contrast it with the reported colour?

I thought your argument was that there's no clear survival advantage to having experiences. My point was that if that is so, it doesn't rule out experiences. Evolution doesn't dictate that every feature of an organism provides survival advantage. — frank

That is my argument, yes.

If 'experiences' are some kind of mental activity, and evolution has not yet produced features which are energy intensive but also useless, then we can, quite rightly conclude that it is unlikely to do so here.

If 'experiences' are some kind of mental activity, and evolution has not yet produced features which are energy intensive but also useless, then we can, quite rightly conclude that it is unlikely to do so here. — Isaac

Do you know of research that picks mental activity out from the rest of the CNS's activity an evaluates it for calorie usage? I don't even know how someone would do that.

Yes. The broken leg is the trauma. The brain activity (or the mental phenomena it causes) is the pain. — Michael

Ok. The broken leg is trauma. The brain activity (the recognising the broken leg as an instance of trauma) is the feeling pain.

And yet as I said we can recognise trauma without "feeling pain" (e.g. congenital insensitivity to pain) — Michael

Sure. The associations effected by merely intellectual recognition of the trauma hardly overlap at all with the associations we are inclined to call "feeling pain", which are informed directly by stimulation of nerves in the site of the trauma.

and we can feel pain without recognising trauma (e.g. headaches). — Michael

Sure. We can recognise wrongly.

Do you know of research that picks mental activity out from the rest of the CNS's activity an evaluates it for calorie usage? I don't even know how someone would do that. — frank

I'm not quite sure what you're after, but this was a classic

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/15041139/

But what we're talking about here is an activity which goes on all our waking day, it's way bigger than a stroop test.

Your argument was as follows:

1. The brain is a high energy organ.
2. High energy organs are likely to have survival advantage.
3. The brain produces thinking.
4. Thinking must have a survival advantage. (from 2 and 3)
Conclusion: Since thinking must have a survival advantage, experience, if it exists, must have a survival advantage.

1 and 2 are true. And the brain most definitely provides a survival advantage since it regulates every life preserving function in the body.

3. Is probably true. We don't know all the details to how mental activity works.

4 doesn't follow, though. Thinking is only one of the things the CNS contributes to, but you're pinning all of the energy used by the brain on thinking.

The research you offered shows that some kinds of thinking are associated with glucose consumption. I don't doubt that.

Your argument was as follows: — frank

It wasn't.

The research you offered shows that some kinds of thinking are associated with glucose consumption. I don't doubt that. — frank

Good. So we can conclude that mental activity requires additional glucose.

Now where is your example of additional glucose requiring features of physiology which provide no survival advantage yet persist over available alternatives?

Good. So we can conclude that mental activity requires additional glucose.

Now where is your example of additional glucose requiring features of physiology which provide no survival advantage yet persist over available alternatives? — Isaac

So now your argument is that anything that uses glucose must have a survival advantage? Why do you think that?

I think "causation" is one of those habits which we learn from those around us who teach us how to use it. It's different from what we feel, i.e. red or pain...So it's more likely that we're inventing causation than it's innate, given the evidence of the intelligent and creative. — Moliere

If causation was not innate and was something learned, as with all things, some people would learn it and some wouldn't.

Imagine someone who hadn't leaned about causation, who were oblivious to the concept of cause and effect. Would they be able to survive in a world where things happen, where future situations are determined by past events. Suppose there was someone who treated the law of causation as optional, who turned a blind eye to the fact that present acts have future consequences. Why would they eat, why would they drink, why would they move out of the path of a speeding truck, why would they study, why would they do anything, why wouldn't they just curl up in a corner of the room.

I would suggest that such people would quickly die out, to be inevitably replaced by those well aware that present acts do have future consequences.

After life's 3.5 billion years of evolution in synergy with the unforgiving harshness of the world it has been born into, something as important to survival as knowing that present acts do lead to future consequences will become built into the genetic structure of the brain, meaning that within the aeons of time life has survived on a harsh planet, knowledge that present acts do lead to future consequences will become an instinctive part of human nature.

As with other features of the human animal, an instinctive feel for causation will be no different to other things we feel, such as pain and the colour red.

So now your argument is that anything that uses glucose must have a survival advantage? Why do you think that? — frank

https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/18490395/

This is basic stuff, I'm not wasting any more time on this.

Well, to start with I guess some basics must be accepted as fact, there are two concepts of reality, apparent reality which is our everyday reality, and that of ultimate reality; which is a place/ a field of unmanifested energies, a place of no things. If you understand and agree with Spinoza's explanation of how we come to know the physical world through the alteration the physical world makes to our biology or bodies, then we are on the same page. Spinoza was a seventeenth-century philosopher and believed that appearance was reality. Modern science, however, tells us that matter is not made of matter and that all is energy. So, it is just a matter of updating Spinoza's conclusions.

The basic substance/god according to Spinoza is that which generates everything, today we have to assume it to be energy itself. So, it is energy processed through biological processes that give us objects/apparent reality. The conclusion I have come to is that objects are biologically dependent, in the sense that energies around us play us like their instrument. The melody it plays upon us is apparent reality, but only the subject consciousness can hear this melody. The subject consciousness is itself an energy form. With such speculation it would not be impossible to think, that there may be other energy forms out there of a different nature; having their own apparent reality utterly unaware of a multitude of other differing energy forms surrounding them.

Modern science, however, tells us that matter is not made of matter and that all is energy — boagie

I don't know about that. Energy isn't actually a thing, per se. Awesome video on that:

Well, to start with I guess some basics must be accepted as fact, there are two concepts of reality, apparent reality which is our everyday reality, and that of ultimate reality; — boagie

I do agree with this. I wonder if it's a built in concept, stemming from understanding what it means to be wrong or mistaken.

Actually, that is the essential point, energy is not an object/thing, and indeed without energy being processed through biological processes there would be no thing/object. I shall watch your video; will this show me the error of my ways?

Actually, that is the essential point, energy is not an object/thing, and indeed without energy being processed through biological processes there would be no thing/object. I shall watch your video; will this show me the error of my ways? — boagie

I'm not attacking you. Just discussing stuff. I'm open to your point of view, truly. I think the video just explains that energy is not an object, so you probably already know that. :smile:

Sorry Frank, it is easy to misinterpret in this medium. My apology, if I offended.

Sorry Frank, it is easy to misinterpret in this medium. My apology, if I offended. — boagie

Not at all. It's very easy to get defensive around these parts. Some of the participants are not here to discuss. They just want to dominate and be done with it. :yikes:

If causation was not innate and was something learned, as with all things, some people would learn it and some wouldn't.

Imagine someone who hadn't leaned about causation, who were oblivious to the concept of cause and effect. Would they be able to survive in a world where things happen, where future situations are determined by past events. Suppose there was someone who treated the law of causation as optional, who turned a blind eye to the fact that present acts have future consequences. Why would they eat, why would they drink, why would they move out of the path of a speeding truck, why would they study, why would they do anything, why wouldn't they just curl up in a corner of the room.

I would suggest that such people would quickly die out, to be inevitably replaced by those well aware that present acts do have future consequences.

After life's 3.5 billion years of evolution in synergy with the unforgiving harshness of the world it has been born into, something as important to survival as knowing that present acts do lead to future consequences will become built into the genetic structure of the brain, meaning that within the aeons of time life has survived on a harsh planet, knowledge that present acts do lead to future consequences will become an instinctive part of human nature.

As with other features of the human animal, an instinctive feel for causation will be no different to other things we feel, such as pain and the colour red. — RussellA

The story from evolution to concept isn't understood. But, even more, I agree with your first sentence, and note that people unable to figure out how things work do in fact die -- that's why we have to take care of our children for so long. It takes forever for them to develop, relative to many other species. It's a massive undertaking to watch over our kind as they adjust and learn the world.

My scenario pointed out that the philosophers have come up with at least three distinct theories of cause, rather than a total absence of the notion of cause -- giving me reason to doubt that cause is innate (else wouldn't they have come up with the same theories?).

I'd say the reason people learn this notion so often has more to do with our environment than it does with ourselves. That is, it's real.

But that substrate thing? Naw.

The story from evolution to concept isn't understood — Moliere

Though we do know that after 3.5 billion years of life's evolution, the concepts in the human mind are more complex that the concepts in the mind of the earliest bacteria.

My scenario pointed out that the philosophers have come up with at least three distinct theories of cause, rather than a total absence of the notion of cause -- giving me reason to doubt that cause is innate (else wouldn't they have come up with the same theories?). — Moliere

Ten philosophers expert in the same field will have ten different theories. As Searle said:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes."

I'd say the reason people learn this notion so often has more to do with our environment than it does with ourselves. — Moliere

Then what has been the point of 3.5 billion years of evolution if an instinctive feel for causality is not part of the structure of the human brain.

Notwithstanding that conceptual confusion, I'm not disagreeing that colour is a construction of the brain's processing systems, I'm denying that it is thereby not a property of external nodes. — Isaac

But the stuff that's constructed by the brain's processing isn't stuff that's in or on the apple. And I mean that in a very real, physical sense. My brain isn't the apple. They are located at separate points in space, composed of separate pieces of matter (and energy). So at the very least you should accept that the word "colour" when referring to the stuff constructed by the brain's processing means something different to the word "colour" when referring to some property of the apple.

Perhaps you might argue that even if the stuff constructed by the brain is a different token to the stuff in or on the apple, they are of the same type? But then we should be able to measure the apple and measure my brain and find the same type of physical stuff going on. But that's certainly not the case. When we measure the apple we find that it reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm, but when we measure my brain we don't find that it reflects light with a wavelength of 700nm.

And that's why I've said before that there's an element of equivocation in the direct realist's argument. That we might use the same word to refer to both cause and effect isn't that they are the same thing. Colour experience is one thing, and apples reflecting light is a different thing entirely.

Consciousness, whatever it is, doesn't extend beyond the brain, and so it's physically impossible for an apple and its properties to be "present" in my conscious experience. It might be causally responsible for conscious experience, but that's all it can physically be.

This is the “illusion” of experience (and in particular sight), and is I believe the driving force behind direct realism. It seems as if external world objects are “present” in my conscious experience, but our scientific understanding of the world and consciousness (as much as we do understand it) shows that this isn’t the case.

We might nonetheless want to say that the experience is of external world objects, but then what do we even mean by this? What is the word “of” doing here? What does it mean to say that the painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, or that I’m talking about my parents? It’s certainly an interesting question to consider, but I wonder if it actually has anything to do with the epistemological problem of perception. It seems to be an unrelated issue of semantics that isn’t prima facie incompatible with indirect realist theories. The painting is of Lisa del Giocondo, and yet the painting is made of paint and canvas, which are not features of Lisa del Giocondo herself. And so it could be that the experience is of an apple, and yet the experience is made of something like brain activity or sense data or rational inferences, none of which are features of the apple itself.

"Like public, social cases of representation such as writing or mapmaking, intentional states such as beliefs have truth-value; they entail or imply other beliefs; they are (it seems) composed of concepts and depend for their truth on a match between their internal structures and the way the world is; and so it is natural to regard their aboutness as a matter of mental referring or designation. Sellars (1956, 1967) and Fodor (1975) argue that intentional states are states of a subject that have semantical properties, and the existent-or-nonexistent states of affairs that are their objects are just representational contents." SEP

So some philosophers will say that intentionality is essentially a kind of representation, semantic in character like the hard copy of a novel represents a story. If we focus on the "mention" part of use-mention, we're focusing on the form of our representing activity. If we focus on the "use" part, we mean the thing being represented.

The article goes on to discuss whether qualitative states (like redness) are representations in this sense or not. If you're interested, we could do a reading of this article.

Ten philosophers expert in the same field will have ten different theories. As Searle said:
"I realize that the great geniuses of our tradition were vastly better philosophers than any of us alive and that they created the framework within which we work. But it seems to me they made horrendous mistakes." — RussellA

True.

But then we can point to the different notions of causality in the sciences. And we can contrast those notions of cause with notions of causality which historians use.

It's not just the philosophers who generate a multitude of theories of causation. I mention them first because they have my highest respect with regards to causality -- if they can't figure it out then I feel justified in saying causality is multifarious, only partially known, and so not innate.

Though we do know that after 3.5 billion years of life's evolution, the concepts in the human mind are more complex that the concepts in the mind of the earliest bacteria. — RussellA

That's interesting.

I wouldn't say I know that, but it's interesting to attribute minds to bacteria. Would they have the concept of causality?

Also it's interesting to think about concepts in terms of complexity. How would the complexity of a concept be established?

Still -- we just don't know enough about the relationship between human biology and human psychology to be able to say our belief in causality is an evolutionary phenomenon. Cultural selection doesn't behave along the same lines as natural selection, and I'd say that it's our culture which gives us our mental background, that teaches us about the world, that shapes our psychology in a specific instance (a specific, rather than general psychology).

A very easy way to see how these are different is to note how our species is still alive, but cultures have died.

Then what has been the point of 3.5 billion years of evolution if an instinctive feel for causality is not part of the structure of the human brain. — RussellA

I'm not sure how to answer this -- evolution doesn't have a point, does it?

Evolution works at the level of a species. While we are members of that species, we are not the species. Species don't have concepts, but individual humans do. And depending on how we use "causality" then various species also have a notion of causality or don't as the case may be. But it'd still only apply to individuals of a species, rather than the species as a whole. It's a mereological thing -- the whole doesn't have concepts, and evolution is a theory about the whole, not its parts.

(EDIT: Regarding wholes/parts -- of course biologists study individual animal psychologies, and such, too -- that's not what I mean. Just that we can't make the inference from the general theory of speciation to concepts which a species must have to survive)

Indirect Realism holds that perception is a direct awareness of objects and events existing in the mind, and an indirect awareness of objects and events existing in a mind-independent world.

Direct Realism holds that perception is a direct awareness of objects and events existing in the mind, and a direct awareness of objects and events existing in a mind-independent world.

Both the Indirect and Direct Realist would agree that it is only through our senses that we know the mind-independent world.

The Direct Realist would need to explain the circular problem as to how on the one hand we can have direct knowledge of things as they exist independently of our sensations about them in a mind-independent world yet on the other hand we cannot have knowledge of these things independently of our senses.

It's not just the philosophers who generate a multitude of theories of causation — Moliere

Is it any more complicated that for every effect there is a cause.

I wouldn't say I know that, but it's interesting to attribute minds to bacteria. Would they have the concept of causality? — Moliere

They might well have. The New Scientist article Why microbes are smarter than you thought discusses communication, decision-making, city living, accelerated mutation, navigation, learning and memory.

evolution doesn't have a point, does it? — Moliere

Not in a teleological sense. Sean Carroll in his lecture The Big Picture: From the Big Bang to the Meaning of Life touches on evolution and causality.